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ABSTRACT
One of the central concerns in recent anthropological theory has been the 
status of objectivity. In the influential writing of James Clifford, it is argued that 
anthropology needs to recognise that it can only establish ’partial truths’ and that 
holistic and integrated disciplinary approaches are untenable. The re-evaluation of 
the subjective brings any concept of objectivity into question. Clifford’s work has 
had such an influence that it suggests a generalised crisis is perceived in relation to 
how anthropological conceptions of objectivity have been established. The thesis 
will consider this question by looking back to aspects of the romantic tradition. It will 
especially consider surrealism in anthropological perspective and will question the 
way in which Clifford has founded his subjectivism in his understanding of surrealism.
It will be argued that surrealism sought its own standard of objectivity which issued 
out of romanticism and needs to be considered in such historical perspective. It will 
be further argued that romantic concepts of objectivity have been systematically 
distorted by positivism, something which has had important consequences for the 
history of anthropology. This was particularly so in that romanticism provided 
anthropology with a methodological tool, in the concept of empathy, against which 
positivist and empiricist inductive methodologies based on intensive fieldwork have 
reacted. This entails a re-consideration of the nature of anthropological evidence and 
its effects, particularly in the way we construct images of other people. The aim will 
be to show that it is only through an understanding of the process of reciprocity that 
takes account not only of the nature of otherness but also our notions of the familiar 
that a genuine anthropological objectivity can be established. It will be argued that 
the current idea of a reflexive anthropology is inadequate to engage with all the 
implications of such an approach.
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OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT
Chapter One: issues in the history of anthropology
The way in which the anthropological discipline has developed has often been presented by 
anthropologists themselves retrospectively, with the present being used as the touchstone from which 
to present the past as a linear process that legitimates the current self-perception of the discipline. 
A classic example of such partial readings of history is Adam Kuper’s Anthropology and 
Anthropologists, a work that represented at the time of its publication, very much a view of 
anthropological history that of current thinking.
In the past few years such a simple view of the past has been questioned by much thoughtful
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work on the constitution of anthropology as a discipline, especially by the admirably scholarly work 
of George Stocking, which has problematised the issues involved in several ways.
One of the issues Stocking has raised relates to the importance of Romanticism as 
anthropology was beginning to take form at the turn of the nineteenth century. Romanticism had 
provided the conceptual basis for the new intellectual disciplines of linguistics and folklore studies and 
had considerable influence on the development of anthropology. In particular, it was within the 
framework of German romanticism that anthropology developed the first methodological tool specific 
to the discipline in the concept of empathy.
As Romanticism degenerated, particularly in its scientific endeavours, during the nineteenth 
century, a counter philosophy, positivism, established itself. Romantic methodology was brought into 
disrepute and empathy was rejected as a concept in favour of a methodology that favoured the careful 
separation of subject and object and asserted the methodology established by Newtonian natural 
science as the only one legitimate for the human sciences.
Anthropology developed against this positivist background and, in order to establish its own 
status as a science, needed to divest itself of its romantic roots. To this end it sought methodological 
means that would fully accord with positivist strictures. In this way it denied part of its own tradition 
and iooked towards the idea of encounters with other peoples as its disciplinary rationale. A 'science 
of man’ may have been how it defined itself, but it soon became reductive of this definition, effectively 
becoming a ’science of other peoples’. Within these terms it established an approach based upon 
extensive fieldwork among ’other people’ in order to collect data from personal experience that would 
provide the empirical framework for its study of mankind.
In this first chapter, these questions are re-examined within the perspective of Romanticism. 
It is argued that anthropology did not divest itself of Romanticist concerns as cleanly as it might have 
wished and that in denying romantic approaches it was denying potentially fruitful avenues of 
research. It has furthermore given its critics a stick with which to beat it, since in tying itself so firmly 
to positivist concerns it has also tied itself to ideological difficulties relating to the way in which other 
people are perceived in the Western world, for, within the terms of positivist methodology, the 
possibility of reciprocity and interchange of ideas with the object of its study is severely circumscribed. 
Indeed, positivist methodology becomes impossible if the object of investigation answers back. The 
’crisis of objectivity’ this implies will be the central concern of the thesis.
Chapter Two: the context of surrealism
The idea of a ’crisis of the object’ has long been a central concern of surrealism, defined as 
such during the early thirties.
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Unlike anthropology, surrealism saw itself as being directly descended from romanticism; in 
open revolt against the postulates of realism, surrealism also sought to bring positivism into question. 
Its trajectory has therefore followed a diametrically different course to that of the discipline of 
anthropology, yet its concerns are often very much anthropological in nature.
The thesis will thus take a particular focus on surrealism as a means to consider different 
approaches to anthropological questions from those formulated within the discipline itself. To do so 
it is necessary to examine the framework of surrealism itself, in order to gain a clear insight into what 
distinguishes it from anthropology. This chapter will therefore cast a sociological eye over the context 
of surrealism to give the necessary background to the concerns of subsequent chapters.
Chapter Three: Surrealism and anthropology
This chapter will draw direct links between surrealism and anthropology. It will look briefly 
at the the context of the French anthropological tradition to distinguish it from the development of the 
Anglo/American anthropological tradition. In turn, the distinction between French anthropology and 
French surrealism will be examined. It will then consider the question of methodological approaches 
within surrealism and especially its perception of the ’crisis of the object’. This will lead into a 
consideration of surrealism and travel with particular reference to as a negation of ordinary 
experience. Again, the intent will be to draw a distinction between surrealist and anthropological 
approaches and will consider the question of whether a surrealist approach to ethnography, as 
advocated by James Clifford, has any validity.
Chapter Four: Reality, Imagination and the Object
Leading on from the argument developed regarding surrealism and travel, this chapter will 
consider the idea of the journey in different aspects: as a journey of the individual through life; as 
travel to different cultures; and as travel within one’s own psyche. This will lead to a discussion of 
the nature of reality and the imagination. The discussion will take its starting point from surrealist 
conceptions of the imagination and its ontological status. The central issue to be discussed will be 
that of the way in which imagination, in objectifying itself, becomes ’real’. This process of 
concretisation through objectification is most readily apparent in language and a discussion will follow 
in which the surrealist conception of language is considered in relation to romanticism and specifically 
the distinction drawn between symbol and allegory. This will be related to romantic ideas of empathy.
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Chapter Five: Representation in post-modernism
This chapter will look at the nature of the post-modernist critique. It will especially consider 
Said’s Orientalism and develop an argument connecting the idealist and subjectivist concerns in 
Said’s work with those generally found in post-modernism, exemplified by Baudrillard, Fabian and 
Clifford. The argument developed will be that in abandoning objective criteria, post-modernist criticism 
denies any form of reciprocity with the object. It will be argued that it is not the process of 
objectification itself that is at fault, as post-modernist criticism generally asserts, but the 
methodological framework within which such objectification takes place. Post-modernist criticism is 
thus mis-directed: in confusing essence with appearance it thereby misunderstands the nature of the 
object. The valorisation of the subject that post-modernism proposes tends in the process to vulgarise 
subject and object relations and to deny the reality of the object as object and to seek to devolve the 
status of subject to all relationships. It will be argued that the consequence of such an endeavour 
is to mystify social relations in a way that causes the object not to be transformed into subject but 
rather to be appropriated by the subject. It is only by a consideration of the nature of reciprocity that 
such issues can be brought into focus.
Chapter Six: The Voice of the Other
To consider the nature of reciprocity, we need first to look at what otherness means to be 
other. This chapter will look at aspects of Latin American reality to try to locate elements of 
reciprocity. It will consider Latin American literature as a means by which Latin American 
anthropologists have addressed anthropological themes outside the institutional context of 
anthropology. It will be argued that what we see in Latin America is a need to relate to 
anthropological themes in a way that cannot be encompassed within the traditional confines of the 
anthropological discipline (which has been defined by Europe). They have thus been displaced to 
the realm of literature. To discover the basis of a genuine anthropological reciprocity within the Latin 
American context, therefore, it is necessary to engage with the way in which such themes have been 
treated in literature.
In a similar way, the question of negritude will be considered as a sort of counter-Orientalism, 
in which the exotic image constructed by Europeans is transposed by the people exoticised by such 
images to provide a radical critique of their own relation v/s-i-v/'sthe European. It will be argued that 
even so, a movement like negritude remains trapped by European norms from which it cannot escape 
simply by means of such reversal. This question will be taken up by looking in detail at the relation 
of Martinique and Haiti in their social, historical, political and cultural links with Europe.
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Chapter Seven: Surrealism and the Other
In this chapter we will look at surrealism and its relation with the other. The surrealists saw 
themselves as being the ’other’ within European culture and sought to establish their own tradition, 
based in great part on a strong anti-colonialism. The extent to which surrealism directed its efforts 
against European society made it attractive to intellectuals and artists in the ’Third World’. The 
international spread of surrealism will here be considered to examine the reciprocal elements involved 
in a specific relationship. To this end the way surrealism unfolded respectively in Japan, Egypt, 
Mexico, Martinique and Haiti will be separately considered. This will lead into a discussion of the 
nature of the constitution of otherness when the question of reciprocity is taken into account.
Chapter Eight: Selfhood, objectification and European consciousness
The final chapter will examine the nature of the European ’self’ against which notions of the 
other are established. It will look at the constituents of the idea of ’European consciousness’ in 
historical and phenomenological perspective. It will especially consider the way in which the idea of 
the self was constructed in Europe and contrast this with that of ’other cultures’. From this angle 
surrealist ideas of identity are examined and the notion of the primitive and what it means in 
contemporary discourse will be questioned. This will be set in the perspective of objectification to 
argue that neither traditional positivist approaches, nor those made fashionable by reflexive 
anthropology are adequate to deal with all the factors involved in the reciprocal relation between 




The question of representation has become a central theme in recent anthropological debate 
and has been given particular stimulus by the publication of the volume Writing Culture.1 Grounded 
in the vogue for post-structuralist textual criticism, the direction that the debate has taken has often 
followed a contentious, and occasionally acrimonious, course.2
1 James Clifford and George E.Marcus, (1986) Writing Culture: the poetics and politics of 
ethnography, Berkeley: University of California Press.
2 For an example of this see the article by Steven Sangren, ’Rhetoric and the Authority of 
Ethnography: "Postmodernism” and the Social Reproduction of Texts’ with comments, Current 
Anthropology Vol 29, no 1, June 1988, pp. 405/437.
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This debate involves several strands of vital importance in the constitution of the 
anthropological discipline, but the issue centrally at stake appears to revolve around the nature of the 
object of study in anthropological discourse. The extent of this ’crisis of the object’ manifests itself 
today around questions of reflexivity and subjectivist positioning that denies the privileged status of 
the objectivity that anthropology, when it sought to establish itself as a science along positivist lines, 
proclaimed as its aim.
2 .
Anthropology today continues to be defined - if only by want of an alternative definition and 
by the etymology of the word - as ’the science of man’, even though it long ago definitively turned 
its back on that branch of philosophy that in the eighteenth century was called ’anthropology’ and 
which concerned the study of what constituted the human being as an entity. Instead, as it has taken 
form through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anthropology in its various branches (physical, 
social, cultural) has taken as its subject matter people who are perceived as being in some way ’other’ 
from ’us’. This category of otherness may be problematic, and the ’other’ may have been 
conceptualised in different ways in anthropological discourse, but until recently the issues raised by 
this problematic had not been subject to systematic debate.
It once seemed likely that anthropology would become the study of ’primitive’ peoples, but 
this has now become untenable for a number of reasons connected primarily with the difficulty of 
defining what ’primitive’ actually means and, even if definable, how it can be studied. The loci of 
study have thereby shifted. First, to deal with peoples who, whilst still being ’exotic’ in the eyes of 
most Europeans, could certainly not be regarded as ’primitive’. With time, the study of people closer 
to ’home’ has become more acceptable, to the extent that anthropological studies of people who live 
in the anthropologist’s own society are by no means uncommon. Almost invariably, however, such 
studies are concerned with a group of people marginalised or in some way cut off from the actual 
context of the anthropologist’s own way of life. This has occurred to such an extent that one wonders 
whether the methodological separation of self and other is not something that is inherent to the 
anthropological discipline itself. This is a philosophical question of some complexity - indelibly 
connected with the nature of the subject - that we shall consider in the course of the thesis. Such 
separation of self and other raises, however, some other questions relating to the nature of the 
relationship that are deeply troubling to anthropologists. In what remains perhaps the most 
devastating of the accounts of disillusioned anthropologists, Edmund Carpenter's Oh What a Blow that 
Phantom Gave Me!, the author has gone so far as to see anthropology as irrevocably trapped within 
a paradigm which does not so much study the object as inevitably destroy it in the very process by 
which it creates it. The effect is to establish anthropology almost as the Golem which wreaks havoc 
no matter what the intentions of the person who animates it.
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For these and other reasons, the very concept of a ’science of man’ is today open to 
question. Some anthropologists have even tried to deny the idea of anthropology as a science (even 
a human science) at all. A recent debate3 has directly discussed the question of whether 
anthropology is a science or an art. Yet is an ’art’ of other people any more satisfactory than a 
’science’? And what are the objective criteria to discuss a concept such an ’art’? The assumption 
in this thesis will be that anthropology ought to assert its status as science, and that it is mystificatory 
to seek to subsume it under the rubric of ’art’. At the same time, however, the category of ’science’ 
should not be taken for granted, but should be recognised as being problematic. As such, particular 
ideological configurations of what constitutes ’science’ should above all be held up to scrutiny.
When anthropology established itself as a discipline during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, the dominant intellectual framework was that of positivism, which had established itself during 
the nineteenth century in reaction to romanticism. Although in some ways anthropology was a 
reaction against the more mechanical aspects of positivism, it did not question positivist 
methodological assumptions and suppressed, more or less systematically, anything that might have 
associated it with romanticism, even though romanticist concerns were central to its subject matter. 
It will therefore be an aim of this thesis to re-evaluate the romantic contribution to anthropology and 
to question the way in which positivist models of natural or human science have imposed themselves 
into the frame of the anthropological project.
3.
The element of positivism that has been most important for the history of anthropology is the 
idea of the separation of observer from the thing observed. Positivist science seeks to establish the 
truth of the object of study independent of the subjective concerns of the observer and bases its 
methodology on the assumption that such a separation is possible. The possibility of attaining such 
an aim has been discredited by several branches of the intellectual disciplines, most notably, perhaps 
by quantum physics and gestalt psychology. Yet if such findings have served to undermine the 
foundations of a positivist scientific epistemology, they have not always filtered down to affect the way 
in which researchers have approached their material. This division between subject and object has 
remained a persistent criterion of judgement for the legitimation of knowledge in the sciences, to the 
extent of becoming almost a myth of contemporary society.4 The difficulty is that theoretical attempts 
to engage with such problems can often lead to an even greater confusion, frequently leading in the
3 see Michael Carrithers, Ms Anthropology art or Science’ and comments Current 
Anthropology Vol 31, no 3, June 1990, pp. 263/282.
4 One of the many ironies of this situation is that in the natural sciences theoretical 
advances since Einstein have meant that the Newtonian principles upon which positivism 
based its understanding of the natural sciences have been almost completely discarded.
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opposite direction and resulting in a subjectivism whose methodological basis is even more dubious 
than that of positivistic objectivism.
Although this question has always been at the forefront of anthropological theory, and despite 
the fact that the nature of anthropology makes positivist assumptions especially problematic, 
particularly from a moral point of view, the positivist framework as such has rarely, until recently, been 
questioned. Whether modelled upon natural science models or on those appropriate to the 
humanities, anthropology has always tended to legitimate its research in terms of its ’objectivity’.
In specifically anthropological terms, Jacques Maquet has written that anthropology results 
from "an activity in which a subject thinks about an object distinct from it and says something about 
the object. The object is supposed to have an existence independent of the subject (i.e. to be ’real’) 
and what is said of it is supposed to correspond to the object (i.e. not to be projected onto it by the 
subject). The aim of the knowledge-seeking activity - as opposed, for instance, to its artistic or ethical 
activities - is objectivity, that is to say, conformity with the object.’’5 As Maquet makes plain, however, 
quite apart from the perceptual difficulties involved, such an aim is hardly compatible with the nature 
of anthropology as an ethical discipline. Inevitably the ethnographic encounter is subjective, or has 
subjective elements: the object of study always responds to and acts in the knowledge of being 
studied. In such a situation, also, emotional and affective ties are almost inevitably established that 
affect such supposed ’objectivity’.
It is against such a background that in recent years an anthropologist like Dan Sperber can 
challenge the idea that anthropology is fundamentally different from, for instance, literature: "Even 
though they make lesser use of the imagination and a greater one of experience, ethnographers 
achieve relevance in the manner of novelists".6 Although Sperber would agree that anthropology 
is a discipline with a quite different epistemological basis from literature, he has insisted that it cannot 
be understood except as "an interpretive discourse. It is not about things but about the 
anthropologist’s understanding of things".7
Such doubts about the nature of representation have created a sense of insecurity within the 
anthropological discipline. Inevitably, taking fellow human beings as subject matter, questions of 
morality interpose into the research framework and, with the emergence of post-modernism in the 
social sciences, these doubts appear to have risen so much as to have a paralysing effect on 
research so that theoretical debate remainstrapped in its own methodological circle.
5 Maquet, ’Objectivity in Anthropology’, Current Anthropology, (1964) p 53.
6 Sperber, On Anthropological Knowledge, p 34.
7 Ibid., p 92.
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4.
In connexion with the nature of subject and object in recent anthropological discourse, the 
relation of anthropology and surrealism has often been raised. This seems to be singularly 
appropriate, since the question of the object was a central surrealist concern and within surrealism 
there is revealed an interest in anthropological themes that presents a contrast to the way in which 
anthropology has constituted itself as a discipline, particularly since surrealism has always seen itself 
within the romantic current of thought and has set itself against positivist and realist models.
Still, the way in which surrealism has been brought into this debate is somewhat 
unsatisfactory since, in the work of James Clifford, surrealism has been used to legitimate an overtly 
subjectivist approach to anthropology. This involves some distortion of the surrealist argument for 
surrealism has always sought to objectify human social relations and has viewed subjectivity as a trap 
to be avoided.
Surrealism has also established relations with non-European countries in a way that helps 
to throw light on the relation between anthropological subject and object. The thesis will therefore 
take surrealism (and in the process will seek to re-evaluate the romantic tradition within anthropology) 
as a point of departure to look at themes on objectivity and the nature of reciprocity in the way that 
subject/object relations are conceptualized. I hope that this way of looking at the problem, will have 
the same effect that Margaret Mead hoped for in introducing the Primitive Heritage volume that she 
edited with the surrealist writer Nicolas Calas, of whom she wrote that he was "neither reared on 
Swiss Family Robinson, oversuckled on an outworn dependence on The Golden Bough, not taught 
to despise Frazer for the wrong reasons. Together, I realized, we might put together a book that 
would restore the sense of wonder earlier generations drew from accounts of primitive and exotic 
men".8 In a similar spirit, I hope that the consideration of surrealism here will provide a similar 
illumination of both anthropology and surrealism. Thus, the aim will not be to write an anthropology 
of surrealism as such (although this will necessarily enter into the study), but rather to try to delineate 
cross-references to the way in which the the subject is perceived anthropologically.
Surrealism is also important in helping us to bring the issue of self and other into focus, since 
the methodological approach of surrealism does not necessarily imply the separation of self and other, 
at least not in the same terms as those ecountered in anthropology. In this sense, then, the use of 
surrealism here is exemplary, in that, since the self can only be aware of itself through the other, the 
subject through its sojourn in the object, shifts in anthropological thinking not only reflect movements 
in the wider culture but are often best understood from a perspective outside the discipline itself.
8 Mead/Calas, Primitive Heritage, p xxxi.
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CHAPTER ONE:
ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY
The sciences are separated only from a want of genius and sagacity - the 
relationships between them are the intellect and stupidity entangled and 
moved apart. The most eminent truths of our day we owe to such 
combinations of the long separated elements of total knowledge.
Novalis
Introduction
This chapter will take a general look at Anglo-American anthropology and the way in which 
it has taken form as a discipline. This will be done to foreground the discussions that follow about 
the nature of representation and the relationship of the subject to the object. The question to be 
especially considered is why certain types of data are legitimated while others are considered to be 
unacceptable. This will lead to a discussion of the consequences that follow from the way in which 
anthropology projected its own self-image through the way in which it collected data and established 
its own methodological approach.
We noted in the introduction that anthropology has been defined as the ‘science of man’. As 
it emerged and defined itself as an independent discipline at the end of the nineteenth century and
17
the early part of the twentieth century, anthropology lay at the confluence of several different 
disciplines: biology, archaeology, economics, history, philosophy, linguistics, psychology, religious 
studies and sociology. It has also directly concerned itself with aspects of other disciplines: law, art 
and literature. Indeed there can, by definition, be no sphere of human activity that is irrelevant to 
anthropology. This might incline one to believe, along with Pierre Mabille, that it must be “the 
science of sciences, or, more accurately, their synthesis’. Few anthropologists, however, would make 
such a claim. Indeed most seem to have seen the breadth of anthropological concerns more as a 
curse than a blessing and in defining their discipline have rather sought to limit the range of its 
concerns. The emphasis has taken different forms at different times, contingent to some extent upon 
political realities, but the overriding concern appears to have been with the perceived institutional 
position of anthropology and the need to maintain its integrity as an independent discipline.
in the introduction we also noted how anthropology had sought to legitimate itself as a 
positivist science. Yet in its early thematic development, anthropology in both Britain and the United 
States can be seen to have emerged from trends in German idealist philosophy against which 
positivism set itself. In particular the influence of romanticism, pervasive especially in the 
establishment of folklore studies, had a considerable impact on the course by which anthropology 
charted out the terrain appropriate for its study. That this influence has largely been repressed in later 
anthropology is a question we shall look at later in the chapter. For the moment, however, we will look 
at the nature of the positivist reaction against idealism, and against romanticism in particular, and the 
reasons why anthropology has sought to establish itself so firmly within the positivist tradition.
Without going too deeply into the history of ideas we should note that the philosophy of 
positivism was associated with the sociologist Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Comte was reacting to 
the intellectual turmoil which followed the French Revolution and which took its most radical form in 
romanticism. The relations of romanticism with the French Revolution are complex and remain 
controversial. These issues are beyond the scope of our discussion here, but we should mention the 
fact that one of the undoubted effects of the French Revolution was to bring into question the 
totalising project that is characteristic of romanticism. For Comte, romanticist methodology was 
collapsing into a confusion in which intellectual rigour was being lost. We should note in passing that 
romanticism in France was something of a negligible movement that never had the intellectual rigour 
it achieved in Britain and especially in Germany, where it was allied to German idealist philosophy. 
In reaction to the grandiose aims of Romanticism, Comte wanted to establish sociology that would 
be modest in its aims. Empirically based, it would not try to penetrate into the heart of things. Rather 
it would take its starting point from the natural sciences, seeking to establish a basis for the human 
sciences that would be equally as rigorous in its methodological approach.
The central tenet of positivism, at least in terms of its importance in anthropology, is 
concerned with the nature of observation: as we noted in the introduction, it assumes a 
commensurability between the observer and what is being observed. In the late nineteenth century, 
the possibility of such correspondence was hardly questioned and it was generally assumed that,
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perception and reality being one, whatever followed from an accurate empirical examination of a 
phenomenon automatically achieved the ontological status of truth’. Since then, the fundamental 
positivist position has been brought into question in the twentieth century by several findings, but most 
notably by those of quantum physics and gestalt psychology.
Quantum physics was to show conclusively that there is no such thing as a pure 
correspondence between observer and the thing observed. The very process of observing something 
changes the nature of what is being observed. Observation cannot, therefore, as positivist science 
would require, be passive: it always has an active component which must make the notion of 
‘objectivity’ problematic at best.
Furthermore, if quantum physics was to show that the presence of the observer affects the 
nature of what is being observed, gestalt psychology was to show, equally conclusively, that the 
process of observation itself was by no means unproblematic. In observing something, the perceptual 
framework through which observation is established is not a direct sensual relation, but is informed 
through a series of complex operations. At the simplest level, the eyes do not ‘see’ the object that 
they look at; rather they construct it from fragmentary messages sent to and analyzed by the brain.
If such findings have served to undermine the foundations of positivist scientific epistemology, 
they have not always filtered down to affect the way in which researchers approach their own 
research. This is perhaps not surprising, since theoretical attempts to engage with such problems 
can often lead to a greater confusion, cutting away the foundations and then being surprised when 
the house falls down. A house with faulty foundations can nevertheless still function as a place of 
habitation, although it ought not, perhaps, be held up as an ideal place to live.
In Anglo-American anthropology we can discern two central traditions, both based upon 
positivistic assumptions. The emphasis has changed at different times, but has tended overall to 
incline anthropologists either to seek to establish a framework that would legitimate anthropology as 
a science with a methodology as precise as that of the natural sciences, or towards an approach that 
would emphasise the links that anthropology has with the humanities. In this latter respect it would 
be the methodology of history that would provide the touchstone for a consideration of the subject.
Both approaches have endeavoured to fix anthropology and to establish thereby an identity 
that would legitimate it as a discipline within the university systems in Britain and the United States. 
Both approaches have also viewed anthropology as a way of thinking about other people and have 
sought to establish a line of descent relating to the process of distantiation this requires. From this 
perspective, the father of anthropology is generally seen as being Herodotus and the pre-history of 
the anthropological discipline has been traced through writers who have written about their travels. 
In this way an evolutionary sequence is established whereby, through a logical process, a science 
is established that becomes more and more systematic as it develops, until it divests itself of 
subjective factors and can thus be entitled to take its place alongside other sciences based upon 
objective principles. Such a lineage denies factors which have undoubtedly been important in the 
development of anthropological ideas. As we have noted, it has also necessitated the denial of the
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romanticist concerns of anthropology, concerns which are often admitted only with an apparent sense 
of embarrassment. We will therefore look at the history of such concerns in the development of early 
anthropology and in particular try to obtain a perspective on the importance of the Romantic tradition 
in the overall context of the anthropological project.
Anthropology and the Romantic Tradition
According to Raymond Williams, the standard 18th century definition of anthropology was as 
follows: "Anthropology includes the consideration of both the human body and soul, with the laws of 
their union, as the effects thereof'1. It will immediately be apparent that while this definition goes 
against the grain of anthropology as it came to be defined during the nineteenth century, it is a 
definition that is in tune with romantic approaches.
As with surrealism, which we shall consider in detail later, romanticism was fundamentally a 
social phenomenon that affected the sensibility of life across a wide range of intellectual disciplines, 
as well as having a general effect upon society as a whole. Above all, romanticism was based upon 
the idea of the integration of man and cosmos. It was thus a totalising philosophy. It was also 
dynamic, insisting that the researcher should be affected by the phenomenon studied. Through self- 
knowledge, a person would act upon the world. In this respect, anthropology based upon the 
eighteenth century definition would appear to be a particularly appropriate arena for romanticist 
research. In claiming Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the founder of anthropology, anthropologists as 
diverse as Claude L6vi-Strauss and Stanley Diamond have acknowledged the basis of theoretical 
anthropology in romanticism, even if such genealogical attribution is problematic.
But if this philosophical lineage is not straightforward, there would seem to be little doubt that 
in subject matter the beginnings of the anthropological endeavour are to be found in folklore studies 
which emerged as a reaction against the Enlightenment and became one of the central thematic 
concerns of romanticism. Although folklore was not defined as such until 1846, the roots of such 
study are to be found in the 'Ossian controversy’, which was one of the first manifestations of what 
can be seen as a specifically romantic sensibility. The conceptual basis for folklore study was 
provided by Herder and given a further philosophical impetus by Schlegal who brought to attention 
to the fact that cultures outside the mainstream of European culture had their own qualities that were 
not reducible to Eurocentric value systems. This gave to folklore studies a philosophical legitimation 
which was possible only in the context of the Romantic rejection of the norms of classicist aesthetics 
that had previously been unchallenged. It was the collection of folksongs established by Brentano 
and Achim von Arnim, based upon their travels through Europe in 1804, which led to several 
ambitious attempts to document folk culture, culminating in the momentous collections of the Grimm
1 Raymond Williams, Keywords, (1976) Fontana p 38.
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brothers and, later, those of Andrew Lang.
The tradition of folk studies has now separated out into a discipline quite distinct from 
anthropology and one which seems to be, if anything, treated rather contemptuously by 
anthropologists and not to have attained full legitimation as a separate academic discipline. Indeed, 
folklore studies appear to have remained to some extent a rather amateurish subject (or at least one 
in which the dichotomy between amateur and professional is not clearly distinguished) despite the 
undoubtedly important theoretical work that has been achieved, most notably perhaps by Dum§zil. 
Yet work as diverse as that of Eliade and L6vi-Strauss undoubtedly belongs as much to the realm of 
folklore studies as to anthropology. There would seem to be little doubt, therefore, that folklore 
continues to hold an important place in the evolution of anthropological ideas.
It is also clear that the nineteenth century German anthropological tradition developed directly 
out of romanticism. Fritz W. Kramer2 has argued convincingly for the way in which romanticist 
concerns became vulgarised during the nineteenth century and sees a clear split between Creuzer, 
who still belongs to the romantic movement, and Bastian, in whom the ideological assumptions have 
moved towards positivism to foreground Bastian’s aim of understanding culture well enough to be 
able to dominate it. Thus, argues Kramer, the German anthropological tradition utilised the romantic 
notion of understanding through ’empathy’ in a way that completely perverted the sense that this 
concept had for romanticism.
The questions involved here are somewhat difficult to evaluate due to the disparate nature 
of the topic. Despite recent excellent historical studies of the context of the development of the 
anthropological discipline by Ian Langham and George Stocking, we still lack a detailed study of the 
way in which anthropology separated from romanticist concerns. This is complicated further by the 
fact that little research has been done into looking at the cultural reasons for the degeneration of 
romanticism in the nineteenth century. In so far as anthropology as an overall subject is concerned, 
it is apparent that both physical anthropology and sociology are for various reasons inherently 
marginal to romantic concerns. In physical anthropology, the necessary emphasis on quantitative 
data means that the discipline is, almost by definition, a specialist subject, something which makes 
it, if not hostile, then undoubtedly wary of romanticist concerns. Sociology, too, although primarily for 
historical reasons (sociology being the discipline that emerged directly from Comtian philosophy), is 
unable to cope with the range of data necessary for the total project that was romanticism. This does 
not apply to anthropology as a whole, however, and indeed the social and cultural branches of 
anthropology can perhaps justify themselves logically only by accepting, or at least not denying, such 
a totalising project.
As Ian Langham has argued, the paradigmatic shift in British social anthropology occurred
2 Fritz W. Kramer, ’Empathy - Reflections on the History of Ethnology in Pre-Fascist Germany: 
Herder, Creuzer, Bastian, Bachofen, and Frobenius’, (1985) Dialectical Anthropology 9, pp 337-347.
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in the early years of the twentieth century. It is now somewhat axiomatic to say that British social 
anthropology came of age with the systematization of fieldwork as participant-observation. Langham 
has placed this moment earlier than generally thought, and has argued that the key figure in the shift 
was not Malinowski but Rivers. This contention may be open to question, but it is not of direct 
concern to the point being argued here. However, Langham also argues, perhaps more persuasively, 
that Rivers was the person who was instrumental in effecting a shift in the subject matter of social 
anthropology, away from studies of religion towards the study of kinship and social organisation. A 
process that corresponds to what Kuhn, in his study of the development of scientific disciplines, has 
identified as a pattern of scientific maturation whereby ’puzzle-solving’ becomes sharply distinguished 
from the ’problem-solving’, which is characteristic of philosophy rather than science. It will also be 
noted that such a shift is also a shift away from the qualitative study of data demanded by 
romanticism towards the quantitative evaluation of data required by positivism.
British social anthropology has since followed a fairly consistent course that would establish 
it as a particular science in the positivistic empiricist tradition, with the main point of contention, as 
noted above, being whether its appropriate methodological approach would be based upon that 
established by the natural sciences or by historiography. In establishing this scientific approach, it 
has tended towards the fetishisation of fieldwork as the essential pre-requisite for a professional 
career within the discipline. We shall examine some of the consequences that follow on from such 
fetishisation later in the chapter. Here we will confine ourselves to noting that, paralleling our 
comments about the shift of paradigms, that such fetishisation necessarily reduces social anthropology 
to a highly specialised discipline and unquestionably problematises the notion of a ‘science of man’, 
if this is what anthropology still endeavours to be. It has also led to the identification of the discipline 
with the flow of the colonial enterprise, something which has created difficulties for the self-identity 
of the discipline in the wake of the collapse of the colonial enterprise. Although romanticist concerns 
have remained present in British social anthropology, they have done so almost as a sort of 
degenerate survival. We will examine this point in a moment. Before doing so, however, we will look 
at the rather different evolution of US cultural anthropology, whose relation with romanticism reveals 
a closer set of interests and mutual concerns.
If romanticist concerns seem to have been jettisoned from the British social anthropology 
tradition with little regret or sentimentality, the same is not the case in the United States. Boas himself 
was steeped in the German romantic tradition with which he had almost a love/hate relation.3 Aware 
that the romantic tradition did not run counter to scientific endeavour, he nevertheless distrusted its 
influence, which he seems, like Comte, to have considered to be potentially confusing. Such 
ambivalence seems to have been transmitted to his students, several of whom had a similarly 
ambivalent relation to elements of romanticism both in their personal lives and in their professional
3 Boas once gave a splendid definition of science that has clear romantic, even surrealist, 
overtones: "the ice-cold flame of passion for seeking truth for truth’s sake", quoted by George 
Stocking in Race,Culture and Evolution, p 274.
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activities.
We know that though both Sapir and Ruth Benedict wrote poetry they did so in a rather 
surreptitious way, almost as a clandestine activity. This appears to bear witness both to the fact that, 
at the time, such ’subjective’ activity was frowned upon in the scientific community, but also to the fact 
that anthropology was not able to satisfy their respective needs to communicate - in fact both had, 
even though neither were original poets, a genuinely lyrical sensibility and their poetry is far from 
negligible. At the same time, both of them could react strongly at times against the introduction of 
‘poetic’ or romantic concepts into anthropology. In Patterns of Culture, for example, Benedict writes: 
"The romantic Utopianism that reaches out towards the simpler primitive, attractive as it sometimes 
may be, is as often, in ethnological study, a hindrance as a help".4 With such statements, one has 
the impression that she is trying to convince herself as much as us.
In America, whether anthropology was to be considered as a natural or a human science 
became a live issue and an anthropologist such as Kroeber who, like Boas, was brought up against 
the background of the German Romantic tradition, put up great resistance to the idea that 
anthropology should be considered as a natural science. The whole ideology behind the Culture and 
Personality school of American anthropology - and its opposition to the eugenics school - was based 
upon the assumption that anthropology could only be a human and not a natural science. In this 
context it is noticeable that the link between anthropology and poetry has been especially close in 
America.5
Stanley Diamond has said that he chose to become an anthropologist because "it was the 
next best thing to poetry". Elsewhere, professional anthropologists such as Nathanial Tarn, Gary 
Snyder and Armand Schwerner have abandoned anthropology for poetry, while the literary ambitions 
that sustain much of the tradition of symbolic anthropology, most notably the work of Clifford Geertz, 
is readily apparent. The anthropology/poetry review Alcheringa (1971/77) was a further testimony to 
this relation, as was the 1981 issue of Dialectical Anthropology, which was devoted entirely to 
anthropology and poetry. Poetry, of itself, is not specifically tied to the historical circumstances of 
romanticism, but an interest in poetry in general tends to imply an interest in the more totalising 
aspects of anthropology that is characteristic of a leaning towards a ’romantic’ sensibility. In this 
general sense the romantic impulse in anthropology itself is deeply etched.
For romanticism, of course, means different things in different contexts. If we have confined
4 Patterns of Culture, p 32.
5 This contrasts strikingly with British anthropology, where cross-fertilization with poetry (and 
indeed any link with literature) appears to have been negligible - aside from activities surrounding the 
Mass Observation Movement and marginal figures in British anthropology like Geoffrey Gorer and 
Tom Harrison. The novels of Bruce Chatwin represent an isolated recent example of an interesting 
cross-over between literature and anthropology.
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ourselves until now to the specific concern with the influence of the Romantic movement as it took 
form from the middle of the eighteenth century to the first decades of the nineteenth century, the 
influence of romanticism in a wider sense upon anthropology has remained considerable.
In terms of this more general sense of the word, Eric Wolf has noted that the repression of 
the romantic motive in anthropology became acute with the Second World War and then the Cold 
War, stating that "this shift led to a feeling that, far from being able to remake the world, all one could 
do was to cultivate a tiny garden..."6 Wolf is here using the term romanticism in a wider sense than 
we have considered thus far, but his comments underline the uneasiness with which romanticism in 
anthropology is perceived and, as such, the process to which he is referring is part of the more 
generalised repression of romanticism we have been discussing.
In this wider, more popularist, context romanticism passes beyond the bounds of its historical 
context to define a more generalised sensibility that can be seen to be anti-scientific and anti-rational. 
This aspect has not been so much repressed in anthropology as uneasily marginalised. It is not easy 
to deny that the anthropological project has ‘romantic’ underpinnings. The wish to invest the so-called 
‘primitive’ with a value in itself is patently a romanticist impulse, deriving from a disillusion with 
technological society and responding, in part at least, to a need to discover other, more humane, 
forms of society. In this sense one might even say that anthropology, particularly in its ethnological 
aspects, is very much a romantic project. The very impulse that leads one to study people in faraway 
lands is, according to Robin Horton, for instance, fundamentally ’romantic’, and he seeks to discuss 
romanticism in anthropology in terms that would integrate such ’romantic’, but also, as he at least 
sees them, irresponsible elements, within the fundamentally rationalist framework that he sees as the 
only one appropriate to anthropology as a whole.
This article is important in that it seems symptomatic of the way in which romanticism is 
usually considered within a discipline like anthropology . He would like to establish romanticism as 
an important element of anthropological research, but one which always needs to defer to models of 
scientific positivism. He defines romanticism as "that paradoxical source of bad interpretation and 
good data".7 As such he believes it needs to be ’tamed and harnessed’. Yet this understanding of 
romanticism is very much a vulgarisation of Romanticism as a socio/cultural movement which, as we 
have seen, was not hostile to science, but rather sought to integrate science with art. It is an 
understanding of romanticism that is the product not of romanticism itself but of the positivist reaction 
to it.
What we learn from a consideration of romanticism in relation to anthropology appears to me 
to be rather different from the lesson Horton would draw. Rather that finding romanticism 
irresponsible from the scientific point of view, we discover the extent to which positivism has imposed
6 Eric Wolf, Anthropology, (1974) p 15.
7 Robin Horton, ’Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim and the Scientific Revolution’ (1973) in Horton and 
Finnegan (eds.) Modes of thought, p 304.
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its hegemony over scientific methodology during the past century and a half, in the process distorting 
the nature of the romantic project.
The great fear that positivism has is of the unbounded ambition of romanticism. To some 
degree this fear is well-founded8, but what is less acceptable is the way that positivism has 
dissembled evidence about romanticism to establish its own hegemony as the only scientific means 
appropriate for a discipline like anthropology.
Romanticism did not eschew scientific principles. Nor did it deny the necessity to seek 
objective criteria for the evaluation of data. Indeed it sought to establish itself on two fundamental 
methodological principles: "The first, governing relationships between the self and the world, states 
that the world should be made central and primary and that to this end the self should endeavour to 
suppress its inevitably biased subjectivity. The second, which concerns the relationship among 
subjects, states that all peripheral or ’eccentric’ viewpoints are of similar value and complement one 
another..."9 Such principles are predicated on the view that reality is inherent in appearance, rather 
than, as positivism would argue, that reality was the contrary of appearance. As such, for 
romanticism, the cardinal principle for any form of research is to respect the integrity of phenomena 
studied and to exclude abstractions that emerge from one’s own thoughts. There is then a need to 
view any phenomena from all sides, to trace all that borders it, all that is related to it and whatever 
follows on from it. One must also recognise the independence of the object of study from the position 
of the investigator and not appropriate phenomena to enhance the reputation of the investigator.
It will be seen that the first of these principles was taken over by positivism, but the second 
was ignored altogether. Contrary to its own ideological claims, then, we can see that the reaction of 
positivism to romanticism still owed something to concepts the romantics themselves had formulated.
During the course of the thesis we will examine some of the implications that follow from 
looking at anthropology from a more specifically romantic perspective. What we need to emphasize 
at this point, and which will become clearer later, is that romanticism does not necessarily collapse 
into subjectivist incoherence. As we have said, romanticism was founded in a search for objective 
criteria with which to observe the world that are in some ways more precise that those developed by 
positivism, even if, being more ambitious, they are also more problematic. We should not, therefore, 
dismiss romanticism for its ’subjectivism’, but recognise that its objective criteria were different from 
those laid down by the positivist ideology of objectivism. This factor will be given a clearer focus 
when we discuss surrealism, but what should be apparent at this point is that the ascription of such 
subjectivist and irrationalist consequences for anything that would challenge the supposedly 
impersonal norms of critical rationalism is an example of the arrogant way in which positivism has
8 The archetypal romantic scientist is Dr. Victor Frankenstein. But we ought also to remember that 
the perception of the dangers of Frankenstein’s work came not from a positivist perspective but from 
Mary Shelley, a woman who was part of the English romantic circle and deeply imbued with its spirit
9 Marshall Brown, The Shape of German Romanticism, p 57.
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imposed its hegemony in the sciences during the nineteenth century. If nothing else (and we hope 
that it will reveal rather more) a consideration of Romanticism does enable us to frame the ideological 
assumptions of positivism and provide us with an alternative methodological framework with which 
to consider questions of scientific validity. Had Romanticism retained any scientific validity during the 
nineteenth century, then it is also clear that the obsession with racial questions and the sterile debate 
between diffusionism and evolution in the development of anthropological ideas would have gained 
another perspective, for Romanticism tended to assume, as Herder wrote, that societies were ’equal 
in necessity, equal in originality, equal in value, equal in happiness’.10
Representing the Other: anthropology in It methodology
Representation is an issue that has only really come to be perceived as problematic in 
anthropology in recent years, with the end of colonialism. Although anthropology may not have been 
precisely the ’child of imperialism’, as sometimes claimed, it undoubtedly took form in the context of 
imperialist expansion and it was only the establishment of a colonial administration that made 
anthropology as we know it today possible. Without the backing of such an administration 
anthropologists would never have obtained either the funds or the logistical backup to spend long 
periods studying alien societies.
The struggle to establish anthropology as an autonomous discipline took place over a long 
period and involved various strands of endeavour. As positivism established its hegemony in the 
sciences, so these heterogeneous strands were denied in favour of a seamless evolution.
In Britain anthropology had emerged from three main areas of concern. As we have seen, 
folklore studies was one area. Humanitarian concerns and the activities of the anti-slavery lobby and 
the Aborigines Protection Society was another. The third involved various scientific activities over a 
range of disciplines, for what we now think of as anthropological themes were most specifically,
10. This is not meant to imply that Romanticism could not be twisted towards racist assumptions. 
The oft-made association of nazism with romanticism obviously implies the opposite and, indeed, 
Herder’s concept of culture was utilised to provide a legitimation for racist ideology, even though he 
had himself explicitly stated that race was methodologically an illegitimate category. Equally, it is clear 
from the context of Herder’s argument that in his concept of culture he is arguing against any idea 
of cultural, let alone racial, superiority. Furthermore, what was basic to Herder’s concept of culture 
was the fact that, though each culture unfolds in its own unique way, progress could only occur 
through interrelation and multiplicity. Although it might be argued that the way the question of race 
was raised related to the degeneration of romanticism, nevertheless within the actual framework of 
romanticism itself it is difficult to see how race as a concept could ever have been taken seriously, 
since to do so would have been to renounce the heart of the romantic idea. There can be little 
question that, even if we can see the roots of racism in romanticism, but romantic methodological 
criteria could not have allowed racial questions to unfolded in the way they did in the nineteenth 
century since, if reality is inherent in appearance then there can be no definitive answer to any 
question. It therefore required the absolutist standards of positivist methodological validation to create 
the atmosphere in which the racial question could take on such a virulent form.
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perhaps, dealt with in philosophy and biology.
In order to gain a perspective into the establishment of anthropology as it is known in the 
twentieth century, we need briefly to consider the process whereby the discipline itself took form. 
In this respect the institutionalization of anthropology did not take academic form until well into the 
twentieth century, even though Tylor had been appointed as a Reader in Anthropology at Oxford in 
1886, rather grudgingly and under pressure from Pitt-Rivers. According to George Stocking, by the 
end of the century there were probably no more than a dozen people who devoted themselves 
professionally to anthropological study and of these only Tylor was involved in training others for the 
anthropological discipline. It was, furthermore, assumed that the basis for anthropological research 
would depend on a clear methodological distinction between those in the field who collected data and 
who did not necessarily have anything to do with anthropology as such, and the anthropologists who 
analysed such data. Although now dismissed as 'armchair anthropology' such a division of labour 
was not in Victorian times seen as a problem and there were justifiable methodological reasons for 
it. Indeed it may be that it is the very lack of such a division of labour in the twentieth century that 
has been responsible for what Sperber has perceived as the disparity between the finds of 
ethnographic data and the theoretical return that anthropology has delivered from such data.
Nevertheless, as anthropology began to gain an institutional impetus in academia, this division 
of labour began to break down. For various reasons, ethnographic fieldwork soon became 
established as a necessary condition of the anthropological discipline in Britain, giving it its own 
particular flavour, a flavour that was certainly unique among academic disciplines that maintained the 
locus of their research in the confines of the university system. But by breaking the division of labour 
and by placing a value in itself on the researcher collecting his own data, the anthropological 
discipline was at the same time imposing considerable limitations on its area of study: it led to an 
emphasis on the particular at the expense of the general and reduced the data available for study to 
what could be personally collected. Could any methodology arising out of such pre-conditions ever 
satisfy the grandiose pretensions of establishing a 'science of man'?
It has often been stated by commentators that fieldwork represents a rite of passage by which 
the student is turned into a fully fledged anthropologist. The connexion appears above all to be made 
to imply that the fieldwork technique, in itself, provides a sufficient methodological grounding to 
become an anthropologist, to the extent that everything then falls into place for anthropology’s claim 
to scientific status. Although the initiation analogy is often made in a rather ironical way by 
anthropologists and, as Ian Langham reports, an anthropologist as eminent as Meyer Fortes objected 
'strenuously' to the term 'rite of initiation' being used in connexion with the anthropological 
discipline,11there is definitely still a sense within the discipline as a whole that the fieldwork
11 Langham, The Building of British Social Anthropology, p 330.
27
experience of itself imparts a status that distinguishes anthropologists from non-anthropologists.12 
As a historian of anthropology, Langham strongly defends the use of such a phrase, perceiving, 
correctly in my view, that anthropology has used the analogy in an ideological way to legitimate itself. 
For as Ladislav Holy wrote, "...fieldwork is seen as a distinguishing and defining feature of social 
anthropology: however else anthropology could be defined, to do anthropology meant to study a 
specific community through long-term participant observation. Correspondingly, doing fieldwork in this 
way became to be seen as a ’unique and necessary experience, amounting to a rite of passage by 
which the novice is transformed into the rounded anthropologist and initiated into the ranks of the 
profession’ (Epstein 1967). This value is clearly signified in the pejorative sense in which the term 
’armchair anthropologist’ has been used..."13 As Holy is aware, the terminology used here, raises 
some questions for discussion.
We will examine this question here not so much to cast doubt on the fieldwork experience 
itself, but to challenge the assumption that the fact of fieldwork in and of itself functions to provide an 
anthropologist with a grounding in the discipline sufficient to constitute an ’initiation’. Although on a 
manifest level I suspect most anthropologists would not challenge the fact that it does not do so, yet 
in practice, the assumption that it does remains pervasive throughout the discipline.
The first difficulty relates to the actual status of the fieldwork ’ritual’. In what does it consist? 
There is necessarily no prescribed form that the fieldwork must take and the ritual input involved 
would therefore appear to be different from that constituting an initiation ritual, which is always rigidly 
controlled. There is, furthermore, no restriction placed upon what the ethnographer ought to find in 
the field; indeed, the more unexpected the findings the more successful the fieldwork is likely to be 
considered. This is quite different from an initiation ritual in which both the state from which the 
initiate passes to the one into which he will be changed is carefully defined. True, it may be said that 
the aim is to turn the student into an anthropologist. But in this respect, anthropology is no different 
from any other academic discipline. In fact, fieldwork in some sense is essential for any original 
research. Whether such work is done in libraries, in laboratories or in other societies, is not relevant 
to the fact that the material needs to be collected and the student has to engage with it. At the level 
of methodology anthropology is indistinguishable from any other academic discipline and if one is to 
speak of initiation rituals, then it would be more appropriate to do so in relation to the whole process
12 On this question see the responses of the anthropologists studied by John Wengle. ’Cathy’, 
for instance, whom Wengle considers to be an example of the ’typical’ fieldwork experience, says 
"Part of the experience is just getting through a really difficult situation. I did it. And it gave me a 
sense of validation as an anthropologist. It was a different experience in ways I never expected. My 
self-image, self-confidence, insecurity, survived some threat. I got through that..." (Wengle, 
Ethnographers in the Field: The Psychology of Research, p 65). In another, more problematic case, 
Wengle was struck by the stridency of his subject’s insistence on the transformative elements of the 
experience and from the quotations he gives it appears that she was clinging to this idea as essential 
to her own sense of identity.
13 Ladislav Holy, in R.F. Ellen, Ethnographic Research: A guide to General Conduct, (1984) 
London: Academic Press p 18.
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of conferring status in academic disciplines. In this respect a prescribed ritual is set down, of which 
fieldwork is one of the optional (although expected) components in anthropology. In all cases, 
however, it is other factors, usually the thesis, that will determine whether or not the student is to be 
accepted into the ’fraternity’. Like any other academic research, anthropological work is judged 
relative to the standards and expectations raised by previous work in the discipline • what the student 
did or did not do during the fieldwork is relevant only in so far as it relates to such standards and 
expectations. The particularity of the fieldwork experience itself is not something that will be judged. 
For instance, no consideration will be taken of the level of the researcher’s integration into the 
community in which the fieldwork was done. For the most part there is no criterion by which such an 
activity can be judged. Yet it remains noteworthy that even where aspects of fieldwork experience 
might be subject to examination - such as language proficiency - this is not done. In this respect, then, 
it is difficult to see how the specificity of fieldwork fundamentally distinguishes anthropology from other 
academic disciplines.
A further objection to the initiation ritual analogy is that the purpose of an initiation is to take 
the subject from one state to another. Such an intent would appear to be very much at odds with the 
aim of anthropological research in so far as it has sought scientific status on the basis that subjectivist 
concerns should be minimised. Furthermore, if we accept that it is not fieldwork that provides the 
specific ritual point of entry into the academic discipline of anthropology, then it would appear that 
such an exercise might only serve to provide a test of character, or therapeutic exploration in self- 
awareness, for the benefit of the anthropologist. Even though such an idea seems to becoming 
fashionable with the rise of a ’reflexive’ anthropology, there would appear to be an inherent 
contradiction between such an approach and the traditional subject matter of anthropology. It is 
difficult to see how the intrusion of subjectivist concerns into the framework of the study can fail to 
bring into question a legitimate anthropological approach, since such concerns must act to diminish 
the presence of the object of study relative to the subject and consequently invalidate what one would 
have thought was the whole rationale of the ethnographic project in the first place. But even in such 
terms, it would seem to be more accurate to describe such a fieldwork approach less as an initiation 
ritual than as a trial by ordeal.
But even if a reflexive attitude towards anthropology is taken as valid, this still does not 
address the epistemological difficulties raised by anthropological fieldwork and its mode of 
representation. Indeed, it might be argued that the fashionability of the reflexive approach merely 
serves to displace such epistemo logical difficulties.
What is certainly true is that fieldwork provides anthropology with a unique tool for the 
analysis of social phenomena. There would seem to be little doubt that field research does mark 
anthropology off from other academic disciplines 14 in a way that can be very positive. Fieldwork
14 Although this is not entirely true: archaeology, botany, geology and zoology all depend on 
fieldwork research, though anthropology might still be distinguished, if we accept that, as Richard 
Cornell’s famous story asserts, man is ’the most dangerous game’.
29
is hazardous, both in a physical and a emotional sense; it is also a total activity. For a certain period 
of time, the ethnographer is tied to the ’laboratory’ - and cannot go home for the evening when he 
gets tired of the experiment. As such the experience of fieldwork certainly forces the anthropologist, 
to an extent that will obviously depend on the sensitivity of the particular anthropologist, to question 
his own personal values as well as the values of his own society. These are all positive factors. But 
their limits should be recognised and the question remains as to how such particularities are to be 
integrated into the anthropological discipline?
The aspects of fieldwork we have raised above can be given force by a consideration of the 
particular mode of participant-observation established by British social anthropology which requires, 
as a principle, the anthropologist not simply to observe the society to be studied but also to participate 
within the society without actually ’going native’. Such a methodological approach may not have 
created too many difficulties in the colonial period when the relation of the anthropologist to the 
society was strictly defined in a way which served to fix it in a fairly stable state so that it was possible 
to ‘participate’ in the society without calling into question one’s own identity. But with the ending of 
the colonial relation, the status of the anthropologist within the society became unclear and thus 
rendered the ethnographic relation extremely problematic.
In his study of the psychology of fieldwork, John Wengle has emphasised the pathological 
elements involved and it would not be difficult to make out a case for the experience itself as being 
psychologically abnormal. Or rather that the two injunctions of observing and participating in an alien 
culture are incompatible from a psychic point of view, especially when the time that one will spend 
there is severely circumscribed. Bourdieu has spoken of ’participant observation’ as a "contradiction 
in terms".15 One takes his point, but it is not so much the idea of ’participant observation’ itself that 
is contradictory as the context in which it takes place. To some extent we are all ’participant 
observers’: in our everyday lives we are always both participating within our own society and making 
observations upon it. Both are aspects of our species-being: we need to be able to interact with other 
people in a spontaneous and unselfconscious way, but we also need to detach ourself from such 
closeness to reflect on our situation in society. The interplay between the two is not at all 
contradictory, but is complementary in the way in which we live our lives. What is peculiar about the 
concept of ’participant observation’ in the context of ethnographic fieldwork is that it is consciously 
elaborated as a calculated technique. It is also presented as being in some way problematic. This 
is so because the situation in which it occurs is so: it involves integration into an alien social and 
cultural environment - a situation chosen by the ethnographer specifically to study the chosen people. 
It is a situation in which the ethnographer cannot, paradoxically enough, ever participate and observe 
in a normal way, since he knows beforehand that the society he studies is one which is and will 
remain alien to him and also because he is equally alien to the people he studies. To collect 
sufficient data, too, he must act in an unusual way, being excessively nosey and pushy: he must
15 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p 34.
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cultivate the acquaintance of people he would not ordinarily mix with, must be polite to people he 
dislikes. And, no matter how much he becomes integrated into the community, the actual period of 
his stay is limited to a certain period of time, generally determined beforehand.
It is here that the claims of ’participant-observation’ as having the effect of an initiation ritual 
lie. For unlike the journalist or the traveller passing through, whose activities require no commitment 
to the people among whom he lives and who thereby does not need to adapt; unlike the exile or the 
immigrant, who does not know how long he will be living within the alien society and who needs to 
adapt to the needs of the new society, the ethnographer must make an adaptation knowing that the 
situation is somewhat artificial: soon he will have to return to his own society. In this respect the 
fieldwork experience is analogous to the liminal state in initiation, but again, unlike initiation, the 
process is uncontrolled. Despite the fact that socialisation within a society is always a difficult 
process, few specific precautions appear to be taken, at least in terms of the research methods 
proposed and experienced, to help such adaptation, even though many anthropologists admit to a 
period of ’adjustment’ after prolonged stays in the field. The fact that this is not recognised as being 
a great problem seems to be a recognition not that the risk to the psyche is not great, but that most 
anthropologists have been able to accommodate such a risk. For one might argue that the situation 
that participant-observation places the ethnographer in is fundamentally a schizoid state, and that to 
do it properly would probably, as happens to the journalist in Sam Fuller’s film Shock Corridor,™ 
result in insanity.
The question that concerns us here, however, is not whether or not fieldwork is a healthy 
activity, but the consequences that follow from participant-observation being used as the primary form 
of data collection for, on the one hand, the way in which anthropology constructs its images of other 
people, and, on the other hand, for the overall project of anthropology.
Any sort of fieldwork necessarily reduces the research project. It tends towards a 
concentration on the particular at the expense of the general. Due to the intensive nature of 
anthropological fieldwork this problem is exacerbated, the more so because anthropology has far 
more need of a theoretical perspective than other fieldwork-based disciplines (none of which indeed 
have been as dependent on fieldwork as an operational technique). The particular technique of 
participant-observation also necessarily establishes a dualistic frame of reference in which the 
anthropologist is led to view everything from a double perspective which privileges, in different ways, 
the society studied in relation to the society from which the anthropologist is coming. This double 
perspective is difficult to hold in mind. It may act positively in the case of particular anthropologists,
16 In Fuller’s film, a journalist, determined to win the Pulitzer Prize, feigns madness to be admitted 
to a mental asylum where an unsolved murder has taken place. He solves the murder but thereafter 
lapses into his assumed behaviour and has to be re-admitted to the mental asylum for real. The 
central question addressed by the film is whether it is possible to ’live a lie’ in a social situation 
without becoming alienated from one’s own personality. It is a film that gives a very vivid portrayal 
of the constituents of the ethnographic encounter, even if its actual situation is somewhat different 
from that usually encountered in anthropology.
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but this is not something that should be taken as given. It needs to be seen as a problem and 
addressed as such.
Obviously, fieldwork research is essential to the anthropological discipline. As an operational 
technique, and providing the anthropologist is aware of the limitations such a technique places on the 
research, the idea behind participant observation is rich in possibilities and achievements. We could 
here reverse our own argument and argue that the very limitations we have enumerated about 
participant-observation are in fact its great strengths. This much can be conceded. It does force one 
to confront otherness, to learn to stand outside one’s own perspective and perceive another order of 
life. But if ethnography is necessary to the anthropological discipline, is it necessary to the career of 
every anthropologist? What is being argued against here is the assumption that the fieldwork 
experience in itself provides a grounding sufficient to enable anthropology to establish itself 
legitimately as a scientific discipline. Rather, can it not be seen that as the cornerstone of the 
anthropological discipline it serves to diminish the overall anthropological project in a way that is 
highly unsatisfactory, unless, that is, one wants to reduce anthropology to being a specialised 
discipline that deals solely with localised problems and eschews general statements. Ironically, then, 
fieldwork, which was set down as necessary to establish the scientific credentials of the discipline, 
threatens, in the current world, to lessen the scope of anthropology to a position in which it will only 
be able to make a subjective comment on a particular social encounter and by so doing risks being 
unable to satisfy one of the most basic of scientific criteria, that is, the capacity to transform particular 
insights into general theoretical understanding.
The emphasis upon fieldwork as the sine qua non of anthropological research was imposed 
at a time when anthropology was just being established as an academic discipline. It served to give 
a focus and a specificity to the study of anthropology that helped to legitimate it as a separate 
discipline: anthropologists were people who went out in difficult conditions to ‘study the natives’. This 
also served positivist and empiricist criteria of scientific study. The anthropologist studied other 
people in the same way that the natural scientist studied natural phenomena. It served, furthermore, 
to provide a political legitimation of the discipline in the context of colonial expansion: anthropologists 
could be useful to the colonial administration in dealing with the natives (even if anthropologists were 
not always happy in such a role, nevertheless it did serve their purposes to the extent that it meant, 
at the very least, that colonial administrations were less hostile to the presence of anthropologists).
But the problematic that fieldwork involves is more deep-seated than this. The question 
remains as to the extent that fieldwork as an operational technique, in terms of participant observer, 
functions within the discipline. The bringing into question of the established golden age myth of the 
Malinowskian fieldworker working in harmonious rapport with the natives has brought epistemological 
factors into play which are difficult to cope with in the framework of traditional anthropological enquiry.
The consequence has been that anthropology since the sixties has been marked by a 
persistent sense of crisis, to the extent that an anthropologist as eminent as Levi-Strauss even 
foresees the end of anthropology as an independent discipline. In recent years, wilting under the
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strain of post-modernism, the crisis, particularly in the realm of representation, has become acute. 
The impact of the volume Writing Culture and the whole ’literary turn in anthropology’, as Bob Scholte 
has termed it, is a recognition of how deeply felt the problem is.
Paul Rabinow, considering the influence of literary models in anthropology, has discerned a 
change of emphasis between the work of an anthropologist like Clifford Geertz who is drawn to literary 
models, and a James Clifford who approaches anthropology from outside. He writes: Geertz is 
"directing his efforts to reinvest an anthropological science with the help of textual mediations. The 
core activity is still social descriptions of the other, however modified by new conceptions of discourse, 
author or text. The other for Clifford is the anthropological representation of the other. This means 
that Clifford is simultaneously more firmly in control of his project and more parasitical. He can invest 
his questions with few constraints; he must constantly feed off the other’s texts"17. It is certainly true 
that Clifford’s sensibility is that of a literary critic rather than an anthropologist and to this extent the 
distinction Rabinow is drawing is justified. But the general conclusion he is drawing here - that the 
fieldwork experience necessarily gives anthropological representation a different (less parasitical) 
authority - raises a number of questions.
Although James Clifford has made his name in anthropology with his later theoretical writings, 
he first came to attention with his excellent study, based on his doctoral research, of the French 
ethnographer/missionary Maurice Leenhardt. For this project Clifford lived in Paris. He spoke to 
people who knew Leenhardt. He read books and consulted archives. He constructed an image of the 
man from what he learned. Now this is exactly what any ethnographer actually does. The fact that 
his subject was an individual rather than a society does not alter this fact. After all, studies of 
particular individuals are not unknown in ethnographic literature, of which Marjorie Shostak’s Nisa: The 
Life and Words of a iKung Woman provides a fine example. Admittedly Clifford was not able to speak 
with the subject of study, since he was no longer alive, but this does not change the nature of the 
research, since ethnography extends in time as well as in space. Yet, Person and Myth is clearly not 
ethnography. This is so because the focus of the study makes its overall concerns ones that are 
perhaps more appropriate to literary criticism than anthropology. Which is not to say that it would not 
be possible to do an ’ethnography’ of Leenhardt, but this would require not a difference of research 
methodology, but a different focus on the material - Clifford would need to contextualise Leenhardt’s 
life in relation to a whole nexus of societal relations that would make the subject less Leenhardt’s 
own life and work, but that wider context. This is not what Clifford is interested in doing. He is 
looking at Leenhardt’s life both to understand the man in his spatial and temporal context and to draw 
from this study some general conclusions. His critical approach may thus be said to be for the most 
part literary, rather than anthropological: his work is not social description, but a critical appraisal of 
one man. Yet it also impinges strongly upon and could even be said to represent an important 
contribution to anthropological literature. That it is so is a further criticism of ethnographically based
17. Rabinow, ’Representations are Social Facts’, in Writing Culture, p 242.
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anthropology that seems to be very circumscribed in the tools it has to deal with its own 
historiography and theoretical concerns.
Rabinow describes Clifford as an ’ex officio scribe’ of anthropology, a designation that is 
accurate in as far as it goes, but, as Rabinow leaves the statement hanging in the air, he implies that 
textual evidence in less valid in anthropological terms and that by not directly confronting the Other, 
Clifford is in some sense involved in an activity qualitatively quite different from anthropology (even 
though Rabinow appears to undermine his own argument by stating that Clifford does participate as 
an observer in the anthropological milieu). Although Rabinow is acutely sensitive to the relation 
between text and representation of a social event, what he appears to be unwilling to take on board 
is the possibility that the fieldwork context itself can be, in some cases, reductive of the overall 
anthropological project. Rabinow’s argument in this context appears to result from a desire to retain 
the disciplinary authority which is perceived as being given by the fieldwork experience and of which 
anthropologists still seem to feel the need: that one needs to assert that it is more parasitical to 
engage with texts than with real people seems to give evidence of a certain sense of insecurity.
The discussion here hinges on the question of whether or not the process of fieldwork itself 
provides a sufficient grounding, quite apart from the anthropologist’s own subjective experience of the 
field, for someone to be considered an anthropologist. Is ethnography to be viewed as the defining 
characteristic at the root of the anthropological discipline?18 It is for this reason that the image of 
a rite of passage is attractive, since initiation, by its very process, effects a change in the status of 
the individual who has undergone it.
If we consider individual fieldworkers here we can perhaps gain a greater insight into this 
question. Sidney Mintz has called Alfred Metraux the ’fieldworker’s fieldworker’ and it is true that 
Metraux appears to have been born to fieldwork as few other anthropologists have been. However, 
does the quality of M6traux’s work depend on his fieldwork technique? M6 traux appears to have 
been an extremely adaptable person with strong affective qualities that gave him the ability to fit into 
most social situations. His anthropological work thus flowed naturally from his own personality: he 
naturally responded to people in an anthropological way and it is debatable whether particular 
fieldwork techniques did anything to help this process (indeed Metraux was not specifically trained 
as an anthropologist). On the other hand we could consider someone like Ruth Benedict, who found 
fieldwork extremely trying and whose reputation is based upon non-fieldwork based projects. Was 
fieldwork a help to Benedict’s development as an anthropologist, or did it actually retard it and prevent 
her from establishing herself until later in her career?
It is worth pointing out here that the vast majority of those who have provided anthropology 
with its most crucial theoretical models (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel) never did any fieldwork. 
Even today the importance that thinkers like Foucault have shows how anthropology must generally
18 The question of exactly what ethnography is itself by no means clear. It is defined, both by 
the Oxford and Chambers dictionaries as the "scientific description of the races of [men] (Oxford) [the 
earth](Chambers)", a definition that must rank as one of the more obscure in the language.
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look for its theoretical models outside anthropology as such. There is nothing surprising in this: in 
most other intellectual disciplines there is a divide between those who are good at data collection and 
analysis; others who are good at making comparative connexions and creating theoretical models. 
It is exceptional to find someone who is adept at both. To expect that anthropological theory can be 
generated directly out of one’s own fieldwork data appears somewhat simplistic, but is necessarily 
assumed by the emphasis that anthropology still places on the fieldwork encounter. The contrary is, 
perhaps, closer to the truth: that the very proximity to the material that fieldwork entails serves at the 
same time to make it difficult to stand back from the material with the distance that is necessary to 
make connexions between different source material.
At the same time, is anything to be gained from a debate that concentrates primarily on 
processes of writing? Is to do so not merely to displace the problems involved to a level of practice 
that is secondary? What appears to be more important is to consider the actual nature of 
anthropological evidence and the way different forms of evidence affect the way in which the scientific 
endeavour of anthropology can take a more effective form. This is a qualitative task.
A personal note may be perhaps helpful at this point. As someone who was drawn to 
anthropology purely through an interest in theoretical questions it raised and with absolutely no 
interest in doing a fieldwork study of ‘another people’, it was something of a surprise to me to 
discover the emphasis that was placed upon fieldwork in the anthropological discipline. I was 
immediately struck by what seemed to me the arbitrary nature of this emphasis and also by the 
restrictive framework it provided for the consideration of issues that interested me. Although I am in 
a fortunate position of being able to do research on these problems, I am also conscious of the fact 
that this research will probably not qualify me to be considered as a fully-fledged anthropologist. That 
anthropology can take for its subject matter only material that can be obtained in alien societies 
through a technique of data gathering that assumes such alienness has never interested me and 
seems to have the danger that the anthropologist might tend to think of such a society as exclusively 
representing the ethnographic experience, an experience quite independent of his daily experience 
of living. Unlike Metraux, one could easily fall into the trap of believing there was no continuum 
between the two. Furthermore it leaves anthropology wide open to the sorts of controversies that 
have erupted over the revelation of Malinowski’s diaries and Derek Freeman’s debunking of Margaret 
Mead’s Samoan ethnography.
The other ethical question raised in this respect concerns the attitude of the anthropological 
discipline as a whole towards the subject of its study. Vine Deloria Jr’s Custer Died For Your Sins 
may not be terribly well argued but the facts presented are sufficient in themselves certainly bring the 
moral question of anthropological fieldwork into focus. To inflict such numbers of badly prepared 
students who are often inadequately educated in the social skills and needs of other cultures on 
indigenous peoples seems to represent a gross case of negligence. Fieldwork research spread so 
widely can only lead to indigestible quantities of data being collected which both lead to sterility in the 
anthropological discipline itself (it seems significant that very few major American anthropologists of
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the past thirty years have studied North American Indians) as well as effecting the structure of the 
indigenous societies themselves. The joke that the average American Indian family consists of two 
adults, two children and one anthropologist is one that contains a warning that must be heeded about 
the structure of anthropological research. It is not enough to say that anthropologists in such a 
situation may be a nuisance but do not do any real damage, since they are part of a whole process 
of imposition that has a qualitative and generally detrimental effect upon indigenous cultures. 
Although this may be the most extreme example, it represents the logical conclusion of the 
fetishisation of fieldwork in anthropology: logically to obtain their degree all undergraduates should 
do some fieldwork, but to do so would be to undermine the whole basis of anthropological knowledge, 
as well as being an unnecessary imposition on the hospitality of other people.
The need for fieldwork in anthropological research arose from a range of exigences that all
led in the direction of the legitimation of the discipline in intellectual discourse. It provided 
anthropology with its very own ’laboratory’, in which it could carry out the experiments which it saw 
as being necessary to establish the scientific credentials of an intellectual discipline. Today such 
exigencies have changed. Intensive participant-observation is becoming increasingly difficult due to 
frequent hostility both from the home government, which above all wants ’value for money’, and the 
native governments, often justifiably wary of the consequences of anthropological research. It is very 
clear that anthropology needs to extend its range of operational techniques for, if fieldwork has come 
to assume such importance because, as George Stocking has stated, there was a "feeling that 
ethnographic categories were somehow inadequate, and that what was needed was a new body of 
data unencumbered by theoretical assumption"19, today we can perceive the opposite picture, in 
which there is such a disproportion between the data amassed by fieldwork and the theoretical 
application of such data, that it is necessary to explore anthropological questions in a wider context.
In the present context of anthropological knowledge, there would seem to be a great need 
for anthropology to examine its own sociology of knowledge and consider the need that it serves in 
contemporary society, in which knowledge of the ’primitive’, whatever that may mean and even if still 
possible, can hardly be regarded as its primary task.
Much of the critique of ideas of ethnographic fieldwork we have made may be seen as being
banal and commonplace, but it has been necessary to try to give a focus to the critique of 
anthropology that will be developed through the thesis, which will attempt to re-consider romanticist 
concerns within the anthropological context, with particular look at surrealism as a means by which 
to bring such concerns into focus.
19 Stocking, Observers Observed, p 94.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE CONTEXT OF SURREALISM
It’s spring - the needle goes wild in the compass.
Jacques Prevert
Introduction
Surrealism and French ethnology were both established in the same turbulent era and 
responded to some of the same exigences. The years following the First World War were ones of 
great upheaval in France, especially in the cultural sphere. We will look at some of the ways in 
which the correspondences between surrealism took form in the next chapter. In this chapter we will 
consider the nature of surrealism itself and the way it responded to changing historical circumstances 
through its history. We will also take a glance at surrealism sociologically and try to give a focus to 
the question of what exactly surrealism is and what it represents within the context of Western society. 
In so doing it is hoped to suggest contrasts and points of contact between surrealism and 
anthropology. In particular it will set the scene for a consideration of issues of subject and object and 
the nature of objectivity in surrealism which will be developed in the next chapter.
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As a movement surrealism took form between the years from 1922 to 1924. It had its birth 
in 1919, with the publication of Breton’s and Soupault’s Les Champs magnfriques, and had evolved 
out of Paris Dada, as the negation of the Dadaist negation.
Dadaism was an extreme response to the carnage and waste of the First World War. It had 
first surfaced in neutral Zurich during the war and had spread to Berlin, New York, Cologne, 
Barcelona and finally to Paris in 1919. It extolled the values of pure negativity in responding to the 
crisis of European consciousness brought on by the First World War. Surrealism from its beginnings 
aimed to deepen this crisis and provoke the conditions necessary for the establishment of a new 
society based upon different values to that of the discredited culture. At the same time, surrealist 
revolt was not simply a destructive response to what was perceived as the barbarity of Western 
civilisation. If it had emerged directly out from the negativity of Dadaism, it was also the heir to the 
rich romantic tradition, and emerged as much from the nineteenth century French symbolist movement 
as from Dada.
The word ’sur-r6 alisme’ appears to have been coined around 1915 by Albert-Pierre Birot and 
had been taken by Apollinaire to describe his play Les Mamelles de Tiresias. As a word, it had a 
quality about it that helped to define a mood of the period. Several attempts were made to utilise it 
as a definition for particular activities before the group that had gathered around Andr6 Breton in the 
wake of the disintegration of Dada managed to give the word a meaning precise enough to act as the 
foundation for a particular movement and sensibility.1
By 1924 a sufficiently coherent platform for collective activity had been established, which was 
expressed by Andr6 Breton in the Manifesto of Surrealism published in that year. Centred very much 
in Freudian psychoanalysis, the Manifesto placed a revolutionary value in the idea of automatic writing 
(initiated by Les Champs magndtiques) which was seen as providing the means by which one could 
destroy the bourgeois notion of literature and put the writer in touch with the more profound sources 
of creativity hidden within the unconscious psyche. The sources of romanticism were invoked and 
the imagination was given an exemplary quality. The first issue of the movement’s journal, La 
Revolution Surrdaliste, under the editorship of Benjamin P6 ret and Pierre Naville, appeared in 
December of the same year and was soon followed by the first important group declaration, issued 
27th January 1925 and bearing twenty six signatures. Its central demand was for the ‘complete
1 The etymology of the word is complex in the context of the period. The prefix sur- in French 
literally means ’above’ or ’over’, but also serves where one would, in English, use the term ’super-’. 
At the beginning of the century, Nietzsche’s concept of the ’ubermensch’ had gained currency and 
was translated by the word ’surhomme’ - the title, indeed, of a novel by Jarry that was one of the most 
direct precursors of surrealism. In the 1930’s, Herbert Reed tried to establish the phrase ’super­
realism’, and more recently A.C. Graham (in Reason and Spontaneity) has argued for the same word. 
Such a translation would certainly be erroneous, since it divests the word of the more subtle shadings 
of the French word. But also it does not correspond with the use the surrealists themselves have 
made of it, which is dialectically ’beyond’ as well as ’above’ realism (i.e. it is not merely ’superior’ to 
it). Indeed, in no sense, it seems to me, do surrealists seek to imply that surrealism is a superlative 
form of realism: to the contrary it conceives itself as exploring areas of which realism refuses to 
accept the existence.
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liberation of the mind and all that resembles it.'
The recent publication of the day-book kept by the Bureau of Surrealist Research through 
1925 has enabled us to see the everyday conflicts that emerged in the early period of the surrealist 
adventure. Looking through these notes it is sometimes surprising that the group survived at all, and 
that it did so is primarily due to the fact that Andr6 Breton decided to take a firm hand with surrealist 
activity in order to give it a greater overall cohesive systematisation. He took over the editorship of 
La Revolution Surrdaliste from issue no 4, dated 18 July 1925, an issue that also contained an 
insulting letter from Breton to Joseph Delteil, which represented the first expulsion from the group.
In many ways the key figure in surrealist activities prior to this had been Antonin Artaud who 
had sought to push the group to the limits of the exploration of their inner lives, although in a 
collective context that would emphasise the bringing into question of the notion of the self. Breton 
had already perceived the dangers in following such a course when, in 1923, he had put an end to 
the sleepwalking sessions that had threatened to end in suicide or murder. And during 1925 social 
issues imposed themselves and came to impinge strongly on surrealist concerns, to the extent that 
Artaud began to become isolated. To maintain the cohesion of the group and prevent it from 
degenerating into disparate activity, Roger Vitrac and Philippe Soupault had been expelled for, 
respectively, their ambitions in the theatre and literature. It was in early 1927, however, that the most 
significant early expulsion took place, when Artaud was accused of seeing "in the Revolution only a 
metamorphosis in the inner conditions of the soul..." An expulsion undoubtedly with significant 
ideological implications: surrealism was breaking with the philosophical idealism that had 
characterized the Manifesto and the early period of its history.
It had been political exigences that had caused the surrealists to question the idealist basis 
of their work, as well as the need to prevent it from degenerating into preciosity. The effect of the 
Bolshevik Revolution had not penetrated deeply into Parisian intellectual life until this time, and indeed 
Aragon had described the Russian Revolution as a Vague ministerial crisis’. In 1925, however, the 
Moroccan War had broken out, in which France was engaged in one of the earliest fights against 
indigenous anti-colonialist movements. The surrealists declared themselves in support of the Rif and 
against France, stating unequivocally that for them ’France no longer exists’. This position brought 
them close to the French Communist Party, which had equally taken an anti-colonialist line on the 
war, and to marxism in general. A rapprochement was sought, primarily through the Clart6 group, 
a splinter communist group with whom the surrealists actively collaborated. The necessity to respond 
to such political exigences was felt by the whole group, but the form that such rapprochement should 
take, and in particular the appropriate surrealist response to dialectical materialism, was to lead to 
disagreements and see first a split with Pierre Naville, who defected to the Trotskyist opposition in 
1927 over the relation of art and revolution, and then the wholesale disruption of the group in 1929.
The political situation in 1929 was extremely complex. In the Soviet Union the consolidation 
of Stalin’s position and the rise of the left opposition had complicated the answer to questions that, 
a few years previously, had appeared to be very straightforward: was one for or against the Soviet
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Union? Was one for or against communism? In 1929, too, the PCF was riven with internal dissention 
which was lead to the withdrawal of those in the leadership, such as Boris Souvarine, who were 
sympathetic to collaboration with the surrealists.
But the split in 1929 cannot be explained in simple terms and involves multiple strands of 
contention about what the Surrealist Group ought to be and what it had become. It would be a study 
in itself to look fully at all of these issues, for they embraced political commitment and ideological 
questions, as well as questions of personal loyalty and morality (complicated by the fact that Breton 
was in the process of divorcing his wife Simone, who had played an important part in the group 
activities and was respected in the circle to the extent that personal loyalty to her rather than Breton 
led to several withdrawals2. What concerns us here is less the actual crisis than the manifest effect 
it had on the way the group evolved.
Breton took the offensive, issuing a Second Manifesto of Surrealism in which several 
members of the group were attacked in the most uncompromising terms. The real significance of the 
Second Manifesto, however, was to provide a philosophical basis for surrealism which defined the 
nature of surrealist research and the way in which it would develop during the next few years.
If the First Manifesto had been written under the sign of Freud, the motivating spirit of the 
Second was undoubtedly Hegel. An insistence on the dialectical method now transforms the idealism 
of the First Manifesto. The romanticism is deepened but also treated critically and surrealist aims are 
established with a precision lacking in the First Manifesto. The overall surrealist project is defined in 
these terms: "Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a point of the mind at which life 
and death, real and imaginary, past and future, communicable and incommunicable, high and low, 
are not perceived as contradictions. It would be vain to attribute to surrealism any other motive than 
the hope of determining this point. It is clear, moreover, that it would be absurd to ascribe to 
surrealism either a purely destructive or a purely constructive character - the point at issue being 
precisely this: that construction and destruction can no longer be brandished against each other. It 
becomes clear also that surrealism is not interested in taking into account [anything...] that has not 
for its ultimate end the conversion of being into a jewel, internal and unseeing, with a soul that is 
neither of ice nor or fire." This Hegelian dimension of surrealist activity, emerging from the political 
concerns of the movement and the rapprochement with marxism, was supplemented by what might
2 It is here worth mentioning - as much in the light of the questions raised in the first chapter about 
the way in which evidence is constructed as anything else - that Breton’s divorce has had a lasting 
impact on our perception of surrealist history. For many years, Maurice Nadeau’s book The History 
of Surrealism was the only authoritive source for a general history of surrealism and it remains the 
most detailed history covering the whole period from 1919 to 1939. This book was published in 1945 
and Nadeau had collected most of his material during the war years. He therefore had no access to 
Breton himself, nor to many of his closest associates. His main informant appears to have been 
Raymond Queneau who was most affected by Breton’s divorce, since he was married to Simone 
Breton’s sister, Janine. In the 1940’s, Queneau still had a certain amount of rancour towards Breton. 
Nadeau’s book, although even handed for the most part, is inflected through Queneau, and thus our 
perception of surrealist history is often distorted from that perspective.
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seem to be a movement in the opposite direction, towards deeper research into surrealist tradition 
and in particular sources of occult belief. Breton demanded the "profound, veritable occupation of 
surrealism",3 which was intended a double sense - first as a call to explore the occult tradition, 
particularly alchemy, but also as a demand that surrealism itself should, if not disappear, at least seek 
to be invisible to the eyes of the vulgar who would corrupt it with worldly concerns. A dialectical 
movement, also, acknowledging the interplay between private and public and internal and external.
By March 1930 the crisis had more or less resolved itself and 21 surrealists declared 
themselves in solidarity with Breton. A fresh cause of division arose soon thereafter, however,when 
Louis Aragon, until then Breton’s right hand man, started to become seduced by Stalinism after 
attending the Kharkov conference for writers and artists in 1930. Aragon wavered in his affiliations 
for some time, before deciding definitively in favour of the PCF against surrealism in 1932 (he went 
on to become one of the most consistent defenders of the Stalinist line in France until his death in 
1982).
The Aragon affair further strained relations between the surrealists and the PCF which 
deteriorated slowly through a number of incidents during the early thirties and became definitive in 
1935, since which time the surrealists have been unyielding in their opposition to Stalinism.
Otherwise during the thirties the Surrealist Group remained relatively cohesive in terms of 
membership, although significant defections (Caillois and Tzara) and expulsions (Eluard for Stalinism 
and Dali for general opportunism) did take place.
The Second World War brought an end to group activities. Several members of the group 
were on Nazi wanted lists and the group dispersed with only a few members remaining in Paris. A 
considerable number sought refuge in the Americas and activity was continued, most notably in New 
York and Mexico City. In Paris itself, clandestine activity did continue, co-ordinated by No6 l Arnaud 
and Jean-Frangois Chabrun. Even though daily group activity along the lines established in the pre­
war period was obviously impossible, it is remarkable how much work was accomplished. A heavy 
toll was paid, however: eight members of the group died at the hands of the Nazis.
Breton returned to France in 1946 and the group was re-constituted on much the same basis 
as in the pre-war period, although not without some traumas. Only two of those who participated in 
the war-time activities, Adolphe Acker and Henri Pastoureau, joined Breton’s group. The others re­
grouped as the ’Revolutionary Surrealist Group’, formed in conjunction with the Belgian Surrealist 
Group and directly oppositional to Breton’s group. The main bone of contention was - once again - 
Stalinism. By 1946 Breton and most of those who had been in exile were implacably opposed to 
Stalinism, which they saw as unredeemably counter-revolutionary and totalitarian in its aims. For
3 If this double concern seems disjointed, it should be recalled that such concerns are by no 
means alien to other marxists of the period. The work of Walter Benjamin, who was familiar with 
surrealism, was moving in a similar direction, and more particularly the research of Ernst Bloch is 
concerned with exactly the same sources of occult illumination as providing a necessary complement 
to the manifest marxist will to transform the world.
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those who had remained in France, though, the picture was rather different. The Communists were 
the heroes of the resistance. The Show Trials, the betrayal of the Spanish Republic, their 
manipulation of the Popular Front, were all but forgotten and not even a matter for debate. It was not 
until David Rousset created a scandal by exposing the reality of the concentration camps in 1947 that 
the PCF’s ascendancy came to be challenged. By their uncompromisingly anti-Stalinist stance, given 
particular prominence in their ‘Rupture inaugurate’ declaration that defined the surrealist aims in the 
post-war era, the surrealists were out on a limb in the tenor of the time. As N0 6 I Arnaud was later 
to acknowledge, Breton was absolutely correct in his assessment of the situation. Collaboration with 
the PCF was as impossible as it had been in the mid-thirties and the Revolutionary Surrealist Group 
was soon to collapse, leaving Breton’s group as the acknowledged representative of surrealism in 
France. Even so, it took a considerable time for the group to gain a cohesion and the following years 
were a period of great inner turmoil.
First Roberto Matta was expelled in October 1948 for "intellectual disqualification and moral 
ignominy". The reasons for this expulsion were personal rather than ideological, but were to lead to 
the expulsion a week later of Victor Brauner and his younger friends (Alexandrian, Bouvet, Jouffroy, 
Rodanski and Tarnaud) who were accused of organising ’fractional activity’. This had been preceded 
by the withdrawal of the two Egyptian surrealists Georges Henein and Ramses Younan, who accused 
Breton of trying to recuperate surrealist tradition rather than confront contemporary problems. It was 
in 1951, however, that the most serious crisis took place, known variously as the ’Carrouges’ or 
’Pastoureau’ Affair (although Maurice Hanry suggested rather impishly that it should have been called 
the ’Breton’ affair).
Like the 1929 crisis, the 1951 affair has considerable ramifications which we shall consider 
subsequently. In many ways it is more difficult to deal with than that of 1929, since no ideological 
reason for the crisis is readily apparent.
Whatever the reasons were, the effect was to completely re-constitute the group under 
Breton’s authority. Apart from Breton himself, only Benjamin P6 ret, Jehan Mayoux and Jean Ferry 
remained from the pre-war group and Ferry was soon to take his distance. From that time the group 
remained remarkably cohesive and we find that the majority of members in 1951 were still involved 
in the Surrealist Group when it was dissolved in 1969. Breton himself died in 1966.
From the Second World War until the time of its dissolution, the French Surrealist Group was 
involved in a quest for what was described in their journal La Breche as "the poetic revaluation of 
thought". In many ways the central figure around which surrealist thought revolved in this period was 
the utopian thinker, Charles Fourier, who was seen by the surrealists as opening up the possibility 
for an approach to the contemporary moral impasse and lead to the introduction of a new moral 
sensibility. The 1965 International Surrealist Exhibition, ’L’Ecart absolu’ was dedicated to Fourier and 
his spirit was very much in evidence in the other main exhibitions, which provided a focus for 
surrealist concerns of the period, in 1959, devoted to eroticism and in 1968, devoted to the ’pleasure 
principle’. 1968 was a crucial year in surrealist history. It began full of promise with the participation
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of the group at the Cultural Congress in Havana, an extremely important forum for the question of 
cultural reciprocity between Europe and the Third World’, and reached a culmination with the Prague 
Spring and near revolution in France. The events both in Czechoslovakia (the ’Principle of Pleasure’ 
exhibition was organised by the Czech group and travelled from Prague to Brno and Bratislava 
through February to May) and in Paris had a strong surrealist component, but any revitalization of 
surrealism this might have brought was crushed with the entry of the Warsaw Pact troops into Prague 
on 21 August 1968. The collective declaration issued by the surrealists in September 1968, although 
defiantly titled They Can’t Kill the Spring’, reads in retrospect as the last cry of a drowning man. 
From that point, the Paris group seems to have rapidly disintegrated and a tract issued in March 1969 
bore witness to the collapse of the group. Its dissolution was formally announced by Jean Schuster 
in his article ’Le Quatri6 me Chant’, published in Le Monde on 4th October 1969, which gave the main 
reason as the "absence of any internal cohesion".'*
I hope this potted history of the French Surrealist Group gives us the bare-bones to look more 
closely at the context in which surrealism emerged and to try to draw out some of the themes relevant 
to anthropology.
Surrealism in Sociological Perspective
We have noted how surrealism took form in a period of considerable turmoil. The First World 
War had created a loss of confidence in the values of the society that had been responsible for such 
a wasteful and meaningless carnage. In France the land itself remained scarred by the minefields 
and trenches that remained behind long after the hostilities had ended.
This ’crisis of consciousness’ had already taking form in the pre-war period and can be traced 
to the decadence of the fin-de-sidcle period. Throughout Europe, in the early years of the century, 
intellectual and artistic movements proliferated. Although some of such groupings, such as cubism, 
simply represented the concretization of a particular style in art, others, such as the different forms 
of futurism in Italy and Russia and expressionism in Germany, raised socio-political concerns within 
their intellectual framework. The most radical of such movements was undoubtedly Dadaism which 
took form in 1915 in Zurich and from which, as we have seen, surrealism was later directly to emerge.
Such intellectual ferment was paralleled by socio/political problems that saw the rise of 
revolutionary socialism that presented a challenge to the capitalist world hegemony that was to 
become especially acute with the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution. The fact that Lenin was living
4 Although this was not a clean break. Attempts were thereafter made to re-constitute the 
group. In fact the immediate consequence appears to have been that the group split into two 
distinct entities, one known as the BLS group after the title of the journal they published 
{Bulletin de liaison surr6aliste), the other the Coupure group. Neither group appears, 
however, to have continued to meet on a daily basis.
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only a few blocks away from the Dada cabaret in Zurich tends to suggest a symbolic link between the 
intellectual and political upheavals.
We have noted how surrealism represented the ‘negation’ of the Dadaist negation. For all 
of its radical questioning of bourgeois values, Dadaism had seen itself as a part of the developing 
European avant-garde that is now reified as ‘modernism’. As it took form, however, Paris Dada 
soon began to react as much against the traditionally marginal role assigned to artists in bourgeois 
society as against the values of that society itself. It is this fact, which became even clearer with 
surrealism, that above all perhaps marks surrealism off from the intellectual movements that preceded 
it and, indeed, from those that followed it.
The symbolic gesture was to cease to meet at the fashionable left-bank literary cafes. 
Instead they sought out unpretentious cafes, generally on the right-bank, well away from areas where 
intellectuals traditionally congregated. The Dadaist and later surrealist ’headquarters’ became the 
Cerfe, a cafe in the Passage de I’0p6ra which, being in the centre of the Paris business and shopping 
centres, was frequented by a nondescript crowd of office-workers, shoppers and strollers. Although 
cafes have taken on an enormous importance in the daily life of the surrealists, as they have for other 
Parisian intellectuals, the surrealists seem to have gone to great trouble to find cafes for which the 
main criterion appears to have been that they wouldn’t encounter other intellectuals, but where the 
clientele would be congenial, comprising for preference a mixed bag of the working-class, the 
dispossessed and various marginals. A certain taste for decrepitude, for the unwonted and the out- 
of-place was part of a general surrealist inclination that was less for such qualities in themselves than 
as places where the unexpected was to be expected and where the promise of revelation was always 
present. The preferred area was, in Nadeau’s words, The Montmartre of suspect boulevards 
swarming with the odd fauna of whores and their pimps, the crowd of those who pretend to enjoy 
themselves. Encounters here were astonishing: circus people (the Cirque M6drano was only two 
stops away) accompanied by trapeze girls with their eyes ’elsewhere’...’’ But this can assigned less 
to a sort of inverse snobbism than to a generalized distaste for the closed nature of Parisian 
intellectual circles. For Paris is a very small city in which, unlike New York or London, everyone 
knows everyone and one tends to be judged by who one is ’in’ with. Surrealism needed to create 
its own space and break with the Parisian cliquishness and the parochialism that asserted Paris as 
the ’centre of the world’. As Thirion was to write: in the literary quarters "the clever skill with which 
people presented themselves as painters or literati seemed to spoil the element of chance in advance 
and took away any sense of anticipation".5 This was thus a tactical decision: they had no objection 
to the more literary cafes for personal meetings. But group meetings never seem to have been held 
there. In discussing the life of surrealist cafes, Robert Benayoun has said that the rendezvous would 
usually be changed for rather trivial reasons - a boorish or too familiar waiter, a bad-tempered cashier 
or due to the fact that ‘stockbrokers, philatelists or actors’ had meetings in the same cafe. They also
5 Thirion, Revolutionaries Without Revolution p 136
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objected to cards or music being played.6
Their final choice of cafe, which served them from 1954 until the dissolution in 1969, was the 
Promenade de V6 nus, in what was then the working-class Les Hailes district. It was chosen, 
according to Benayoun, because, apart from the charm of the poetic quality of the name, it was 
central, strategic, comfortable, magnetic and itinerant. It appears to have been a personal taste to 
choose unpretentious cafes, for it seems that none of the Surrealist groups have ever met together 
at the fashionable Montparnasse or Montmartre venues (although the dissident group around Desnos 
and Bataille did meet for a time at Aux Deux magots, but this cafe did not become fashionable until 
after the war when it became famous as Sartre’s favourite place. What the surrealists seem rather 
to have been seeking was an environment in which they could establish a moral community. They 
sought out areas in which there was a sense of community feeling. This seem to have responded 
to a very strong need within most of the surrealists to break the aura surrounding the status of artists 
and intellectuals in contemporary society, an aura that is probably stronger in Paris than anywhere 
else. This fact does distinguish the surrealists from the vast majority of other intellectuals, who have 
generally tended, at least collectively, to cling to their status as a breed apart, whether they consider 
themselves as vanguard or traditional artists. While artists and intellectuals have always created their 
own particular communities centred around their own artistic and intellectual concerns, the surrealists 
always wanted something else: a sense of community, not to establish solidarity for common artistic 
activity, but founded in a moral sensibility.
At this point it is necessary to consider what exactly is meant by ’surrealism’. For my 
purposes it is necessary to consider surrealism in an extremely wide perspective. Surrealism is not 
a definable activity: by its very nature it is proteiform and to be defined, as the definitions of surrealism 
given by the surrealists over the years (which are appended to the thesis) make clear. Surrealism 
is always to be defined not by what it is but what it will become. It is thus definable only if we 
consider it as being transcendent of its own ontological category. As such it has something in 
common with the tao or the gnosis in, respectively, Taoism or Gnosticism. This, of course, makes 
it difficult to deal with methodologically or to clearly define the individuals who actually comprise the 
category of ’surrealists’, since surrealist activity is not, by definition, reducible to what people actually 
do. For my purposes I intend to treat the subject in the following way: ’surrealism’ is understood to 
comprise all those groups formed internationally that have called themselves ‘surrealist’ and have 
become recognised as such by the surrealist groups elsewhere; all those who have participated on 
the margins of such groups, in sympathy and critical relation (what Roger Caillois called ‘complicity 
and divergence’) with such groups; and all those lone individuals who have situated their own work 
in relation to surrealism and have been accepted as surrealists by the various groups. Generally I 
have tended to assume that participation in a Surrealist Group is enough for one to consider the
6. Benayoun, Le Rire des surr6alistes p 54
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subsequent work of the writer to be still within the orbit of surrealism after his withdrawal from the 
group, unless a clear disjunction is apparent in the nature of his subsequent work - the clearest case 
of this being Aragon. But if a there is a continuum in such work, then it seems to me that the author 
must be considered to be a surrealist, since were he not to be so considered it would invalidate the 
surrealist quality of his work as when he was a member of the group.
Although there have been numerous surrealist groups in several countries, the starting point 
for a consideration of the collective impetus of surrealism must be the Paris Surrealist Group which 
functioned actively from 1924 until 1969 (although it would be more accurate to see this as two 
separate groups, the first of which functioned from 1924 until 1939, the second from 1946 until 1969).
The creation of intellectual movements is essentially a phenomenon of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries which reflected a change in the perception of the position of artists within their 
culture. Previously intellectuals and artists had tended to be solitary and individualistic figures and 
such artists who did work together did so not on any collective basis, but in terms of a master and 
apprentice relation. To be sure, there had always been a tendency for intellectual figures with a 
message, and generally a charismatic personality, to initiate social movements. The names of 
Luther, Calvin and Loyola immediately come to mind here. Also, the guild mentality of many 
craftsmen did draw artists together for financial or stylistic reasons. It is only with the dawn of 
romanticism, however, that an urge for artists and intellectuals to work together collectively becomes 
apparent. The establishment of the Athenaeum circle in Jena by the Schlegel brothers in 1798 is 
probably the first attempt artists and intellectuals made to try to work together collectively.
Similar groups formed throughout the nineteenth century, with a greater (the Parnassans, the 
Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood) or lesser (symbolism, impressionism) degree of organisation. However, 
it was during the inter-war years of the twentieth century that such movements proliferated.
In looking at surrealism sociologically, Albert Souvy has argued that what differentiates 
surrealism from previous movements is its programmatic nature. Earlier movements did not issue 
manifestos and define their work so clearly. This is not entirely accurate. Both the Italian and 
Russian futurists did issue manifestos and the manifesto became something of a Dadaist trademark. 
It is, however, true that the surrealist manifestos defined surrealist activity with more precision than 
those of earlier groups. Where surrealism is undoubtedly to be distinguished from earlier groups, 
however, is in its longevity and in its concentrated nature
From 1924 until 1969, with the exception of the war years, the French Surrealist Group met 
every weekday (with a summer break - although the members of the group often went on holiday 
together). In the early years the meetings were twice daily - at lunchtime and then in the evening - 
but at some point seem to have been reduced to one meeting in the evening, between 6  and 8 . The 
numbers attending varied from half-a-dozen to sometimes around fifty. The aim was that there 
should be about a dozen active members of the group, to keep its activity as intimate and intense as
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possible, but without establishing any set structures or conditions of membership.
How do we define the nature of the Surrealist Group? Jochen Noth has precisely defined 
the way in which the Surrealist Group differs from any political group: "A political party whose actions 
are led towards the exterior, places at its heart a form of discipline that easily, and perhaps fatally, 
becomes a domination by the activists over the subjects. In surrealist revolt the process is reversed: 
the group is not a tool, but creates a sort of space for communication in which can be created a 
space of internal exchange, a process which replaces in great part the old communication of artist 
in relation to society: in great part the surrealist refusal consists in a refusal of society itself, but 
through a social organ that is the group."7
In a similar vein, Jules Monnerot has considered the Surrealist Group to be more of a secret 
society than an art movement.8
In seeking to classify the Surrealist Group, Monnerot rejects most established collective forms. 
He insists that ‘clan’, ’band’ or ‘sect’ would be inappropriate terms to use. Monnerot considers that 
the only appropriate term might be the English one of a set, which he defines as a chance union 
without obligations or sanctions in which anyone can be denounced at any time and for any reason 
by any other member. As such it remains in the form of an imperfect realization of an ideal form, 
of a Bund (that is, of a society opposed both to that based on contract [gesselschaff\ or that based 
on kinship relations [gemeinschaft])). The set as distinct from the Bund has no stable structures and 
can potentially collapse at any moment. It is an aggregation based not upon obligations but upon 
elective affinities.
As a free association united in a common cause but with no fixed principles and actively 
hostile to any form of proselytisation (indeed always seeking to prevent entrance to camp followers) 
can the Surrealist Group be viewed in the context of the history of secret societies? This question 
can be brought into relief by a consideration not of the Surrealist Group itself, but of the groupings 
set up around Georges Bataille which functioned between 1937 and 1939, Ac6phale and the College 
of Sociology which, issuing from surrealist collective concerns, were defined directly in relation to the 
idea of a secret society. Since we have little specific information on the activities of Ac6phale, we 
will concentrate on those the College of Sociology.
Roger Caillois, who had been one of the founders of the College of Sociology, specifically saw 
the College as a secret society in the tradition of monastic and military orders, Templars and 
Assassins, Jesuits and Freemasons. What seems to characterise all such orders was their 
conspiratorial nature: they were all societies for initiates, structurally reliant upon initiation rituals that 
would make access to the society difficult and, once such access had been obtained, withdrawal from 
the society would be even more difficult, in some cases impossible. Despite their attraction towards 
conspiratorial models, the College of Sociology was in this respect no more a secret society than the
7. Jochen Noth in discussion in Ferdinand Alqui6 , Entretiens sur le Surr6alisme p 514
8 see Jules Monnerot, La Po6sie moderne et le sacre
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Surrealist Group was, since it was to be, as its inaugural declaration states, "as free of access as the 
established scientific community". In fact the feeling conveyed is that structurally the College of 
Sociology had far more in common with a conventional educational establishment than with a secret 
society, the difference being that whereas an educational establishment is hierarchically founded on 
a distinction between students and academics (tested by means of examinations and aggregations), 
dedicated to the pursuit of disinterested knowledge with absolutely no obligation for the participant 
to act on any findings resulting from the study, the College of Sociology would abolish the distinction 
between students and academics, would be dedicated to the pursuit of interested knowledge which 
would involve a requirement that the researcher should act on the findings of the research, and there 
would be no salaries involved. Within the College there would be no hierarchical structure, but the 
participants would have a sense of privilege in the very fact of their participation in the sacred 
conspiracy (a Communion of the Strong, to take the title of a book to be published later by Caillois). 
In this sense, the College would not seem to have strong connexions with the tradition of the secret 
society, many of the basic ideas of which, such as the need for initiation rituals, it did not share. It 
was a secret society only in its conspiratorial character, although it might be argued that this character 
was little more than a romanticisation of the project since, apart from Bataille and Caillois, none of 
the other participants seem to have taken such claims very seriously.9
"I am not for adepts," wrote Andr6 Breton in one his poems that might, one feels, have been 
addressed to the activity of the College of Sociology. Although in the Second Manifesto, Breton had 
called for the "profound, veritable occupation of surrealism" and elsewhere had said "We must keep 
the public out", nothing was more foreign to his nature than the assumed hierarchical structure of the 
College of Sociology. In calling for the occupation of surrealism, he was seeking an activpy that would 
remain hidden from the eyes of the vulgar and the fashionable. Never once, however, did he 
succumb to the temptation to impose condPions of acceptance into the Surrealist Group. Nor did he 
seek to push surrealist activity in any one particular direction which would establish a collective 
rationale for group activity. This seems to be the crucial difference, at the organisational level, 
between the activities of the Surrealist Group and those of the College of Sociology. The Surrealist 
Group was consequently always more than the sum of its parts, always pressing beyond Ps own 
boundaries. The College of Sociology, on the other hand, was constrained by the framework placed 
around it by its participants and there could never be room for breaking down that framework. Its 
raison d’etre would be disqualified in such a case. The Surrealist Group, however, was always a 
place of encounter open to all possibilities. There was no restriction placed on Ps members as to the 
direction Ps activities should take. Breton rather sought to establish the Surrealist Group as a place 
of encounter that would be available only to those able to perceive its existence. Like the Grail 
Castle, only the chosen would actually be able to see it. Reference to the grail legend, probably the
9 Indeed even Bataille was dubious about placing the College of Sociology in the tradition of secret 
societies, particularly in ascribing to P a conspiratorial character.
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surrealists’ own favourite myth, is extremely suggestive in relation to the activities of the Group itself. 
Julien Gracq has contended that the Surrealist Group functions in the same way as the Round Table 
of Arthur’s court: as a point of departure from and into the world. As such it takes form as an elective 
community established by a shared sense of mystic vocation.10 Jean Ferry is even more suggestive 
in a story that is clearly based upon his own experience as a member of the Surrealist Group in which 
he describes a very secret society which it is difficult and perhaps even impossible to join, to the 
extent that many people spend their whole lives vainly trying to do so. On the other hand, many 
people are members of it without being aware of the fact, perhaps even without knowing of the 
society’s existence. Others, who might think of themselves as leading members of the society, do 
not in fact belong to it at all. Here we can see the illumination of what Breton meant by occultation: 
the creation of a society that would be at once so secret it would be impossible to penetrate it and 
yet at the same time so limpid that anyone could at any moment discover its most intimate mysteries. 
As Gracq pointed out, the idea of a secret society was an almost necessary temptation to surrealism, 
but it represented more a symbolic gesture towards closure than any great desire for secrecy.11 
Indeed, it almost seems that the idea of a secret society was often invoked to prevent cliques 
developing within the group.
For, like the Arthurian court, the Surrealist Group would function in quite a different way from 
a secret society. The ’secret’ (the Grail, surreal/s/77) would remain external to the activities of the 
group itself. To see the Surrealist Group as an end in itself would be to defeat the whole purpose 
of surrealism. There would thus be no initiation ritual for entrance to the group, but each member 
would be under an unspoken obligation to uphold the values of the group and would be subject to 
denunciation at any time and possibly to immediate expulsion from the group. Such expulsion would 
involve no punishment or anathematising of the person involved, but would be necessary to protect 
the integrity and vitality of the group. In theory no one was immune from such denunciation.12
All this, of course, is the contrary of the basis of the secret society, to which the process of 
initiation is of crucial significance and provides a means whereby one demonstrates one’s worthiness 
to be a member of the society. However once having established such worth, one no longer has 
anything to prove and can be expelled only by means of an equally complicated procedure and then 
only for grave misconduct that threatens the basis of the secret society, which thus has a reality of 
its own that the members must protect and the cardinal virtue is loyalty to the group. The surrealist, 
like the Arthurian knight, has no loyalty to the group; in fact has a duty to push the activities of the
10. Julien Gracq Andrd Breton, quelques aspects de t’auteur p
11 Gracq ibid p
12 In practice, at least from 1951 onwards, Breton was probably immune from such denunciation, 
but this was because, like Arthur, he had established such prestige in the group that such a 
denunciation would have been unthinkable. To maintain such prestige, however, Breton’s actions 
remained severely circumscribed within the moral framework surrealism had established.
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group to the limit, in the process threatening the dissolution of the group at any moment. Again, like 
the Arthurian fellowship, the Surrealist Group cannot, indeed must not, without betraying its nature, 
become more important than the members that constitute it. To be accepted within the group one 
has to be chosen, one does not choose. In this respect we can perhaps give a clearer distinction 
between the Surrealist Group and the College of Sociology in that the former was a fellowship based 
upon mutual affinities, while the latter was a brotherhood based upon complicity and virility (although 
such virility was of a purely intellectual type).
If the Surrealist Group can never transcend the activities of those who comprise it, the 
surrealism itself, like the Grail, must always transcend such activity. What, then, is this surreal ism to 
which the individual surrealists and collective Surrealist Groups have allegiance?
The Belgian surrealist Marcel Marign has written: "This word [surrealism] arouses so much 
confusion that it is impossible, when facing triumphant psittacism, to defend the strict, complicated 
principles which define the surrealist spirit. Furthermore, these principles are in many respects 
incommunicable. By this I mean that its no use striving to understand them from outside, to translate 
them into a language outside the experience itself - internal daily experience"13 The reality of 
surrealism must therefore be by definition an ideal type in the Weberian sense, but an ideal type 
created not by the researchers studying surrealism, but by the surrealists themselves. This must take 
form through the quest for the ’Supreme Point’ that Breton defined as being the aim of all surrealist 
activity. At the same time there was never any wish to actually attain such a point, since to do so 
would be to renounce life itself. As Breton explained: "I have spoken of a certain sublime point in the 
mountain. There was never any question of my going to live at that point. It would, besides, have 
at that moment ceased to be sublime and I myself a man".14 In a similar vein, Aragon defined 
surrealism as "at best a notion that slips away like the horizon before the walker, for like the walker 
it is a relation between the spirit and that which it will never attain". And again, as the French 
Surrealist Group declared in 1947: "Surrealism is that which will b e ”
The quest for the location of this point is what can be said to characterise the surrealist 
beyond all other disagreements. Most histories and studies of tend to emphasise the arguments and 
splits that have taken place within surrealism. What, however, seems to be striking is the contrary - 
by how few serious splits there have been and by how little lasting rancour has been generated if 
one considers the level of concentrated collective activity involved. Certainly compared, for instance, 
to the contemporaneous Psychoanalytic Movement, the Surrealist Movement has remained 
remarkably cohesive and there have been no splits to compare with those between Freud and Jung 
or Adler, and nothing comparable with the rancour generated by the expulsion of Lacan from the
13. Transformaction no 3 (1967) p 34
14. Breton L ’Amour fou p 171. This is not to imply that the supreme point is conceived as being 
metaphorical in nature. To the contrary, it is reality in its pure form. But to actually bathe in that pure 
form would be to renounce the materiality of life, which is essentially imperfect in nature. "Perfection", 
as the surrealists always defined it, "is laziness."
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Psychoanalytic Association. Indeed, there seems not to have been a single surrealist of importance 
who has later renounced his or her surrealist activity - not even Louis Aragon (who is considered the 
arch-renegade in surrealist circles) renounced his surrealist past but claimed it was part of his 
development towards the light of socialist realism and Stalinism. As Michel Leiris has explained in 
a recent interview: "You know, people are astonished that surrealist histories often seem frightful, full 
of exclusions and anathemas. But that came from the fact that surrealism was a passional 
movement. We treated each other as lovers who argue and drag each other through the mud".15
The one constant in the history of the French Surrealist Group was the presence of Andr6 
Breton who, until his death in 1966, attended group meetings virtually every day, signed most of the 
tracts issued by the group and was responsible for the publication of the Surrealist Manifestos. 
Bearing in mind the particular quality of surrealist circles, how do we account for the special position 
of Breton in the history of surrealism?
Called the ’Pope’, the ’Magus’, the ’Arbiter’ of surrealism by various enemies and critics, 
consideration of Breton’s position certainly reveals a more subtle presence. Virtually all those who 
have participated in the Surrealist Group, no matter how bitterly they quarrelled with Breton, are 
agreed that his position was never one of a ’pope’. Octavio Paz, rarely a man to use vituperative 
language, described such a designation as an "ignoble epithet popularised by certain swine".16 The 
words the surrealists themselves use to characterise Breton’s position seem to be words like 
'magnetism ’, ’illumination’,’reflexion’. Jean Schuster says that nevertheless Breton had "an authority 
which, contrary to a leader’s, aims at the development of ideas through mental stimulation and not 
their petrification through the intimidation of others".17
Even so, the history of the French Surrealist Group followed the course of a human life, with 
the enthusiasm of youth being followed by middle-age consolidation and then by decline and death. 
While Breton did not overtly outline this course, it seems clear that his life helped to define the course 
that was taken.
As we have noted, at the beginning of the Surrealist adventure, it was Artaud rather than 
Breton who was the dominant personality in the group. Indeed, judging from the daybook kept by the 
Bureau of Surrealist Research, it appears that Breton was not fully convinced of the desirability of 
continuing the Surrealist Group at all, and there are several entries in which he threatens to withdraw, 
often complaining about the laziness of colleagues and the neglecting of simple tasks. It was only 
with issue number 4 of La Revolution Surr6aliste that he took over the editorship and imposed a
15. interview in Le Nouvel Observateur 20/26 May 1988 p 63
16 Paz Alternating Currents p 53
17 Schuster ’La Quatrteme Chant’ in Tracts Surrealistes et Declarations Collectives p 291. 
Perhaps the best sketch of Breton’s personality and particular qualities has been given by Andre 
Thirion in Revolutionaries Without Revolution p 173/4
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tighter discipline on surrealist activity. Antonin Artaud was an extremely troubled individual and he 
had a forceful but dogmatic character. As Breton was later to acknowledge Artaud had given 
surrealist activities an urgency and powerful impetus, and such vitality is witnessed by the first three 
issues of La Revolution Surrealiste. But Breton recognised that such furious activity was liable soon 
to burn itself out. In any event it did not provide a basis for sustained collective activity.
From the time that Breton took over the editorship of the journal, he was certainly the central 
figure of the Surrealist Group. However, such position was sustained by no authority inherent in him 
as an individual. It is difficult to see any charismatic quality in his leadership which was rather 
maintained by his resolve of purpose. It was above all his moral intransigence that gave him 
authority, an intransigence that was such that he was prepared to break with his closest friends if he 
felt they had behaved in an unacceptable way. Aragon was later to say: "People tended to judge AB 
too hastily by appearances: that commanding air of his, and the impression he gave of always being 
in the majority."18 Yet it is apparent that Breton’s authority was always on the line during this period. 
He could take nothing for granted. Andr6 Thirion has noted that during the crisis of 1929, it looked 
for a time that everyone would desert Breton and perhaps establish a group without him.19 It is 
apparent from some of the comments, and especially by the tone, of the Second Manifesto, that 
Breton feared the establishment of an alternative Surrealist Group. Indeed he accuses Georges 
Bataille of trying to form such a group. Bataille always denied any such intention but it does seem 
that those disaffected surrealists who gathered around him would have liked to have formed a 
separate group to challenge the authority of Breton’s group. That this never actually occurred seems 
to bear witness more to the lack of organisational capabilities among the dissidents than any lack of 
will. Bataille is probably the only one who had the intellectual calibre to challenge Breton’s authority 
and there seem to be no reason to doubt that he is telling the truth when he says that he had no 
interest in doing so. It is clear that, at least up to the war, Breton’s authority was purely nominal. 
Although he had the power to make decisions on behalf of the group, his authority was sustained only 
providing he made the correct decisions.
After the war, however, we see a different position emerging. We have noted that the re­
establishment of the group had been subject to much turmoil in this period which culminated in the 
’Carrouges Affair’ of 1951. The crisis broke when Henri Pastoureau, one of the old guard of the 
group, objected to the presence of Michel Carrouges, a Catholic intellectual who had published a 
sympathetic and intelligent, if tendentious, study of surrealism entitled Andre Breton et les donnees 
fondamentales du surrealisme (1948). Carrouges’s study was subject to criticism on a number of 
counts. The objections began with the title and the prominence that was given to Breton’s name. 
More substantial, was the criticism that Carrouges had sought to treat surrealism, if not precisely as
18. Aragon quoted by Simon Watson Taylor in the preface to the English translation Paris Peasant 
(Cape 1968) p 15
19. Thirion Revolutionaries Without Revolution p 190
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a Christian heresy, at least as a movement was not at root hostile to fundamental Christian precepts, 
whilst he ignored the commitment both to atheism and to social revolution. Since the Surrealist Group 
had just re-affirmed its complete rejection of Christian ideas in a broadside entitled ‘A la niche les 
glapisseurs de dieu’, aimed specifically at those who would equate surrealism with Christian heresy, 
Carrouges’s work certainly seemed to be out of line with surrealist thinking, yet Breton defended 
Carrouges as being someone sympathetic to surrealism. When Carrouges gave a lecture on 
surrealism at a meeting of Catholic intellectuals, however, Pastoureau and a group of other surrealists 
took the opportunity to create a disturbance. In the repercussions that followed it was discovered that 
Carrouges had lied to Breton about his participation in a Catholic propoganda film and he was 
expelled from participation in the Surrealist Group. Things did not end there, however, and 
Pastoureau found himself, for reasons that are not at all clear, under criticism for his actions.
There followed a vitriolic polemic which is well documented but the import of which is very 
difficult to discern. To my mind the most significant thing in the polemic was that at one point Breton, 
apparently for the first and only time in surrealist history, pulled rank, saying that if his position was 
not accepted he would dissolve the Surrealist Group altogether. When the dust had settled, 
Pastoureau, along with Acker, Harfaux, Henry, H6rold, Jean, Lebel and Waldberg had either been 
expelled or withdrew from the group. This constituted almost the whole of the pre-war ’old guard’ and 
meant that the group had virtually been created anew. To emphasise the extent of the changes the 
group went through during this period, of the 14 collective declarations issued from 1947 to 1954, 
signed by a total of 113 individuals, only two (Breton and P6ret) signed both the first ’Freedom is a 
Vietnamese Word’ (April 1947) and the last ‘Qa Commence Bien’ (September 1954). Furthermore, 
following the Carrouges Affair, with the exception of Breton the only survivors from before the war 
were P6ret, Mayoux and Ferry (Ferry himself withdrew in 1954, while Mayoux, living in Ussel, 
attended group meetings only infrequently). Otherwise, the nucleus of the group consisted of two 
Czech exiles (Heisler and Toyen), Adrien Dax, aged 38, who lived in Toulouse, and a number of 
much younger members: Nora Mitrani (aged 30); Jean-Louis B6douin (21); Robert Benayoun (22); 
Jean Schuster (22); Georges Goldfayn (18); G6rard Legrand (24); Michel Zimbacca (27) and Jos6 
Pierre (24). The predominance of youth should be noted. Noteworthy, too is the fact that, apart from 
Heisler and Mitrani who died in 1954 and 1961 respectively, all were still actively involved in the group 
up to the time of its dissolution in 1969.
In reading the documents around the 1951, one is struck by Breton’s uncharacteristically 
bullish behaviour. He almost seems to have deliberately behaved in such a way that he knew would 
offend the older members of the group. One has the impression that he was determined to take the 
opportunity to re-constitute the group on a new basis that would take account of the changed post-war 
situation and he feared that the survivors of the pre-war period would be an encumbrance, insisting 
on moral exigences, notably in the political sphere, that Breton no longer saw as being relevant. It 
may also be that he wanted to give youth its chance. He always emphasised his faith in youth and 
it may be that he considered the political situation had changed so radically that it was necessary to
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start again with young people who were unprejudiced by concerns of the thirties and the war years. 
Such speculations must remain for the most part unsubstantiated until more research is done into this 
period of surrealist history. What concerns us more here is the manifest effect that the upheaval had 
on the evolution of surrealist activities.
Jean Benoit was later to draw a distinction between the inter-war and post-war Surrealist 
Groups, noting that "two generations succeeded each other. The first came naturally to surrealism, 
the second was attracted by surrealism".20 More than this, though, the second generation was not 
only attracted by surrealism, but also by the personality of Breton himself. This in itself stamped the 
post-war Surrealist Group with the personality of Breton in a way in which the inter-war group had 
never been, even though Breton was to become far less active personally in the group after 1951. 
The first generation were surrealists by a natural process of evolution; they did not have to think about 
what surrealism was and their own place within it. They themselves defined surrealism, which was 
commensurate to their own beings and everyday practice. Surrealism could only become what they 
made of it. They had no loyalty towards it or to Breton. For the second generation, however, 
surrealism was pre-existing: it had its own tradition into which they needed to fit. They could enrich, 
advance or, most difficult of all, re-make it, but they could not ignore it and follow their own path 
independently of surrealist history. To do so would obviously be to define oneself as not being a 
surrealist. They therefore had to confront something external to themselves and separable from them 
and did not have the same freedom to create it that the first generation had. This was emphasised 
by the fact that Breton remained in the group as what was undoubtedly an authority figure, even if 
he did not choose to exercise such authority. It is also apparent that all those who joined the group 
after 1951 felt a loyalty to its tradition to the extent that the protection of the surrealist heritage was 
in most cases stronger than their urge to re-invent it.21
What also undoubtedly changed after 1951 was Breton’s position within the group. Whether 
it had been his intention or not, once he had dispensed with Pastoureau and his friends, he had 
ensured that his authority within the group was unchallengeable. None of the newcomers was likely 
to have the confidence to challenge Breton on a major point. The fact that Breton never actually had 
to invoke such authority directly does not show that it did not exist, but rather how strong it was. The 
next fifteen years witnessed a period of unaccustomed harmony within the group with only one active 
participant (Simon Hantai) actually being expelled, on grounds that were unequivocal. There was 
another expulsion, however, one that is perhaps the most controversial in surrealist history, and which
20. Jean Benoit in the surrealist enquiry Rien ou Quoi? (March 1970) p 141
21. This is something that reaches its logical conclusion in the activities of ACTUAL, established 
by several of the surrealists, with Jean Schuster as its director, precisely for the purpose of 
documenting the ’true’ heritage of surrealism. In part this was established to counter what was then 
the admittedly very poor scholarship that passed for surrealist research. In the 1980s, however, 
research into surrealism, particularly in France, has improved so substantially that the work of 
ACTUAL overlaps with it.
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is very revealing in the context of this argument. This was of Max Ernst, expelled in 1953 for having 
accepted the Grand prize for painting at the Venice Biennale.
The expulsion of Ernst was singular in several ways. First, it seems to be the only time 
someone who was not actually an active member of the group was actually expelled. Ernst was 
being expelled not so much from the Surrealist Group as from the Surrealist Movement as a whole. 
Furthermore, both Arp and Mir6 accepted prizes at the same Biennale without being expelled 
(although both were censured). As was the case with Matta and Brauner (the two other most 
significant post-war expulsions) the decision was unilaterally taken by a group vote, rather than the 
initiative being taken by Breton personally (indeed both Breton and P6ret voted against the expulsion). 
Now this may seem to be more democratic, as Jean Schuster has sought to argue (though whether 
it is democratic to ’try’ someone without giving them the chance to put their case or appeal against 
the verdict [for the decision was taken unilaterally] is a moot point), but the surrealists otherwise never 
seem to have sought democratic legitimation for their actions. In fact the ‘democratic’ alibi seems to 
have been established precisely to camouflage the fact of Breton’s ultimate authority. While it may 
be true that Breton, out of loyalty to an old friend or for whatever reason, genuinely did not want to 
see Ernst expelled, the fact that he was prepared to bow to the majority tends to suggest that he was 
pleased that the group would take such a decision against his wishes, almost like a father proud of 
his independent child. But the fact that the expulsion had to be performed in such a high-handed, 
even bureaucratic, way, shows that no-one within the group had sufficient authority to take decisions 
as Breton had previously done. In fact it is perhaps not going too far to suggest that Ernst 
represented a sort of surrogate victim who could be sacrificed without affecting the cohesion of the 
group. It would seem, however, that the real target may have been internal tensions within the group 
which could not be resolved since no one had the authority to confront such tensions except Breton, 
who no longer was interested in doing so. This is to some extent conjectural, but it does seem to be 
borne out by the way in which the Surrealist Group disintegrated into internecine strife as soon as 
Breton died. One certainly has the impression that fifteen years of suppressed tensions were 
suddenly being released.
Of course, if we are right in conjecturing that Breton wanted to see the Surrealist Group re­
constituted on a different basis in the period after the war, then logically he ought himself to have 
withdrawn from group activities and left the group to take its own form independently of his presence, 
which must have been intimidating. It is not to diminish Breton if we suggest that it was his vanity 
that prevented him from doing this. He may also have felt that there needed to be at least some 
continuity between the inter-war and post-war periods and that he could provide such continuity. The 
history of the French Surrealist Group since his death has shown, however, that his presence certainly 
had an inhibiting effect on the group. Of course, it may have happened that had he withdrawn in 
1951, the group would have disintegrated then. But this risk is inscribed in the nature of the surrealist 
endeavour which does not seem to admit of any value in allowing phenomena to outlast their own 
natural timespans. Here Breton might be seen as forgetting Schlegal’s key romantic maxim that ’only
that which annihilates itself is of value’ and in this respect it is tempting to extend the Grail analogy 
and see the Surrealist Group as no longer being Arthur’s vibrant Round Table, but as having become 
the Grail Castle, isolated in its purity and lost in the time and space of a wasteland while it is presided 
over by a sterile Fisher King and his knights who live only for illusions of lost glories. Although such 
an image would not be entirely fair, it is one that contains an element of truth.
In looking at the history of the French Surrealist Group in this way, we have sought to 
contextualise the ‘institutional’ frame of surealism to give a focus to the contrast to be drawn between 
it and that of anthropology. The analogy could be taken further and we could directly relate the history 
to the way in which anthropology has constituted itself as a discipline. To do so, however, would be 
to take us too far from the central issues of the thesis. If this chapter has represented something of 
a detour from the main theme of the thesis, it has been necessary to locate the contrast with the 
history of anthropology and to provide a background against which we are seeking to contrast 
approaches within surrealism with those within anthropology. If we have not made the contrast 
particularly explicit, it is because the institutional framework within which anthropology works is well 
enough known not to require re-formulation here, particularly since this is not the central issue in this 
thesis. What we have tried to do here is to describe the framework of surrealism in order to give a 
foundation for the insertion of surrealism into the terms of anthropological debate. In the next chapter 
we will look at the links between anthropology and surrealism more closely without, however, seeking 
to draw the comparison too rigidly, since, as will be apparent from what we have said above, the aims 
and direction of surrealism are very different from those of anthropology. It is not, then, to be a matter 
of judging one against the other, but of looking for contrasts as a means of illuminating both 
surrealism and anthropology.
It should also be emphasised that the French Surrealist Group has simply been the most 
active and most clearly defined of numerous surrealist groups that have existed around the world. 
In taking it as an exemplar we are not seeking to minimise the importance of such other groups, but 
rather looking at the group that has undoubtedly generated the most interest and critical consideration. 
Nor should it be thought that the Surrealist Group represents the sum total of surrealist activity. We 
will be looking at other groups and individuals connected with surrealism later. There are also other 
elements involved in considering a sociology of surrealism which will be dealt with later in the thesis. 





Show me the wise man in love with the Cyclops woman 
And I'll make of him my equal
Benjamin P6ret
Links between surrealism and anthropology
In the first two chapters we have considered various aspects of the sociology of anthropology 
and then of surrealism. This has been done less to draw a comparison between the two (we have 
taken different aspects of the two traditions for study) than to give a general background and to bring 
out elements in the two traditions that will be developed throughout the thesis.
In the introduction, we noted how anthropologists had often used surrealism as a counterpoint 
to their own activities as anthropologists. Edmund Carpenter, announcing that his account is going 
to follow a different path than that usually encountered in anthropology, stated: "The notes that follow 
belong to the world of surrealism where events are experienced from within, not observed from
57
without"1. More specifically, Georges Balandier has drawn a direct relation with surrealism in defining 
his own aims in anthropology, which he states ought to have "a revelatory function [which] generates 
a return to oneself and a deviation by means of the Other. It enables the subjects to have better 
access to themselves and their roots; to allow their muted words to be heard; to take account of, and 
responsibility for, their differences. It illuminates our own world by means of comparison... But this 
ethnology is also revelatory of those who practise it; it impels them to greater truthfulness by forcing 
them to take off the masks which are imposed on them by social conventions. [...] Ethnological 
knowledge of this kind is never neutral, but committed, and the task of expression is a necessity."2
For surrealism the task of expression is always a necessity. The idea of disinterested 
knowledge is anathema, as is anything institutionally controlled and defined. On the question of day- 
to-day living the surrealists have shown themselves to be intransigent. To be required to undertake 
specific research for the purposes of professional advancement must always run against the grain of 
surrealist sensibilities. (Which is not to say that all individual surrealists have not, to some degree, 
had to compromise with the need to make a living: this is not what is at issue, but the fact that to do 
so is never to be considered as something to be sought for itself.) This must make surrealism 
fundamentally different from the university discipline of anthropology which is forced within the 
constraints of the university system to offer inducements for career advancement not based upon the 
fact that the anthropologist must feel an inner necessity to do the research he wants to do. It is this 
fact, rather than anything specific to anthropological approaches to the world that brings surrealism 
into conflict with it.
The question of surrealism and anthropology has been brought into anthropological debate 
particularly following the publication of James Clifford’s article ’On Ethnographic Surrealism’ in 1981.3 
Although this article has been subject to some astringent criticism from Jean Jamin4 (which Clifford 
himself acknowledges as a ’corrective’ to his own approach), it has been much quoted in 
anthropological writings as an authoritative examination of surrealism in the context of anthropology.
Although Clifford’s article does contain some interesting material, his approach to surrealism 
itself it so far off-beam as to muddy rather than clarify the picture and has had the unfortunate effect 
of distorting the nature of the debate that has followed.
The error that Clifford makes is one that is common to superficial commentators on 
surrealism. He sees surrealism as making a concentrated assault upon reality in favour of something
1 Edmund Carpenter, Oh What A Blow That Phantom Gave Me! p 67
2 Georges Balandier "’Terre Humaine’ as a literary movement" (1987) Anthropology Today Vol
3 no 1 p 1
3 in Comparative Studies in Society and History, no 23 (1981). Reprinted, with some modifications 
in Clifford, The Predicament of Culture.
4 Jamin, ’L’Ethnographie mode d’inemploi: De quelques rapports de Pethnologie avec la malaise 
dans la civilisation’ (1986) in J. Hainard & R. Kaehr (eds. Le Mai et la douleurp
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more heterogeneous and confused. In terms of a scientific discipline like anthropology, he sees the 
surrealist response as being one of subversion and an ironic lack of respect. In this latter respect, 
Frances Slaney has recently, and in my view rightly, come to the defence of anthropological authority 
against such a maverick form of ’subversion’. She argues that there is nothing inherent to surrealism 
that makes it any the less prone to making ethnocentric judgements and that its (supposed) 
’ethnographic’ approach is as suspect, if not more so, than traditional anthropological ones.5 This 
seems, however, rather like arguing over a void, since I suspect that in this argument the surrealists 
themselves would most likely side with Slaney. At any rate, it is manifestly false to see surrealism 
as attempting to subvert anthropology: its attitude towards scholarship has always been respectful and 
even supportive.6 Nor have they ever made any attempt to advocate an alternative ’ethnographic’ 
approach. Although, later in the chapter, we will look at questions raised within ’ethnographic’ 
accounts made by surrealists, it should be made clear at this point that no sort of approach would 
ever be advocated as one appropriate to surrealism, any more than they ever advocated an 
appropriate ’surrealist’ style in painting or writing: indeed, to try to draw one out is to be false to the 
spirit of surrealism.
For Clifford, though, surrealism is a ’strategy’, consciously directed against some sort of 
seamless ’reality’ that he never actually defines. I suspect from the terms he uses that he is 
transposing what he himself dislikes - which is the kind of objectified representation that is 
predominant in anthropology - to the context of France in the twenties and thereby makes an 
assumption that what surrealism was attacking was the same thing. This doesn’t seem to me to be 
a warrantable assumption. Moreover, Clifford confuses reality {an ontological category) with realism 
(an ideological construction). The surrealists had no quarrel with the former and their critique of the 
latter was extremely complex. Certainly, it was on quite a different level from that which Clifford would 
like to emphasize. It is, at best, extremely simplistic to see surrealism as seeking to invoke a 
relativistic perspective in which the reality of culture would be turned upside down: "for every local 
custom or truth there was always an exotic alternative, a possible juxtaposition or incongruity. Below 
(psychologically) or beyond (geographically) ordinary reality there existed another reality".7 Such a 
dualistic schema would hardly find favour with the surrealists. To the contrary, it was always, above 
everything else, the fusion of realities that was the primary concern of surrealism. They were not 
interested in ’exotic’ worlds: they were interested in the world as a whole and they resented above 
all the way in which rationalized reality portioned everything out and created an excluded category 
of being, which was condemned precisely as being ’exotic’ or ’primitive’. Thus it is quite erroneous 
to see surrealism as valorizing "artificial arrangements susceptible to detached analysis and
5 Slaney, ’Psychoanalysis and Cycles of "Subversion" in Modern Art and Anthropology’, (1989) 
Dialectical Anthropology, 14 pp 213/234.
6 as the current activities of ACTUAL show.
7 Clifford, The Predicament of Culture p 120/121.
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comparison".8 Similarly, the surrealists did not view collage techniques of juxtaposition and re­
arrangement as being, in themselves of any value. To be understood, surrealist collage must be seen 
as an attempt to draw out, on analogical principles, the world’s hidden unity. Clifford could therefore 
hardly be more wrong when he sees the essence of the affinities of surrealism and anthropology as 
follows: "Ethnography cut with surrealism emerges as the theory and practice of juxtaposition. It 
studies, and is part of, the invention of and interruption of meaningful wholes in works of cultural 
import-export".9
If Clifford conflates reality with realism, the connexion he draws between surrealism and 
anthropology, and especially with ethnography, is still more spurious. Surrealism and anthropology 
are quite separate things. It makes no sense either to set one off against the other or to draw false 
analogies between them. It is possible to use one to illuminate the other, either by applying an 
anthropological approach to the study of surrealism, or by applying surrealist concepts towards a 
critique of anthropology, which is partly what I have sought to do in this thesis. But it is not legitimate, 
in my view, to treat them interchangeably and use the one against the other. If one wishes to criticise 
anthropology through surrealism, then it must be recognised that one is utilising a different value 
system. And vice versa. To see surrealism, as Clifford does, as though it had a better ethnographic 
approach than anthropologists have developed is absurd: the surrealists had no ethnographic 
approach, for the simple reason that they were not doing ethnography. To contrast surrealism with 
anthropology can be valuable, but one must not lose sight of the special characteristics of the two 
ideas. In a like manner one could look at anthropology through philosophy and vice versa, but if one 
was to subsume the one into the other the argument would necessarily collapse into confusion and 
not be able to throw any illumination. If anything, the gulf between anthropology and surrealism is 
wider than that between anthropology and philosophy. And if anthropology has cast its net wide in 
seeking to establish a ’science of mankind’, surrealism’s aim is wider still, being nothing less than the 
transformation of being. Joseph Jablonski has been very clear in defining the relation of surrealism 
to science: "...surrealism does not surrender its arms, critical or other, to the representatives of the 
special sciences. Surrealists make use of the special sciences because they provide useable data, 
ideas, and techniques. This does not mean that surrealism itself has been converted to a purely 
scientific world view. Valid as science may be, it has no claim to deal with all the random data and 
all the phenomena that man must confront; and so surrealism has developed its own ways of 
approaching the multiple indeterminisms."10
In an article specifically considering the relation of surrealism to anthropology, the Czech 
surrealist Vratislav Effenberger saw anthropology as emerging in periods in which political and
8 ibid. p 119
9 ibid. p 147
10 Joseph Jablonski personal communication 12 October 1987.
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religious ideologies begin to decompose and responding to a need for fresh perspectives on 
consciousness. Effenberger sees surrealism and anthropology as parallel responses to such a need, 
seeking to "establish new points of departure to bring together new perspectives on our 
consciousness of existence"11
Such comments emphasise, I think, the inadequacy of Clifford’s interpretation of surrealism. 
Since his article has been rather influential, it has served rather to mystify the contribution that 
surrealism can make to the debate about representation. For Clifford would like to utilize surrealism 
to help to legitimate his own position, which derives from, and sees surrealism through, the distorting 
mirror of post-modernism. In actual fact, in the way in which it evolved in its cultural context in 
France, post-modernism has little in common with surrealism. The surrealists’ own attitude towards 
it has essentially been one of indifference, though Jean Schuster in a recent interview has stated that 
one of the tasks of a functioning Surrealist Group in France today would be to combat post­
modernism, though "probably by ignoring it".12
We need, therefore, briefly to consider the development of anthropology in France and the 
relationship of the Surrealist Group to it.
11 Effenberger, ’Surrealism and Contemporary Civilization’, in Change 25 (1975) p 117
12 He particularly objected to its ’perennial spirit of emulation, its desire to occupy the terrain and 
wave the latest flag’ (interview with Paul Hammond in New Statesman 4 December 1987). Although 
it is true that post-modernism has claimed Artaud and Bataille as its ancestors, it is generally been 
hostile towards surrealism. For their part, according to Jos6 Pierre, the surrealists had always 
dismissed post-structuralism in its beginnings as being "pedantic and boring, but of little consequence" 
(note in Tracts Surrbatistes et declarations collectives p 424). There has, nonetheless, been the 
occasional skirmish between the surrealists and the post-structuralists. A broadside (’Beau Comme 
BEAU COMME) was issued by the surrealists in 1967 against what were seen as distortions in 
Marcelin Pleynet’s book on LautrSamont, in which post-structuralism was ridiculed for its obsession 
with texts, seen as a return to literary models that the surrealists had long abandoned. In 1972, a 
declaration by the Maintenant Surrealist Group (Goldfayn, Ivsic, Le Brun, Legrand, Peuchmaurd, 
Toyen) contemptuously noted in passing how the champions of ’6criture’ were ’muck-spreading the 
subjective’ (’Quand le surr6alisme aurait cinquante ans’ (1972: Paris: Maintenant). Another incident 
took place in 1974, when Jean-Louis Houdoubenne protested in the name of post-structuralism 
against a lecture given by the surrealist Jean-Louis Bedouin with the extraordinary slogan: ’NO to 
revolt - LONG LIVE the revolution; DOWN with Surrealism - Long live the Avant Garde for Mao Tse- 
tung thought’. Bedouin’s response was to dismiss the ’Papermaoists". An interesting article by Robert 
Lebel in 1978 assessed the overall surrealist position on post-structuralism (see 'Les machines 
Iangagi6res’ in V.Bounoure (ed) La Civilisation Surr6aliste pp 73/79). For a good account of the way 
in which surrealism has been appropriated to the post-modernist cause in Britain, see David Macey: 
Lacan in Context.
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The French anthropological Tradition
Ethnology came late to France. Although the roots of an anthropological approach can be 
found in Montaigne and Rousseau, and though the Soci6t6 de I’Observation de I’Homme had been 
founded at the end of the eighteenth century, ethnological research soon became rather 
unfashionable and throughout the nineteenth century anthropology exclusively meant physical 
anthropology, although it is true that in practice rich ethnological work was being done by a range of 
marginal figures as different as the missionary Maurice Leenhardt and the anarchist Louise Michel. 
In institutional terms, ethnology seems to have formed part of oriental studies, which remained the 
discipline in which most early French anthropologists received their training (even as late as 1938, 
Michel Leiris, preparing his doctorate at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, did so under the Orientalist 
Louis Massignon), but it did not concretize as a specific discipline until well into the twentieth century.
What had developed in nineteenth century France, out of Comtian positivism, was a strong 
sociological tradition. This flowered with the establishment of the Annie Sociologique and the rise 
of the Durkheimian school. It was not until after the First World War that ethnology as such became 
a central concern, although the work of Robert Hertz had led the way into anthropological themes 
earlier.
The publication of the volumes on primitive mentality of L6vy-Bruhl gave a stimulus for a 
systematic approach to ethnology and the Institut d’Ethnologie at the University of Paris was formed 
in 1925 by L6vy-Bruhl together with Marcel Mauss and Paul Rivet. Thus for the first time there was 
a centre for the study of ethnology as a specific subject in France (although the first doctorate was 
not to be granted until 1943).
Despite the creation of the Institut, it was the museum (particularly the Mus6e d’ethnographie 
du Trocad6ro [later the Mus6e de I’Homme]) rather than the university that sustained ethnological 
research until after the Second World War. This is especially so in respect of the key ethnographic 
expedition prior to the war - the Dakar-Djibouti expedition (1931/33) - which was to lead to a vast 
collective project to study Dogon and Bambara culture that continued until the fifties.
Mary Douglas has noted one of the effects that such a bias has occasioned, for while British 
anthropologists tend to look to understand the meanings that appearances conceal, French 
anthropology has tended to be concerned with the nature of such forms13. French ethnology, at least 
during this period, was primarily concerned with the collection and quantifying of data, the main 
consideration of the Dakar-Djibouti expedition being the ’booty’ to be brought back (some 3600 
cultural items) and tended to spread itself over space rather than concentrate on the determinants of 
small scale societies. A concern that also emphasises the different orientation of the two colonial 
powers, for where the British policy of confederation and indirect rule required a knowledge of the 
colonial subjects and their culture, the French policy of assimilation and direct rule did not. As Roger
13. Mary Douglas Implicit Meanings
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Bastide has pointed out, the French colonial attitude, based upon an assumption that the spread of 
reason was for the universal good, made the sort of activist anthropology we see in Britain which 
engaged with the native cultures, impossible in the France of the period. Furthermore, although Mauss 
was keen to encourage fieldwork, it was not then considered an essential pre-requisite for 
anthropological study, and even today it does not have the importance it has in Britain. James 
Clifford has also noted that it is difficult to discern a specific fieldwork methodology in French 
anthropology that corresponds to the idea of participant-observation. Rather, French ethnographers 
have developed individual ways of treating the fieldwork experience which would not always have 
been considered as such by their British colleagues. It has often been questioned, for instance, 
whether the ’fieldwork’ of L6vi-Strauss can really be regarded as such. Indeed, the evident distaste 
that L6vi-Strauss displays in Tristes Tropiques both for the idea of travel itself and for the fact of 
writing about it would doubtless be inconceivable for anyone brought up in the British tradition.
It will be noted that both anthropology and surrealism developed in France at the same 
period. James Clifford has drawn links between them on the basis of similar thematic concerns which 
are certainly not as straightforward as Clifford would like us to believe, although such links are 
undoubtedly present. The official publication of the Mus6e d’Ethnographie au Trocad6ro was edited 
by Bataille and became a mouthpiece for dissidents from the Surrealist Group as well as publishing 
strictly ethnological research. In the late thirties the College of Sociology, a marginal surrealist 
grouping, had a strong anthropological content and is of importance in the development of French 
anthropology.
We have seen that the political context in which both surrealism and anthropology developed 
was extremely volatile. The surrealists had unequivocally given their political support to the left, and 
although most anthropologists were likewise supporters of socialism, neither individual anthropologists 
nor anthropology as a discipline had questioned the framework of colonialism, or the ideology of the 
spread of reason. It is this fact that above all separates surrealism politically from anthropology in 
this period.
As Jean Jamin has argued, in an article written directly in response to Clifford, far from 
identifying with the establishment of an anthropological discipline in France, the surrealists would most 
likely - had they thought about it - have considered it "the result of a mistake, if not treated it with 
contempt".14 For surrealism, ethnography might have been considered as "a suspect science, in as 
much as the first fieldwork expeditions of French ethnology were undertaken not only with the 
agreement of the Colonial Ministry, but also unfolded in particularly spectacular - not to say publicity 
seeking - circumstances which had much in common with expeditions of exploration and conquest”.15
14. Jean Jamin op.cit. p 45
15. ibid. p 53
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Methodology
In endeavouring to consider surrealism anthropologically the question of methodology arises. 
If one seeks to define the nature of surrealist activity, one comes across a series of negatives. It is 
not a literary or artistic movement, it is not a science; it is not an ideology, a party, or a secret society. 
Or rather, if it is any of these things, it is not reducible to any of them. It is a community, but a 
community that is so diffuse that it cannot be treated in terms of what its members actually do, since 
those activities are not confined to what its members do within the community (that’s to say that no 
distinction is made between what they do within the community from what they do within the larger 
society of which they are part). It is a sensibility, but a sensibility with no fixed attitudes as such. It 
is an attitude, a way of living, that is in process of continual change. Although it imposes no 
conditions on its members it remains bounded by a certain shared - if largely unspoken - perspective. 
As such it is apparent from a consideration of surrealist writings as a whole that methodological 
criteria are being respected. To try to draw these out, we can best look at some of the surrealist 
critical writings.
Jules Monnerot has defined the central dilemma of sociology in very clear terms. He points 
out that the sociologist who studies, for instance, revolution cannot do so adequately unless he 
actually becomes a revolutionary, but if he does indeed become a revolutionary then he would cease 
to be a sociologist. A methodological separation of roles is thus essential: "John’s anger and my 
understanding of John’s anger are distinct to the point of incommensurability.”16 One can only make 
assumptions about John’s anger based upon one’s own experience of anger. In this respect the 
human sciences establish a different relation vis-&-vis the object of study from that of the natural 
sciences, since the latter can never understand a phenomenon. It can only establish as great an 
explanatory framework as possible. To ’understand’, on the other hand, is a characteristic of the 
human sciences. Monnerot sees this as the central issue that Durkheim refused to face. In fact he 
claims that Durkheim is only of value when he breaks his own methodological rules: "Durkheim 
confounds the two orders of comprehension and explanation when, evoking the ’corrobori’ in the light 
of what he understands of the crowd-psychological-situation, he passes inductively from the 
comprehension appropriate to the coincidence of social and religious concerns to a theory of religion 
as an expression of the social."17 This causes him to lose sight of the fact that "behind the idea 
of ’collective consciousness’ is not the truth of a thing but the truth of a lived-state and affective 
situation".18 This causes Durkheim to lose sight of what it is that constitutes society: he conflates 
the phenomenonology of what a society is with both its noumenon and its essence. In other words,
1S. Monnerot, Les faits sociaux ne sontpas des choses p 41
17. ibid. p 51
18. ibid. p 51
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he makes of it an abstraction. Jealous of the natural sciences, Durkheimian sociology is established 
as a closed sociology, "closed to biology, closed to psychology, closed to history, closed to 
comprehension".19 It arbitrarily isolates ’social causes’ from the totality of social life and banishes all 
particuliarity and all history. Society becomes reified, given its own reality in which there are no 
longer ’societies’ but only the society, which is thereby abstracted as a thing in itself with universal 
properties.
Although Monnerot’s critique of Durheimian sociology was published after he had left the 
Surrealist Group,20 it very much emerges out of his surrealist research and is consistent with 
reflections by other surrealists on the question of methodology. So although it would be misleading 
to try to establish a specific ’surrealist’ methodological approach, we can still look for methodological 
approaches within surrealism to see whether they respond to any systematic criteria and to what 
extent such methodological approaches are of value in relation to anthropology.
Monnerot’s approach is guided by the concrete. This, above all, appears to be the starting 
point of all surrealist research. Abstract thought in itself, in accordance with their materialism, is alien 
to a surrealist view. Nicolas Calas has insisted on this point: "From concrete to concrete again, from 
matter to new materiality, such is order that the artist’s thought must follow, if it is not to lose itself in 
vain abstractions."21 From this perspective, Calas rejects anything that begins from a metaphysical, 
artistic or ethical standpoint. As examples of such a false methodological approach, Calas cites the 
psychoanalytic research of Adler and Jung, the first of which is faulty because Adler begins with a 
social framework, the second because Jung begins with a metaphysical one. They represent two 
poles of a fundamental methodological error. Adler displaces psychic mechanisms to the realm of 
the social, while Jung displaces social mechanisms to the realm of the psychic. In so doing both 
establish, like Durkheim, an abstract point of departure which cannot be questioned in its owns terms. 
On the other hand, Calas sees Freud as an exemplary figure in that he establishes his psychoanalytic 
theory entirely in the concrete, recognising his own position in relation to the subject of study.22 At
19. ibid. p 71
20 It might be argued that it is inappropriate to consider Monnerot within the context of surrealism. 
His bizarre personal trajectory, which led him to become an ideologist for fascism in the 1960’s, 
makes him something of an embarrassment to surrealism. Yet although he was to some degree 
writing from outside surrealism in the forties, it seems to me that his work in the forties is still fully 
within the surrealist tradition. He did, in fact, take part in the major surrealist exhibition 'Le 
Surr6alisme en 1947’ and, within the terms of reference taken by this study, I feel it is essential to 
consider his books from this period, which are all major works, as being fully within the orbit of 
surrealist criticism.
21. Calas, Confound the Wise, p 107. Although Calas uses the word ’artist’ here, it is clear that 
he means any form of research.
22. One might note that though Freud was dogmatic in asserting how crucial the idea of infantile 
sexuality or concepts such as the Oedipus Complex or the Primal Horde are for psychoanalysis, these 
are concepts that, no matter how much they may be open to question, emerge from within the data 
itself and can be questioned within the methodological framework that Freud himself sets up. That
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this point Calas’s critique of Adler and Jung is remarkably similar to Monnerot’s of Durkheim: both 
Calas and Monnerot see the error as being to reduce social or psychic phenomena to abstractions. 
The aim is always to engage with the concrete - a concern that one finds again and again in surrealist 
writing. To be based on concrete reality, according to Calas, it is necessary that the researcher must 
recognise his own subjectivity in relation to the material and also recognise the essential subjectivity 
of any theory emerging out of the research. To understand a theory we must recognise that our intent 
is always pre-eminent: no experiment can ever prove the correctness of a theory since, by its very 
nature, an experiment can only work within the frame of the terms of reference we place upon it. An 
experiment cannot then show the correctness of a theory, but can be judged only within the terms of 
reference so established to be either a success or failure. We need nevertheless to remain conscious 
of the framework we are establishing. In recognising the subjective element in research, though, 
Calas still does not argue for the subjectivity of the result of such research. To the contrary, like most 
surrealists, he seems to see a collapse into subjectivity as the enemy. But the trap of subjectivity is 
only revealed in relation to the false assumption of objectivity. Objectivity is always possible providing 
one is clear about one’s own frame of reference, which is always subjectively established. The great 
danger is to believe that objectivity can be established in absolute terms and have reference beyond 
the confines of the particular argument. Ren6 Alleau expressed the surrealist understanding on this 
point with great clarity: "All human sciences are subjective and it is the lucid and sincere recognition 
of that basic subjectivity that determines the degree of relative objectivity they can attain."23
The first task for the experimenter, then, is context: "I believe we cannot study a phenomenon 
such as art without situating it in relation to causes and effects, that is to say as a process."24 As 
such the two essential factors in criticism are first to situate the object in historical context and then 
to "make an evaluation according to the poetic needs of the present"25 In working with concrete 
reality the aim must always be, according to Calas, to "materialize the dream". It is this aim that 
seems above all to motivate surrealist criticism and present us with one of the determinants for the 
evaluation of research. An affective relation to the material must be established. Breton put the issue 
in these terms: "Criticism must be a matter of love."
In a like manner, Roger Caillois was to take up the issue of classification and to advance a 
notion of ’diagonal science’ which seems significant from a surrealist point of view. Caillois took issue 
with specialization in the sciences and in particular with the way in which systematization was used 
as a modular justification for such classification. He notes that all classification distorts. It
is, his concepts are not imposed upon it from without, whereas with Adler and Jung social and 
metaphysical ideas are assumed from without and cannot be challenged within the material itself.
23. quoted in Thirion, Revolutionaries Without Revolution, p 136.
24 Confound the Wise, p 5.
25 ibid. p 107.
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corresponds to no recognisable reality and is no more than a methodological tool for coming to terms 
with the multiplicity of being. For instance, he notes, general classification tells us that bats are not 
birds, but flying mammals. However, such classification requires the separation of the component 
parts of different creatures, giving a greater importance to certain features, here the metabolism. If, 
however, the wings were to be taken as the loci from which the classification was taken (as is de facto 
the case if one studies the mechanics of flight), then one would have to classify bats with birds.26 
He goes on: "Nature is one; its laws are everywhere the same or correspond to each other and are 
united and coherent in the different kingdoms and to different degrees. Each science explores a part 
of the whole, bringing together a collection of phenomena and given characteristics, of individuals or 
of reactions which bring out similar or parallel properties. But the limits that determine these 
collections, without being arbitrary, are often deceptive and in any case have been determined with 
the aid of criteria which, while they might be the best available, necessarily exclude others."27
In its beginnings surrealism based itself on a concept of automatism that could be seen as 
a methodological technique. Automatism aims to explore the play of disinterested thought. 
Confronting thought in its ’pure state’, it proposes to express ’the actual functioning of thought’. 
Probably nothing in surrealism has been so misunderstood as automatism, which was conceived 
neither as a technique for the production of texts, nor as a means to explore some kind of essential 
reality. Rather it was a means to put oneself in touch with the inner resources of one’s own being. 
As such it has something in common with eastern meditation techniques. To my mind Roger Caillois 
has best expressed the ’automatist attitude’ in writing of his relation to stones, which he regards "at 
times [as] objects of contemplation, almost as support of spiritual exercise. [...] Like the ancient 
Chinese, I am drawn to consider each stone as a world. Like Pascal, I presume that, from the atom 
to the nebulae, the models of two infinities coincide and, like Paracelsus, I readily accept that things 
establish their own sorts of signatures which are at once diverse and constant."28 As such 
automatism can be seen as offering a means to establish a direct relation with the object 
contemplated. This was what Breton saw as fundamental, in distinguishing automatism from the 
spiritualist concept of automatism: "contrary to what spiritualism proposes - that is the dissociation of 
the subject’s psychological personality - surrealism proposes nothing less than the unification of that 
personality".29
Automatism also connects up with another key surrealist idea - that of objective chance, which
26. This argument clearly has something in common with the one advanced by Foucault in Les 
Mots et les choses, although Caillois, unlike Foucault, does not suggest that classification is thus 
arbitrary.
27Caillois, Cases d'un dchiquier, p 54.
28. Caillois, Pierres Reflechies, p 9.
29 Breton, The Automatic Message’, (translated by Guy Ducornet) in F. Rosemont (ed) What is 
Surrealism? p 105.
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is based on the belief that there is a continuity and a coincidence between the natural world and our 
own experience of it. Through the workings of objective chance is revealed the unexpected 
correspondence between material and mental facts. The idea itself was taken from Hegel, as the dual 
process whereby necessity manifests itself as chance, and vice versa. Subjectivity and objectify thus 
meet as a sign of recognition of the basic harmony between man’s desires and the natural flow of the 
world. Objective chance is thus the most affirmative of all surrealist ideas, which is posited on the 
belief that the world offers everything to someone who has confidence in it.
Objective chance is most obviously manifested in the surrealist object, which represents in 
itself the concretization of human desire in material form. It is noticeable that the object has been one 
of the most persistent art forms within surrealism, which has generated theoretical discussion that 
relates, obviously enough, to our debate on objectivity.
The Crisis of the Object In Surrealism
The idea of a crisis of the object was one of the central themes within surrealism during the 
thirties. In 1936 the surrealists organised an exhibition of objects in Paris and in a text in the 
accompanying catalogue, Breton addressed the question in a text ’Crise de I’objet’. Breton saw that 
this crisis had been precipitated by the falling apart of rationalist and realist models for the 
representation of reality. "We are witnessing", he wrote, "the same vigorous stirrings of the thought 
process rebelling against the thinking habits of the past millennium heralding a way of thought which 
is no longer a reducing agent but has become infinitely inductive and extensible: one in which the 
object ceases to be fixed permanently on the nearer side of thought itself and re-creates itself on the 
further side as far as the eye can reach."30
The concern with the status of the object arises above all from the surrealist interest in Hegel. 
In Hegelian philosophy subject and object are seen as being problematic. They are not independent 
categories. They respond to each other, act upon each other and are inseparable from one another: 
the subject could only be viewed through the object while in the same way, the object could only be 
viewed through the subject. As the surrealists were well aware, to posit a ’crisis of the object’ was 
to imply at the same time a ’crisis of the subject’. To bring the object into question was to challenge 
mankind’s relation with the eternal world. "Nothing that surrounds us is object: all is subject",31 as 
Breton had written. At the same time, objectification was necessary for the self-realization of the 
object as subject. This accords with Hegel’s insistence on differentiation in subject and object 
relations and, in the anthropological context, points to the fact that the subject cannot be invested with 
a value in itself, but has to be mediated through its relation with the object. In this respect surrealism
30 Breton, ’Crisis of the Object’, in Surrealism and Painting p 271.
31 Breton, Surrealism and Painting p 35.
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looks towards liberty as breaking the chains that tie the object and subject in an iniquitous relation. 
As Annie Le Brun explained: the object "allows the subject to rise above the folly of separation and 
invent itself by means of the union of two separate realities as a continued symbolic conjuration of 
rupture. Simply perceived the object serves to mask emptiness by its neutral presence, or tends to 
be confounded to it, while the privileged object imposes its own presence on us as a touchstone of 
emptiness, serving to reveal, between internal psychic reality and external reality, a horizon in which 
the menace of separation is vanquished without being repressed, and thereby becomes a guarantee 
of the freedom to take risks."32 The transformation from perception of the object in itself to its status 
as privileged object is effected by means of the image which holds subject and object in balance 
between separate realities. In such a way, surrealism challenges the inequality of the subject and 
object relation through the image that "confronts this inner representation with that of the concrete 
forms of the real world, seeks in turn [...] to seize the object in its generality, and as soon as it has 
succeeded in so doing, tries to take that supreme step which is the poetic step, par excellence: 
excluding (relatively) the external object as such and considering nature only in its relationship with 
the inner world of consciousness".33
The first principle in surrealism, then, must always be objectification, since it is only through 
objectification that the nature of the object can be defined. But at the same time we need to remain 
conscious of the fact that the object we perceive does not correspond with anything more than, at 
best, a small part of the object’s own integral being: "The object is the rock and the beach and as we 
think we have reached the heart of the rock, we find that the horizon of the beach still continues to 
unfold into the infinite. The object is never identical with itself and invites us to discover, one by one, 
the pieces of the symbolic functioning of the puzzle of our identity".34
These Hegelian reflexions, which are at the heart of the surrealist approach towards the 
object, show how the aim is to both fix and disintegrate identity at the same time: that is to hold 
fixation and disintegration in a tension that never allows the fixity of the object to become an issue. 
As such the object ceases to be a thing in itself but becomes, as Jean-Frangois Chabrun expressed 
it, "the conception of an economy of exchange between the I and the Universe".35 The great value 
of the surrealist object is to establish a non-uUtilitarian relationship with matter. It destroys our 
privileged relation with objects which are thereby returned to their proper integrity. While from a 
rationalist point of view this means that they become out of control and a threat, for the surrealist this 
lack of control is not percveived as a problem. In such terms, knowledge has been defined in 
surrealist terms by Ren6 Crevel as "the eternal and infinite rapprochement of thought with its object".
32 Annie Le Brun, ’Objets d’identit6’, in A Distance p 42.
33 Breton, ’Surrealist Situation of the Object’, in Manifestos of Surrealism p 260.
34 Annie Le Brun, op,cit. p 42
35 Jean-Frangois Chabrun, in Michel Foure (ed) Histoire du Surrealisme sous I’occupation p 400.
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Bearing these points in mind, let us next try to apply this to some thoughts about 
’ethnographic’ approaches within surrealism.
Elements of a Surrealist Ethnography
In surveying the topics on which the surrealists have written, one is often astonished by their 
range. One subject which is noticeably absent, and which seems all the more surprising in that it has 
proved to be one of the most important genres of twentieth century literature, is travel. It is 
noticeable, for instance, that though three of Breton’s books, L ’Amour fou (1938), Martinique, 
Charmeuse de Serpents (1942) and Arcane 17(1947) are centred around journeys made respectively 
to the Canary Islands, Martinique and Canada, one would find in them only the barest of impressions 
of the lands though which he travelled. His concern with any documentary evidence is almost nil, and 
what little there is seems devoted to the fauna and flora of the land. Even the various 
autobiographies hardly ever seem to dwell on journeys made and in a book by Raymond Queneau 
with the promising title Le Voyage de Gr&ce, which collects together articles from a time when he did 
indeed make a journey to Greece, the only reference we actually find to Greece is in the form of a 
questionnaire: "Qu’attendiez-vous de la Gr6ce? Je n’en attendais rien. J’en suis revenu autre".
In fact the surrealists as a whole seem to have had something of a marked distrust of travel. 
This was certainly true of Breton. Elisa Breton told me that she had a great love of travel, but that 
for Breton himself it was little more than a great inconvenience: he did his travelling, she felt, through 
his collection of art objects. Likewise Reng Magritte’s rather contemptuously ironic attitude towards 
travel is well documented in his correspondence: "I’m completely devoid of the kind of imagination one 
needs to ’set o ff on a trip" he wrote to Andrg Bosmans.36 And again: "Wherever I go, I say to 
myself ’It’s just like I imagined it would be. I thought so.’"37 In a similar sort of vein, Marcel MariSn 
says that when he came to London, he used a map of Paris to find his way around.
I mentioned to Vincent Bounoure that there seemed to be this dislike of travel in surrealist 
circles and although he said he had not really perceived that himself, for his own part he had never 
had any interest in travelling even though he is one of the leading French experts on Polynesian art 
and culture. His attitude was that such artifacts were the evidence of the society he loved but which 
did not exist any longer ’on the ground’ and thus there was no point in going there.
One can cite other cases: Paul Eluard made a legendary trip to the South Seas in 1925, 
having left without a moment’s notice and remained in the Orient for 9 months, but never said 
anything about the voyage, which appears to have left no mark on his writing, while it remains
36 letter of 26 May 1958.
37 letter to Guy Mertens April 1965.
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something of a mystery what he actually did there. Luis Bufiuel has stated: "I’ve never travelled for 
pleasure. This taste for tourism, so prevalent these days, is incomprehensible to me. I don’t have the 
least curiosity about countries where I’ve never been and never will go."38 This dislike of tourism 
is also apparent in several of their collective declarations, most strongly expressed in ’Murderous 
Humanitarianism’ published in Nancy Cunard’s Negro Anthology in 1934, in which, having castigated 
those "drawn to some ’mystic’ Orient or other" and the "votaries of corpses and theosophies,[who] go 
to ground in the past, vanish down the warrens of Himalayan monasteries" goes on to pour scorn on 
"our romantic exoticism and modern travel lust".
There are nonetheless some accounts of journeys in surrealist writings and to cast an eye 
over some of these works hopefully will be to gain a perspective on the way surrealists have 
approached the question of travel and the encounter with other cultures in a context of relevance to 
anthropology. Whether these can be classed as ’ethnography’ or not they certainly go beyond what 
we usually consider to be mere travel literature. None are concerned with the individual’s own 
subjective impressions of the country that are characteristic of modern travel writing. All seek a form 
of ’participation’ within the culture, although it is on terms that are very different from those associated 
with the concepts of anthropological fieldwork.
The most significant of these works is certainly Michel Leiris’s monumental L ’Afrique fantdme, 
which has become very important in recent years as a precursor of the fashionable genre of ’reflexive 
anthropology’. For James Clifford, Leiris has led the way to an ethnography based on a "writing 
process that will endlessly pose and recompose an identity".39 He says of L ’Afrique fantdme, that 
by "interrupting the smooth ethnographic story of an access to Africa, it undermines the assumption 
that self and other can be gathered to a stable narrative coherence".40 Clifford then goes on to 
argue, in line with his assumptions about surrealism, that this represents a ’surrealist ethnography’, 
based upon techniques of collage and juxtaposition and arbitrarily establishing ’meaning’ by shuffling 
reality as one would a deck of cards. From our exploration of methodological questions above, there 
seems little doubt that such an aim would be thoroughly out of accord with surrealist intentions. Since 
we would agree with Clifford that Leiris’s achievement in L'Afrique fantdme is certainly in accord with 
surrealism, then we need to consider the nature of the work and its relation to surrealism in the 
context in which it was written.
L’Afrique fantdme is an account of the Dakar-Djibouti expedition, which was one of the most 
important events in the history of French ethnography. Leiris had gone on the expedition purely by 
chance. He had become interested in anthropology and had begun attending Marcel Mauss’s lectures 
along with Georges Bataille, but apparently he had no intention of making anthropology a career. Nor
38. Bufiuel, Mon Dernier souffle, p 167.
39 Clifford, The Predicament of Culture, p 173.
40. ibid. p 173.
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did he seem to have any particular interest in Africa as such. It is not entirely clear what the 
circumstances were that led to Leiris being invited to join the expedition. He says that Griaule had 
asked him if he was interested (Luis Bufiuel has recounted that he was asked to accompany the 
expedition as a film-maker. It didn’t interest him so he suggested Leiris go instead). It is also 
doubtless of significance that Leiris had been the secretary of Documents, then being published by 
the Mus6e de I’ethnographie au Trocad6ro, and it is perhaps for this reason that he was appointed 
as the ’secretary-archivist’ of the mission. Clifford calls this designation ’superb’, but presumably as 
a junior member of the mission with no specialist knowledge, he was simply given the most menial 
task.
Leiris was certainly diligent in his task. He made an entry virtually every day and the record 
of the twenty-two month journey is documented in impressive detail. On his return to Paris, Leiris 
showed the untouched journal to Andr§ Malraux who, deeming it worthy of publication as it was, 
arranged for it to come out with Nouvelle Revue Frangaise in 1934. Griaule was furious, considering 
that Leiris had betrayed the expedition and, by his excessive ’subjectivism’, had endangered further 
research. The question arises as to what exactly is the status of the information we are given in 
L ’Afrique fantdme.
From the perspective of what the Dakar-Djibouti expedition represented in the development 
of French anthropology, it is difficult not to have some sympathy with Griaule, for Leiris breaks even 
the most elementary rules for the collection of ethnographic evidence. Since he was charged with 
documenting the ethnographic findings of the whole mission, one can understand Griaule’s 
exasperation that Leiris should record only his own impressions and make not the slightest attempt 
to get this record to accord with the experiences of the other members of the expedition. In fact, 
considered purely as ethnography, L'Afrique fantdme must be regarded as a complete failure. 
Although it does set down some tantalising ethnographic details, these are completely 
uncontextualised as such and one can gain no real sense of the various societies through which the 
mission passed. There is no consistency to the data to which we are given access, which we see 
only through the eyes of Leiris. Of some events we are given minute details, of other hardly anything. 
We are entirely dependent, not simply on what Leiris personally saw and did, but on whatever his 
mood happened to be at the particular time and on the particular day on which he made the entry. 
The best that can be said for such an approach, considered as the ethnography of another society, 
is that it is outrageously irresponsible. But can L ’Afrique fantdme be considered ethnography in the 
usually accepted sense of the word?
Prior to going on the mission, Leiris had done little study of ethnography and had apparently 
not given any thought to the idea of becoming an anthropologist. Any interest he had in Africa itself 
appears to have been as a result of Raymond Roussel’s Impressions of Africa, an outrageously 
extravagant account of life in Africa that quite consciously draws a completely ’imaginary’ Africa that 
has no verisimilitude at all with the actual continent. As his notes reveal, Leiris was uncomfortable, 
not to say hostile, to being placed in the role of an anthropologist. It was not until after he had
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returned, and indeed after L ’Afrique fantdme had been published, that he decided to train as an 
anthropologist. As he embarked on this career, his own anthropological writings are relatively 
conventional and certainly take none of the liberties, in terms of subjective positioning, that L'Afrique 
fantdme does. As regards his own position within the anthropological discipline, Leiris does not seem 
to have ever considered himself as an innovatory anthropologist. Indeed most of his work gives the 
impression of being a little distracted, the work of someone doing a job that interests him but that his 
own personal interests are elsewhere. This is borne out by his comments in recent interviews41, in 
which he rather dismisses anthropology. In this respect, I think Frances Slaney is correct in viewing 
Leiris primarily as a poet who became involved with anthropology and that his most immediate 
interests lay elsewhere.
In this respect, L ’Afrique fantdme can be seen as something of a prolegomena, not to his 
anthropological career, but to his vast autobiographical project which, although it has often been seen 
as representing - much to Leiris’s own annoyance - an ’ethnography of the self’ - in fact has little to 
do with any conventional anthropological approach.
Leiris himself seems somewhat ambivalent about the place to assign the work within his 
oeuvre. Making a clear distinction between his ’anthropology’ and his ’literature’, he does place 
L’Afrique fantdme in the anthropology section (although this could in fact have been for professional 
reasons - to make it seem he had written more anthropology than he had) but still has doubts about 
whether it is ethnography42 Perhaps it could be more accurately described as ’testimony’ than as 
’ethnography’, since what it effectively does is to bear witness, with exemplary candour, to what 
happened to a group of Europeans who travelled for twenty one months through the centre of Africa. 
As such it certainly has an exemplary value, but it does not bring into question the traditional 
ethnographic approach, nor does it establish a role model for an innovatory form of ethnography. 
Indeed, implicit in L ’Afrique fantdme is a critique of any role model. Leiris has stated that he had a 
"repugnance for everything that is a transposition or arrangement, in other words a fallacious 
compromise between real facts and the pure products of the imagination."43 L ’Afrique fantdme 
bears witness to this repugnance and to the continuity of the book with his surrealist concerns. 
There can be little doubt that L ’Afrique fantdme is a surrealist work, but not for the reasons Clifford 
gives, since surrealism is a moral attitude and not a technique. It is therefore not the collage 
technique, the use of metonymic juxtaposition, the mockery of scientific discourse, the taste for 
incongruity, that make the work surrealist, even if these things are apparent within the book. In 
surrealism it is simply false to say, as Clifford does, that procedures of cutting out and assemblage 
are the message and that surrealists would find anything to praise in such an anthropology. But
41 see interview with Jean Jamin and Sally Price in Gradhiva (1980), no 4
42 interview in Gradhiva, p42.
43 Leiris, L'Age d ’homme, p 15.
73
having said all this and denied the status of L ’Afrique fantdme as ethnography, whether in the 
traditional mode or in that of the currently fashionable reflexive, we will now seek to turn our argument 
back on itself and argue that L ’Afrique fantdme is indeed ethnography, even innovatory ethnography, 
not because of either its form or its reflexive matter, however, but because of its content.
In L ’Afrique fantdme what we see is the displacement of the object of ethnographic study; 
Leiris is not studying the peoples encountered by the Dakar-Djibouti expedition, nor is he studying his 
fellow ethnographers, as Michel Izard has suggested, since his observations on them are no more 
systematic than those on the natives. What is treated systematically as an object is the internal 
dynamic of Leiris’s own imaginative processes. It does not seem to me that this can be described 
as an ’ethnography of the self’, since Leiris himself is not really the focus of the ’study’ (if this is an 
appropriate word). Rather it is the dialectic interplay between Leiris’s self and his perception of the 
external world. Internal and external, in this context, become inseparable. Can we speak of such a 
process as representing an ’ethnography of the imagination’?
Three clear literary influences play upon Leiris’s intentions with regard to the writing of 
L ’Afrique fantdme. Most immediate is Breton’s Nadja (1927), in which real and imaginary events are 
presented with the same veracity and given an identical ontological value. The other two works are 
Proust’s A la Rdcherehe du temps perdu and Joyce’s Ulysses. The influence of these two works is 
perhaps less pervasive and immediate (and Leiris’s intentions may have been rather different from 
these two authors), but if we consider the book in relation to these two works we gain some insight 
into the background against which Leiris was working. The importance of Proust is in the meticulous 
way in which he sought to address the question of memory while Joyce was important again for the 
way the events of a single day are presented so meticulously as to suggest numerous levels of 
possible interpretation. In some ways it might be possible to argue that both Proust and Joyce were 
engaged in an ethnographic quest, a quest in which the ’object’ is not other people but the 
mechanism of one’s own imagination. In this respect both works, in the way in which they effectively 
’mythologise’ contemporary life, have something in common with surrealist intentions, even though 
the surrealists were generally fond of neither author because of what was perceived as the overly 
literary intent. Even so the tantalizing glimpses of a potential ’ethnographic’ approach to the 
imagination, something that is rather characteristic of surrealist narrative strategies in general, is in 
many ways prefigured in Proust and Joyce, and takes particular form in Leiris’s autobiographical 
project.
If Leiris’s account of the Dakar-Djibouti expedition raises difficulties as to the status of its 
ethnographic import within anthropology, Antonin Artaud’s writings on Mexico and most notably his 
journey to the Tarahumara Indians - even though Artaud was not an anthropologist and had no 
interest in anthropological theory - are more clearly ethnographic in their overall aims in that Artaud 
was concerned to describe his experience in Mexico, and had no interest in problematizing his relation 
to the collection of ethnographic data. Artaud’s work does nevertheless raise equally difficult 
questions in other respects.
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There are some parallels between Artaud’s journey to Mexico and the Dakar-Djibouti 
expedition in that Artaud had also hoped to be able to establish a similar sort of expedition among 
the Indian populations. The parallel, however, ends there. While the Griaule mission was primarily 
given the task of documenting the cultures encountered in the course of the journey, and also of 
bringing back as many cultural exhibits as possible, Artaud’s intention was "to do with discovering and 
reviving the vestiges of the ancient Solar culture."44 Where the Dakar-Djibouti expedition was 
supported by the French government, Artaud had been invited to Mexico by some Mexicans 
interested in surrealism and had to raise his own funds, which were mostly obtained from friends, 
supplemented by the giving of lectures when he was actually in Mexico. He was given a grant by the 
Mexican government to visit the land of the Tarahumaras.
Artaud visited Mexico in 1936, staying there from January until October. His attitude towards 
his visit was nothing if not grandiose. Believing that the rest of the world had collapsed into 
barbarism, and considering that Mexico alone held the flame of world regeneration, Artaud believed 
he could work with the Mexicans towards the recovery of essential reality by rejecting pernicious 
European influences and reconciling Mexican revolutionary consciousness with the ancient secrets 
still retained by Indian civilisation.
It should be recalled that at the time Mexico was governed by the progressive Cardenas 
administration, which was determined to build upon the achievements of the Mexican Revolution and 
was far from being unsympathetic to ideas like those of Artaud. It was indeed a government grant 
that allowed Artaud to visit the Tarahumaras, even though in the end he was unable to establish the 
expedition he wished and had to travel alone.
Artaud’s ethnographic attitude is the polar opposite to that of anthropology. Where 
anthropology seeks to discover and comprehend an ’Other’, Artaud refuses to accept the notion of 
alienness. He refuses to accept the validity of treating other societies in terms other than his own. 
One could say that his image of the Tarahumaras was pre-determined, although this would be 
something of an over-simplification. It would be truer to say that he knew what he wanted to find in 
Mexico. It would be up to the Mexicans to conform to this idea. If they did not, then Artaud would 
reject them. Now, in considering the issue in these terms, what is apparent is that to some extent 
such an attitude is implicit in any ethnographic approach. Artaud’s attitude problematises any 
conception of ’ethnocentrism’, or rather brings into relief the fact that the ethnographer must bring 
some preconceptions into the field. The fact that Artaud’s practice does not admit of the validity of 
denying such preconceptions does not necessarily invalidate his approach as ethnography, especially 
since the limit within which he is working is much narrower than that of most ethnographers. At the 
same time he makes no attempt to hide his own preconceptions and therefore one might argue that 
his ethnographic approach has some exemplary qualities in relation to the approach of traditional 
ethnography, since such an approach always leaves us to try to draw out what the anthropologist’s
44. letter to Jean-Louis Barrault
75
own prejudices are, whereas there can be no doubt about Artaud’s.
Artaud’s attitude is very much a surrealist one, the assumption being that ’thought is ONE and 
indivisible’. This stance does not admit of the possibility of relativism. It is fundamentally monist and 
against any form of pluralism. And, thought being common to all, the distance and detachment 
formally demanded by anthropology, is denied. Since everything comes from the same source, since 
everything is connected with everything else, then there is no possibility of alienness: everything 
becomes a matter of positioning. There is no question of ’objectivity’ as such, but of establishing the 
objective relation between different subjectivities. From an anthropological point of view, Artaud’s 
image of the Tarahumaras can be dismissed as being inaccurate, but it is so only because 
anthropology does not accept the starting point with which Artaud began. What Artaud saw of 
Tarhumaras culture is as objective as any anthropological account; if it is invalid from the point of view 
of the anthropologist it is so because the anthropologist is looking for something else. This argument 
brings to mind the Freeman/Mead debate, where it can be seen that neither Freeman nor Mead 
present an objective view of Samoan reality, but one which reflects their own perspective on it.
Artaud's approach towards foreign culture contrasts interestingly with that of Leiris. At root 
both had a similar attitude and Leiris had gone on the Dakar-Djibouti expedition to "get rid of old 
European attitudes". He expected to find in Africa something analogous to what Artaud wanted in 
Mexico, but was constantly frustrated. Was Artaud more tenacious? Was it because the 
Tarahumaras, unlike the peoples Leiris encountered, were to a large degree unacculturated? Was 
it because Leiris was a more reflective individual who was responsive to the nuances of the other’s 
society and perceived the disparity between what he hoped to find and what he actually did find? 
There is probably an element of truth in all three , but the fact that the Tarahumaras were an isolated 
tribe with little contact with the outside world, meant that Artaud was able to establish a more 
immediate relation with the indigenous peoples than Leiris, who was part of a group of Europeans 
travelling among peoples who were in large degree colonial subjects and used to dealing with 
Europeans.45
A different perspective can be gained from a consideration of Octavio Paz’s The Monkey 
Grammarian (1971). Paz gives us no details about the circumstances of his journey to the Indian holy 
city of Galta. He wrote the text of the book in the summer of 1970 in Cambridge, where he held the 
chair of Latin American studies for a year. He had visited Galta when he was in India as the Mexican 
ambassador to that country, a post he resigned in July 1968 in protest at the massacre of students 
in Mexico City. There was therefore at least a two-year gap between his visit and the writing up of 
the account. Paz never allows us to forget this triple conjunction: a Mexican, writing about a visit to 
an Indian town in the quiet seclusion of Cambridge University.
4S. Lourdes Andrade told me that the particular Tarahumaras tribe with which Artaud stayed have 
remained completely isolated to this day and that Artaud has been the only European they have 
allowed to live among them. Two anthropologists who tried to study them were murdered. I have 
not been able to verify this.
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Galta is a town in Gujarat which was abandoned around 1920 because of encroachment by 
the desert. Falling into ruin it soon became a refuge for pariahs, holy men and, last but not least, 
monkeys. It also became a place of pilgrimage. Paz takes these images: a ruined city, untouchables, 
pilgrims, holy men and monkeys, as a point of departure for multiple reflexions on the nature of reality 
and the signification of perceptions of fixity and movement, turbulence and equilibrium, language and 
representation, fullness and emptiness. Thematic unity is established by the figure of Hanuman, the 
ambivalent Hindu monkey god who presides over culture and language.
At first glance, The Monkey Grammarian is even more disordered than either Leiris’s or 
Artaud’s books. Paz’s narrative flies off in all directions at once, one perception being a touchstone 
for a whole series of reflexions. Such apparent confusion is illusory and as soon as one starts to 
engage with the book one comes to terms with its internal unity.46
Paz challenges the whole concept of writing about travel. For him, to write an account of a 
journey is to erase the journey. It is thus only vanity to seek to ’represent’ what one has seen. And 
unhealthy to try (this is also the theme of another surrealist travel narrative, Alberto Savinio’s 
Speaking to Clio, which is founded on the idea of writing as a process of clearing away past thought - 
a process of exorcism, even. Savinio goes so far as to recommend keeping a diary for the purpose 
of wiping the slate clean of the previous day - life is to be re-made anew each day). The purpose 
of writing is even precisely this: to wipe memories away and establish a new meaning in the new 
journey. Paz refuses to privilege any type of journey, whether it be a physical journey, or one 
conducted through reading or writing. The journey he undertakes from his study in Cambridge has 
as much significance as the one to Galta. Both represented the desire to continue the journey 
towards the self and towards the world. As such it represents the objective form of knowledge that 
surrealism sought, in which the subjective perspective would be incorporated within it and desire 
would become concretised. Breton had written that the universe is "an indivisible cryptogram which 
man is called upon to decipher" and this, we might say, provides the cornerstone for the surrealist 
’anthropological’ approach. Nothing is ever ’represented’; it is only re-made in a different form 
responding to different contingencies. The world, being one, cannot be experienced as separable 
from this whole. It is for this reason that Paz gives such significance to the figure of Hanuman, the 
grammarian who preceded man. As such he symbolises the unity of man with nature.
We can see here the point at which the approaches of Leiris, Artaud and Paz converge: in 
the wish to decipher the universe. Within these terms the fundamental framework of the ethnographic 
encounter - of trying to understand the other - is renounced. All three decline, or more often ignore, 
the idea of trying to establish a distance between oneself and the object of study. They all refuse to 
detach themselves from the people they are visiting and insist on considering both as parts of the 
same reality while still respecting the problematic this establishes: they remain conscious - often
46 The Monkey Grammarian is clearly influenced by Tristes Tropiques, with which it has much in 
common. Paz has written a book on L6vi-Strauss and has clearly learned a great deal about 
anthropology from him, although his philosophical position is somewhat different.
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acutely so - of themselves as different from those they travel amongst (at least this is true of Leiris 
and Paz, but is less so of Artaud). The anthropologist is supposed to dissolve his own prejudices, 
but Leiris, Artaud and Paz all accept their own tendentiousness. But it can, I think, be seen that their 
approaches can not be considered to be subjective. On the contrary, within the terms of the 
framework established, they all seek to establish an objectivity in relation to their own work. They 
also point to areas of subjective intent, of imaginative construction, of factors of desire, that 
traditionally in anthropology have been excluded from the calculations upon which the ethnographic 
attitude is founded.
In each case, however, it is not the people visited who are the objects of study. In Paz’s 
account, in particular, we gain no insight into the people who live at Galta. As an ethnography of 
Galta and its people, it would be worthless. As Paz states, nothing actually happened there. 
Although he describes a trip to an exotic place, Paz in fact refuses this exoticism and inscribes the 
very ordinariness that it involved, but only to emphasise the way in which any journey, any encounter, 
is at root mysterious. To a lesser extent, one could say the same about all the other accounts we 
have considered. Neither Leiris nor Artaud really make more than perfunctory attempts to understand 
the societies they visited. Such understanding as they had came from the extent to which they felt 
integrated into the society. They did not travel to try to find something new, something exotic and 
foreign, although to some extent they were looking for something that had been lost within themselves 
and their own society. In this respect they have something in common with other travellers in search 
of the ’Noble Savage’. I don't, however, see that this is the primary importance of these works in the 
anthropological perspective. Rather it is the extent to which they confront, in different ways, the 
encounter with otherness through their own individual imaginations.
The key surrealist image for the idea of travel is the phrase, As he crossed the bridge the 
phantoms came to meet him, something that comes from a film in which the lead character crosses 
a bridge into a dark forest. In the film the scene that follows the crossing of the bridge is printed in 
negative, suggesting the dialectical encounter with otherness in terms of a turning upside down of 
values.47 It is perhaps in the surrealist attitude towards the cinema that we can gain another 
perspective onto ethnography through surrealism. The surrealists saw the visit to the cinema as 
always involving the crossing of a threshold into something unknown. Breton expressed this as 
follows: "it is a question of going beyond the bounds of what is ’allowed’, which in the cinema as 
nowhere else, prepares me to enter into the ’forbidden’."48 The effect is such that "a super­
disorientation is to be expected here, not from the transference of a normal act from everyday life to 
a place consecrated to another life, which is profane, but between the ’lesson’ the film teaches and
47 The film is F.W. Murnau’s Nosferatu (1923), the first film version of Dracula. The image is an 
inter-title which does not in fact appear in the original version of the film, being a mis-translation that 
occurred when the inter-title was rendered into French. The scene itself is when Hutter leaves the 
common road to take the path to Dracula’s castle.
48 Breton, ’As in a Wood’, in Paul Hammond (ed), The Shadow and its Shadow, p 44.
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the manner in which the person receiving it disposes of it".49
To consider this approach in ethnographic terms is not to suggest that it provides any 
’alternative’ ways of doing ethnography, but rather to bring into relief the way that any ethnographic 
approach must pass through the ethnographer’s own sensibility. In giving us such a transparent view 
of the way in which they have approached the question of alienness, the surrealists allow us some 
insight into the imaginative process. We could, perhaps, describe this as giving the beginning of a 
potential ’ethnography of the imagination’, the idea of which we will try to develop in subsequent 
chapters in dealing with the way the imagination functions in representation.
49 ibid. p 44.
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CHAPTER FOUR;
REALITY, IMAGINATION AND THE OBJECT
The imagination is the queen of truth, and the possible is one of 
the provinces of the truth.
Baudelaire
Travel, the Imagination and the exotic
In considering surrealist travel narratives, we have sought to problematise the notion of travel 
itself. What does the idea of ’travel’ actually mean? Does it simply involve a change of geographical 
location? In the West, the idea of the seasoned traveller tends to be applied only to physical journeys 
undertaken from one place to another. If they involve difficulties of access, if one has problems with 
customs, is required to have numerous inoculations, falls ill with a tropical disease, is held up at 
gunpoint by bandits, has problems understanding local conventions, then so much the better: it is 
precisely such exotic adventures that legitimate the travel experience. This is equally true of 
anthropology and gives a romantic veneer to the fieldwork experience. All well and good, but as we 
discussed in the first chapter, such experiences, given a value in themselves, do scant justice to all
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the congeries involved in the establishment of a ’science of man’.
Such an image of travel is not one shared by all cultures. In many societies, the most 
significant image of travel is towards an inner reality represented in particular by the shamanic 
journey. In such societies, the notion of travelling ’abroad’ is often given no credence at all. Yet in 
Western societies it is often the freedom with which one is enabled to travel to other countries that 
provides one of the main barometers of the social well-being of a society.
This lust for the exotic is a reflexion of alienated social relations, for it is rarely a case of travel 
being perceived as a confrontation with otherness. To the contrary, everything is often done to restrict 
the extent to which the ’other’ should enter the exotic framework. Whether it be a package tour or 
an anthropological expedition, the primary concern appears to be to frame the experience of travel 
within familiar terms of reference. What is sought is an encounter with something ’different’, 
something outside oneself that is separable from oneself. No matter what the physical difficulties, or 
even dangers involved, everything is done to restrict the risk of psychic contamination. As Sidney 
Mintz has said: "...we rush about the globe, encouraging our children to do likewise, in search of 
something ’totally different’, even while we relentlessly turn it into something that is ’the same’; that 
is, more like our own.”1
This conception of travel, then, is diametrically at the opposite end of the spectrum from the 
idea of the shamanic journey, where it is precisely the notion of the confrontation of otherness that 
is centrally at stake. The idea of the physical journey as exclusively representing the process of travel 
is thus equally a turning away from the idea of the internal journey. Frequently such a conception of 
travel implies that there is something exemplary in any change of scene, that, simply by the process 
of going somewhere else, one’s own vision of the world will be renewed. The curious phrase, 'travel 
broadens the mind’, emphasises this assumption: the mind is broadened not by anything the mind 
itself actually does, but purely though the process of a physical change of locale. Such a belief relies 
upon the separation of mind and body and especially the separation of oneself from the external 
world, all of which is brought into question by our discussion of surrealist narratives that have dealt 
with the process of travel. This became particularly apparent to Leiris as he travelled across Africa 
to ’lose his white habits’ and found that, contrariwise, he simply became more aware of them. It is 
still the case that the urge to travel frequently represents little more than the will to be elsewhere than 
one is. As such it remains a primarily negative experience, responding to a lack in one’s perception 
of one’s own social surroundings rather than a will towards something new.
Yet the image of the journey is an elemental human image. In being born we are set on an 
inescapable journey through life, in which we are continually forced to confront the alienness of what 
is external to us. The process of learning is one of gradual absorption of alienness into oneself. For 
the newly-born child, it might be said, everything is perceived in terms of itself. As it grows it learns 
that it must adapt to what surrounds it and it is only by passing through such an experience that the
1 Sidney Mintz, preface to the second edition of Voodoo in Haiti by Alfred Metraux.
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child grows as an individual. There is no reality inside oneself that is independent of one’s experience 
of the world. Equally, one’s experience of the external world only takes form through one’s own inner 
experience. Being born is thus to be thrown on the path towards the other. Marx expressed this well: 
"Since he comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand nor as a Fichtian philosopher 
to whom ’I am I’ is sufficient, man first sees and recognises himself as other men. Peter only 
acknowledges his identity as a man by comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And 
thereby Paul, just as he stands in his Pauline personality becomes to Peter the true type of the genus 
homo..."2 To this extent, then, we are all born as anthropologists.
Since the image of the journey is so integral to the experience of human life, being perhaps 
the most archetypal of all human images and at the heart of most mythologies, it is hardly surprising 
that the idea of the journey is one of the first specifically human images that has come down to us 
from the origins of culture. The oldest written text known to us, The Epic of Gilgamesh, represents 
a journey of some complexity dating from 3000BC. A similar account of a journey, the Odyssey of 
Homer, takes its place as a cornerstone of the Western cultural tradition.
As it took form, anthropology established its lineage in direct relation to the travel narrative. 
It has not traced its origins back to Gilgamesh or Homer, though, but to Herodotus, for reasons that 
are pertinent to our discussion.
Herodotus was attractive as the founding father of anthropology less because of the 
verisimilitude of the representations that constitute the anthropological content of his work (it is 
arguable that there are as many outlandish things in Herodotus as in Homer) as in its form; Herodotus 
disengages us from the mythical form of the journey to confront us directly with an image of 
otherness, which he claims to present with as much verity as possible. It is this claim, rather than 
anything directly in the content of his work, that establishes the credentials of Herodotus as 
anthropologist (and also as historian). The approach of Herodotus is descriptive of ’other people’. 
He separates himself from them and comments on them. Unlike the ’epic’ or ’romance’ form, he does 
not conflate his own perspective with that of the people he is writing about. Rather he seeks to 
establish the other’s integrity, positing the other as being different rather than, as in the epic form, an 
enemy or an obstacle to be overcome. In Herodotus alienness becomes objectified instead of 
emerging pell-mell from the necessities of the narrative structure. We might exemplify this point by 
the episode of the Cyclops in the Odyssey. For Homer he is simply a dangerous obstacle to 
Odysseus in his journey and must be defeated to allow the hero to pass on his way - as such he has 
no integral reality except in relation to the hero of the narrative; Herodotus, on the other hand, had 
he encountered such a creature, would have sought to understand him quite independently of his 
relation to the story being told. This would seem to represent, at least at first glance, an admirably 
anthropological attitude and to draw a sharp distinction between the concerns of science and those 
of romance. It perhaps does do so, in fact, but not entirely in the way generally thought. For, as we
2 Marx, Capital, p 35.
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have sought to show, questions of objectivity are by no means as simple and straightforward as 
positivist anthropology might like to believe.
In her history of early anthropology, Margaret Hodgen has considered Herodotus as being 
an exemplary figure who established an anthropology avant la lettre which was to be distorted over 
the centuries to come: "It was his hand," she writes, "which first set down in an organized and vivid 
form a description of a series of human cultures, later to be deformed and disfigured to suit the 
twisted imaginations of his successors. It was his mind, brooding restlessly over strange cultural 
contrasts in Mediterranean lands, which first formulated some of the persisting problems of 
anthropological inquiry."3 Hodgen writes with great enthusiasm for the approach of Herodotus and 
seems to be incredulous at what she sees as the wilful distortions of the medieval mind.
In fact, Herodotus has often been considered to be too fanciful; and as a ’liar’. Was the 
reason for this some sort of incomprehensible perversity of medieval thinking, or does it rather involve 
a different perspective on the nature of the objective portrayal of the alien?
Of course, whether Herodotus’ intentions were ’anthropological’, in the contemporary sense, 
is open to question. It is a hazardous matter to impute intent (especially within such a specific frame 
of reference) to a person of such a different culture and sensibility as ours. It is misleading to try to 
establish a category (or discipline) of something like anthropology in so specific a framework as to 
make of it an absolute value applicable to all historical periods. Especially when anthropology, as 
consciously elaborated, properly belongs only to recent European history. The question of the status 
of Herodotus’ work in the context of Greek society is something for Greek historians, not 
anthropologists, to determine. No doubt in considering Herodotus to be the originator of anthropology, 
we are imposing our own gloss. But what concerns us here is the nature of the evidence offered by 
Herodotus and how it helps to illuminate questions about travel and the nature of anthropological 
evidence.
At a superficial level it is not difficult to see that one of the central strands that unites 
Herodotus to modern anthropology is the needs of colonialism. Greek political authority was 
expansionist and imperialist in nature and such authority must have ’accurate’ information about the 
peoples it has conquered to be able to maintain an efficient administration and impose its authority 
in the colonised territories. Even so, such ’accurate’ information still needs to be ideologically sifted 
and defined: it is never neutral.
For in truth the medieval mind was not ’imperialist’ in this sense at all and consequently its 
interest in other peoples was far more disinterested. Disinterested, but hardly more accurate. Yet 
accuracy in such a context begins to lose its sense. It is defined relative to the requirements of the 
society from which one is working. Medieval accounts of travel may seem to us to be fanciful and 
almost devoid of reality and we tend to ascribe this to some form of descriptive deficiency. The fact
3 Margaret T. Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, p 
20/21 .
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is otherwise: medieval travel accounts responded with perfect accuracy to what medieval society 
required from travel accounts.4 To understand particular travel accounts it is not enough simply to 
establish a framework of supposed ’objective’ portrayal. What is necessary is to consider the whole 
question of the to-and-fro nature of the encounter with the alien in terms of what is perceived as 
familiar and ’home’. Anthropological evidence always establishes its objectivity by means of balancing 
subjectivities. Here our argument about surrealist writers making an object of their own imaginative 
process gains additional force. For it is only through an understanding of the imagination, I would 
argue, that we can hope to come to terms with the range of difficulties involved here.
In the journey, the perception of the alien is always set off against a conceptualization of the 
familiar. One state begins where the other ends, although the boundaries between them are never 
clear cut and are always in process of new mediation. We are always, at every moment, involved 
in mapping out a new terrain by which our concepts of the familiar and the alien, the domestic and 
the wild, home and abroad can be established. How we perceive other people and how we undertake 
specific journeys is always dependent upon the relative sense of mediation we have established 
between concepts of what is familiar and what is alien, concepts which are largely produced by the 
imagination. This is something that was particularly important to the late nineteenth century writer, 
doctor, archaeologist and traveller, Victor Segalen.
Segalen denied the usual definition of exoticism as being a fixed form of strangeness that is 
assigned to particular races, cultures, fauna etc. Rather the exotic is a sense of surprise in which a 
disjunction is apparent between oneself and the world in which one lives. It is a feeling - the opposite 
of a ddja-vu - in which perception is torn apart from the familiar. It tends to occur in one of three 
ways - through a confrontation with the physically distinct, with the past or with the future. The exotic 
is a jolt into the unknown. But as it is established, so it tends to fade with assimilation and coming 
to terms with the new experience. The exotic is a means for the renewal of vision - it enriches the 
sensibility as it holds the real and imaginary in tension. Segalen’s quest - which has to be considered 
as being very much an anthropological one - was to try to hold this tension so that internal and 
external reality would not be perceived as contradictory to each other. He wrote: "Let’s not flatter 
ourselves that we can assimilate morals, races, nations, others, but rather let’s rejoice in never being 
able to do so, thereby reserving to ourselves the durability of the pleasure of feeling the diverse."5 
What needs to be considered is the nature of the imagination as such. How does it function in 
relation to the real and produce the images encountered in representation?
4 On this question we might note the revealing example recounted by Jamake Highwater 
concerning an encounter between the Swiss artist Rudolph Friedrich Kurz and a Sioux Indian 
in 1852. The Indian expressed dissatisfaction with Kurz’s drawing and said that he could do 
better. The Indian drew a man on horseback in a way that both the man’s legs could be seen. 
Kurz’s objected that this was wrong because one of the man’s legs could not be seen from the 
angle from which it was painted. "’Ah,’ the Sioux said softly, ’but, you see, an man has two 
legs.’" (Highwater, The Primal Mind, p 57.)
5 Segalen, Notes sur I ’Exotisme.
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In Segalen’s book Equip6e (1928) he explores the nature of travel in its double sense as both 
a journey out there and as a journey within. The subtitle of the work is ’a journey to the land of the 
real’ and it is written around a voyage that Segalen himself made in 1914 across China. The journey 
was undertaken primarily as an archaeological expedition to uncover examples of ancient Chinese 
statuary. Segalen was accompanied by Gilbert de Voisins and the photographer Jean Lartigue, and 
an account of the expedition was published in 1924 by the Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner. But 
this very concrete reason for travelling was not sufficient for Segalen. He wanted to use it to try to 
understand the mechanism of the imagination through the process of travelling, to try to determine 
the extent to which one’s preconceptions determined how one perceived the actual process of travel. 
Or did the physical act of travelling eliminate the preconceptions built up whilst thinking about the 
journey beforehand? The question that Segalen attempted to answer in Equipde was this: "is the 
imaginary dissipated or replenished when confronted with the real?"6 As Yvonne Hieuh says: "The 
ultimate goal is to settle the following question: do the world of the Real and the Imaginary unite and 
reinforce each other, or does one inevitably destroy the other, so that returning from this ’Equipee 
dans le R£el,’ the author will have to give up the ’double jeu plein de promesse sans quoi I’homme 
vivant n’est plus corps, ou n’est plus esprit’?"7
Segalen had a background in symbolism, in which the idea of travel was often scorned in a 
cult of the artificial. The classic example of this is the chapter in Huysmans’ A Rebours in which the 
central character, Des Esseintes, having decided to visit London, wanders around Paris for anything 
imbued with English atmosphere - he buys a map, visits tea-shops and English bars, mixes with 
English people, etc. On his way to the railway station to catch the train, however, he decides he has 
had enough of London: "After all, I have felt and seen what I wanted to feel and see. I have been 
steeped in English life ever since I left home; it would be a fool’s trick to go and lose these 
imperishable impressions by a clumsy change of locality. Why, surely I must have been out of my 
senses to have tried thus to repudiate my old settled convictions, to have condemned the obedient 
figment of my imagination, to have believed like the veriest ninny in the necessity, the interest, the 
advantage of a trip abroad?"8
Although coming from the same background, Segalen had none of this aristocratic contempt 
for the physical reality of the journey itself. On the contrary, he travelled as much as he could. But
6 Victor Segalen, Equip6e, p 11.
7 Yvonne Y. Hsieh, Victor Segalen’s Literary Encounter With China: Chinese Moulds, 
Western Thoughts, p124.
8 J.K. Huysmans, Against the Grain, p 130. The symbolists should perhaps be 
distinguished from the surrealists in this respect, for although the surrealists appear to have 
been largely indifferent or had a rather ironical attitude toward the idea of travelling, they never 
had any of the active contempt for travel displayed by the symbolists. This is an important 
distinguishing feature, for ultimately symbolism retreats before the exigencies of the real world 
into an inner sanctum of the imagination, whereas surrealism always sought to hold imagination 
and reality in tension.
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his symbolist background gave him an acute sensitivity to the inner component involved when one 
travels in (outer) reality, and the extent to which the two are dependent on each other. He could not 
accept the fact that a journey simply involved the physical transportation of a person from one 
environment to another. He begins Equip6e with these words: "I have always held to be suspect or 
illusory everything within the genre of adventure tales, travelogues, and tattletales - decked out with 
sincere words - based on activity presented as occurring in specific places at the end of catalogued 
days."9 In this his attitude prefigures that of surrealism.
Real and Imaginary In surrealism
The question that arises here is the status of the imaginary in relation to the real. We are 
accustomed to considering reality as being commensurate with our perceptual frame of reference: we 
do not admit as reality anything that is beyond, or simply not reducible, to that perceptual framework.
This conception of ’reality’ is legitimated philosophically by the delineation of ontology 
preponderant in Western culture and first expressed by Plato. This separates essence and 
appearance from each other in absolute terms and makes a dualistic division between them, in which 
essence is valorised against ’mere’ appearance.
In surrealism this ontological principle is challenged. The issue has been considered in some 
detail by the philosopher Ferdinand Alqute, in his book The Philosophy of Surrealism. It is therefore 
useful here to recapitulate AlquiS's argument to bring the question of the imagination in this context 
into relief.
Alqui6 identifies two essential postulates upon which the surrealist conception of the 
imagination is based. The first assumes a relation and a unity between the real and the imaginary, 
a unity that alone makes identity possible. The second rejects the Bergsonian concept of an arbitrary 
imagination to replace it with one which is fundamentally synthetic. The imaginary takes form as a 
realising force which holds images in an unstable relation formed by the play of the imagination, which 
is fluid, with the real, which is solid. It thereby throws a conducting line between the internal and the 
external, ceaselessly breaking the framework of the given in order to re-constitute it. The motive force 
here is desire, which tends towards the realization of what it imagines.
Up to this point surrealism remains within the framework of Cartesian ontology based upon 
three essential postulates - identity of sensation and image, the proper existence of images and the 
power of actualization - but reverses the values invoked, removing the rationalist frame and 
welcoming the free expression of images against reason, utility and moral censure. As surrealism 
developed, however, it began to question this framework and to anticipate the findings of gestalt 
psychology which undermined the belief that images accurately represented sensations. The
9 Segalen, ibid., p 11
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surrealists had, Alqui6 suggests, anticipated such findings by what they had learned from Freud, 
positing the liberty of consciousness to create images rather than imitate given forms: ’The surrealist 
imagination refuses the given and derealizes it; desire chooses whatever in ordinary life pleases it, 
and, the logical boundaries of perception being broken, all approaches become permissible and all 
are sources of light."10 In this Freud had led the surrealists to question what they had at first simply 
taken to be a product of nature and to consider the imagination in relation to the nexus of subjective 
relations. In practice this leads surrealism to replace representational images with comparative ones 
and divests the imagination of all mystical forms. In this way, surrealism always invokes a dialectical 
relation whereby the seen is always seeking to suggest an unseen and vice versa; it is, in other 
words, always seeking to go beyond itself. As such it does not involve a return to immediacy but 
rather establishes contact with the immediate. Therefore it always remains opposed to what exists 
mechanically and presents itself as an eternal promise. This much is in harmony with surrealism’s 
own self-image.
Alqui6 describes himself as a Kantian philosopher who sees himself as lying within a direct 
tradition that connects up with Plato through Cartesianism. He would like to claim surrealism for the 
same tradition, and argues that it does not - as superficially appears to be the case, and as the 
surrealists themselves would claim - break with the Enlightenment tradition that claims descent from 
Plato, but rather as developing in a new direction. Alqui6 does not specifically try to connect up the 
surrealist understanding of the imagination with that tradition, but prefers to view surrealism as a 
particular development, in terms of lineal process, of the Western intellectual tradition that links Plato 
with Descartes and Kant (who are AlquiS’s own favourite philosophers). He argues this because in 
surrealism the individual liberation that establishes the self’s integrity is in opposition to all forms of 
oppression that would seek to limit it. This is in accord with Enlightenment ideas about the 
perfectibility of man and the requirement to foster self-consciousness as the means towards the 
realization of freedom. We will examine this question in some detail in the final chapter of the thesis. 
For now we will confine ourselves to looking at the implications of such an argument for the way in 
which we conceptualize the imagination.
In seeking to claim surrealism for the Enlightenment in this way, Alqute admits that he is 
interpreting surrealism in a way that is contrary to what the surrealists have said and thought about 
themselves. But he justifies his argument by the fact that the surrealists are not professional 
philosophers and cannot be expected to appreciate the full philosophical implications of their own 
practice. In this respect he is particularly keen to extricate surrealism from what he considers to be 
a faux pas by claiming descent from Hegel and German Romanticism, in which he sees a rejection 
of the Platonic tradition of self-realization and the establishment of mystificatory ideas that are the 
foundation of tyranny.
We cannot deal with this argument here, but it is important to establish the precise
10. Alquie, The Philosophy of Surrealism, p 134.
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relationship of surrealism to romanticism, and especially to the philosophy of Hegel (which Alqui6 sees 
as being particularly pernicious), since it will be clear from what has been said so far that I do not 
think the surrealists were mistaken in charting their own lineage through romanticism. It seems to me 
that the surrealists were far more philosophically literate than Alqui6 is prepared to give them credit 
for and that, for better or worse, surrealism has to be seen in terms of the heritage of romanticism 
and Hegel.
The a key element to be considered in treating notions of what constitutes reality is the 
ontological status of the imagination. Is it simply a deceiving realm of uncertainty to be distrusted, 
but which acts upon the ’real’ by default. Or does it - as the surrealists would certainly argue - itself 
an ontological category as tangible as that of the ’real’? From the perspective of our argument about 
the way in which images and representation are established and take particular form must therefore 
turn on ontological questions about the status of reality.
Alquie recognises the difficulty involved here when he says that surrealism represents a 
’rupture with ontology’. This is the crux of Alqui6’s argument, for he sees an inherent contradiction 
between surrealism’s aims in this respect that reveals both the limits of surrealism in its central task 
of the transformation of man while at the same time it also shows the profound impact it has had on 
ideas of human freedom. He asserts that surrealism is "the sign of our autonomy. It chooses, it 
comprehends, it invents. It is not the road leading from the image to the real, the blind natural force 
by which forms are incarnated. It is much rather the liberating faculty that permits us to pass from 
the real to the image itself.”11 This backhanded compliment, praising the surrealists not for 
what they thought they were doing but for what Alqui6 thinks they are actually doing, robs surrealism 
of its founding principle and inserts the human will at the heart of its liberating aspirations. But even 
so, it is still not accurate to describe this as a break with ontology, since the surrealists plainly do not 
break with the notion of essence. It is, rather, a reformulation of ontological principles.
Alqui6 goes on: "In introducing into its conception of the imagination an element of critical 
consciousness, will not surrealism be constrained to renounce its fundamental project and to justify 
scientific and technological activity as the only way - at the level of scientific knowledge - that the 
imaginary can become real? If the image is born of our rupture with spontaneous and vital adaptation 
[...] we can no longer in effect find the real through the image except by acknowledging still more our 
first separation from nature and submitting our desire to the laws of representation. On the level of 
pure spontaneity and instinct, we can conceive of an action directly extending the affections. But 
precisely on this level there are no images properly so called. Dolorific, tactile, olfactory, and 
gustatory sensations, which express the animal nature in us, cannot be recalled in the form of 
images..."12 This is the crux of Alqui6’s argument - it implies that the task the surrealists set 
themselves is untenable and contradicted by their own practice, but that surrealism is of great interest
11 Ferdinand Alquie, The Philosophy of Surrealism, p 134/5
12 AlquiS, ibid, p 135.
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if we consider it as part of the Western tradition they themselves consciously rejected. This is rather 
condescending and brings to mind the worst anthropological approaches that purport to explain in 
’primitive’ society what is above the heads of the ’primitives’. But how firm is Alqui6’s own 
philosophical framework?.
As Alqui6 explicitly states his philosophy is grounded in Platonic concepts that make an 
absolute distinction between essence and appearance. Plato’s own concepts here are complex, but 
in the way they have entered into the Western discourse on the functioning of the imagination, and 
how Alquig appears to view them, is in terms of a pure dualism in which essence is commensurable 
with ’reality’, which thereby determines ontological value - the imagination and its immediate 
materiality (the imaginary) are thereby necessarily consigned to the realm of appearance. They are - 
by definition - illusory. But this is not the framework that surrealism accepts: the idea that ’the 
imaginary is that which tends to become real’ can perhaps be seen as the first principle of surrealism. 
Alqui6 denies this principle, but he is certainly incorrect in stating that it represents a ’rupture with 
ontology’. What he really means is that it breaks his ontology.
External to the Platonic framework, Heraclitus had earlier suggested a different ontological 
principle in which the distinction between essence and appearance is established on a quite different 
basis. At the heart of Heraclitus’ philosophy is the idea of the all-encompassing fire of creation from 
which all things are formed and pass through. He wrote: "This universe, which is the same for all, 
has not been made by any god or man, but it always has been, is and will be an ever-living fire, 
kindling itself by regular measures and going out by regular measures." All creation, of which both 
man and the gods are part, passes through the fire which is both substance and non-substance. 
Creation and the imaginative faculty are thus of the very essence of things. As Paul Eluard insisted: 
"the mind has no taste for imitation." In such terms the image is given its own autonomy and its own 
integrity. It is not subservient to whatever it might represent.
These questions were made philosophically manifest in Hegel. Taking issue with the Platonic 
conception of essence and appearance, Hegel argued that there could be no fundamental difference 
between the two things - they were in themselves one and the same. But the distinction remains at 
the perceptual level - a thing can be essence or appearance under different angles. Appearance is 
thereby an aspect of essence and cannot be separated from it. There is no such thing as essence 
existing in and of itself. Hegel expressed this as follows: "Nothing is more real than appearance, in 
so far as it is recognised as appearance."13 Roger Caillois has illustrated this point by the example 
of a mirage, which is not an illusion if it is recognised as the essence of what it is (i.e. as a mirage), 
but becomes so only to the extent that it is perceived as something other than it is. Maurice Henry 
made the point directly in a cartoon in which a man stranded in the desert sees in the distance a sign 
announcing a ’Restaurant-Bar’; he races towards it to be finally greeted with another sign that reads 
’Sucker!’ This ’revenge of the object’, which is embodied most forcefully in the mirage, is one of the
13 quoted by Roger Caillois, Approches de I ’imaginaire.
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central themes in surrealism and shows, I think, the extent to which they had - even if often intuitively 
- incorporated Hegelian philosophical concepts into their work.
In this respect, what surrealism learned from Hegel was combined with their understanding 
of Freud and the discovery of the unconscious. The value that Freud perceived in the unconscious 
(even if it was, for him, a negative value) acted as a concretisation of imaginative processes: it 
connected up with Hegel’s concept of essence and gave to internal processes a material foundation 
that served also to undermine the old ontology that posited essence as existing in things themselves. 
As such the imaginary was brought out of the shadowy realm of appearance and could be seen as 
having its own place within the phenomenology of the real. It could thus be seen as a material and 
above all active quality that was inherent in all things. Imaginary and real thereby become aspects 
of the same things: "What is admirable about the fantastic," as Breton had said in the Manifesto of 
Surrealism, "is that there is no longer anything fantastic: there is only the real."
In the surrealist view reality is not a static category to which the imaginary must be related. 
The two categories are interrelated, to the extent that the one without the other becomes 
inconceivable. Having its own material integrity, the imagination is neither a product of the mind, nor 
is it a divine gift or manifestation. Although the generative principle par excellence, this is not seen 
as implying a pre-existing realm into which man can dip at will. Breton always insisted that creation 
must be empirical at root and must never presuppose "an imaginary universe tending to be 
manifested”.14 Indeed although the imaginary exists in material form, it remains ontologically 
unformed and disordered. It can take form only through a transformation that causes it to become 
real. To repeat: "The imaginary is that which tends to become real." It is a tendency only, however - 
everything that is imaginary does not necessarily become real.
This concept of the imagination appears to function in a quite different way in practice to that 
which Alquig would like to assign to it. It does not therefore follow that the art/science divide is as 
problematic at the heart of surrealism as he thinks. He writes: "Technological society does not make 
things as nature makes them; born of the constitution of the object by the rupture with ontology, it can 
no longer find the real except by the paths of reason. Everything here is language, and language will 
never be able altogether to turn against language to let appear what is only expressed 
symbolically."15
This relates to the centrality of the argument. Alqui6 is arguing that Cartesian reason is the 
only path of lucidity and the only valid means to explore scientific issues. Despite his sympathy and 
genuine love of surrealist writings and art, Alqui6 is convinced that this is all they are and can be, i.e. 
works of art. They are not the result of immediacy - as Hegel would have argued - and they are 
incapable of taking form as objects of knowledge. His argument here turns on the question of the 
status of imagery. Following Alqui6 the image is able only to embody abstract ideas in symbolic form.
14 Andr6 Breton, La CI6 des Champs, p 113.
15 Alqui6, op. cit., p 113.
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It cannot break the ontological framework to exist in spontaneous form. This point is the basis of 
classicist aesthetics and implies that art can only express a subjective vision. It cannot objectify itself.
In Oh What A Blow That Phantom Gave Mel Edmund Carpenter has spoken of the difficulty 
he had in recognising the non-visual qualities of art and the object. He sees this as a peculiarly 
Western deficiency which has become pervasive with the growth of literacy to encourage an attitude 
in which visual perception becomes so predominant as to be the only legitimate means of evaluation 
of phenomena: The eye of the reader [learned to scan] life as well as print".16
This is not a necessary consequence of literacy, however, as Carpenter has to recognise: in 
art a painter like Renoir does not paint a woman’s body as it is seen, but as the hand touches it; 
others like Klee or Mir6 structure their paintings more by sound than by visual harmony. In this it 
connects up with primitive and children’s art in which a hard-edged quality is predominant: the effect 
it provokes tends more towards the tactile than the visual.
The questioning of the nature of visual representation has become a central concern in post­
modernist criticism (a question to be considered in the next chapter) which has perceived an anti­
visual trend generally within Western art. This strain is strong within surrealism, but it is not a 
question of anti-visualism. To the contrary, surrealism has sought to emphasise the power of the eye 
to conceptualise images: "the eye exists in a savage state," as Breton once wrote. In surrealism it 
was a question of opposition to what Marcel Duchamp called the ’retinal’ qualities of the image: the 
eye should not be allowed to hover over the surface of a painting, taking in its visual spectacle, but 
be drawn in to the frame and become one with it. "What interests me in a painting," as Breton said, 
"is not what it contains, but what it looks out upon."
This connects up with Carpenter’s argument: "Literate people experience sound as if it were 
visible; they listen to music. Non-literates merge with music. Far from becoming detached, they 
become involved participants, immersing themselves totally within it."17 This detachment from the 
object was in many ways the central issue that surrealism (and indeed the whole romantic tradition) 
had sought to confront. As Aim6 C6saire warned: "Beware my body and my soul, beware above all 
of the pose of the spectator, because life is not a spectacle, a sea of sorrows is not a proscenium, 
a man who cries out is not a dancing bear."
We can thus see that, contrary to Alqute’s argument, the image is not purely visual. It 
therefore follows that it is not necessarily ’born of our rupture with vital and spontaneous adaptation'. 
It may be true, speaking literally, that ’dolorific, tactile, olfactory and gustatory sensations cannot be 
recalled in the forms of images, but one can equally say it is no more possible to recall a visual 
sensation as an image, since the image partakes of all the senses and its visual elements, even if 
preponderant, cannot be separated out from the other elements. We can thus see that the 
imagination is not separable from nature by an ontological break but rather participates within nature
16 Carpenter, Oh, What A Blow That Phantom Gave Mel, p 42.
17 Carpenter, ibid., p 41.
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itself. There would appear, therefore, to be no reason why spontaneous and vital images can not be 
formed.
Language, sign and symbol
This issue can be brought into focus by a brief consideration of language. Alqute sees the 
autonomy of human language from the natural forms of the universe as a prerequisite for the 
becoming of human freedom. As such he assumes that language is a purely human phenomenon 
that is artificially elaborated and can only construct meaning symbolically. Yet language is a form of 
communication; it may be the most complex form of communication that we know, but it is not 
qualitatively different from any other systematised form of communication, such as, for instance, 
courtship rituals in any number of animal species. Furthermore all living beings communicate: 
communication can even be seen as a sine qua non of existence. I can see no reason to assume 
that human language is necessarily any more divorced from a spontaneous relation to the world than 
any other form of communication.
Surrealism had been the inheritor of the symbolist tradition which, emerging out of 
romanticism, denied the primacy of written language as a symbolic code of meanings. Paradoxically, 
in this context, symbolism sought to invest language with a direct value in itself rather than to utilise 
it as a system of symbolically functioning signs. Rimbaud called for a poetry that would be created 
by all the senses, and Lautr£amont, demanding that poetry should be made by all, invoked at the 
same time the necessity that language should respond to all the sensual rhythms of the body. In 
Mallarm6 language was taken to an extreme in which it almost ceased to function as a language in 
the sense of being a systematic and intelligible code of meanings - meaning now comes to reside 
within the text itself and is no longer a means of communicating through an external system of signs. 
Signifier and signified thus became one.
Symbolism was undoubtedly the greatest influence on surrealist understandings of the 
function of language, which is no longer defined by its symbolic meaning, but has a concrete reality 
of its own. "Words make love," as Breton observed. But language, even at its limits, remains 
communication. In surrealist practice, automatism seeks to break down the codes of language to 
reveal communication in its pure state. A cleansing operation that does not deny language but seeks 
to open it up: "All that can be expressed," said G6rard Legrand, "expresses itself and can be 
intelligible; when it is not intelligible to reason, it is intelligible to poetic intuition, and it has not at all 
been proved that these two things are not the two faces of the same coin."18 It had been stated by 
Breton in the First Manifesto that the problem that surrealism was most centrally concerned with was 
that of ’human expression in all its forms’. A little surprisingly, though, in French surrealism this
18. Gerald Legrand, in Alquie, Entretiens sur le surrealisme, p 17.
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concern has revealed itself almost wholly at the level of practice and there has been almost no 
interest shown in considering questions of linguistic theory.19 To consider the question, then, it is 
necessary to return to romanticism, which foregrounds in theoretical terms the questions surrealism 
has raised in practice.
One of the key elements in romantic linguistic theory was the distinction drawn between 
allegory and symbol. This distinction is extremely important but is also complex and difficult to grasp. 
As will become apparent, it is a qualitative distinction, but not one that is in any sense dichotomous 
or dualistic: the symbol contains allegory within it. It might even be said that the symbol cleanses 
allegory of its mechanical and artificial elements. In the symbol, sign and signifier become one and 
perception and representation are established as parts of a unity.
It was Goethe who first made the distinction explicit, based on four main postulates: 1. symbol 
is indirect - it separates itself from representation to reveal representation; allegory is direct and seeks 
to dissimulate representation; 2. symbol is intransitive and endowed with signification - it is a thing 
in itself without being so, i.e. is simultaneously identical and separate from itself; allegory is transitive, 
functional, utilitarian, rhetorical and with no value in itself; 3. symbol is part of an image and derives 
from the natural; allegory is arbitrary and unmotivated; 4. symbol is intuitive; allegory rational. The 
fourth of these distinctions is crude and establishes a false dichotomy, but the others are richly 
suggestive. Schelling was later to give a more subtle shading to some of these distinctions by adding 
another category, the schematic, to the allegorical: "That representation in which the general signifies 
the particular, or in which the particular is apprehended through the general is the schematic. That 
representation, however, in which the particular signifies the general, or in which the general is 
apprehended through the particular is allegorical. The synthesis of the two, in which the general does 
not signify the particular nor does the particular signify the general but in which the two are absolutely 
one, is the symbolicT.20 Further qualities were also added to the distinction: symbol is open, allegory 
closed (Schelling); symbol is simultaneous, allegory discontinuous (Creuzer); symbol is related to
19. The same cannot be said about Czech surrealism, which indeed grew out of the Prague 
linguistic circle and Jakobson and Muzarowsky remained close to the Czech Surrealist Group. 
It would obviously be of value to consider Czech surrealism in the present context, but I have 
decided not to do so for three reasons. First, because the fragmented nature of the material 
available at present does not give a complete picture of Czech surrealism and leaves one 
subject to the likelihood of treating materials out of context. Second, because the subject is 
worthy of a full study in its own right and, since no such study has been done as yet, it would 
be impossible in the current framework to deal adequately with all the issues involved. Third, 
because the focus here is on the practice of French surrealism, which was not influenced in 
its practice by theories coming from Prague - in this respect the Czech Surrealist Group 
charted its own autonomous course and it would be methodologically confusing to treat the two 
as if they emanated from the same source. For this reason I have also not included a 
discussion of the important work contained in La Civilisation Surr6aliste (ed Vincent Bounoure, 
1978), which was a collaboration between Czech and French surrealists with a particular focus 
on language. It seems to me that to bring this work into the current context would require the 
Czech contribution to the debate to be contextualised and evaluated.
20 quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, p 208.
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humour, allegory to wit (Solgar).
What is important to this discussion is that these distinctions do not pertain solely at the level 
of form and content, but also at the level of observation and interpretation. Brentano gave a felicitous 
example of this in a discussion of a man who was incapable of playing chess because he dramatized 
the figures in the game and imposed his allegorical interpretation on it. He was thus unable to take 
the game seriously. The game of chess itself is an example of a symbolic interpretation of the world, 
which was here being undermined through the imposition of an allegorical meaning: the particular was 
being perceived through the general. Such fragmentation of reality establishes an illusion which 
encourages virtuosity and trickery and the cultivation of wit rather than humour.
The valorization of the symbol in this way was complementary to romantic concepts of the 
imagination and paralleled the distinction drawn between ’imitative’ and ’productive’ imagination. 
Allegory was rejected on the same grounds as the imitative in art. This also connects up with the 
romantic anthropological principle of empathy.
Although expunged from anthropology as the positivist reaction to romanticism set in - and 
perhaps rightly so, for it had degenerated into a crude and rather mystical form by the middle of the 
nineteenth century as exemplified by the work of Bastian - the idea behind empathy remains pertinent 
to our discussion. It had emerged from romantic philosophical concerns and had its roots in Herder. 
But it was first given concrete form by Friedrich Schlegal during the years of the Jena Circle, in what 
he called ’symphilosophy’ (sympathy + philosophy).
What is significant of note here is that it was the collective context of romanticism that gave 
form to the idea. As Todorov pointed out: "During a five year period, these men frequented the same 
houses, the same women, the same museums; they had countless conversations and exchanged 
numerous letters... There is one doctrine and one author, even if their names are several: not that 
each repeats the others (that would be no more than sympathy), but each one formulates, better than 
any other, some part of the same single doctrine."21 This context is important to recall, for it gives 
the lie to the idea of romanticism as an individualist project. Far from being so, the collective input 
was considerable and quite consciously encouraged, indeed the Jena Circle during those few years 
enjoyed an intellectual cohesiveness not surpassed even during the heroic era of the Surrealist 
Group. Empathy was not conceived, then, as a means for one person to project himself into the ’soul’ 
of another; it was conceived rather, in its beginnings, as the establishment of a common environment 
to enable ideas to be collectively pooled and take form. Otherness and the exotic relation become 
dissolved.
As an anthropological tool, empathy was brought into disrepute by Bastian, who sought to use 
it for unashamedly hegemonic and imperialist purposes. But it appears never to have been discussed 
in anthropological context in the way that the romantics themselves conceived it. It may be the case 
that the romantics here, as with their ideas on the imagination, may be seen to overreach themselves,
21 Todorov, op. cit,. p 165.
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for it will be apparent that for empathy to function properly, the relations involved must be 
symmetrical. Since human relations are almost never so, this is highly problematic, but even so the 
notion of empathy ought not to be summarily dismissed from anthropological considerations, 
something which brings us back to a consideration of travel.
In today’s world, in which travel has become a comparative formality, we need to question 
in what exactly the idea of travel consists. As Sidney Mintz has said: "In its savage and repeated 
thrusts into the world outside, the West has gone very far in replacing difference with sameness, in 
supplanting other, contrasting modes of thought and act, in changing what had been exotic for 
Westerners into pale and tawdry reflexions of itself.”22 As we argued at the beginning of this 
chapter, travel has become a sort of empty status symbol in which the idea of otherness loses its 
meaning. For, as Mintz continues: "It may be that the day when the total history of European 
hegemony is finally written, the indictment that we made many societies resemble ours will count as 
heavily as that we destroyed many others altogether."23 From this perspective, we need to question 
ourselves and to enquire into the way in which our conceptualisation of others has been formulated 
according to our own needs. It is not enough, to quote Mintz again, to be "alternately amused and 
enraged by the consequences". What ought to be challenged is the ground upon which we thought 
to impose our presence on other people, something which arises from the assumption that perceptual 
realism is the only ground for the basis of ontology. The surrealist Jean-Louis B6douin, writing about 
Segalen in 1963, decried what he called the ’sad esperanto’ of contemporary language and 
communication, and went on: "true communication, fruitful exchanges, a profound understanding of 
Nature and of living beings are directly a function of the differences and distances existing between 
things in the intelligible, tangible universe and of the faculty granted to us to perceive and experience 
them. For it is these differences and distances that lay the foundation for the innumerable forms of 
relationships and make possible, for that very reason, the life of the spirit."24 And we should also 
remind ourselves, in the process, of the part that our own imaginative process plays in the way in 
which communication takes place. As Segalen wrote: "I have called real only what is Palpable... I 
hasten towards an other Real."25
To this end, our discussion of romantic and surrealist uses of the imagination provides some 
sort of a starting point.
In the Western tradition, positivism has not been the only ideology that reacted against 
romanticism. In the next chapter we shall consider some of the consequences of the structuralist 
tradition that gave rise to the crisis of representation revealed in post-modernist criticism.
22 Sidney W. Mintz, op cit., p 7.
23 ibid
24 Jean-Louis B6douin, Seglaen, p 11.
25 Victor Segalen, Equip$e, p 145.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
REPRESENTATION AND RECIPROCITY IN THE CONTEXT OF
POST-MODERNISM
If the solution appears to you difficult, perhaps even 
impracticable, don't blindly cry out that it is false. Don’t 
use the real to justify your own shortcomings. Rather 
realize your dreams to merit your reality.
Edouard Glissant
Post-modernism and Representation
In our discussion of language we noted that the distinction between symbol and allegory had 
important implications for Western thought during the past two centuries. In the schools of thinking 
that have followed (either directly from or in reaction against romanticism) - and this includes both 
positivism and surrealism - the symbol has tended to be valorised against the allegorical, while in 
other schools, particularly those derived from structuralist modes of thinking issuing from Saussure, 
it has been the other way round. The latter tradition reaches its culmination in post-modernist 
criticism.
By valorising the symbol, the romantics broke with the notion of representation as pure 
contemplation: they were breaking the separation of the observer from thing observed. Although the
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unity of observer and observed was perceived very differently by such movements as positivism and 
realism that reacted against romanticism, both still accepted that the two were related to each other, 
even if the pure objectivism that positivism sought to achieve necessitated the denial of the subjective 
relation of the observer vis-a-vis the observed. Although this relation was not denied as such, it was 
asserted that the observed could be represented objectively without taking into account the position 
of the observer. That is, the observer was not seen as being inevitably present within in the observed 
and the route to true representation was to divest the representation of any traces of the observer’s 
own subjectivity. The problem of positivism was to assert that such absolute separation was possible 
and to make of this assertion an ideological position disguised as a methodological necessity.
For, while symbolic thinking (and, in this context realism should be seen as a form of 
symbolism, even if not a very rich one) assumes continuity with the world and looks for a synthesis 
of experience in which all the senses are involved, allegorical thought emphasises discontinuity and 
necessitates a separation of sensual experience. Allegory functions by presenting different images 
(representing different levels of experience) to different senses.
Recent post-modernist theory has sought to re-evaluate the notion of allegory and this has 
gained an anthropological perspective in the work of James Clifford.1 Thus, at the level of sensual 
experience, Clifford can argue for allegoric ethnographic texts that present difference at one level and 
similarity at another: "Strange behaviour is portrayed as meaningful within a common network of 
symbols - a common ground of understandable activity valid for both observer and observed, and by 
implication for all human groups. Thus ethnography’s narrative of specific differences presupposes, 
and always refers to, an abstract plane of similarity."2
This may be true of most ethnography, but Clifford is looking to a new ethnographic approach 
that would address the question more directly: "Allegory prompts us to say of any cultural description 
not ’this represents or symbolizes that' but rather 'this is a (morally charged) story about that’".3 Here 
he accepts the artifice of rhetoric, seen by romanticism and positivism alike as a prime enemy, which 
allows, Clifford argues, for the multiple levels involved in the ethnographic encounter to be expressed. 
He writes: "once all meaningful levels in a text, including theories and interpretations, are recognised 
as allegorical, it becomes difficult to view one of them as privileged...".4 Now this may be true within 
the text, but it assumes that such privilege is necessarily a bad thing and that symbolic and realist 
forms likewise attempt (unsuccessfully) to avoid such privileging. It further assumes that an avoidance 
of privilege within the text automatically means that privilege outside the text is avoided as well.
Although he would reject the label as such, there can be no question that Clifford’s work is
1 in particular see, ’On Ethnographic Allegory’, in Clifford and Marcus, Writing Culture, pp 98/122.
2 ibid, p 101.
3 ibid, p 100.
4 ibid, p 103.
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established against the background of the post-modernist swell in contemporary criticism and 
responds to the textural fetishism that has been apparent from the early days of post-structuralism.5 
In valorising allegory against the symbol, the imagination is brought into question and denied all the 
powers given to it since romanticism.
Richard Kearney has defined the post-modernist conception of the imagination as being 
’parodic’. That is, it can only parody itself and have no connexion with reality. As such it is 
essentially an allegorical form and a fairly pure example of the type of allegorical thinking the 
romantics condemned, one that makes of the text an object independent of its referents. This idea 
is already contained within post-modernist criticism itself, but in mystified form, since the frame of 
post-modernist criticism needs to assume that it is not part of the process it comments on (some post­
modernists would doubtless try to assert otherwise, but it is difficult to see how they can do so in good 
faith, since it must close off the possibility that it is simply parodying a parody, something that would 
make its own critique meaningless). In respect of the imagination, Kearney argues further that the 
existentialist distrust of the imagination has been taken to its logical conclusion in being denied a 
motive force at all. "Curiously," he says, "the collective term 'the imaginary’ survives to some extent 
the philosophical decline of the subjective term 'the imagination’. This former term increasingly carries 
the connotation of an impersonal entity. The ’imaginary' is seen as a mere ’effect’ of a technologically 
transmitted sign system over which the individual creative subject has no control".6 Imagination is 
thus condemned to do nothing but parody itself, and it has no established point of reference, no point 
of origin, no contextual framework. Subjectivism has been given its head, only to revolve endlessly 
on itself. It negates the existentialist displacement of romanticism, but in so doing it can only spin a 
web of its own emptiness and can never function to come to terms with the implications involved in 
a consideration of imaginative constructions. The hope that romanticism and surrealism had placed 
in the imagination is seen as a ridiculous illusion.
The most coherent exposition of the post-modernist conception of the imagination is 
Baudrillard’s idea of simulation. Baudrillard conceives of simulation as being indistinguishable from 
the real, but yet not to be real: "Since it is no longer enveloped by an imaginary, it is no longer real 
at all. It is hyperreal, the product of an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace 
without atmosphere".7 An image follows four phases: it begins as a reflexion of a basic reality; it then 
masks and perverts that basic reality; it marks the absence of a basic reality; it finally bears no 
relation to any reality whatsoever, but becomes its own simulacrum. If this scenario seems to recall
5 In an early assault (the broadside ’Beau comme BEAU COMME’ from 1967) on the 
presumptions of post-structuralism, the Surrealist Group had already noted how the impetus of post­
structuralism was towards textual authority and the rehabilitation of ’literature’, which the surrealists 
thought had been dead and buried for fifty years. This document is to be found reproduced in Jose 
Pierre (ed) Tracts Surrealists et Declarations Collectives, p 276/273.
6 Kearney, The Wake of the Imagination, p 251.
7 Baudrillard, Simulations, p 3.
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that of the invasion of the body snatchers, this is doubtless one of the reasons for its attraction: it 
responds very knowingly to the paranoia of contemporary society in which people feel increasingly 
powerless and alienated from their own inner beings. But in focusing on one of the central 
phenomological problems of modern society, Baudrillard merely legitimates such paranoia whilst 
offering no way out of its entangling structures. One does not require too much insight to recognise 
that Baudrillard’s categories represent little more than a modern form of Platonism, in which the 
imagination is equally cursed, although the content is reversed since the evil imaginary has already 
succeeded in triumphing over the real. Quite what the original ’real’ actually was that has been 
destroyed remains something of a mystery.
Baudrillard opens Simulations by referring to a fable by Borges in which a group of 
cartographers draw a map so detailed it becomes indistinguishable from the territory it ’represents’. 
He does this to undermine the foundations of representation. But a map is not a representation. Its 
purpose is not to create an image of a territory, but to provide a guide to a territory for the aid of 
people visiting it. The frame of its reference is not the territory itself, but other maps. If it serves the 
purpose of providing a guide to the territory it is beside the point whether or not it is ’accurate’ to the 
territory itself. Indeed, such accuracy cannot even be measured, since the signs by which a map is 
constructed are wholly incommensurate with anything in the landscape itself. Borges’s fable is, of 
course, telling: it points to the impossibility of the human endeavour for perfection. Even if it is true 
that a perfect map would have to become indistinguishable from the territory it represents, such a map 
would not, even so, become a simulation of the territory: it would become the actual territory itself. 
This would remain unsatisfactory. How can one put limits on a territory, since its existence would be 
dependent upon surrounding territories? The map would therefore have to extend further. It would 
have to encompass the whole world. Even that would not be enough. One would have to recreate 
the whole universe. And even then, it would be necessary, for completeness, for the ’simulated’ 
universe to have a copy of this ’map’ and therefore one would have to begin the whole process 
again... This presents us with a rather nice example of the old paradox of the play of mirrors. Good 
enough. But as far as representation is concerned, since cartographers in general don’t seem to have 
such grandiose aims when they draw maps, one wonders just what Baudrillard’s point is. We might 
also point out here that the use of Borges’s fable merely emphasises the extent to which Baudrillard 
has moved away, in his later work, from even the pretence of a social critique towards making a 
philosophical statement on human endeavour. This tends to further distance his work from any 
concrete applicability: if all is simulation, then we could reverse the terms of his argument and say 
that the simulation has become real. Any point of differentiation must be impossible to determine and 
one could, just as easily say that there is no such thing as simulation: everything is real.
This example lies at the centre of Baudrillard’s ontology. He makes the same point directly 
about anthropology, claiming that ethnology died in 1971 on the day that the Philippines government 
decided to keep isolated the Tasaday tribe - a confirmation, if such were needed, that anthropology 
can live only by killing what it is supposed to protect (it is doubtless a little unfair to tax Baudrillard
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with the fact that he seems to take the story of the Tasaday at face value, since he was writing at a 
time that all the complex absurdities of the tale had not been revealed). Even so, the myth of the 
Tasaday (even when taken at face value) is little more than a fable as acute as that of Borges, and 
one to which exactly the same objection to Baudrillard's interpretation could be made. It might bring 
anthropology into question if we consider anthropology to be the study of people completely 
unacculturated by Western society and to be otherwise illegitimate. But who would be so naive as 
to believe this was the aim of anthropology? Even in its beginnings, anthropology was acutely aware 
of the fact that the object of its study was being transformed by its contact with the West.
Bearing in mind what we have said about the way in which the romantics’ distinction between 
allegory and symbol has become inverted in twentieth century social science, one could see 
Baudrillard as the logical consequence of such inversion, incapable of seeing anything but the 
allegory. He would seem perfectly to encapsulate the false consciousness of Brentano’s allegorical 
chess-player unable to actually see the game itself. But one would have thought that if everything 
is simulation, then logically this must apply to Baudrillard’s critique as well. One therefore wonders 
why he writes at all, since he can only add another level of mystification to the morass of 
simulations.8
Although Baudrillard argues that this shows that everything has become object, and that it 
represents the triumph of the object over the subject,9 one could equally take the argument the other 
way round and note that the object has been completely lost from view. Indeed, if everything is object 
then the idea of the object becomes purely a matter of arbitrary semantics: one could just as easily 
say that nothing any longer is object. For all of that Baudrillard would like to present as a radical 
critique of subjectivism, his own critique is nothing but subjectivism taken to its limits.
Much as it might like to do so, post-modernism cannot escape the consequences of its own 
discourse. If the imagination does not exist and reality is no more than a parody of something that 
was once alive, then post-modernism itself is nothing but a parody. Like all nihilism it remains trapped 
within the terms of the hermeneutic circle it has itself created: if it doubts everything then it must doubt 
its own doubt, but if it does so then it undermines its raison d ’etre and denies its own starting point.
Most post-modernist critiques do not take quite such an extreme position as Baudrillard and 
within the frame of post-modernism important issues connected with representation in anthropological
8 Yet, in keeping with the most hypocritical of idealisms, Baudrillard assumes that his own critique 
is transcendent of what it criticises. In his book on Baudrillard, Douglas Kellner puts this assumption 
rather nicely: "Baudrillard takes a broad philosophical view of ultimate reality (which has disappeared 
to the masses lost in simulations, but reappears to Baudrillard sitting high above the silent majorities 
on his philosopher’s throne), and pontificates as if he were the scribe of Hegel’s Absolute..." (Kellner 
Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, p156).
9 Baudrillard here owes a great, unacknowledged, debt both to the surrealists and the situationists, 
for their ideas about the revenge of the object. But where both the surrealists and the situationists 
situated the object dialectically in relation to the subject, Baudrillard establishes a dualism and 
imposes value onto the object, even though the object has no value independently of the subject. We 
will examine this point more closely in a moment in discussing Hegel’s master/slave dialectic.
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context have been raised.
The Orientalist Debate
Perhaps the most far-reaching of post-modernist critiques to have taken up anthropological 
themes has been Edward Said’s controversial Orientalism, in which a consideration of the way in 
manner the West has conceptualised the Near East is used for a more general analysis of the way 
in which representation has been used by European consciousness in relation to its ’Other’. Although 
Said does not directly deal with anthropological images as such, his critique takes form around 
questions that must, if accepted, bring anthropological images into question.
Said’s central concern appears to have been to examine the consequences that follow from 
what he gives early in his book as one of many definitions of Orientalism: "a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient".10 As a Palestinian working within 
the Western intellectual tradition he feels a personal stake in these issues and he writes with some 
passion and urgency.
Central to Said’s argument is an undermining of the basis of the self/other relation, something 
that must have wide-ranging consequences for anthropology. We have already raised the question 
of how far the anthropological discipline needs to establish a self/other distinction. It might even be 
argued that such a distinction in some form is so fundamental to the discipline that it would deny its 
own legitimacy if it were to accept the consequences of Said’s argument, even though some 
anthropologists, most notably, perhaps, Ronald Inden,11 have tried to revise their own work to take 
account of the implications that Said’s study raises for anthropology. The success of such 
endeavours is open to question, particularly given the radical nature of Said’s epistemological critique.
What seems to be more urgent, though, is to question Said’s own methodological 
assumptions and to try to consider the extent to which his critique advances our understanding of the 
way in which we establish images and representations of other people and in the process enables 
us to conceive the relation between ourselves and the ’Other’ in different terms. As against this we 
must ask to what extent it simply adds one more level of mystification to what is already a difficult 
terrain to survey. Does his critique do any more, in other words, than address itself to European 
masochism and guilt?
Said’s approach is manifestly idealist. Situating his critique in the realm of ideas divorced 
from concrete relations of living, he is able to present us with a very convincing argument of the
10 Said, Orientalism p 3. Said gives numerous other definitions of Orientalism through the course 
of the book, but this one seems to be most central to his overall theme.
11 Ronald Inden, ’Orientalist Constructions of India’, Modern Asian Studies (1986) 20(3) pp 
401/446
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deleterious effects of a particular way of perceiving the Orient. Said insists that such a perception 
is false; it was created in the European mind almost without reference to what the Orient was really 
like. One of Said’s disciples, Christopher Miller, places the issue squarely in these terms: 
"...perception is determined by Orientalism rather than Orientalism being determined by 
perception".12 This statement, something of an idealist statement par excellence, accurately sums 
up, I believe, the impulse underlying not only Said’s own approach, but also those who have followed 
him. It emphasises the extent to which the ’real’ Orient was irrelevant to the thrust of the movement 
to create a composite fictional character for the Orient. The images constituting this character were 
the products of who knows what perversity of mind (and Said shows curiously little interest in 
understanding why such images were created beyond making a banal equation with imperialism) and 
are completely devoid of reality: "The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some 
version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the 
representation does the job, for the West, and faute de mieux, for the poor Orient. ’Sie konnen sich 
nicht vertreten, sie mussen vertreten werden,' as Marx wrote..."13 This passage is highly significant 
in relation to the work as a whole and we will return to consider it in more detail. For now we will look 
at some of the implications that arise from the apparent ’fictionality’ of the Oriental construct, a 
construct that would appear to be a clear example of the sort of ’simulation’ that so obsesses 
Baudrillard (even though these representations are all from the nineteenth century and before), 
although Said, unlike Baudrillard, is certainly not complicitous with such images and wishes to provide 
a critique that would reveal the mechanisms of such simulation. Nevertheless, he remains tied to the 
same frame of reference and his critique, in anthropological terms, is pitched at the same level.
The problem remains that if such representations are false then there has to be the possibility 
of a representation that is ’true’. Towards the end of the book, Said recognises this problem. He 
writes: "I would not have written a book of this sort if I did not believe that there is a scholarship that 
is not as corrupt, or at least as blind to human reality, as the kind I have been mainly depicting.”14 
He is even able to give us an example: "the anthropology of Clifford Geertz, whose interest in Islam 
is discreet and concrete enough to be animated by the specific societies and problems studied and 
not by the rituals, preconceptions, and doctrines of Orientalism". Yet we find that, five years on, the 
work of Geertz has been miraculously transformed into being simply "standard disciplinary 
rationalizations and self-congratulatory cliches..."15 We are given no indication of what might have 
caused this extraordinary transformation.
That Said feels under no compunction to justify his change of opinion here is indicative of his
12 Christopher Miller, Blank Darkness: Africanist Discourse in French, p 15.
13 Said, op tit, p 21.
u . Said, ibid, p 326.
15 Said ’Orientalism Revisited’, in Europe and its Others, (1985).
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methodological approach. As he felt no necessity to explain what it was specifically that made the 
work of Geertz admirable in the first place so, it appears, he is not called upon to explain a radical 
change of opinion. For of course nothing about the work of Geertz has changed. It is Said’s 
perspective that is now different. In 1978 he had been seeking to place himself within ’Western’ 
discourse, almost in the role of a radical reformer. By 1983, he is clearly seeking to orient his critique 
differently, seeking to find a place within anti-imperialist studies in which the work of Geertz does not 
fit. This much is apparent in his article 'Orientalism revisited’ in which he plays down the originality 
of his own study, to place it in a line of anti-colonialist writers who seem to have nothing in common 
but their anti-colonialism and the fact that Said approves them.16 It is thus not difficult to see that 
Said’s value judgements made against the ’Orientalists’ are based on a fundamental bad faith. What 
he is keen to establish is a catch-all critique that is able to provide him with the means to dispose of 
what he finds objectionable and to praise whatever he approves. This is exactly the same power 
relation he accuses the Orientalists of constructing in relation to the Orient. Unlike the Orient itself, 
however, contemporary Orientalists have the power to answer back, something they have not 
surprisingly hardly been hesitant about invoking. Said’s pathetic response to some of these 
counterblasts indicates the weakness of his position, which he seems incapable of defending, except 
by means of a particularly offensive form of invective and by constantly shifting his ground.17
The more substantial questions raised (or, one could equally argue, hidden) by Said’s critique 
are those relating to questions of reciprocity between subject and object. In this respect the extent 
that Said has adequately represented what the Orientalists themselves have said about the Orient 
becomes largely irrelevant. His argument rather stands or falls on his denial of such reciprocity. 
Orientalism was imposed upon the Orient: it was a European project, more or less consciously 
elaborated, in which Orientals were nothing but passive pawns. To this extent it is not the question 
of the accuracy of the images as such that is at issue as the way they were utilised in the relationship 
between Europe and the Orient and the extent to which representation itself, as an epistemological 
category within Western thought, is compromised by such use.
The problem is that if reciprocity between subject and object is impossible then, by the same 
token, the object cannot challenge the subject by developing alternative models. In fact, since the 
object has no real existence, being only a conceptualization of the subject’s mind, it can never be a 
question of the former acting upon the latter. However, this just will not do, as Said has to recognise 
in the conclusion to his book, since to leave the matter there would be to freeze the relation in empty 
space. There could be no way of ever changing it. The only way out of the impasse is for the subject 
to develop representations of the object that would represent the object more faithfully. Given the 
extent of Said’s critique, however, it is difficult to see how this can ever occur and, even if it could,
16 see, ibid, p 214/5.
17 for a particularly good example of this see Said’s response to Bernard Lewis in the New York 
Review of Books, 12 August 1982.
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it would emphasise even more the power of the subject over the object. The best that can be 
achieved is that the representation should accord with Said’s own understanding. But by what right 
can Said stand as a representative of the Orient? By entering Western discourse and contesting 
these issues he is, by definition, becoming part of the subject which is supposedly imposing its will 
on the object. He is consequently forced into a position that relies on precisely the same discourse 
he is criticising. There is certainly no easy way of avoiding such an ironical position, but we might 
expect a little recognition of its existence. Instead, Said presents his critique with all the self-certainty 
of the most dogmatic of positivists. Whether or not the ’Orientalists’ are guilty of the central charge 
he lays against them, of believing that the Orient ’cannot represent itself, it must be represented’ (and 
it cannot be said he proves his case on this point), it would certainly appear that Said himself believes 
it; indeed such a belief is inscribed at the heart of his project. Furthermore, his own critique relies on 
just as much mis-representation of Orientalists as he accuses them of making in their representations 
of the Orient. In Said’s terms, in fact, his own conceptualization of ’Orientalists’ is as pure an example 
of ’Orientalism’ as one could wish for! Can there be such a thing as Orientalism except as a product 
of Said’s mind?
This raises various questions relating to representation that Said makes no attempt to 
confront: What is a representation? For whom is it made? In what circumstances? What are the 
factors that determine the use that will be made of it? How does it function at various meta-levels? 
Said sidesteps such questions by assuming a simplistic cause and effect relation: representations of 
the Orient were a means of political control over the Orient and nothing more. Furthermore, they 
acted to create an entirely homogenous frame in which British, French and German writers all seem, 
at some mysterious unconscious level, to have conspired with each other to produce this composite 
view. And it also seems that no distinction is to be drawn between different types of knowledge: 
travellers’ tales meet the statistical tables of administrators in a contiguous way, all with the aim of 
denying a voice to the ’Oriental’.
At this point, we can perhaps bring such questions into relief by looking at the elements of 
reciprocity in representation, elements that Said himself is determined to avoid. We have already 
noted the use made by Said of Marx’s phrase ’they cannot represent themselves; they must be 
represented’. This phrase is also used as an epigraph to the book and is clearly one if its central 
themes. Yet if we refer to the context in which Marx himself made this comment, we find that the 
implications for Marx are radically different from those that Said seeks to establish. Given the 
importance this phrase has for Said it is perhaps useful here to give the context of Marx’s own 
argument.
Marx was considering not the Orient but the peasantry. He was concerned with 
understanding a concrete historical context: the failure of the revolution of 1848, and in this specific 
quotation he was looking at the relation of the peasantry to the Bonapartist Party. He wrote: "Insofar 
as these small peasant proprietors are merely connected on a local basis, and the identity of their 
interests fails to produce a feeling of community, national links, or a political organisation, they do not
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form a class. They are therefore incapable of asserting their class interests in their own name, 
whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must 
be represented. Their representative must appear simultaneously as their master, as an authority 
over them, an unrestricted government power that protects them from the other classes and sends 
them rain and sunshine from above."18 If there are implications in this for the Orientalist debate, 
they are certainly not the ones that Said himself picks up. Indeed it is noticeable that Marx 
emphasises the fact that representation is not imposed on the peasantry. What will be immediately 
apparent is that for Marx this relation is dynamic: the peasantry are not acted upon but rather actively 
seek such representation and use it for their own purposes. The relation between the Bonapartist 
party and the conservative peasantry is thus reciprocal: they need each other. It goes without saying 
that the idealist conclusion drawn by Said: ’if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, 
the representation does the job...’ would be wholly foreign to Marx. Indeed it reveals a curiously 
distorted idea about how people actually conceive images. Does Said really believe that anyone 
actually thinks that images of the Orient are commensurate with what the Orient is really like?
In any representation something of the original is always lost. But one could equally say that 
something is gained. Perfect verisimilitude in imagery is almost impossible, but it is pertinent to ask: 
does it matter? Why do we construct images? What actually occurs during the process of creating 
images that determines the form it will take? General responses to such questions are impossible, 
since the process is too complex and contains too many variables. But if we wish to understand all 
the congeries involved in representation then it is necessary to consider all the factors involved in the 
relation. And what should be clear is that while representation does not stand on its own 
independently of the social and cultural situation in which it is produced, it equally cannot be tied in 
a causal relation with what it represents. Representation and what is represented are not 
commensurate and ought not to be treated as though they are. It is at least arguable that it is only 
academic literary critics who could become so embroiled in the representation as to mistake it for the 
thing represented. Can one not see a certain self-loathing of the literary critic in relation to his own 
profession in the virulence with which the concept of representation is treated, both here and more 
generally in post-modernism?
Said would wish to extend such a critique even further to dissolve the subject/object relation 
altogether, something that is not unique to him but is something of a post-modernist stance. It 
certainly cuts to the heart of the anthropological project, since, as we have seen, a relation of self to 
other is fundamental to anthropology and it is difficult to see how anthropology can possibly take form 
unless it engages with the complex dialectical relation between distantiation and familiarity that the 
subject/object relation implies. If at its root such a relation is unable to entertain the notion of 
reciprocity, then anthropology must resign itself to producing images that bear no relation to the object 
of study. Worse, such images could only function ideologically and involve falsification in a power
18 Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Selected Works, p 122.
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context.
In this context Said fails to justify, or even to argue, the presupposition that enables him to 
establish the monolithic nature of the object of his study: the European subject that has created 
Orientalism. What is the nature of this subject? Where did it originate? And why and how? Such 
’willed, human work’, as he calls it, can hardly be born from empty space. Given the nature of his 
critique, it would seem incumbent upon him at least to take this issue on board. The fact that he does 
not do so emphasises even more the ’Orientalist’ nature of his own project: Orientalism is a given to 
be analyzed; as such it becomes Said’s own ’Other’. In this way, within his own work, the self/other 
relation remains intact. And the object of Said’s analysis is treated, furthermore, in a purely 
’ethnocentric’ way. No question of any reflexivity here: Orientalists are fair game.
Yet even if we allow for the possibility of the dissolving of the self/other relation, it must still 
be asked whether this can be done except by means of a tautological sleight of hand. Said has 
certainly not taken on board the philosophical underpinning of this relation, which is contained in 
Hegel’s anthropology and most notably in his treatment of the relation of master and slave.19 For 
in Hegel’s terms what is fundamental is reciprocity. In fact it is more than reciprocal - it is symbiotic: 
the reality of slave is the master; the reality of the master is the slave. Neither are free agents, and 
each needs the other to complete his relation to the World. This is not, at root, an exploitative relation 
(although it may become so in certain circumstances). The separation it implies is also necessary 
for any sort of lucidity; without it undifferentiation and entropy take over. But in Hegel’s terms, the 
differentiation between master and slave remains, at root, illusory: it is the interplay of the relation, 
not its fixity, that is of importance. In Hegel’s terms, then, Orientalism could only be changed by the 
Orient itself acting upon the relation. The Orient would have to recognise itself, something that Said 
refuses to accept and the consequences of which he is determined to avoid. The problem is that if 
the relation remains static then Orientalism will not, indeed cannot, change its ideological character. 
In this respect a critique such as Said’s, acting solely on the form by which the subject master asserts 
its ascendency, can change only the form and not the substance of such domination. Indeed it must 
become subsumed within the dominant subject; it must of necessity become part of the dominating 
ideology. In this respect Simon Leys was not merely being malicious when he wrote acidly: 
"Orientalism could obviously have been written by no one but a Palestinian scholar with a huge chip 
on his shoulder and a very dim understanding of the European academic tradition."20 As we have 
already noted, Said himself must become an ’Orientalist’.
The deleterious consequences that Said’s critique can have for anthropology can be shown 
by a consideration of Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other?' Fabian adopts Said’s approach
19 Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, (1977) Oxford University Press (translated by A.V. Miller) 
p 111/119.
20 Simon Leys, The Burning Forest, (1988) Paladin p 96.
21 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other, (1983) Columbia UP.
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almost wholesale and applies it directly to the anthropological discipline as a whole. Virtually all the 
reservations we have made concerning Said could equally well be applied to Time and the Other, but 
Fabian has made his critique even more vague by focusing not upon an identifiable group of people 
who can at least be methodologically defined as ’Orientalists’, but has taken up the whole question 
of how a perceptual category (time) and a particular sense (sight) have been utilised by the West, 
particularly in anthropology, against its other.
As with Said, there would be much value in such a critique if it focused on the ideological 
aspects involved in the relation. Unfortunately, again like Said, Fabian displaces the ideological 
aspects to locate the critique in the methodological categories themselves. This once more conflates 
representation with the essence of what it represents and refuses to countenance the possibility that 
people are capable of making such a distinction. In discussing the question of time, for example, 
Fabian writes as though historians believe that time and history are the same thing, even though 
historical methodology is acutely aware of the fact that history is a construction made through time 
and can never be commensurate with it.
Fabian displays a tenacious determination to establish a duality between an accursed Western 
idea of linear time and the ’Other’s’ cyclical concept. In philosophical terms this distinction is not new, 
going back to Vico and before. What is new is the virulent quality that is now attached to linear time 
itself rather than the perception of it. What should be pointed out is perhaps an elementary point: that 
though people may perceive time in different ways, the defining characteristic of time is that it passes. 
Such passing must be capable of being presented in a linear fashion. But it is evident that time itself 
is not linear, since time has no reality in and of itself independent of the human perception of it. In 
the West it may be true that a particular concept of linear time has been established to provide a 
basis for Western hegemony. Again, however, this needs to be considered in its concrete historical 
circumstances, not detached and presented as though it was the concept of linear time itself that is 
responsible for such distortion. Even in the West, Yi-Fu Tuan has identified three different 
conceptions of time appropriate for different circumstances: the cosmogonic (dealing with history and 
ideas about origin); human time (which follows the course of a human life and involves birth, life and 
death); and astronomic time (the sun’s daily round).22 What is undeniable is that time can be 
conceptualised in numerous ways which respond to the exigencies of particular situations. If 
anthropological discourse has adopted a specific conception of time that has consequences for the 
way in which anthropology constructs its object, this is something that calls for comment. But it does 
not mean that it follows that to establish a different mode of conceptualising time in anthropological 
discourse can provide a solution to the problem, if there is indeed a problem.
Fabian sees the problem involved as one of distantiation. This is the point at which his 
critique of conceptualizations of time in Western discourse connects up with the idea of the visual.
22 Yi-Fu Tuan, ’Space, Time, Place: A Humanistic Frame’, in T. Carlstein, D. Parkes and N. Thrift 
(eds) Time, Space and Spacing Time Vol 1, (1978).
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(He even emphasises the dangerous effects of visualism so much that the eye almost gains a 
Luciferian quality. Here Fabian’s tone assumes apocalyptic proportions that perhaps calls for an 
appropriately puritan response: "If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out".) Fabian seems to see vision 
as an authoritarian sense that organises reality in such a way as to exclude messages received from 
the other senses. Arguing against the Aristotelian idea of a hierarchy of the senses with vision at the 
top, he still seems unable to think outside this framework in asserting that if there is to be a hierarchy 
of the senses then it ought to be the audile that ought to be valorised.
What does not seem to occur to Fabian is that the separation of the senses in this way is 
characteristic of the Cartesian thinking he is criticising. It is not that sight is in some way a hegemonic 
sense; if it has assumed such a quality in Western discourse it is precisely because it has been so 
isolated. In this respect Fabian confounds his own argument and shows how far it is rooted within 
the discourse he is criticising. What should be obvious is that the senses never function 
independently of each other. They are furthermore all dependent upon the mediation of the brain. 
It is obvious that vision is the sense responsible for distantiation. One would have thought that this 
was precisely its strength. Distantiation allows precision and differentiation and prevents ideas in 
discursive discourse falling into virtuoso performance in which content is collapsed into form. The 
visual is always critical. Hearing is far more subject to persuasion. In totalitarian regimes it is the 
visual that is feared above all and it should be recalled that the primary means of persuasion of the 
Nazis was the immediacy of the mass-parade and the radio, both formed around an auditory 
experience, within which the visual is carefully integrated to provide framing. Hitler, we might recall, 
established his authority through the charismatic quality of his oral presentation, not through writing 
Mein Kampf, and in totalitarian regimes it is word-of-mouth, gossip and innuendo that predominate 
and the visual is seen as a threat. It is the little boy who refuses to disbelieve the evidence of his 
eyes that brings attention to the Emperor’s nakedness. We may say that ’seeing is believing’, but we 
also speak of the 'voice of authority’.
To point this out is not to assert that the visual really is superior to the oral, but to show the 
absurdity of the framework being constructed. The human senses are complementary to each other: 
they do not function by competing against each other for hierarchical positions.23
The difficulty arises here from faulty methodological premises: instead of working from
23 Fabian’s critique is almost identical to that put forward, with far more cogency, by Edmund 
Carpenter in Oh, What a Blow That Phantom Gave Me! But a critical difference lies in the form by 
which the argument is established. Carpenter refuses to rationalize his argument and eschews the 
discursive frame. This leaves the tendentiousness of his argument wide open: his intent is not to 
persuade but to provoke. In this he remains consistent with the postulates of his own argument in 
seeking to engage the reader sensually rather than purely by appealing to the visual. Fabian’s mode 
of argument, on the other hand, remains firmly within the visual form he regards as being so insidious. 
Carpenter’s overall argument doesn’t convince me any more than Fabian’s does, but I can recognise 
and applaud the vitality and urgency of the questions addressed and the cogency of many of 
Carpenter’s insights. In Fabian’s work, on the other hand, I can see only tendentiousness and a 
straining for intellectual effect.
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particular social situations and identifying the way ideological formations are constructed within them, 
Fabian, like Said, establishes the ideology in a void and then applies it to arbitrarily selected social 
situations. Addressing a different, but contiguous question to that of Fabian, Eric Wolf has defined 
culture as "a series of processes that construct, reconstruct, and dismantle cultural materials, in 
response to identifiable determinants".24 The way in which anthropology functions is part of such 
a process and what cannot be separated out from it is the particular modus operandi adopted in each 
case. Wolf goes on: "...instead of assuming transgenerational continuity, institutional stability, and 
normative consensus, we must treat these as problems. We need to understand such characteristics 
historically, to note the conditions for their emergence, maintenance, and abrogation. Rather than 
thinking of social alignments as self-determining, moreover, we need - from the start of our enquiries - 
to visualise them in their multiple external conditions".25 These seem to me to be general first 
principles, yet Fabian’s critique sidesteps such implications to focus on spurious oppositions 
(coevalness vs allochronism; orality vs visualism) that accept the self-determining quality of 
methodological categories.
Post-modernism and the Object
The critiques of Said and Fabian are both issued, through post-modernism, from a dubious 
Nietzschean subjectivism. Said dutifully quotes Nietzsche (p 203) in defining truth as a ’mobile army 
of metaphors’, but he refuses to recognise the problematic that Nietzsche himself recognised in such 
a definition. Nietzsche recognised that truth and falsehood existed in dialogic relation to each other 
and that if one accepted that truth was simply a ’mobile army of metaphors’ then one needs to 
establish a centering position to enable the relative value of the particular ’lie’ to be evaluated. Both 
Said and Fabian fall into the trap of all subjectivism and conflate general and specific critiques in a 
way that de-legitimates both. The direction of the ’deconstructive’ impulse in contemporary criticism 
is not negation, but rather its subversion, to the extent that genuine negation becomes impossible. 
It recovers idealism to insert a subjectivist vision at the heart of intellectual discourse. But where does 
such subjectivism lead? Where is it intended to lead? Here it is often difficult, in considering post­
modernist works, to discern the direction of a particular critique. The impulse for deconstruction can 
lead one on so far that what is supposedly being deconstructed becomes unclear. But having 
rejected the claims of objectivity, the only place to go is towards the subject. It is necessary to give 
to the subject value in itself. Some way must be found to establish a dialogic relation between two 
subjects. But in viewing the subject subjectively, are we not faced with a double negative? As 
Adorno wrote: "The denial of objective truth by recourse to the subject implies the negation of the
24 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History, p 387.
25 ibid, p 387.
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latter: no measure remains for the measure of all things: lapsing into contingency, he becomes 
untruth."26 It is time, perhaps, to look more closely at the post-modernist subjectivist impulse, in 
which its claim to have developed an original perspective must lie.
An urge to establish a subject as subject in itself does not at all mean the same thing as 
’subject for itself’. Indeed the latter aim is quite independent and perhaps necessarily hostile to the 
former. No one can claim to transcend their social position and no one from the West has the right 
to imbue subject status upon the object of study. To do so is simply a form of condescension. If the 
object is to establish itself as subject then the impetus must come from the object confronting such 
status. In this respect the establishment of the object as subject in itself can serve to mystify such a 
process by imposing a spurious dialogic relation that effectively silences the other by imposing the 
terms of the argument on him. The frame of reference in any dialogue is always established by 
means of a stronger authority, and, no matter what one’s intentions, there is no way that any 
westerner can relinquish his authority, especially in the framework of intellectual study.
To consider the question involved here (to which we will return in the next chapter), we need 
to look further at the nature and status of evidence. We have considered the relation of positivism 
to romanticism and looked at how different objective criteria have operated in romantic and surrealist 
methodologies on the one hand and those of positivist/realist methodologies on the other. The 
essence of the dispute between romanticism and positivism in this context seems to come down to 
a disagreement over the appropriate methodological response to the phenomenal world. Positivism 
charges romanticism with over-ambition and fears the consequences of such over-reaching. 
Romanticism accuses positivism of reducing human reality to the level of over-simplification. But both 
positivism and romanticism are agreed on seeking out objective criteria for a consideration of the 
world. They are united in believing that there ought to be a continuum between reality and 
representation and that knowledge should have an immediacy that connects it with experience.
It is in structuralist thinking that such immediacy is denied. We noted in passing at the 
beginning of the chapter how, in Saussure's linguistics, the sign is valued at the expense of the 
signifier. As Bourdieu has pointed out: "Language as conceived by Saussure, an intellectual 
instrument and an object of analysis, indeed the dead, written, foreign language referred to by Mikhail 
Bakhtin, a self-sufficient system, detached from real usage [...] opened the way to all the subsequent 
research that proceeds as if mastery of the code were sufficient to confer mastery of the appropriate 
usages, or as if one could infer the usage and meaning of linguistic expressions from analysis of their 
formal structures..."27 This assumption appears to be the central methodological presumption of 
post-modernism, and from the point of view of representation it appears certainly to be Saussure 
rather than Nietzsche who ought to be considered as the father figure of post-modernism.
The opposition between sign and signifier is what confers legitimation on allegorical
26 Adorno, Minima Moralia, p 63.
27 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p 32.
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configurations that establish meaning independently of social conditions. The text is given its own 
integrity and comes to define the nature of those social relations of which it was, at the beginning, 
only the representation. In anthropology this implies a re-valorisation of the subjectivist concerns that 
James Clifford has been predominant in advocating. Clifford wishes to deny the legitimacy of a 
particular viewpoint predominating within discourse and to promote the values of multiplicity and 
dialogue. This concern is manifested on all levels: between anthropologist and informants, between 
academic disciplines, between academic and artist, between different texts etc etc. No viewpoint 
must be given privileged status and all positions should be open to criticism. Such an aim can be 
seen as a process of de-centring: it necessarily denies monist and holistic approaches and any 
attempt at establishing universal criteria of judgment. But such a position cannot escape the 
consequences that follow from the way it has been established in the first place, in which it can only 
legitimate itself through imposing its own ideological hegemony over such universalist approaches. 
Admirable though such an aim may appear to be it cannot escape the logical consequences of its 
own postulates. This is equally so at the level of methodology: Clifford can establish a subjectivist 
and allegorical framework only by bringing into disrepute symbolic and realist methodological criteria 
seeking to establish an objective frame of reference. In his reply to an article by Steven Sangren 
pointing out some of the more hegemonical aspects of Clifford’s own practice, Clifford can only reply 
with apparently unassumed ingenuousness: "The book [Writing Culture] encourages debate about 
its own crucial assumptions", he writes. And again: "the possibility that the book might represent not 
a position to be marked off but rather a series of debates and evolving ideas entirely escapes 
Sangren."28 However, this is exactly Sangren’s point: that it is precisely the ’debates and evolving 
ideas’ encouraged by Writing Culture that have established the agenda and imposed authority over 
the course the debate can follow. It seems to be more because the nature of Sangren’s critique 
cannot be encompassed within the terms established by the debate around Writing Culture that 
Clifford is so offended by it, rather than by Sangren’s ’misrepresentations’.
What should also be noted in this context is that the prefix ’post-’ in itself has significant 
hegemonic properties. It is a rhetorical conceit that deflects analysis from what is happening on the 
ground towards a transcendent realm where the criterion of value appears to be entirely evolutionary: 
we can be post- modern, anthropology, history, Orientalist - you name it - and by the simple evocation 
of this word we sweep away all the prejudices of the past. From this perspective, the prefix functions 
- almost exclusively, as far as I can see - as an uncritical nodal point by which to de-legitimate a 
particular discourse without having to analyse its particularities or even to raise the context of the 
appropriate frame of reference
But, although I substantially agree with the thrust of Sangren’s critique of the form of post­
modernist authority that Writing Culture establishes, I think he overplays his hand in doubting the
28 Clifford replying to Sangren’s article, ’Rhetoric and the Authority of Ethnography’, in Current 
Anthropology Vol 29, no 3, June 1988 p 425.
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good faith of the authors involved. Indeed, I must say that in Clifford’s case at least good faith seems 
to be manifest. What seems to be more useful is rather to question the consequences that follow from 
establishing the sort of framework that Clifford in particular would like to see. Does it really encourage 
a more open approach to the writing of ethnography? Does it provide a potentially more equable 
approach (i.e. one that is capable of giving equal voice to the ’Other’) than the sorts of approaches 
he is criticising?
One of Clifford’s definitions of allegory is as "a representation that interprets itself".29 But a 
representation that interprets itself is one that can make no judgement outside of itself. Clifford 
commends Majorie Shostak’s Nisa with the comment that in it "Ethnography gains subjective ’depth’ 
through the sorts of roles, reflections, and reversals here".30 Yet this subjective ’depth’, which 
presumably makes of this account ’one story among many’ denies the story of totality that would give 
such subjectivity meaning. This means that the particular gains ascendency over the general which, 
in the process, tends to become lost from view. It was on such grounds that the romantics rejected 
allegory and it is an objection that Clifford does not meet. All the world, as they say, is a stage, but 
the purpose of ethnography is surely not to write stories engaging in verbal wordplay along the lines 
of the experiments of the Ouilipo but to seek to establish an integrated science of mankind. 
Otherwise ethnography might just as well be seen as preparation for the creation of literature.
What is still more serious in this context is the relation to the ’Other’. Clifford’s preferred 
approach assumes that the relation between anthropologist and informant is symmetrical within the 
terms of any human relationship and that ethnographic representation should convey the sense of this 
relationship. Such an approach implies its own kind of universalism: a universalism based upon the 
assumption of and even imposition of cultural diversity (which in the process denies the very diversity 
it advocates by placing everything in the same melting-pot). This range of ’diversity’ can be explored 
by ethnographic means to provide the ’partial truths’ that represent what must be the limit of 
anthropological knowledge. The argument here seems to be that in so far as anthropological 
knowledge can never attain the ’truth’ to which it aspires, then it should abandon such an aim: "In 
cultural studies at least, we can no longer know the whole truth, or even claim to approach it."31 
In his invocation of subjectivist concepts like a polyphony of voices and decentredness, Clifford does 
not specify what the nodal point of analysis is. He speaks of a general trend toward a specification 
of discourses in terms of "who speaks? who writes? when and where? with or to whom? under what 
institutional and historical constraints?"32 This is all very well, but it does not address the question
29 Clifford in ’On Ethnographic Allegory’, op. cit., p 99.
30 ibid, p 108.
31 ibid, p 25. It is interesting that Samir Amin, in his study of eurocentrism, identifies the idea of 
'partial truths’ as one of the central ideological falsifications that Europe-centred thinking asserts.
32 ibid, p 13. .
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of the nature of anthropological evidence and the status that data should have. Such questions are 
subsidiary ones that should be asked only when there is a clarity about the aim of the object within 
an intellectual discipline. When there is such a crisis of objectivity as we have tried to focus upon in 
the preceding chapters (and which Clifford himself has played his part in bringing to light), then it is 
obfuscatory to locate the problem within such hermeneutic categories. The crisis of objectivity within 
anthropology is not essentially a crisis of methodological means (although it necessarily entails that 
such means must be brought into question); it represents a more generalised crisis within 
contemporary consciousness. This concerns above all the status of reality and the understanding of 
imagination in relation to it.
In establishing the distinction between symbol and allegory, the romantics were taking issue 
primarily with the classical conception of beauty as pure contemplation. They were arguing for an 
approach toward reality that would involve the observer in what was observed whilst, at the same 
time, giving full rights to the imagination to interpose into the frame as both an interlocutor and 
generative principle of reality itself. In so doing they were rejecting the rhetorical and the arbitrary and 
charting out the ground for a unity between reality and experience in extremely complex terms. The 
post-modernist valorization of the allegorical refuses this complexity and seeks to separate out reality 
from experience in such a way as to enable both to be quantified. Yet reality, by its very nature, can 
never be quantified, since it is always in process of negotiating the sensible area of its domain in the 
dialectical relation between the real and the imaginary. We can see, then, why post-modernism 
needs to deny the powers of the imagination if it is to establish a coherent argument about the 
structure of allegorical simulation that it would wish to pass off as contemporary reality.
The main impetus for the current fashion for post-modernist analysis in anthropology has 
come from anthropologists in the United States. What seems extraordinary is that with all the plethora 
of critiques of textural authority and concern with the status of the object, no analysis appears to be 
directed in concrete terms towards the contemporary relations between the USA and its Third World’. 
Nor does the reflexive component seem generally to extend as far as the analysis of the 
anthropologist as American (as opposed to being an individual who just happens to be an American) 
in relation to the object of study. Where is the analysis, for instance, of American popular attitudes 
towards Latin America, of the sociology of the media in the Vietnam War, of middle American religious 
fundamentalism, of the reasons for US support for the Contra assassins in Nicaragua? Where are 
the anthropologists, to repeat a complaint made by the Haitian writer Rene Depestre as long ago as 
1971, "who had the idea of taking as their field of study the boards of management of neo-colonial 
banks and exchanges? Where is the anthropology of the military caste, of the so-called Inter- 
American economic and political institutions, of pseudo-legal mechanisms of ’Papadocracies’ and 
military dictatorships. To summarize: how long should we continue to rule into squares the 
elementary structures of imperialist power, which, together with the indigenous oligarchies, continues
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to underdevelop our societies?"33 In the intervening twenty years, how far has anthropology gone 
to satisfying such demands?
Perhaps we should not be surprised that, living in a society as imbued with imperialist 
assumptions as the contemporary United States (in which the idea of ’manifest destiny’ is almost as 
strong as the nineteenth century idea of the ’white man’s burden), intellectuals in that society (any 
more than intellectuals in Victorian Britain) are not always able to stand outside such a framework and 
analyse its workings. We should, however, not allow them the alibi of presenting thoroughly 
conservative approaches as though they were subversive of social norms. This is the fundamental 
error of the whole ’deconstructivist’ impulse, which raises, in a generally banal way, examples of 
Western hegemony without in any way challenging the context or the even seeking to understand it 
in terms of the nexus of objective relations in which it is founded. Simon Leys rightly pointed out that 
Edward Said shows a ’dim understanding of the Western intellectual tradition’, but this could be 
applied to post-modernism as a whole, if one did not suspect that such poor understanding was often 
a wilful refusal to try to understand, for the reason that one is too busy jockeying for one’s own place 
in the sun in that very same intellectual tradition.
33 Rene Depestre, Bonjour et adieu a la negritude
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anthropology could not afford to set itself up against colonialism. The surrealists, on the other hand, 
were deeply at odds with their own society. They had no illusions about the ’civilising mission’ of the 
West and had no interest in maintaining the colonial order. This gave them a perspective, lacking in 
anthropology, from which to declare themselves in opposition to the colonialist attitude.
In line with thinking about questions of reciprocity and objectification, surrealism is of especial 
interest in that surrealism was taken up by intellectuals in the Third World who sought in it ’miraculous 
weapons’, in the words of Aim6 CSsaire, in their own struggle against colonialism. There have been 
surrealist groups in several non-European countries: Japan, Egypt, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and it has generally had an considerable impact throughout Latin America. We will look at the 
specific relations established in particular countries in a moment.
As we noted earlier, the French Surrealist Group had been politicised by the Moroccan War 
of 1925. They then assumed an anti-colonialist position, unequivocally took the side of the Riff rebels, 
called on French troops to fraternise and declared that ’for us France no longer exists’. The famous 
’surrealist map of the world’ was drawn up soon afterwards and emphasises this displacement: 
France, indeed, does no longer exist and Paris has become the capital of Germany; the United States 
has also vanished and Britain has become an inconsequential dot dwarfed by a massive Ireland. The 
map remains a remarkable statement about surrealist affective considerations of the time: Mexico, 
Alaska, and Polynesia have become the centre of the world culturally; Russia and China maintain 
their positions in the world primarily due to the political upheavals. The comparatively small size of
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CHAPTER SIX:
RECIPROCITY AND THE VOICE OF THE OTHER
People do not follow the same course like water.
Zulu saying
Introduction: a background to Latin America
If, as we have argued in the previous chapter, the impulse of much recent theory around 
conceptualizations of the other has been to mystify the nature of this other, then we need here to look 
at the relation of (anthropological/Western) self towards the other.
The question of what it is that actually constitutes the ’Other’, in so far as one is seeking to 
provide a definition sufficient to be considered as representative of the ’Other’s’ voice, is an 
impossible one to answer. It would be absurd to try to give to ’otherness’ some homogeneous quality 
which expresses itself in certain ways. What we are concerned with here is the extent to which 
another voice has sought to establish itself consciously as such; to establish its own identity against 
that of the dominant European model. Of course, there is no such other voice in absolute terms,
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since the extent of Western hegemony over communications in the contemporary world is so 
extensive that to contest its ideology one must engage with it, to an extent on its own terms. To 
refuse to do so is to be excluded from such discourse. Even if it were possible to establish an 
alternative discourse, then we, who remain within the confines of European hegemonic discourse, 
would necessarily remain ignorant of it.1 In this context the ’other’ can be provisionally defined as 
being ail those who contest the legitimacy of European hegemony, but this is a category comprising 
such vast numbers of people as to be impossible to quantify. The claims of all of those who seek to 
define themselves as ’other’ in this sense must always be questioned therefore, both on a collective 
and individual level, to see the extent to which their otherness involves a meaningful opposition to the 
dominant ideology.
The Latin American Background
In this chapter we will endeavour to raise the question of the self and other in connexion with 
the relationship between Europe and Latin America. It is impossible to do more than touch on such 
a complex theme; what follows therefore only related to certain aspects of Latin American reality that 
provide some illumination on this question.
There are several reasons why it is particularly useful to take Latin America as exemplar in 
this connexion. In the first place its colonial relation with Europe has been the longest and most 
complex of any part of the world: most of the region was colonised and settled by the end of the 
seventeenth century; in many areas the indigenous population was decimated; colonial wealth was 
assured by slavery and iniquitous forms of indentured labour which involved the forceable immigration 
of a whole population of African peoples. Despite the fact that the majority of countries in Latin 
America had obtained their political independence from the European colonial power by the early part 
of the nineteenth century, none of the Latin American countries has succeeded in establishing a 
genuine autonomy from Europe in the economic, social or cultural domain, and the whole of Latin 
America today remains tied in a neo-colonial relationship with the United States that is, in its way, as 
invidious as the old colonial forms imposed by Europe. Furthermore, the internal dynamic of Latin 
American cultures dramatises issues of reciprocity and dialogue since it represents a society in which 
American, European and African values are intermingled to such an extent that it is impossible to 
disentangle them one from another. The social differentiation along racial lines dividing white from 
mulatto and mestizo on the one hand and from black and Indian on the other provides another level 
of internal reciprocity within Latin American societies as a whole.
Does it, however, make any sense to differentiate Latin America as an entity? Can such a
1 It was a realisation of just this point that was partly responsible for the surrealist demand for 
’occultation’.
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heterogenous range of cultural experiences be given methodological unity, and if so, upon what 
basis? Obviously the range of contingencies that Latin Americans share is wide and also complex, 
as are those that divide them: three colonial powers were involved directly in Latin America (Spain, 
Portugal and France) as against the five involved in America as a whole (the Dutch and the British 
being the colonial powers in the other American countries). Each colonial power adopted a different 
colonial policy which gave a different cultural coloration to the areas colonised. Nor was this 
homogeneous. English influence was pervasive in predominantly Spanish Argentina; Spanish 
influence remained strong in British Guyana etc. Obviously the boundaries involved are very fluid, 
but two elements that unite ’Latin America’ as a concept are the economic relationship with the United 
States (which also, it is true, unites Latin America with anglophone West Indies and Canada) and also 
the racial component, a carry- over from colonialism that still conditions Latin American society. Ren6 
Depestre has defined this ambivalently as an attitude of 'passionate racial antagonismf. This is the 
opposite to what occurred in anglophone America, where racial antagonism has a more 
straightforward relation based upon a mutual suspicion that is uncomplicated by a large 
mulatto/mestizo population. The racial question thus seems to be a crucial factor in looking at Latin 
American reality, which it has affected to a profound extent and brings into relief issues of identity and 
cultural belonging that are of considerable importance in looking at questions of otherness. Due to 
the nature of the racial question in Latin America, and the way in which the struggle for independence 
from European hegemony has unfolded, we can see numerous aspects involved in the question of 
a specific Latin American identity. The question of the relation of the European elements in Latin 
American society to both American Indian and African cultures brings this especially into focus, but 
also the relation towards the particular colonial power, towards the United States and Britain, is also 
deeply ambivalent and problematic. The situation is quite distinct from that of anglophone American 
societies in which racial heterogeneity is essentially European and the fundamental racial problem is 
not one of identity but of integrating different racial groups into a Europeanised society. In Latin 
America, on the other hand, societies are much more clearly ’hybrid’: there is revealed an interplay 
between European, American Indian and African realities. Simplistically, we could say that whereas 
anglophone American societies are European societies transposed to the Americas, those of Latin 
America are of a more specifically American origin in which the relation between Europe and its 
others is more clearly brought into focus.
In this respect it is revealing to take the cases of Martinique and Haiti. At first sight they may 
seem to be rather atypical examples of Latin American societies, not least because they are two of 
only four francophone societies in Latin America and, as such somewhat marginal to Latin America 
as a whole. Nevertheless, they still represent extremes that help to define the dilemmas of the 
continent. Haiti was the first Latin American society to obtain independence from the European 
colonial power, and has the most traumatic history of any Latin American nation. Martinique, on the 
other hand, remained a French colony until 1946, when it became, by national plebiscite, not an 
independent nation, but legally part of the French mainland. Such are the extremes that face all Latin
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American societies, caught between the Scylla of being cast adrift from the European controlled world 
market, and the Charybdis of colonial dependence. Before we look specifically at Martinique and Haiti 
we will take a brief look at the way original anthropological themes have been raised in Latin America 
not so much by means of an institutional academic discipline as within the novel. This will have a dual 
purpose: to add to the insights developed through looking at surrealism as a non-institutional form of 
anthropology and to locate anthropological themes outside the European context.
Anthropological themes in the Latin American novel
One of the things that characterises Latin America as a whole in the contemporary situation 
is under-development. This is something recognised by virtually everyone who has considered the 
problems of Latin American reality, no matter how different their solutions to the ’problem’. In 1968, 
Fidel Castro insisted on the fact: "We do not feel in the least offended if we are included among the 
underdeveloped countries. Because development of awareness, our social as well as our general 
cultural development, is steadily becoming a prerequisite to our economic and industrial development. 
In this country [...] the development of a political as well as a social awareness among the people 
becomes a sine qua non requisite for winning the battle against underdevelopment".2 In the 
obsession with economic development, the consequences of cultural under-development tend to be 
underestimated; it might be said that one of the central problems is that in so far as economic, social 
and cultural development are treated in isolation from each other rather than being perceived as part 
of the same thing, then under-development is bound to persist. As James Cockcroft has reminded 
us: "Real development involves a structural transformation of the economy, society, polity and culture 
[...] that permits the self-generating and self-perpetuating use and development of people’s 
potential."3
It is in Latin America’s cultural history that we can see most clearly the historical attempt to 
grapple with the question of identity, in which the central issue has always been to integrate the native 
American, African and European aspects of Latin American reality into something that would represent 
a separate American identity. Latin America has always been aware of this necessity in the cultural 
sphere, although in the economic and social spheres it has tended to look to Europe for models of 
what its development ought to be. This has led to what might be called, in fact, some degree of 
cultural ’over-development’, although such ’over-development’ must be seen in the overall context of 
generalised under-development. In the cultural sphere there has been a tenacious attempt over two 
centuries to come to terms with Latin America’s reciprocal yet unequal relation with Europe. To use 
Hegel’s concept of becoming, we can see Latin American culture as involving a constant effort in 
which "the aim of the conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essence, to rouse
2 Fidel Castro, Speech at the Cultural Congress of Havana 12 January 1968.
3 James D. Cockcraft, Dependence and Underdevelopment. Latin America’s Political Economy, 
p xvi.
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its self-certainty to truth".4 This effort has seen its most tangible results in the sphere of literature, 
in which Latin Americans can certainly compete with Europe on equal terms and in which Latin 
American self-certainty has unquestionably been turned into truth.5
In the context with which we are concerned here, however, we are not dealing with literature 
in its quality as literature. An area in which Latin America still remains 'under-developed* is 
anthropology (in the sciences generally as opposed to the arts, Latin America remains still tied to 
European models). To be sure, there are excellent anthropologists in Latin America such as Gerardo 
Reichel-Dolmatoff, Victor Daniel Bonilla, Carlos Furtado or Darcy Ribeiro, but they all work within a 
framework, whose boundaries have been determined by Europe. Even though they doubtless have 
a keener insight into Latin American reality by virtue of their status as Latin Americans, their 
fundamental framework is always European and there is nothing in their work that could not by 
presented by a European anthropologist with only a slight change of emphasis. It is also worth noting 
that the focus of almost all Latin American anthropology is either developmental themes, or is 
concerned with Indian cultures. This is hardly surprising in the circumstances, but it does show the 
extent to which anthropology there is subservient to vital everyday concerns which prevent Latin 
American anthropology from being able to develop a comparative approach of its own. It is hardly 
a rhetorical question to ask how many Latin Americans do - or are even interested in doing - research 
in Britain or France o r ... China? This is not, of course, through a lack of interest in such countries, 
but is a recognition of the fact that Latin American concerns are too vital and immediate to expect 
Latin American anthropologists to be interested in casting their net wider. It does, nonetheless, mean 
that they remain dependent upon European anthropology to provide such a wider comparative 
framework.
It is also the case that financial, political and social pressures on Latin American 
anthropologists are far greater than they are on their European counterparts and this also obliges 
them to conduct their research in more restricted ways. Nevertheless there is still a strong perception 
throughout Latin America that anthropology is of vital concern and this can be brought into relief by 
looking at the way in which anthropological themes emerge in a very original way in the context of 
Latin American literature. Indeed, so striking is the way that anthropological themes are inserted 
within the frame of literature, that one could see such literature as representing a sort of surrogate 
anthropology in which themes that cannot be dealt with in the restricted realm of institutional 
anthropology find their way into the mainstream of Latin American thought. This is emphasised by 
the fact that many Latin American novelists have studied anthropology and anthropologists like Jose 
Maria Arguerdes and Darcy Ribeiro have turned to literature as a more immediate way of exploring 
anthropological themes in their widest sense.
4 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p 137.
5 although one could equally perhaps consider dance or football as being comparable in terms 
of influence on Europe.
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It would be impossible within the confines of our subject to treat this question with the depth 
that is due to it. What I want to do is to use Latin American literature in a general way to illustrate 
the the nature of reciprocity and the status of objective knowledge. For what I hope this consideration 
will show is that it is impossible to make a divide in Latin America between the concerns of science 
and those of art. This is not to suggest that the realms of science and art should collapse into each 
other but that they should, on the contrary, become sharply delineated in the way they develop in 
relation to each other. That is, that unlike what we have witnessed in European culture, especially 
over the past century, where science and art have been set against each other, in Latin America we 
can see the beginnings of a process, the deepest aim of which, as we have seen of romantics and 
surrealists, is for the two realms to inform each other and interact.
Julio Cortazar has spoken of Latin American literature as constituting a "kind of grand 
inventory of Latin American reality, covering everything from geopolitical conflicts to sociological 
processes, the evolution of customs and feelings, and the search for valid responses to the great 
conscious or unconscious questions of our peoples: What are we, who are we, where are we 
going?"6 He sees this process as always being orientated towards something external to oneself (the 
other, indeed) at the same time as involving a confrontation with one’s own essential being. This sort 
of attitude, which plainly implies a sort of anthropological beginning, is central to much Latin American 
literature, and especially to those writers we shall examine here.
Anthropological themes In Latin American literature
The question of reciprocity and the nature of Latin American reality has been tackled with 
great subtlety by Darcy Ribeiro in a trilogy of novels, of which only the first, Maira (1978) has been 
translated into English. Ribeiro himself has something of a legendary quality. As Brazil’s leading 
anthropologist he spent fifteen years among Indians of the Amazonian basin. He has also had a 
tempestuous political career and, as personal advisor to President Goulart, who was overthrown by 
the US sponsored coup in 1964, has spent much of his time in exile, mostly in Argentina and 
Uruguay.
Given his background as an anthropologist it is hardly surprising that the Amazonian world 
conjured up in Maira gives the impression of complete authenticity. The story tells the tale of Av£, 
the chief-to-be of the Mafrun Indians and Isiais, the Christian missionary unable to come to terms with 
his place in the world. These are, in fact, one man: Ava left his tribe as a child and has studied since 
at the Vatican, learning the ways of the white man. He has taken the Christian name of Isiais but has 
become unsure about his identity. Although ordained as a priest he is convinced he must return to 
his tribe: "We the Mairuns are an aspect of God, our Creator, worthy of being an aspect of Him, so
6 Cortazar, ’Reality and Literature in Latin America’ Index On Censorship (1981) Vol 10 no 6.
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we have a mandate to preserve ourselves in all the singularity of how He had made us. What is the 
consequence of this mandate for me? I who am Isiais of the Missionary Order and, at the same time, 
Avd of the Jaguar clan of the Mairun people?" But as he ponders he becomes clear about his 
identity: "In truth I was only acting, am still acting a script that I have learned. I am not, I never was, 
never will be Isiais."7
The novel concerns his return to the tribe. On the journey he is accompanied by a young 
European woman, Alva, a former nun, a promiscuous 'lost girl’ from civilisation, hoping to find herself 
in the wilderness. Multiple senses of journey are thus suggested: Ava’s return is counterpoised 
against Alva’s escape, their respective journeys leading in the opposite direction, but both involving 
a quest towards a sense of identity: ideas about ’otherness' are presented with a great deal of 
anthropological acuity, in which it is not simply, or even primarily, about us and them, but takes 
account of multiple levels of reciprocal relation, all of which Ribeiro seeks to elucidate.
The knowledge that Av3 is to return creates a mood of expectancy among the Marirun. The 
guide of the souls relates the news to the people: "He was taken away from here by the alien sorcerer 
many years ago, do you remember? Well, yes! He is about to return. He will come, bringing us 
everything, in a white boat as big as the Great House. Do you believe it? How strange. Perhaps it 
is for the good. Perhaps it is for the worse Who knows?"®
His return is opportune since the chief, Anaca, has just died. Preparing for their burial rituals, 
the tribe need to re-establish their society in its harmony with the world and heal the breach which 
the death of Anaca had brought about, something that reveals a completely different conception of 
death than the one we are familiar with in the West: "Anaca is buried. Soon he will be dead. Life 
must now be re-bom."9 As the rituals are enacted, Av£ reveals himself as being incapable of 
assuming the chieftainship. No one can account for this disappointment. They had expected that he 
would return with the new skills learned at the hands of the foreigners and be able to add Western 
knowledge to traditional Indian knowledge. Instead he appears to have learned nothing and to have 
lost all the skills taken for granted by the Indians. At first they explain Ava’s failure in the hunt, and 
inability to assume the chief’s authority, as being due to the necessity for him to work through some 
'secret destiny’ that he would in time reveal to them. Time, however, merely serves to emphasise the 
extent of his displacement. He seems to have lost his old identity without having gained a new one. 
He becomes a social outcast, impotent (both figuratively and literally). Eventually, in desperation, the 
Mairun have to re-create their society without Av£, and another warrior has to take over the 
chieftainship. Henceforth Av£’s only purpose in the tribe is to be sort of village idiot to the Indians, 
who assume that the white man must have stolen his soul. For himself, Av3 realises that white
7 Ribeiro, Maira, p 17.
8 Ribeiro, Maira, p 26.
9 Ribeiro, Maira, p 12.
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civilisation has nothing to offer the Indians, who can only follow their own path. They cannot become 
integrated with, or learn anything from white civilisation, since the latter’s relation towards them is only 
an exploitative one, that refuses to recognise the Indians own reality on its own terms. Av£ is able 
to do no more than take refuge in a personal tranquillity in which he recognises that "truth is not to 
be found in one place. And it is not a single thing. It is everywhere; it is multiple, dispersed and 
contradictory."10 We are left numbed by a sense that these people are doomed to be destroyed by 
the encroaching civilisation. It is impossible for them to adapt to changing circumstances without 
denying their own essential being. Av£’s pious hope at the beginning of the book that "This is the 
only command of God that completely moves me: that each people retain its identity", is shown to be 
a woefully inadequate response to the conditions that pertain in the Amazon today, in which the 
Indians can only be to be absorbed by the process of civilisation, as if being taken into some infernal 
machine (bringing suggestions of Jarry’s ’debraining machine’).
But if the Indians have nothing to learn from civilisation, there is plenty that civilisation has 
to learn from them. Alva discovers this as she does not, as she had hoped, ’find herself’ in the 
process of discover a reason for living among ’primitives’. Rather she finds her place within Mairun 
society not by attempting to understand them, but by shedding her European identity. Her ego seems 
to dissolve as she becomes impregnated with the life of the village: she comes to accept life in all its 
immediacy, accepting her own identity as being contingent and in a constant state of flux. She learns 
that she has no ’self’ to find: she is only what she is. And in accepting this, in losing her fear of the 
loss of identity, she loses the sense of alienation she had felt from living in the West.
It would be misleading, and somewhat presumptuous, to try to read Maira as an allegorical 
fable about relations between Europe and Latin America, since the issues Ribeiro focuses upon are 
wholly concrete and he seems specifically concerned to deny the reduction of relations to an 
allegorical level. In sketching out the effects of human development in the terms he is using, Ribeiro 
denies the nature of reciprocity that pertains at present between Europe and its ’Other’. It is not 
dialogue that is being encouraged, however, since dialogue always privileges the stronger and leads 
to a denial of the reality of otherness. The tragedy of Amazonia is one of imposition. In its 
determination to exploit the region for profit, the West denies space to the other and makes it 
meaningless for the exploited even to seek to come to terms with what is happening to them. But 
civilisation itself cannot escape the consequences of what it is doing. By destroying the Indians (and 
indeed the jungle itself) it is also destroying something of itself: it is part of a slow process of suicide 
to which civilisation is subjecting itself. This process can only be arrested by that civilisation 
recognising itself in itself and in the process recognising the other, not as a separable, and 
disposable, object, but as a part of itself. One must, as Alva does, learn to respond to the ebb and 
flow of life as it unfolds around one, rather than imposing one’s will over it. It is only in such 
recognition that genuine reciprocity becomes possible. In such a scenario, Latin America as a
10 Ribeiro, ibid, p 320.
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collective entity lies betwixt and between, forced to forge ahead with Western ideas of development 
(characterised by Octavio Paz as a "race to see who can reach the gates of Hell first") and yet 
seeking to establish an identity that would be unique unto itself.
This is a dilemma that was central to the work of another Latin American anthropologist- 
turned-novelist, the Peruvian Jose Maria Arguerdes. Arguerdes had an absolute commitment to the 
lives of the Quechua Indians with whom he had been brought up and with whom he had lived for 
much of his life. He was obsessed, not to say tormented, by the problem of expression: the double 
imperative of how to find the means to express the reality of the Quechua people and how to expose 
the way in which European language served to locate and establish power over the people. 
Arguerdas saw that if the continent was to advance then its culture had to collectively express the 
aspirations of whole communities in all of their varied and dynamic aspects. Although he has been 
accused of seeking to maintain an old archaic social structure, in fact it is apparent that Arguerdes’s 
intention was exactly the opposite. As he wrote: "Who will change this social ’equilibrium’ that has 
already prevailed for centuries - an equilibrium that is profoundly horrible - and destroy it, to enable 
the country to roll more freely and catch up with other nations - of the same age but with less human 
potential - that have already left such a shameful period behind?”11 Change,then, but not change 
that involved the imposition of alien modes of living and thinking, but a change that was integral to 
the community itself.
What particularly concerned Arguerdes was that such ’destruction’ should not come from 
without, but rather from within the community itself, as part of a process of change that would in its 
wake create a newly integrated community rather than one divided against itself. He saw that 
economic development could offer no solution to such problems, but could only exacerbate them, and 
he bitterly opposed most of the development programmes organised either by the government or by 
aid organisations on the grounds that they ignored the realities of life in the communities to which they 
were supposed to apply. Both in his anthropological writings and in his literary works, Arguerdes 
sought to alert us to those realities. But how can one present such realities without betraying them? 
How to even talk of Quechua reality in the Spanish language, a language that can only, even with the 
best will in the world, serve to mask an oppressive relation. At times he won himself over to the idea 
of writing in Spanish, thinking he had found a tentative solution to what he called his ’Way of the 
Cross’. He explains what occurred: "I solved the problem by creating for them a special Spanish 
language, which has since been used with horrible exaggeration in the work of others. But the 
Indians do not speak that Spanish, not with Spanish speakers, much less amongst themselves. It 
is a fiction. The Indians speak in Quechua. [...] So it is false and horrendous to present the Indians 
speaking the Spanish of Quechua servants who have become accustomed to living in the capital."12 
His anguish over this dilemma was to lead him to write only poetry in Quechua during his last few
11 Arguerdas, ’The Novel and the Problem of Literary Expression in Peru’, in Yawar Fiesta, p 4.
12 Arguerdas, preliminary note to Yawar Fiesta, p xi.
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years and was one of the reasons for his suicide in 1970.
Both of these novels problematise the question of what exactly internal reality is and how to 
integrate the Indian populations into the polity of Latin American society. This problem cannot be 
divorced from the wider one of the position of Latin America in the world and directly implicates, in 
the way both authors organise their themes, the wider relationship between European and Latin 
American reality. The fact that both authors have seen anthropology as being inadequate to express 
the reality they wish to document is also significant, for it is apparent that neither author has seen 
their novels as an escape from anthropological research but as an intensification of it, able to convey 
a more complex sense of the burning actuality they perceive in their own societies which calls for a 
sense of recognition by the other of a sense of their own involvement in the relation between Europe 
and otherness. In this relation it becomes essential that we as Europeans should listen to the other 
voice, and not dissemble it in terms of a relativist universalism.
It was precisely such a demand that was made by Latin American anthropologists as long ago 
as 1971 at a symposium organised in Bridgetown, Barbados on the situation of the forest Indians of 
South America. They issued the complaint against the anthropology of Latin America that it "took 
form within and became an instrument of colonial domination, openly or surreptitiously [...and] has 
continued to supply information and methods of action useful for maintaining, reaffirming and 
disguising social relations of a colonial nature. [...] with growing frequency we note nefarious Indian 
action programmes and the dissemination of stereotypes and myths distorting and making the Indian 
situation - all pretending to have their basis in alleged scientific research. [...] The anthropology now 
required in Latin America is not that which relates to Indians as objects of study, but rather that which 
perceives the colonial situation and commits itself to struggle for liberation. In this connexion we see 
anthropology providing the colonised peoples with data and interpretations both about themselves and 
their colonisers useful for their own fight for freedom, and re-defining the distorted image of Indian 
communities current in the national society, thereby unmasking its colonial nature with its underlying 
ideology..."13 Whether or not this complaint against Western anthropology is still valid in the same 
terms today, there can be little doubt that the colonialist relation as a whole has remained unchanged 
and the way in which Indians within Latin American countries are treated simply replicates the way 
in which Latin America as a whole is treated by European consciousness. Just as the Indians need 
such weapons to enable them to come to terms with their own context, so too do Latin Americans 
generally need to become aware of their own specificity that would not simply represent the apeing 
of European standards.
The themes we have touched upon in looking at the novels of Ribeiro and Arguerdes do no 
more than touch the surface of the anthropological themes that could be drawn from looking closely
13 The Declaration of Barbados for the liberation of the Indians’ made 30 January 1971 and 
signed by Miguel Alberto Bartolome, Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, Victor Daniel Bonilla, Gonzalo Castillo 
Cardenas, Miguel Chase Sardi, Georg Grunberg, Nelly Arvelo de Jimenez, Esteban Emilio Mosonyi, 
Darcy Ribeiro, Scott S. Robinson, Stefano Varese.
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at Latin American literature as a whole. Indeed it could be argued that novels in Latin America often 
represent anthropology ’continued by other means’. They are certainly seen throughout Latin 
America as a means of knowledge, as a way of understanding the world and of defining themselves. 
They could certainly, as such, be seen as contributions towards a ’science of man’. But the value 
they have for us is that they question the monolithic relation we tend to establish between the other 
and ourselves. These are others who do talk back. It is this that appears to be the great value of 
treating anthropological themes in literature. Even if Latin American anthropologist had the same 
means of research at their disposal as those of Europe, there would remain the difficulty of making 
their voice heard in the rough and tumble of the international world market of ideas, in which there 
are barriers of translation and distribution to be broken down before the ’Other’ voice can possibly be 
heard. In literature, on the other hand, these barriers have to some extent been broken down. There 
can be little question that, in literature at least, we can hear the unmediated voice of the Other. 
Whether we choose to listen or whether we deflect such voice into our own universalist perspective 
is, of course, another matter. In an interview given shortly before he died in 1985, the Mexican Juan 
Rulfo doubted the sincerity of Europeans who assume knowledge of Latin America. "They published 
us because we were exotic, strange," he said. They did not listen but rather established a voyeuristic 
relation that simply appropriates and extends European and North American concerns. It was only 
with the Cuban Revolution, he asserted, that any sort of genuine interest in Latin America had been 
awakened: "Before 1959 they didn’t even know where our continent was located.”14 And it is 
perhaps for this reason above all that anthropology in Latin America is treated not as a luxury but as 
a necessity: a necessity that will enable a sense of identity and common purpose that would emerge 
from their own appropriate reality.
As long ago as 1950, Michel Leiris called for an end to a localised anthropology that refuses 
to treat societies in terms of the real relations of power, but seeks to dissemble the colonial or neo­
colonial context.15 Repeating such demands, indigenous Latin American anthropologists like Darcy 
Ribeiro have called for an anthropology that does not base itself on dubious concepts like scientific 
objectivity, but which would seek to participate directly in the life of the communities involved, a 
participation at some remove from the detached idea of the participant observer.
In the previous chapter we looked at the way in which an obsession with Western images of 
the other tends to lead to an over-estimation of their power and serves to deflect debate away from 
the nature of the self/other relation in so far as it concerns the other as an entity in its own right. We 
noted that Edward Said, for all the deficiencies of his study, had brought into focus a specific part of 
colonial ideology that could be identified as ’Orientalism’. The functioning of this ideology cannot be 
simply located in the Orient, but takes form in different ways throughout the colonial Empires. The 
terms by which such ideological conceptualization are framed is a form of exoticism, made concrete
14 Juan Rulfo, interviewed by Victoria Azurduy, Granma, 23 February 1986.
15 see Leiris, ’L’Ethnographie devant le colonialisme’ in Bris6es, pp125/145.
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by the colonial relation.
In considering exoticism in the colonial context, Ren6 M6nil has defined it as "an initial 
moment in relations from country to country, people to people. But this moment must be transcended 
and denied to allow the truth of man to emerge from what has until then only been perceived in terms 
of the exotic relation."16 M6nil considers that the effect of colonialism was to stunt this relation in 
its initial exotic form. No real contact was made between cultures and the relationship was reified in 
a way that prevented real development. The effect upon the oppressed was to deny on the 
conscious level the reciprocity involved in the self/other relation. Thereby for the colonised the self 
becomes exoticised, the T becomes alienated, becomes, in fact, ’other’ to oneself, and one is able 
to see oneself only through the veil of exoticism so constructed. He becomes, in M6nil’s words 
"exotic-for-himself".17
But for M6nil this relation is extremely complex. These are real relations. They are not, as 
they are for Said, simply conceptualizations of the European’s mind. Far from it - in their very 
material reality they directly implicate the ’other1. It is not so much a matter of imposition and of 
mutually defined relations. It is not the European who has made the other ’exotic-for-himself; it arises 
rather from his own complicity in the way in which this alienating identity is established. It is a relation 
that can be refused, but only at the cost of an even more acute identity crisis. One can see this 
problem with Edward Said himself in that, as a Palestinian, he rejects the ’exotic-for-self identity and 
seeks, through his analysis of Orientalism, to undermine the ideological apparatus that is placing the 
dilemma on him. The irony is that he can only escape the dilemma by himself becoming part of the 
same ideological apparatus he is seeking to undermine. For Ren6 Menil, the relation involved cannot 
be denied: the ’exotic-for-self identity must be taken as given since one cannot outwit history. The 
only way to deal with the relation is to confront it and to conquer autonomy in order to "destroy the 
duality in virtue of which we appear, to ourselves, strangers and strange... in order that we can at 
last be ourselves, to be invented, it’s true".18
M6nil’s comments were made against the background of the development of the concept of 
negritude, of which he has been one of the most consistent critics. In considering the question of 
representation in the context of current post-modernist debates, we doubted the various paths that 
have been followed in anthropological theory. We considered the way that current ideas of dialogue 
could set up a spurious reciprocity in which the voice of the other was as effectively suppressed as 
in the traditional forms of anthropological knowledge against which the reflexive model of 
anthropological discourse is reacting. This process of incorporating the other’s voice into one’s own 
in order to claim a genuine dialogue can be brought into focus by considering the history of the
16 M6nil, Tracies, p 19.
17 M6nil, ibid., p 23.
18 M6nil, ibid., p 24/25.
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negritude movement.
Negritude as ’counter’ Orientalism
The negritude movement developed in francophone African and West Indians societies during 
the late forties and the fifties. It began as essentially a cultural movement, but became, as the 
independence movements in the French colonials gathered force, a political doctrine. In 1960, the 
leading negritude poet Leopold Sedar Senghor was elected the first President of the newly 
independent Senegalese Republic, a position he was to hold for more than thirty years. Negritude 
consequently became the banner around which much of the independence movement in the French 
colonies rallied. Considering negritude here, we will concentrate on issues arising from the effects 
of negritude in the Caribbean.
In the West Indies, negritude emerged from two different points: the first coming as a 
response in Haiti to the US occupation (1915/1934) which prompted Haitian blacks to undertake a re­
examination of their culture and to re-appraise the African contribution; the second took form in the 
late forties in the then French colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana as part of the 
movement towards more political autonomy for the colonies and resulted in all three colonies 
becoming a legal part of metropolitan France. The impetus thus covered a range of exigencies, but 
both were attempts to recover a specifically black consciousness perceived as being either lost or 
under threat in the particular context of the four societies. We will examine some of the national 
effects of negritude later, but here we will concentrate on the ideological implications of its 
development through the Americas in general.
In the nineteenth century the French colonial myth had developed along quite different lines 
from that of the British. Having lost the ’pearl’ of the empire in the trauma of the Haitian Revolution, 
France was more responsive than Britain to the aspirations of the colonised for integration into the 
body-politic of the ’mother country’. French colonial policy was thus based on cultural rather than 
biological racism. The colonial lie was not that black was inherently inferior to white, but that it was 
his culture that prevented his personal becoming. To the extent that he renounced his own culture 
and accepted that of the French, he would become civilised, ’French with a black skin’. The name 
of this game was assimilation.
Such a policy was, if anything, more insidious than the British myth based upon inherent 
biological inferiority, since it involved a double alienation. Not only were blacks told they were from 
an inferior race, they were also led to believe they could, in Fanon’s words, be "elevated above jungle 
status in proportion to [their] adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards".19 Thereby denied 
their own culture, they were also placed in a hierarchical relation defined by cultural terminology
19 Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, p 136.
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always controlled by the coloniser. Before being able to act politically against colonialism, then, the 
colonised of the French Empire would need to re-establish a sense of their own cultural identity.
The roots of the negritude movement in the French colonies (we will deal separately with Haiti 
later in the chapter) were laid down by a group of West Indian and African poets who were studying 
at the Sorbonne during the thirties. It was in 1938 that one of their number, Aim6 C§saire, composed 
what was later to be seen as the rallying cry of the movement in writing the monumental poem Cahier 
d'un r6tour au pays natal, a lyrical document of passion and fire that would be published in its entirety 
only in 1947. The poem announced a changed relation between black and white in the French 
colonies, in which assimilation could no longer be taken for granted as the destiny of the colonised: 
"Listen to the white world 
appallingly weary from its immense effort 
the creak of its joints rebelling under the hardness of the star 
listen to the proclaimed victories which trumpet their defeats 
listen to their grandiose alibis (stumbling so lamely)
"Pity for our conquerors, all-knowing and wise".20
Defiance would henceforth be the watchword:
"Accommodate yourself to me. I won’t 
Accommodate myself to you."21
The title was significant in another way, signalling C6saire’s own return to Martinique, a 
decision that Franz Fanon later regarded as being of crucial symbolic importance (it was also to be 
symbolic that the ship on which he travelled was to be bombed by the Nazis on its return journey: 
there would be no way back to Europe). As Fanon has testified, C6saire’s very presence in 
Martinique was a provocation and his great poem suggested a ’bridge’ to Africa: contrary to the 
assertions of the assimilationists, there was now an important figure on the island who celebrated the 
very African values that the people of Martinique had always been taught to despise. C.L.R. James 
saw the importance of the Cahier as being threefold:
"1. He has made a union of the African sphere of existence with existence in the Western 
world.
2. The past of mankind and the future of mankind are historically and logically linked.
20 C6saire Return to my Native Land [translation by Anna Bostock and John Berger] p 76.
21 C6saire, ibid.,p 60.
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3. No longer from external stimulus but from their own self-generated and independent being
and motion will Africa and Africans move towards an integrated humanity."22
Back in Martinique, C6saire established, together with his wife Susanne and with Ren6 M6nil, 
the journal Tropiques, which would provide a starting point for the development of negritude, although 
immediately after the Second World War, Ren6 M6nil would move away from C6saire and later 
become one of the most trenchant and unsentimental critics of negritude.
To consider negritude critically is to be faced with a problematic established when an 
amorphous movement of ideas becomes crystallised in an ideological form that causes its ideas to 
move away from their initial direction. Rend Despestre expressed this shift: "as it developed into an 
ideology, and even an ontology, the concept of negritude began to adopt one of various meanings, 
all of them ambiguous, until it presented the following paradox: formulated to awaken and to 
encourage self-esteem and confidence in the strength of the social groups that slavery had reduced 
to the status of beasts of burden, negritude now makes them evaporate into a semantic 
metaphysics."23
Although the reductive essentialism that became prevalent in negritude had been defined in 
Cdsaire’s poem ("Those who invented neither gunpowder nor compass/Those who never knew how 
to conquer steam or electricity/But who abandoned themselves to the essence of all things..."), it was 
Senghor who placed an ideological gloss on to the process. Or more specifically, if we accept the 
argument of Ren6 M6nil, it was Jean-Paul Sartre, through Senghor (in his introduction of Senghor’s 
Orpheus Noii), who established negritude in ideological form. It was Sartre’s formulations, 
transformed by his point of view, that defined the direction that negritude would take. In this process, 
as M6nil sees it, negritude’s apparently progressive credentials were assumed as a mask by the 
native petty-bourgeoisie who, in complicity with imperialism, wished to ensure that a neo-colonialist 
mentality would follow independence. Sartre’s unwitting role in this process emerged from his own 
relation to negritude, which he was unable to see on its own terms, but which he wished to use as 
part of his own existentialist philosophy. As M6nil says, the negro in question resembles Sartre, but 
it is a Sartre "who had darkened and sometimes reversed his colour. It was a very anguished, very 
existentialist and picturesque negro".24 He becomes a character without concrete reality that has 
emerged from nowhere, exists outside all social relations and outside the real world and the national 
context. In making such a reification, the doctrine of negritude is led to the error of believing that 
blacks were colonised because they were black. Rather, M6nil asserts, it was the other way round: 
that through being colonised, disparate blacks became negroes and gained thereby something in
22 C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, p 402.
23 Ren6 Depestre, Bonjour et adieu a la nigritude, p 176.
24 Menil, op cit, p 65.
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common. This is not a racial trait, but is born of a common experience: the experience of colonialism.
In discussing negritude in these terms, M6nil is raising complex issues about the self/other 
relation, for it is a question not simply of the development of black consciousness, but of the whole 
nature of self/other relations, whether they be black/white, coloniser/colonised, Occident/Orient etc. 
For negritude was defined precisely in relation to the West, but instead of questioning the relation, 
it capitulated to the ’exotic-for-self identity (something which, In Hegelian terms is defined as 
’appetitive self-consciousness’, the first stage of becoming). If we apply Hegelian concepts here, the 
second part of the process of recognition, and the basis of M6nil’s critique is that negritude is unable 
to take this step and remains trapped in its own-self-consciousness. On the one hand it reflects the 
inverted image of the European, allowing itself to be defined by external consciousness (in this case 
by Sartre) and on the other hand it capitulates to its own petty-bourgeois class interests to serve in 
the neo-colonial relationship established post-independence. There is a double movement involved 
that is equally confining and requires re-formulation in different terms by both consciousnesses (i.e. 
both by the coloniser and by the colonised). As M6nil puts it: "...in not wanting to consider a black 
philosophy as simply a human philosophy, is this not a repression of racism? In the same way, 
negritude is not just a matter among Blacks since its object is the relation Blacks/Whites and the 
Whites are there qualified and defined correlatively and antithetically in relation to Blacks. In the last 
analysis negritude, being situated at the point of departure in the framework of progressive and anti­
colonial ideologies, the most liberal white critics have the problem of surmounting the following 
difficulty: how to make without complacency a progressive critique of a progressive ideology that has 
made mistakes?"25 Recognition, that is to say, must become mutual. If this recognition is refused, 
by either side, then the relation remains trapped and neither can act upon it. It is necessary for both 
to see negritude as a mentality that developed in a particular historical time, responding to exigencies 
both within the indigenous culture and in that of Europe.
The trap that Sartre fell into was to refuse this recognition. It was not a question of 
ethnocentricity, but the reverse. What Sartre was doing was not making a judgement of the other in 
terms of the West, but was rather assuming the position of the other as a means to make a value 
judgement against the West and as a legitimation of his own political and philosophical position. In 
so doing he effectively stole the identity of the other as a means of escaping the self. Whether he 
wanted to be or not he was a European serving his own culture.
It was left to Wole Soyinka to pinpoint the moment that a liberatory idea falls into an 
ideological strait jacket. In clarifying a notorious statement he was alleged to have made to the effect 
that ’a tiger doesn’t proclaim its tigritude’, he said, "The point is that, to quote what I said fully. I said: 
’A tiger does not proclaim its tigritude, he pounces.’ In other words: a tiger does not stand in the forest 
and say ’I am a tiger’. When you pass where the tiger has walked before, you see the skeleton of 
the duiker, you know that some tigritude has emanated there. In other words: the distinction I was
25 M6nil ibid., p 86.
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making [...] was a purely literary one: I was trying to distinguish between propaganda and true poetic 
creativity."26 Soyinka’s image is a potent one and points to the fact that ideas, when they stand still, 
become congealed. It is necessary, like the tiger, to keep moving on.
This necessarily rather cursory look at some of the ideological factors that have affected the 
history of negritude, gives us the background to look more specifically at the way in which the 
relationship of Europe and the Other has unfolded in specific contexts. We will consider here relations 
between France and Haiti and Martinique which can be seen to represent, as we have noted above, 
the extremes of the different Latin American societies in their relation with Europe.
Reciprocity and dependence In Martinique
We will first look at the example of Martinique, where the idea of reciprocity has been much 
touted, and yet the overwhelming sense is of a particularly insidious form of colonial dependence.
To orient ourselves, a little general information about Martiniquan history is necessary.
The island, in the eastern part of the Caribbean, was colonised by the French in 1635. As 
a colonial possession it was subjected to the slave-based plantation system centred around the 
production of sugar that was typical of French possessions in the Caribbean, although the island was 
of minor importance compared with the enormous wealth generated by Saint-Domingue (now Haiti). 
As a response to the slave revolt in Saint Domingue, and as part of the general libertarian policies 
of the French Revolution, slavery was abolished by the Convention in 1792, something that led to 
much resistance from the planters who openly collaborated when the English invaded the island, 
which was brought under English control in 1793, unlike its sister island of Guadeloupe, which 
successfully resisted the English assault. The English restored slavery and the plantation system 
continued when the island was restored to French control in 1812. It was finally and definitively 
abolished in 1848 but the actual system of production remained more or less the same through the 
nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. Nationalist feeling arose during the Second 
World War, when the French administration collaborated with Vichy, and in 1946 a plebiscite was held 
to vote on whether the island should be incorporated into France itself. A considerable majority, voted 
affirmatively and since then Martinique has been a legal part of France, with the status of being an 
overseas department with all the same rights and duties as any other French department. There is 
a nationalist movement on the island which continues to make the demand for independence, but its 
influence is not great. In Martinique, it seems, there is a relative contentment with this relation and 
the island appears pleased to be seen as an ’exotic’ part of France, completely assimilated to its 
culture. Unlike the other francophone islands of Guadeloupe and Guiana, which likewise voted to
26 quoted in Jahn.A History of Neo-African Literature, p 265/66.
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become part of France, there seems, on the surface, to be little ambivalence in this attitude.
Nevertheless, Martiniquan intellectuals like Aim6 C6saire, Ren6 M6nil, Franz Fanon, Edouard 
Glissant, and Georges Gratiant have been at the forefront of attempts to recover a specifically 
American identity with full acknowledgement of the African influence on the island’s culture. Their 
work has provided a considerable body of analysis of the colonial mentality that still persists in the 
island and these analyses have been drawn upon considerably by the French anthropologist, Francis 
Affergan, in what is a remarkable study of the island called Anthropologie k la Matinique.
Affergan’s work is a deliberate challenge to traditional anthropological research methods. He 
does not appear to have done fieldwork, or if he has, then the nature of his book eschews the sort 
of evidence that generally is gained from an ethnographic encounter. Affergan refuses the personal 
nature of ethnographic evidence to undertake "an anthropological experience through Martinique and 
not of Martinique".27 Martinique is an ideal subject for such analysis, argues Affergan, because the 
relation between France and Martinique gives to the nature of otherness a clarity that emphasises the 
reciprocal nature of the relation. In Martinique ’otherness’ is rendered ambivalently. The French 
person who visits the island is beguiled by complete familiarity on the one hand and by strangeness 
and exoticism on the other. It thus renders possible a relation in which "complicity with others 
consists in mingling there, mingling in life itself, whilst ceaselessly detaching oneself".28 But 
internally, too, the population is divided within itself in ambivalent fashion, torn between its African and 
French traditions, which pull against each other in different directions so that everyone becomes in 
some way envious of the other: "to feel oneself to be white is better socially than culturally: to feel 
oneself black is better culturally than socially".29
Affergan sees Martiniquan society as being defined by race, which divides the society in four 
ways: blacks, mulattos, Martiniquan whites (b6k6s), and metropolitan whites. But relations between 
them can be described as being pathological: a state of perpetual disequilibrium is established in 
which black and white relate to each other through a continual play of mirrors. This pathology is 
marked by two main symptoms: first, a sensibility that over-reacts based upon a negative transference 
in relation to France; culture thus tends to be marked by a mimetic quality in which there is an attempt 
to flee the self and which is consequently dominated by a sense of morbidity; and second, a sense 
of failure in relation to the metropolis which leads to auto-repression in an attempt to master body and 
consciousness. The Martiniquan is denied a sense of the other since the other is identical to the self. 
By voting for incorporation into France, Martinique was turning its back on the essential Hegelian pre­
condition for self-recognition - the determination to be prepared to fight to the death. It is thus 
condemned to a form of simulation in morbidity, as Fanon had earlier pointed out. This is most clearly
27 Francis Affergan, Anthropologie k la Martinique, p 9.
28 Affergan, ibid, p 7.
29 ibid, p 27.
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seen in the petty-bourgeoisie, which clings to French culture and yet also wants its own Martinquan 
identity. In effect it wants France but not the French, thus establishing an amorous relationship based 
on need rather than desire.
In this way Martinique can have no consciousness of the self nor knowledge of the other, but 
only a sort of pseudo-recognition in which the other exists only as a negative aspect of the self. This 
is the consequence of assimilation which results in the extinction of the self rather than the creation 
of an autonomous source of existence - the object of desire thereby remains unrecognised by the 
subject. As such class consciousness can never take form, since it is diverted into a mimetic quality 
by those who are perceived as the ’haves’ against the ’have-nots’. In the process even race itself is 
emptied of content and is condemned to being ’an eternally empty subject’,30 and racial 
consciousness leads not so much to racial antagonism as to objectivisation and fetishism: "To be 
neither French nor Antillean consequently comes back to saying that man is nothing."31
The key to this problem is the relation of France and the ideological consequences of 
assimilation. Assimilation denies otherness and reduces the other to a coeval entity. This makes an 
assumption of the equality of the relation even though it is patently clear that the relation is not equal. 
France thus refuses to accept any form of reciprocity except money (which it both gives and receives), 
since it refuses to accept that Martinique is different from itself. This is so even though it is patently 
clear that culturally Martinique is quite distinct from any other part of France (although one should not 
see this as a process unique to relations between Europe and its other, since, within France itself, 
the relation of Bretons and Basques, to take just the most obvious examples, are treated in exactly 
the same way by the hegemony of French social and cultural politics). France is thus literally the 
mother country, to which Martinique maintains an unnatural attachment. Time is thereby denied and 
any dialectical movement becomes impossible.
This brief synopsis of Affergan’s complex argument does not do it justice, but what I have 
sought to bring out has been the themes it touches upon that relate to the themes of the curent study. 
Affergan brings out very forcibly the pitfalls that are involved in making too close an assumption about 
affinity with the other and the consequent denial of otherness. It will be noted that the situation 
Affergan describes is curiously like the sort of approach on which Fabian, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, would like to found current anthropological research. It is precisely the denial of the 
autonomy of the other’s voice that has created the insidious situation that we find in Martinique. It 
is the assumption of coevalness and the refusal to recognise difference as difference that has resulted 
in the other being unable to establish a clear sense of identity, or rather, has served to muddy 
questions of identity so that the other’s identity is absorbed into that of the self.
The question of otherness is one that is acutely felt throughout Latin America, particularly in 
the way that cultural imperialism can take form in ways that are, on the surface, ’sympathetic’
30 ibid, p 130.
31 ibid, p 131.
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European attempts to understand or ’empathise’ with the other. For Latin American intellectuals this 
presents a particular problem, in that they are often simultaneously incorporated into and excluded 
from the voice that speaks with European authority. Carlos Fuentes, speaking some years ago at the 
ICA, related how the Latin American has this dual personality formed by his relation to European 
culture on the one hand and his reality as a Latin American on the other. To establish oneself as an 
intellectual it is necessarily the relation with European culture that is fundamental in one’s formation. 
Communication, both within and between Latin American countries, is difficult, and institutions of 
education are isolated from each other. Their self-knowledge tends, therefore, not to be constructed 
through a direct confrontation of their own direct reality, but mediated by their relation to Europe. He 
illustrated this with a revealing example: for the North American, crossing the border into Mexico is 
an adventure, the crossing of a frontier into another land, a land of strangeness and disorientation, 
the land of the other. For the Mexican crossing the border in the opposite direction no such 
disorientation is apparent. In fact, he suggested, if one were to ask most Mexicans about their feeling 
on crossing the frontier, their most likely response would be "What frontier?" This anecdote illustrates 
an important distinction between European identity and identity in the Third World in general, for 
whereas European and North American culture defines itself, that of the Third World tends, at the 
present time, to define itself necessarily in relation to Europe.
In his study of Martinique, Francis Affergan has allowed some of these problems to be openly 
confronted within the terms of a specific relation. He has also opened the way for an anthropology
that looks at other societies in a rather more sophisticated way than is possible if the fetish of
fieldwork remains in place. There still remain methodological problems with his own approach. First, 
he seems over-eager to engage in theoretical discussion at the expense of ethnographic detail. His 
ethnographic detail is rarely properly contextualised and though this does not affect his overall 
analysis, it does create substantial methodological difficulties. It seems to me that any anthropological 
study must be properly grounded in ethnography, even if one has not collected the ethnographic facts 
oneself and it must be unacceptable to seek to impose a theoretical argument using ethnography as 
back-up for a theoretical argument established beforehand, which is effectively what Affergan does. 
In his case it works, I think, because his theoretical insight is so acute, but as an approach it has the 
danger of encouraging the very complacency he is directing himself against. This relates to a second 
difficulty: we are given no standard against which Martiniquan sensibility can be classified as being 
pathological. This is hardly unproblematic. What is the norm against which this pathology is being 
compared? How is Martinique’s relation with France qualitatively different from that of any other 
department? What is the nature of the entity defined as ’France’? How has the incorporation of 
Martinique into French society effected (in social, political and cultural terms) the ’mother1 country 
itself? These are not questions that ought to be ignored given the aims of Affergan’s study. 
Martinique is not only a problem for Martinique, but also for France. As Ren6 M§nil has insisted, in
terms of otherness, it is also the self that must be brought into question.
Bearing in mind what we have said about Martinique, we will briefly bok at Haiti, the
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Caribbean island that has followed exactly the opposite course from that of Martinique, in refusing the 
direct relation with Europe and making a tenacious attempt through two centuries to define its own 
separate identity.
An indigenous anthropology: the case of Haiti
The French colony of Saint Domingue was established in 1697 when France seized the 
Western part of the Spanish island of Hispaniola, till then mainly a haunt of pirates and bandits. For 
almost a century it was to be the most magnificent colony in history, providing untold wealth for the 
mother country. One of the most fertile pieces of land in the world, the territory was mercilessly 
exploited to become the jewel in the French colonial crown.
The upheaval brought by the French Revolution was to lead to the only successful slave 
rebellion in history and to the French colony of Saint Domingue being transformed into the Republic 
of Haiti. Inspired both by the ideals of the French Revolution and by African traditions that had taken 
form in the religion of voodoo, the Haitian Revolution was one of the more extraordinary happenings 
in history, in which the Haitians had to successively defeat the French royalists, the Spanish, the 
English (the only time the British navy has ever surrendered) and finally Bonaparte’s France to finally 
proclaim independence in 1804, when Dessalines declared the establishment of the Republic by 
tearing the white out of the French flag.
Independence was to bring fresh sorrow to Haiti. Internal divisions between mulatto and black 
were difficult enough, but the refusal of the population to engage in anything other than subsistence 
farming, perceiving any attempt to rationalize the economy as being a prelude to the re-introduction 
of slavery, made it very difficult for any Haitian government to come to terms with the political and 
economic needs of the new nation or to enable even a small proportion of the wealth produced under 
colonial rule to be generated. What was determining for the course of Haiti’s history, though, was the 
attitude of foreign powers.
Soon after the declaration of independence, France imposed an economic blockade to 
prevent trade. This had a paralysing effect, particularly since Haiti soon established a position in 
European demonology as ’the Black Republic’. Even other Latin American republics, newly 
independent themselves (and to whose own independence struggles Haiti had given all possible aid), 
refused to give any solidarity. Britain, and then later in the century the United States and Germany, 
watched the Republic through vulture’s eyes, looking for an opportunity to re-establish colonial power. 
It was not until 1825 that the French government lifted the blockade after forcing the Haitian 
government to agree to pay absurd amounts of reparations for the loss of the colony. Since the 
interest on the debt soon became more than the Haitian gross national product this did not do 
anything to help Haiti establish economic autonomy. Of course, it was hardly designed to.
European pressure intensified throughout the century, and was typified by an incident in 1898
135
when a Haitian court had the temerity to find a German citizen guilty of beating up a Haitian 
policeman and sentenced him to one month in prison. In response the German government created 
a diplomatic incident: two battleships entered Part-au-Prince harbour and trained their guns on the 
National Palace. The immediate release of the German was demanded, together with $20000 
compensation and a letter of apology. A salute was also to be given to the German flag. Whether 
or not the German was actually guilty of the alleged crime seems to have been a matter of no 
consideration.
This sort of war of attrition against Haiti was to continue until 1915 when the United States 
invaded the country and was to remain in occupation for nineteen years.
The reasons for the US invasion were complex, responding to internal confusion in Haiti itself 
as well as to US imperialist interests, and the invasion may indeed have been viewed in Washington 
as a genuine implementation of the Monroe Doctrine to forestall an invasion by Germany.
Whatever, the occupation was to be an unmitigated disaster from the point of view of Haiti. 
The only positive effect was to impress on Haitians the need to become conscious of the specificity 
of their society and to explore what being a Haitian meant.
Despite being seen by Europe as the uncontrollable ’Black Republic’, a place of cannibalism 
and unspeakable savage happenings, the Haitian elite (which was primarily mulatto) regarded 
themselves as a uniquely civilised society in the Americas. They saw themselves as being part of 
French culture and indeed looked down on the ’uncivilised’ Yankees to the north (their sense of 
superiority over the US made the occupation, if anything, more unacceptable to the elite than to the 
general population). As Jean Price-Mars was to argue in his celebrated 1928 work, Ainsi Parla 
I ’Oncle, in this continued identification with French culture, Haitians had fallen into a form of ’collective 
bovaryism’ in which they were only able to see themselves as other than they are. They had, in 
effect, ’exoticised’ themselves. This is obviously very similar to the contemporary situation we have 
examined in Martinique. Two factors were, however, very different. In Haiti political independence 
had been fought for and won. Also, it was only the elite who were tied to French culture. The 
peasants, who comprised the vast mass of the people, had their own tradition based upon the voodoo 
religion that the elite had conspired to deny.
Jean Price-Mars had been considering Haitian folklore well before the US invasion, but this 
event gave his research greater urgency. By the mid-twenties, there was coming to be recognised 
a need to delve deeper into the particularities of Haitian culture: "The Haitian soul must be uncovered 
and analyzed in its bareness", as Philippe Thoby-Marcelin was to write in 1925. In 1927, a group of 
young writers began to publish a journal, La Revue Indigene, whose title emphasises the new concern 
with dealing with native values. Then, in 1928, as we have already noted, Price-Mars’s Ainsi Parla 
I ’Oncle exploded on the Haitian scene and made the literate population aware of the richness of the 
voodoo tradition.
During the 1930’s the quest for an authentic identity became a central concern and led to 
the formation of Les Griots, a movement established by Carl Brouard, Lorimer Denis and Frangois
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Duvalier to recover African values and promote the doctrine of Africanism, which was to have much 
the same characteristics of the later negritude movement. It was indeed Brouard who had coined the 
word ’nightie’ as early as 1929.
A concern with anthropology was, hardly surprisingly, central to such considerations, and in 
1941 the Haitian Bureau d’Ethnologie was created by Price-Mars and Jacques Roumain.
Although such interests may have had important consequences in the cultural domain, they 
made little impression in the political sphere. The US occupation had left the mulattos firmly in 
political control and in fact successive presidents were little more than US puppets. This became 
particularly apparent with the accession to power of Elie Lescot in 1940. Michael Dash explains that 
typical of his administration was "his agreement with the American controlled S.H.A.D.A. 
(Haitian/American Society for the Development of Agriculture) [that] gave the company the right to 
expropriate peasant land for planting rubber trees. In order to subdue peasant opposition to the 
project Lescot sanctioned a campaign by the Catholic Church against the voodoo religion - La 
campagne anti-superstitieuse - realizing that voodoo temples could become obvious centres of 
peasant revolt. The tactlessness of the Catholic Church provoked widespread criticism and the 
S.H.A.D.A.project was a failure - thousands of acres of peasant land destroyed in the process".32
To attack the voodoo religion in such a blatant fashion was to do more than display complicity 
in an imperialist operation. It was also the assertion by the mulatto elite of their intellectual superiority 
over blacks, an assertion based upon the assimilationist lie that European values are the ones to be 
emulated. This assertion was, of course, a denial of their own selves and also a denial of Haitian 
identity.33
No matter what the internal effect of the creation of an Ethnological Bureau in Haiti has been, 
it does seem undeniable that its very existence has been to provide the means for a certain 
reciprocity between European and Haitian anthropological concerns. The French anthropologist Louis 
Maximilian and the surrealist Pierre Mabille were among those involved in the founding of the bureau, 
and one can see that the quality of the anthropology that has since been done in Haiti is of an 
extremely high standard, notwithstanding the fact that sensationalist accounts have continued to 
proliferate in more general representations of Haiti. Nevertheless, it is clear that the creation of an 
indigenous anthropological tradition has the consequence of giving to creative writers a focus on their
32 Michael Dash, Literature and Ideology in Haiti.
33 Although it may seem incredible to people who associate Haiti exclusively with voodoo, the 
voodoo religion has always been (even under Duvalier) legally prohibited, even though no government 
has ever been able to suppress it. One of the most noticeable consequences of this auto-repression 
within Haitian society has been to force voodoo adherents to form a network of secret societies to 
defend themselves, something of immense value to the repressive apparatus that a government such 
as that of the Duvalier dynasty established. That, since the fall of Duvalier, the Catholic Church has 
persisted in its hounding of voodoo (quite beyond the bounds of ’revenge’ for the complicity that some 
voodoo priests certainly did have in the crimes of the regime) does not bode well for the future of 
Haiti.
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own culture and has also served to orient Western anthropologists in their work on Haiti. The work 
of Louis Maximilian, Alfred M6traux, Sidney Mintz, Harold Coulander, Roger Bastide and Maya Deren 
has provided us with a rich tapestry of Haitian life, revealing evidence of a genuine sense of 
participation in issues of concern to the indigenous population itself.
In Haitian folklore, the key myth is that of the zombi. This is a specifically, one might even say 
archetypal, New World myth which, though having its roots in Africa, addressed American realities 
in its particularity. Most specifically it has obviously been created out of the experience of slavery. 
M6traux brings out this aspect of the myth well: "He moves, eats, even speaks, but has no memory, 
and is not aware of his condition. The zombi is a beast of burden exploited mercilessly by his master 
who forces him to toil in the fields, crushes him with work, and whips him at the slightest pretext, 
whilst feeding him on the blandest of diets. [...] Zombis can be recognised by their vague look, their 
dull, almost glazed, eyes, and above all by the nasality of their voice, a trait also characteristic of the 
’Gued6’ spirits of the dead. Their docility is absolute as long as they are given no salt. If they 
inadvertently eat any food containing even a single grain of salt, the fog envelopping their minds is 
immediately dispelled and they become suddenly aware of their enslavement. This discovery arouses 
in them an immense anger and an uncontrollable desire for revenge. They hurl themselves on their 
master, kill him, and ravage his goods, then go off in search of their graves."34 What is this but the 
collective memory of slavery and the knowledge that it will, one day, be revenged? For this is not 
simply a reflexion of the slave’s helplessness: it is more especially a myth of regeneration. For 
voodoo belief does not recognise death in the sense in which it is accepted in the West. There is no 
death, there is only transformation. The zombi is a being denied this transformation and is trapped 
in a world he ought to have left. Thus the zombi cannot be seen as a soul in purgatory in the 
Christian sense of the term since 1. by definition it has no soul; 2. because it is not dead. It is rather 
a being trapped without identity that has been denied the right to certain means of life that are 
rightfully its own.
But it is also as the image of death ensnaring life - which it is unable to leave - that the zombi 
haunts the world of the living and acts on it like an unspoken condemnation. Zombification thereby 
implicates the world of the living - unable to die (that is to be transformed, in the sense also of the 
’Death’ card of the Tarot pack), we are also condemned not to be able to live. The Haitian surrealist 
writer Magloire-Saint-Aude brings this out well in a passage from his story Veillee:
"As I examined her face (I only had to stretch out my arm to be able to touch her body) one 
particular made me shudder: the eyes were not completely closed and, from beneath the 
eyelids, the young girl seemed to look at me... and she did so with such fixity that it threw me 
into a state of panic. I tried to move, but my movements were paralysed with cramp. I
34 M6traux, Le vaudou haitien, p 250/1.
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wanted to speak, but I was voiceless.
"And all the time Ther£se continued to stare at me.
"At me alone.
"And my own eyes were as if magnetised and could not detach themselves from those eyes
of the other world."35
The implication is that the gaze of the slave transfixes the master. By enslaving another we 
become enslaved to the slave and have perverted the real relations of life. Real life passes 
elsewhere and we become alienated from ourselves. The continuity of existence asserts itself through 
death, but a death that is not death, a ’death’ that straddles the borders of life and death, denying the 
existence of either and preventing their natural flow.
What the zombi lacks is salt, which would restore its creative and imaginative gifts. As Ren6 
Depestre wrote: "The history of colonialism is that of a process of generalised ’zombification’ of 
mankind. It is also the story of the quest for a revitalising salt that is capable of restoring to man the 
use of his imagination and culture."36 I'm not certain that ’quest’ is the right word here, since the 
zombi, being incapable of desire, is unable by definition actively to seek revitalisation. What is rather 
implied is the necessity for the restoration of reciprocity: the master who restores the salt to the slave 
liberates himself as he frees the latter. Such recognition is rarely, of course, in the nature of things. 
The restoration of salt almost always comes about, to use a surrealist term, by means of an ’objective 
chance’ that forces the recognition of such reciprocity.
This truth is borne out by a consideration of the abolition of slavery in Haiti. This did not take 
place through an act given from without, nor was it established by events within Haiti itself. It was 
rather an act of generosity born of the recognition of two peoples in struggle of their mutual 
dependence. It is perhaps the finest achievement of C.L.R. James’s The Black Jacobins to elucidate 
the mechanics of this symbiosis. The slaves of Saint-Domingue had demanded their emancipation 
and the people of France were in the mood to make such a demand their own. As James says: "the 
generous spontaneity of the Convention was only a reflexion of the overwhelming desire which filled 
all France to end oppression and tyranny everywhere."37 This desire was not one way, however: 
it had to be completed by an equal desire on the part of the oppressed themselves. In Hegel’s terms, 
the slave had to be prepared to put his own life into question. In the other French colonies slavery 
was abolished from without and was easily re-applied when the revolutionary tide had passed. In 
Haiti there was to be no turning back. The Haitian people would fight to the death to defend their 
newly-won freedom and the consequences engendered by the struggle were such that Napoleon’s
35 quoted in Maximilian Laroche, L'image comme echo, p 185.
36 quoted in ibid., p 196.
37 C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, p 141.
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wish to re-establish slavery was doomed from the beginning. The Haitian Revolution thus belongs 
wholly to the Haitians themselves, to their sense of being and history. Today this must involve a 
sense of creative dialogue. On the one hand, as Fanon insisted, there is the need to reach the point 
at which "...consciousness is immanent in its own eyes. I am not a potentiality of something. I am 
wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the universal".38 On the other hand, we also need to be 
aware of turning the other into an ill-defined universal, or of denying the fact that the reality of the 
other is always separable from our own true reality. Such a gap is impossible to surmount and is 
almost certainly necessary for any sort of lucidity to be established.
This need for mutual recognition is strikingly revealed in Haiti, where the political history has 
been so profoundly terrible and remains so to the present day. Duvalier’s election triumph in 1957 
may be seen as heralding a new era of barbarity in Haitian history, but the complicity of the US in the 
maintenance of power by the Duvalier family was always such to make it impossible to blame 
Duvalierism simply upon anything specifically internal to Haiti itself. Of course US ignorance about 
Haiti, a measure of its general ignorance about Latin America (which should be called its ’sphere of 
influence’ only in an ironical sense), is quite astounding, but is no more than a continuation, taken 
perhaps in extremis, of the general Europe attitude towards its other. Except that the US attitude 
towards Haiti is not in reality an imperialist one in any of the traditional senses of the term. It 
responds rather to the need to establish otherness as a measure for one’s own sense of identity. For 
as Sidney Mintz has said: "Haiti’s enigmas, if any, will be solved by those who patiently acquire 
enough knowledge of its past and present to make sense of what has been happening there, not by 
those who substitute neologisms and bad imagery for research.'*39 He goes on to note that what 
Haiti lacks is "the unified institutional forms through which class and other conflicts could be mediated, 
settled, or fought out; and this lack is related both to the nation’s isolation during the first century of 
its existence and to the effects of North American colonial rule not long thereafter."40
It is the denial of any sort of reciprocal relation that has created this situation and keeps it in 
place. Although it is difficult to see how anything - short of major structural change in the nature of 
US society - can change the situation in the foreseeable future, nevertheless through anthropological 
exchange a beginning of reciprocity and dialogue can be made, both here and elsewhere. The 
Haitian writer Jacques Stephen Alexis was well aware of the double nature of the alienation of Haitian 
society when he wrote: "If I have chosen without hesitation the human families which appear to be 
the closest to me, the negro family and the Latin American family, I am equally determined not to 
deny any part of my heritage. I am close to the thought and sensibility of the French and France has
38 Fanon, Black Skins White Masks, p 135.
39 Sidney Mintz, Caribbean Transformations, p 296.
40 Mintz, ibid., p 301.
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given me so much that I am obliged to reciprocate with the little I have to offer".41 It is through the 
same sense of generosity, in the same sense of recognition, that European understandings of the 
other ought to begin.
41 quoted in Michael Dash, Haiti and the US, p 201.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SURREALISM AND THE OTHER
In declaring their differences, men wish to be alike. From this 
one wish all human relations derive their value.
Andre Breton and Paul Eluard
Surrealism and the Western Tradition
In the last chapter we looked at otherness from the perspective of the other and raised some 
of the difficulties that emerge from trying to consider issues of reciprocity in the context of the 
relationship between the West and non-western societies. In this chapter we will return to surrealism 
and try to raise the same issues directly in the frame of the concrete reciprocal relation established 
in the general context of surrealism and notions of what constitutes otherness.
In taking form and distinguishing itself from Dadaism, surrealism looked to create a sense of 
its own tradition that would be opposed to that of the dominant European tradition that emphasized 
rationalism and realism. Taking as its starting point, Marx’s watchword, ’merciless criticism of 
everything in existence’, surrealism saw itself as a night avenger within bourgeois culture. As such,
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although it was not content with assuming a passive outside role, it did not seek to reform the 
dominant tradition. Rather it began consciously to assert itself as an ’other’ within European culture, 
and sought to recover aspects of European culture that had been excluded from the dominant 
tradition.1
Ever since the romantic rebellion against the Enlightenment, Western intellectuals had sought 
a counter-value that would go beyond ideologically legitimated Enlightenment modes of thinking. The 
romantics themselves were tied within the frame of their own intellectual ancestry and unable to see 
a way out of the Enlightenment cul-de-sac other than by vague appeals to the powers of imagination 
and intuition. Romanticism never engaged with the ideology of the Enlightenment; it believed it was 
sufficient to challenge Enlightenment rationality at the level of pure thought. The aim was to counter 
Enlightenment ideology, but on the Enlightenment’s own terms. The effect could only be to make of 
romanticism a sort of counter-Enlightenment: not its negation, but its complement, in the same way 
that the coming of reason brought with it the complementary category of unreason.
Although some romantics did perceive the necessity of developing an alternative tradition 
directed against Enlightenment values, this never got beyond a vague medievalism and an invocation 
of the claims of a mystical Christianity. Likewise, during the nineteenth century, artists in the romantic 
tradition tended to build a whole mythology about their outsider status, a process that reached its 
culmination in fin-de-siecle decadence. It would await the coming of surrealism for the establishment 
of the basis of a counter-tradition by means of a systematic search for elements excluded from the 
Western tradition itself. Breton was to make this very explicit: "We have had to attack everything in 
Western man which conspired to shamefully repress his past, for this has been the lasting effect of 
the tenet 'might is right' imposed by the Roman legions nineteen hundred years ago. Historically, 
there is no doubt that this assault was facilitated by the increasing general awareness that the thinking 
of a past era was blatantly ill-equipped to define the conditions of life in the nuclear age. From that 
point we were led by an atavistic leap in the mind to inquire about the possible aspirations of the men 
who lived in our land before the Greco-Latin yoke descended so heavily upon them".2 For Breton, 
according to Julien Gracq, this went as far as refusing ever to visit Greece because "I don’t visit 
occupying powers. For two thousand years, now, we have been occupied by the Greeks".3
The idea of sweeping the past away had been dominant in Dada, and surrealism took this 
as a starting point on which it was necessary to build something new. Alfred Jarry had written: "We 
will not have destroyed anything if we don’t destroy the ruins as well", but surrealism also recognised
1 for an account of the extent of this re-evaluation see the article by Elizabeth Cowling, ’An Other 
Culture’ in Dada and Surrealism Reviewed by Dawn Ades. Appended to this thesis are the various 
documents in which the surrealists have affirmed their ancestors.
2 quoted by Jean Markale in his Celtic Civilisation p 20
3 quoted by Julien Gracq, Sur les sept collines, p 7.
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that something more than pure negation was required: a tradition of revolt had to be established - a 
tradition, in a sense, rubbed against the grain. "In matters of revolt," as Breton was to write in the 
Second Manifesto, "we have no need of ancestors." At the same time there was a very real sense 
in which surrealist revolt could only be legitimated by what their predecessors had achieved: 
surrealism could not exist in a vacuum, either in space or in time, and, as it needed to expand its 
contemporary political horizon out from its core towards marxism, so it needed to extend itself into 
the past.
The most significant aspect of this process in early surrealism was their ’Orientalism’. In the 
light of our earlier discussion of Edward Said’s examination of Orientalism, the way in which the 
surrealists utilised the idea of the Orient is of some interest. Marguerite Bonnet has dealt directly with 
this point in her article about the role of the Orient in surrealism. She notes that this was a theme 
that became for a very short time a key element of surrealism and then was suddenly dropped. She 
notes that the Orient was barely mentioned in surrealist writings before 1925, yet from January of that 
year the surrealists seem to have taken up Nerval’s invocation of ’to the Orient’. They spoke of the 
'purifying fire from the Orient', and the symbolism it invoked of the dawn, light, presentiment and the 
promise of new beginnings was obvious. In 1925, the surrealists also announced, on the cover of 
La Revolution Surrealiste, ’the end of the Christian era’. Yet as suddenly as the theme was taken 
up it was just as suddenly dropped. After October 1925 the ’Orient’ is hardly ever mentioned again 
in surrealist writings.4 This surrealist ’Orientalism’ is very revealing in terms of the way the 
surrealists subsequently conceived otherness and we will therefore spend some time looking at what 
was involved.
Bonnet notes that during 1925 when Drieu de Rochelle poured scorn on this ’absurd neo­
orientalism’, Aragon responded with a vigorous defence of its symbolic value. Bonnet argues that the 
surrealists never confounded their image of the Orient with a real place: "The Orient has no true 
reality; it is only a word which allows a resolutely Manichean opposition to take form: the Occident 
represents an absolute evil, the Orient an absolute good."5
Surrealist interest in the Orient was filtered through the writings of Rene Guenon, who had 
published his major work, Orient et Occident in 1924. This work had so impressed the surrealists that 
they invited Guenon to join the group, an invitation that was refused, according to Pierre Naville, 
because Guenon had no belief in the future or in anything to do with Western civilisation.
Pierre Naville explains that the appeal of Gu6non to the surrealists was precisely because 
of the fact that he used the Orient as a weapon against the West. His was hardly an appeal to 
Oriental wisdom or inscrutableness, but came from a deep sense of disenchantment with the West
4 Although one can mention the serious work of Ren6 Daumal on Oriental philosophy or Artaud 
on the Balinese theatre as examples of some surrealist interest in the Orient, this was very specific 
and involves no conceptualization of the ’Orient’ as such.
5 Marguerite Bonnet, 'L’Orient dans le surrealisme: mythe et reel’, in Revue de literature 
comparee no 4 (1980) p 416
144
on every level of being. GuSnon, to quote Ren6 Daumal, definitively rejected all the modern idols of 
"discursive science, moral progress, human happiness, the autonomy of the individual..."6 The 
attraction of this for the surrealists was the refusal of the whole Promethean urge of Western society. 
It was the necessary counter-weight to the Hegelian sense of becoming, placing man in his proper 
perspective as nothing but a symbol of descent from a superior reality. As such, any progress is just 
an illusion within appearance, for "the inferior can never give birth to the superior, for it is 
fragmentation and illusory dust; it is the primordial that is alone capable of giving sense to the world, 
because it embraces the whole within the self and the self within the whole."7 This fitted in perfectly 
with the most pessimistic aspects of the surrealist programme. GuSnon had set himself "against the 
horizons of bourgeois progress, Christian humanism, egalitarian democracy of minds, speculative 
individualism, in sum anything that could hold back the powers of the imagination that surrealism 
placed above, and even beyond, everything we are reduced to perceiving under the name of reality."8 
For GuSnon - and this above all was the message the surrealists took from his work - the Orient had 
nothing to teach the West but one thing: to learn to accept the inevitability of its own destruction.
But if the surrealists were drawn to the ’Orient’ for these reasons, there were other 
contingencies that imposed themselves in the context of the time, in which to accept the Orient meant 
at the same time to reject the ’civilising mission’ that sustained French colonialist ideology. To 
appreciate the significance of this step we need to take a brief look at the historical background.
The ’crisis of consciousness’ of Western sensibility that took form in France after the first 
world war involved a considerable sense of national paranoia. As Bonnet argues, the ’East’ did not 
simply comprise the Orient itself, but also meant Germany and Russia - the former the defeated, but 
still dangerous, enemy, the latter the land of Bolshevism. In this respect the influence of Spengler 
was pervasive. In his analysis of the ’decline of the West’ the French perceived an assault on their 
own self-perception as the crystallization of the ideals of Greco-Roman civilisation. German thought 
as a whole was seen as representing a threat to the whole tradition of French rationalism. Germany, 
the defeated, became confounded with the colonised of the empire in which the danger of a ’return 
of the repressed’ was not to be under-estimated.
For the surrealists such an argument was very attractive, but they perceived the situation in 
exactly the opposite sense - if they represented such a threat to the ’French spirit’, then German and 
Oriental thinking was only to be welcomed. Thus the surrealists made a myth of the idea of the
6 Rene Daumal, quoted in Pierre Naville, Le Temps du surreel p 291
7 Pierre Naville, ibid. p 286
8 ibid. p 288
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Orient precisely to counter the patriotic neo-fascism of Massis and Maurras.9 There was never any 
wish to look seriously to the Orient itself. That the surrealists were aware of the way in which they 
were using the concept of the Orient in order to establish a myth is apparent from a collective 
declaration: "The Orient is everywhere. It represents the conflict of metaphysic and its enemies, who 
are the enemies of freedom and contemplation. In Europe itself who can say where the Orient isn’t? 
In the very street, the person you pass may carry it within himself: the Orient is in his 
consciousness."10
During 1925, too, political realities began to impinge. The rise of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the momentous strikes in Shanghai, Gandhi's struggle in India and finally the outbreak of 
the Moroccan War gave a concreteness to the surrealists’ ’Orientalism’. With their declaration on the 
Moroccan War, made in July of 1925, the ’Orientalist myth’ in surrealism had almost run its course. 
The imaginary had, indeed, become real, and the myth no longer meant anything in respect of the 
changed circumstances.
This myth of the Orient (which, we might note in passing, gives a rather different picture of 
Western perceptions of the Orient than that analysed by Said) served to give to surrealism a 
perspective on the nature of otherness and gave a grounding to an uncompromising anti-colonialist 
attitude that never flagged until the fall of the colonial empire, something that can be seen from a 
consideration of their collective declarations that are appended to the thesis.
As it developed the influence of surrealism spread widely. Although this influence was felt 
most deeply in Europe, especially in Belgium and Czechoslovakia, it also spread in significant ways 
to non-European countries. We will look at each of the examples in terms of the question of 
reciprocity and consider how, in each case, the relationship between French surrealism and the 
indigenous surrealist movement was played out.
The interest in surrealism was generated in part by the attitude it took towards indigenous 
cultures and especially by its uncompromising and consistently anti-colonialist standpoint. It was this 
very point that made surrealism incompatible with the French anthropology of the period, since the 
latter never questioned its framework as a project issuing out of the enlightenment and dedicated to 
positivist research methods. It was thus unable to question the Western hegemony that had resulted 
from colonialism and made the anthropological project viable. Although individually anthropologists 
were often unhappy with the social framework of colonialism and with the ideology of western 
civilisation in general, to be able to exist as anthropologists they were forced to work within the 
framework of colonialism, with which they had to make an accommodation: as a discipline,
9 In an enquiry in 1925 on the question of the Occident and the Orient, Breton explicitly denied 
that the Orient could give ’us’ anything, and stated that the myth of the Orient was necessary 
precisely to combat the ’odious fanaticism’ of Massis. See Breton Oeuvres Completes p 859.
10 ’La Revolution d’abord et toujours’ dated June 1925, in Jose Pierre (ed), Tracts et declarations 
collectives du surrealisme p 55
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anthropology could not afford to set itself up against colonialism. The surrealists, on the other hand, 
were deeply at odds with their own society. They had no illusions about the ’civilising mission' of the 
West and had no interest in maintaining the colonial order. This gave them a perspective, lacking In 
anthropology, from which to declare themselves in opposition to the colonialist attitude.
In line with thinking about questions of reciprocity and objectification, surrealism is of especial 
interest in that surrealism was taken up by intellectuals in the Third World who sought In it 'miraculous ! |f§ | 
weapons’, in the words of Aim6 C6saire, in their own struggle against colonialism. There have been 
surrealist groups in several non-European countries: Japan, Egypt, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and it has generally had an considerable impact throughout Latin America. We will look at the 
specific relations established in particular countries in a moment.
As we noted earlier, the French Surrealist Group had been politicised by the Moroccan War 
of 1925. They then assumed an anti-colonialist position, unequivocally took the side of the Riff rebels, 
called on French troops to fraternise and declared that ’for us France no longer exists’. The famous 
’surrealist map of the world’ was drawn up soon afterwards and emphasises this displacement:
France, indeed, does no longer exist and Paris has become the capital of Germany; the United States 
has also vanished and Britain has become an inconsequential dot dwarfed by a massive Ireland. The 
map remains a remarkable statement about surrealist affective considerations of the time: Mexico,
Alaska, and Polynesia have become the centre of the world culturally; Russia and China maintain 
their positions in the world primarily due to the political upheavals. The comparatively small size of
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Africa shows that the surrealists were not particularly drawn to African art, but this is something that 
has been over-emphasised, I think, since Africa is still quite large - as large, in fact, as South 
America.
This anti-colonialist impetus was maintained at the time of the 1931 Colonial Exhibition, which 
brought a surrealist response in the form of two broadsides attacking ’colonial piracy’ and urging 
people to boycott the exhibition. They also organised a counter-exhibition, with the support of the 
PCF, under the title ’The Truth About the Colonies’. This exhibition was organised under the principle 
of reciprocity and took as its underlying theme a quotation from Marx: "A people which oppresses 
others cannot be free". Among the exhibits of 'European fetishes’ was a black child with a begging 
bowl.
A further vitriolic declaration was published in English in Nancy Cunard’s important Negro: 
an anthology (1934). This attacked all forms of imperialism in such uncompromising terms that its 
violent tone surprises even today. But it was not simply an emotional attack on the most obvious 
abuses of colonialism. Rather is was particularly directed against those who, under the veneer of 
liberalism, were drawn to ’some mystic Orient or other’. The title emphasises this aspect: "Murderous 
Humanitarianism". Even so, it is one thing for surrealism to have taken such an unequivocally anti­
colonial stance for their own cultural purposes. It is quite another to see in this evidence of genuine 
reciprocity with other cultures.
Surrealism in non-Western countries
Having set up this context, then, let us now look at the way in which surrealism was taken 
up by intellectuals in non-Western societies to see what the relations established can tell us about 
the more general question of reciprocity across cultures.
1. Japan
We will begin our survey with a consideration of Japan. Even through Japan has never been 
tied in a direct colonial relation with Europe, it still embodies ideas of otherness in the eyes of many 
Europeans.
The idea of surrealism in Japan may seem a somewhat unlikely conjunction given the general 
Japanese indifference to Western currents of thought, and particularly in the context of the inter-war 
period, with the growth of Japanese nationalism and militarism that was to culminate in the Second 
World War. Yet Japan was perhaps the first place outside France to feel the direct influence of 
surrealism, for Japanese surrealism pre-dates even Belgian surrealism. The origins of the movement 
go back to 1925, when the first Japanese group was formed, although it does not appear to have led
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to any very tangible activity for a few years after that. Nevertheless, the first Japanese translations 
of French surrealist works soon followed, with Takiguchi Shuzo’s translation of Breton’s Surrealism 
and Painting being published in 1930 (and thus pre-dating the first English translation by some forty 
two years!). Interest in surrealism in Japan was such that the third International Surrealist exhibition 
was held there, a show that travelled from Tokyo to Osaka and Kyoto. It was organized by Takiguchi 
Shuzo and Yamanaka Chiru in Japan with European co-ordination by Paul Eluard, Georges Hugnet 
and Roland Penrose. However, Takiguchi and Yamanaka decided not to include any Japanese artists 
in the exhibition, which they saw primarily as being a means to introduce surrealism into Japan, 
placing their emphasis to Freudian psychoanalysis and the surrealist object.
The period from 1937 to 1941 appears to have been the richest in the history of Japanese 
surrealism and led to the formation by Fukuzawa Ichiro of the group ’Bijutsu-bunka’ (Art-Culture), 
which made the greatest impact of any of the surrealist groups that have surfaced in Japan. By 1941, 
though, the political situation had, not surprisingly, become very difficult and both Fukuzawa and 
Takiguchi were arrested and charged with propagating ’surrealist and marxist ideas’. They were 
released after a few months on an undertaking not to publish and not to engage in political activity. 
The group was re-established in 1945, but seems to have been unable to adapt to the post-war 
situation in Japan. Further groups were formed by younger surrealists in 1951 (’Jikken kobo’) and 
in 1956 (’Chogenjitsushugi Kenkyukai’), but neither seems to have made a great impact.
We are indebted for what little information we have about Japanese surrealism to the efforts 
of the Czech surrealist, Vera Linhartova, who has collected together their texts and published an 
anthology together with an illuminating, if primarily descriptive, introduction. She makes little attempt, 
however, to analyse Japanese surrealism in its social, political and cultural context and therefore gives 
us little real sense of how surrealism was perceived in the Japanese context.
What does seem clear, though, is that surrealism in Japan testified to a desire to engage with 
Western modes of thought. Although, at least on the evidence provided by Linhartova, this does not 
seem to have gone beyond establishing a sense of their own individual identity and attempts to situate 
their surrealism in Japanese cultural reality seem not to have gone very far at all. Not that they seem 
to have been at all francophile or especially Euro-centred in their approach (Takiguchi in fact only 
travelled to Paris in 1957), but they seem rather to have been drawn to surrealism for its use-value 
in their revolt against Japanese society. There would thus seem to be little real reciprocity in their 
relation to French surrealism. For the most part European surrealists seem to have been almost 
indifferent to Japanese culture (Linhartova’s comment that the fact that Eluard and Gilbert-Lecomte 
both wrote some haiku seems rather a desperate attempt to force a mutual relation) and no one in 
the surrealist movement (until Linhartova) has ever learned Japanese, so communication could only 
really be one way. Nevertheless, the fact that surrealism emerged at all in Japan is testimony to the 
universal aspects in its appeal.
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2. Egypt
Surrealism flourished in Egypt between 1936 and 1952. It was in 1936 that the Anglo- 
Egyptian Treaty was signed which established Egypt as a sovereign state, albeit still with an 
occupying British army and also with a strong French influence. During the next few years, Egypt 
would become a focal point for the anti-fascist struggle, which would culminate in the defeat of the 
Nazi army in 1942.
During the period of Egyptian surrealism, then, Egypt was at the forefront of a struggle that 
properly belonged to Europe. As we shall see, the activities of the Egyptian surrealists reflected this 
fact.
The Egyptian Surrealist Group itself was formed in 1939 under the name ’Art et liberte’ and 
in the same year they published a bulletin, in French, with the same title. This was followed by the 
appearance, also in French, of a weekly journal, Don Quichotte, which began publishing in December 
1939. At the same time they published an Arabic journal, Ai Tatawor, which appeared monthly. The 
group was animated primarily by Georges Henein and Ramses Younan and also included Anwar 
Kamel, Kamel El-Telmisany and Fouad Kamel.
In his study of the Egyptian group, Abdul Kader El Janaby has argued that though both 
Henein and Younan were original thinkers who made important contributions to surrealist theory, they 
were both essentially European in their thinking and outlook. In particular, they looked to Europe to 
provide the key to Arabic modernization. As such their surrealism, in the Egyptian context, simply 
represented a strong but ephemeral ’flapping of Breton’s wing’. But still, Henein and Younan were 
aware of the problems connected with the relation between Europe and otherness, and after Henein 
left Paris in the 1950’s he tried to set up a review with Mounir Hafez that would function as a critique 
of surrealism and, by extension, of European attitudes from the point of view of ’Orientals’. This did 
not come to pass, but Henein was very conscious, according to Serane Alexandrian, of his role as 
a ’stroller of two worlds’. He made an important distinction between Europe as a geographical place 
and the Occident as a mental place that regulated the whole world. According to this schema, the 
Occident is an amorphous mental construction that seeks to regulate the world and dictate organised 
life. It assumes the status of active thought, imposing a sort of architecture of action on the whole 
world: "Occidental thought is founded, in the first place, on doubt in relation to the absolute. This 
doubt transcends it in creating and erecting work which will become in its turn another object of doubt 
and contestation, which is to say a pretext for new creations. This is the cycle of all spirit which 
refuses to allow itself to be present in things. [...] To say that the world needs the Occident is to say 
that it needs works which are no longer temples but indefinitely correctible human edifices."11 
Henein's insight is important, but is simply thrown out as a random thought and he never developed 
this critique fully.
11 Georges Henein, L ’Esprit frappeur p 101
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During the actual period of Egyptian surrealism their concern was primarily with the 
introduction of modernity into Egyptian culture and society and with countering the dual threats of 
fascism and Stalinism. As El Janaby argues, however, such concerns were tangential to the real 
needs of the Egyptian people. He argues that "the main task in Egypt was to bring to the Arabic 
language innovation that had the power to liberate it from the tyranny of traditional Koranic structure. 
[...] Such a task, certainly, would entail the sweeping away of the ultra conservative Islamic train of 
thought..."12 Yet this was something that neither Henein nor Younan were in a position to even 
contemplate since, both coming from Christian families, such a concern could only be alien to them, 
even if they perceived its urgency. Failure to do so still meant a failure to confront Egyptian reality 
and in this respect Egyptian surrealism was no more than an adjunct (albeit a highly original and 
critical one) of French surrealism and no more managed to find an ’indigenous’ form of surrealism 
than did the Japanese surrealists. Equally, European surrealists has no more interest in 
contemporary Egypt than they had in Japan and we can not see the basis for any sort of reciprocity 
there (admittedly some interest may be perceived in ancient Egypt, but this hardly implies any form 
of reciprocity within the modern world).
3. Mexico
In Mexico the position is certainly rather different. Unlike Japan and Egypt, the French 
surrealists undoubtedly had an interest in contemporary Mexico. Pre-Colombian art had a great 
appeal, but there were also the myths of the Mexican Revolution, which were still fresh in human 
memory, and the fact that, during the thirties, Mexico had an extremely progressive left-wing 
government that saw its task as being to build upon what was achieved by the Revolution.
As we have already seen, Antonin Artaud had visited Mexico in 1936. Andre Breton was to 
follow in 1937, partly to visit Leon Trotsky, but also drawn to Mexico in one of the few journeys he 
seems to have made willingly. On his return Breton was to write that he considered Mexico to be one 
of the places where the destiny of the world was being played out. The other countries were Russia, 
Germany, China and Spain, but it was probably only in Mexico that Breton felt a positive hope for the 
future was being generated.
It was with the surrealist diaspora to the Americas during the Second World War that 
surrealism really came to Mexico. The fifth International Surrealist exhibition had already been 
announced for Mexico and it took place in Mexico City in 1940, organized by Wolfgang Paalen, who 
was to remain in Mexico for most of the remainder of his life. At the same time Paalen was in the 
process of establishing his own surrealist journal Dyn, although in doing so he was to split with Breton 
and most of the surrealists over what he saw as the authoritarian tendencies of Hegelian philosophy.
12 A.K.EI Janaby, The Nile of Surrealism p 21
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Paalen was to be joined in Mexico by a cosmopolitan group of surrealists: French (Alice 
Rahon and Benjamin P6ret); English (Leonora Carrington and Gordon Onslow Ford); Spanish 
(Remedios Varo and Luis Bufiuel); Peruvian (Cesar Moro); as well as the Austrian Paalen. After the 
war, Rahon, Carrington, Remedios and Bufiuel would continue to live in Mexico and become almost 
adopted children whose work was seen not as being French, Spanish, or English, but as specifically 
Mexican.
Their presence did not, however, lead to the creation of a specifically Mexican Surrealist 
Group, and the most prominent of Mexican surrealists, Octavio Paz, came into contact with surrealism 
in Paris and needs to be regarded as much a cosmopolitan artist as a specifically Mexican one. 
Surrealism has been a pervasive influence on Mexican culture, but a detailed study of this relation 
would take us too far from our central theme.
What needs to be noted is that in Mexico, contrary to what we saw in Japan and Egypt, it was 
European surrealists who were seduced by Mexican reality to the point of seeking an identification 
with it, an identification that was not rejected by the Mexicans themselves. Even so, only a handful 
of Mexican artists identified themselves fully with the surrealist attitude and the nature of the 
reciprocity revealed remains evanescent. It exists somewhat in the margins of actual relations, 
somehow ungraspable. A reciprocity without dialogue, perhaps, in which each party rather took the 
other for granted. To find traces of a genuine reciprocity we need to return to the West Indies and 
look at the way in which surrealism unfolded in Haiti and Martinique.
4. Martinique
The surrealist anti-colonialist declaration, ’Murderous Humanitarianism’, which we mentioned 
above, was notable for the fact that it was signed by two young Martiniquan surrealists, Jules-Marcel 
Monnerot and Pierre Yoyotte (indeed it would seem quite likely, from the tone, that Monnerot may 
have had a hand in drafting the statement). In 1932, Monnerot and Yoyotte had tried to establish an 
Antillean Surrealist Group. This never came to pass as such, but they did publish, together with 
fellow Martiniquan students at the Sorbonne, a single issue of a journal called Legitime Defense. The 
title, taken from a short book published earlier by Breton, announced its surrealist affiliation, which 
was made explicit in their declaration of intent which, invoking both surrealism and marxism, stated 
that "as traitors to [our] class [we intend] to take treason as far as it will go. We spit on everything 
they love and venerate".13
Legitime Defense was the first publication in which colonised blacks in the French Empire had 
sought to speak with their own voices. The tone, so clearly influenced by the French surrealists, was 
unaccustomed and the French authorities, without going so far as actually to ban publication, put so
13 published in Legitime Defense, issue no 1 (1932). A translation of the declaration is included 
in the appendix of the thesis.
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much pressure on the students that they were unable to publish any further issues.
In breaking with the ethics of the European culture that blacks had been taught to emulate 
at all costs, surrealism had in a sense provided them with a sort of Trojan Horse within which they 
could enter the previously impregnable white citadel. They were hearing a new voice. Previously the 
only thing they had heard had been the homogeneous white voice of authority that extolled the values 
of white civilisation. Now they heard white people themselves actually accusing that ’civilisation’ of 
unspeakable barbarities that outdid anything the so-called ’primitive’ peoples were ever supposed to 
have done. As Jacqueline Leiner put it: ’’Reinvested by the Other, the Black could no longer deny 
himself".14 In this respect marxism complemented surrealism in the socio/political judgement it made 
on Western institutions.
If Legitime Defense sowed the seeds that were to flower in the next decade as negritude, it 
was not to be the only link between surrealism and black consciousness in Martinique.
We have noted the importance of the work of Aim6 Cesaire in looking at the development of 
negritude in Martinique. Cesaire had been a student at the Ecole Normale Superieur soon after 
Legitime Defense was published. He and his friends, L6on Damas and Leopold Sedar Senghor, were 
very impressed with it but had doubts about its relation to marxism and surrealism. They considered 
that it simply appropriated the position of French communists and surrealists and did not leave room 
for a specifically Antillean position.15 Even so, the composition of Cesaire’s Cahier d'un retour au 
pays natal, owed much to surrealist practices, both at the level of language and in terms of its 
content.
We noted in the previous chapter that when he returned to Martinique, Cesaire had founded, 
with M6nil and with his wife Susanne, the journal Tropiques. What we did not mention was that this 
journal, aside from establishing the roots of negritude, was also important as a specifically surrealist 
journal. Cesaire had met Breton in 1941, during the course of the latter’s enforced stay in Martinique 
whilst fleeing to the United States. It was a meeting that C6saire was to consider decisive in his life 
and caused him to make a more direct commitment to surrealism. Tropiques, indeed, was to assume 
an importance on three fronts: as developing a specific black conscious, as an organ of international 
surrealism and as a focus of the anti-Vichy struggle in the colonies. Susanne Cesaire expressed what 
surrealism meant to them as follows: "surrealist activity [is] a total activity that is alone capable of 
freeing man by revealing his subconscious and is among those that will liberate people by casting 
light on the myths that have led humanity to its current blind predicament... not for a moment during 
those terrible years of domination by Vichy was the image of liberty tarnished here and this we owe
14 Jacqueline Leiner, ’Les Chevaliers du Graal au sen/ice de Marx’, preface to re-edition of Le 
Surrealisme au Service de la Revolution p xix. (re-printed in her Imaginaire-Langage-ldentite 
culturelle-Negritude [1980])
15 Rene Menil, who participated in Legitime Defense, has always asserted, on the other hand, 
that Legitime Defense had established a platform closer to the one that Fanon would later develop 
and that it was far more radical than the negritude that C§saire would later help to establish.
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to surrealism. [...] Our surrealism will provide the bread of the depths that will finally transcend the 
crass antimonies of white/black, European/African, civilised/savage. [...] Surrealism, taut cord of our 
hope."16
After the war, as we have seen, Cesaire and M6nil went their separate ways, the one to 
become a leading proponent of negritude, the other to be a trenchant critic of it. What Tropiques did 
establish, though, was a forum for dialogue which emphasised the nature of the reciprocity.
5. Haiti
In the previous chapter we stressed the extremes of Caribbean reality represented by 
Martinique and Haiti. This is especially so in the cultural domain and was even more marked during 
the thirties and forties, the period we are discussing here. Haiti had been an independent nation for 
more than a century: it had a rich literature which, if it was often derivative of French models, did have 
its own dynamic. It was dependent on France neither in the cultural nor the political sphere. Yet 
surrealism had as strong an impact in Haiti as it had in Martinique.
When he was in Haiti in 1946, Andre Breton told his listeners that "...the beautiful name of 
Haiti immediately evokes, if not the most important chapters of your history at least a will to freedom 
that has never been quixotic. The beautiful name of Haiti has assumed such poignant overtones that 
it is etched forever in the minds of all who are worthy of thinking. It is a dynamic words, among the 
small number moving forward.”'7 This panegyric is typical of the mutual love affair between 
surrealism and Haitian culture.
As we have seen, the Haitian Revolution was born of the ideals of the French Revolution and 
the Haitian people have never renounced a belief in the ideals of ’liberty, equality, fraternity’. Such 
a collective belief has meant that Haiti would never accept a neo-colonial relation with Europe without 
a struggle. But it also meant it would never be able to compete in a capitalist world market in which 
the rules were made by and for Europe. The result has been a history that has been a continual tale 
of political instability and poverty, to the extent that one imagines it must have been with one eye on 
Haiti that Sekou Toure made his famous comment that for the colonies the choice was between 
’independence in poverty or riches in slavery’.
Nevertheless, this refusal to compromise has given to Haitian popular culture a singular 
vitality. "In Haiti," according to Rene Depestre, "even the political history is marked by surrealism." 
He goes on: "the whole of Haitian culture is imbued with a popular surrealism, manifested in the 
voodoo religion, in the plastic arts and in the different forms of being among the people of Haiti.’’18
16 Susanne Cesaire, ’Le Surr6alisme et nous’ in Tropiques no 8 (October 1943).
17 Breton, ’Speech to the young Haitian Poets’, published in F.Rosemont (ed), What is Surrealism?
p 260
18 Rene Depestre personal letter dated 19 July 1987.
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Contrary to Martinique, Haiti did not need to use surrealism to help to establish a sense of cultural 
identity. That identity was already formed when it came into contact with surrealism: what it found 
there was a recognition and an affinity. One can discern a trace or an echo, at least, of surrealism 
in the majority of Haitian writers of the past half-century: Jacques Roumain, Rene Depestre, Ren6 
Balance, Paul Laraque, Hamilton Garoute, Jacques Stephen Alexis, Franketienne, Jean Metellus... 
quite apart from Clement Magloire-Saint-Aude, the one Haitian poet committed to surrealism.
As we have already seen, the study of the roots of Haitian folklore had become of great 
importance during the 1930’s. In this context, surrealism had already begun to make waves in Haiti. 
For the writers of the Africanist movement surrealism was one of the modernist ideas coming from 
Europe that gave some legitimation - in its reclamation of the ’primitive’, in its assault on rationalism - 
to Haitian hopes of developing a specifically black consciousness. To be sure, this was a superficial 
influence that gave no particular precedence to surrealism over other manifestations of European 
modernism. On the other side, the surrealists had also evinced a similar interest - equally superficial 
it must be said - in the mythology of voodoo, in which they had seen something of a confirmation of 
their own thoughts about dream, trance and automatic writing, stimulated by the publication of 
Seabrook’s sensationalist The Magic Isle (1931).
In the 1940’s this influence was to be deepened on both sides. In 1944 Aim§ C6saire had 
visited the island to give a series of lectures. The following year an exhibition of paintings by the 
Cuban surrealist Wifredo Lam was organised - some on voodoo themes, something that Lam was to 
substantially develop in subsequent years. In the same year, too, Pierre Mabille was appointed 
Cultural Attach^ at the French Institute at Port-au-Prince.
Mabille had previously worked in Haiti in 1940, when he had been head doctor and surgeon 
at the French hospital, before being transferred to Mexico. Whilst in Haiti he had become particularly 
interested in voodoo, making contact with voodoo priests and studying the religion, with a particular 
interest in voodoo medicine. Mabille had also become friendly with Price-Mars and had assisted in 
the foundation of the Bureau d’Ethnologie.
On his return to the island, Mabille embarked on a systematic study of Haitian culture and 
established the journal Conjonction to provide, under the auspices of the French Institute, a focal point 
for the indigenous study of Haitian culture.19 Towards the end of 1945, Mabille arranged for Andre 
Breton to visit Haiti, something that was to have far-reaching consequences.
Breton was to have given a whole series of lectures presenting surrealism within the general 
context of French culture. His first talk was given to a group of young poets on 14 December 1945 
and in it he drew lines of convergence between surrealism and Haitian culture. On 20 December he 
gave a longer and more formal lecture directly on the history of surrealism at a cinema in Port-au- 
Prince to a large audience that included some of those who had been at the previous talks, but also
19 Mabille himself only edited the first issue, after which he was recalled, for reasons directly 
connected to the visit of Breton to the island, which will be discussed below. The journal itself is still 
being published.
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some of the most important people on the island, including President Lescot himself. They were 
expecting an inoffensive man of letters. Instead, as Ren6 Depestre, who was among the audience 
on that day, was to recall: "...his words exploded over their stupid official heads. Presidents, senators, 
ministers, colonels, big businessmen in the import-export trade, all these inflated gentlemen of bad 
taste with their little women squirmed in embarrassment at the words of the poet, while the flower of 
youth, who were also present in the room, cheered and expressed its joy, dancing and entering into 
Breton’s lyricism as though into a magic tree. In that cinema was re-created the whole climate of 
subversion and scandal that had marked the heroic age of surrealism..."20
The consequences were dramatic. The students immediately brought out their journal La 
Ruche, dedicated to Breton and taking an insurrectionary tone. It was seized and its editors were 
imprisoned. In protest a student strike was called. This led to street fighting. Unrest spread to the 
general population and resulted in the calling of a general strike. Within days the government had 
fallen. According to Michael Dash, Lescot was convinced that Breton had come to Haiti expressly 
to foment the revolt.
The fact that Breton was the catalyst for a popular revolt does not, of course, mean that the 
revolt itself was expressly surrealist in nature. No calls were made for Breton, or even any of the 
poets who had started the revolt, to be made President. Indeed, the practical effect of the 1946 
Revolution was to pave the way for the rise of a black middle-class that would gain political 
ascendency during the fifties and result in Duvalier’s election victory in 1957.21 For Rene Depestre 
the failure of the Revolution equally indicated "the limits of surrealism and its main ambition of seeking 
to 'change life’. Since that time it has been vital for us to understand that it is impossible to change 
life without a prior revolution which has transformed society and brought about fundamental changes 
in the conditions of social existence."22 This is rather unfair, since surrealism has never claimed 
anything otherwise, always having been at pains to emphasise the fact that its aim of changing life 
must be allied to a social struggle for the transformation of the world. Also, the 1946 Haitian 
Revolution was clearly not a Revolution for surrealism. If Breton had provided the spark, this was no 
more than coincidental. The fact is that there was little to distinguish the 1946 Revolution from 
several others in Haitian history, when a popular uprising had been used by factions within the elite 
to jockey for power. The question of whether or not surrealism has helped in any qualitative change 
in the nature of Haitian society is not the issue here, however. What is more important for the
20 Rene Depestre, Bonjour et adieu a la negritude p 228
21 It is curious to note that if surrealism can be implicated in Duvalier’s rise to power, then so too 
can anthropology. At the time of Duvalier’s election victory the Bulletin of the Bureau d’Ethnologie 
applauded the event, noting that it was the first time ever that an anthropologist had been made a 
world leader. The editor believed that Duvalier was thus the ideal person to bring about a 
’regeneration’ of Haitian society (see the Bulletin of the Bureau d ’Ethnologie Serie III no 4 (January 
1958).
22 Depestre, ibid. p 230.
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purpose of the present discussion is the nature of the reciprocity involved in the relation.
As we have seen, surrealism had a clear influence on the emergence of ideas of negritude 
both in Martinique and in Haiti. As Paul Laraque was later to say, surrealism made such a dramatic 
impact in Haiti because it served to demystify Haitian society in their minds and enable them to see 
their society from a different perspective. This gives further emphasis to Jacqueline Leiner’s assertion 
of surrealism acting as a sort of Trojan Horse’ and also provides clear evidence of the diffusion of 
ideas. But is this an influence only, or is something deeper involved on which we need to focus in 
trying to consider the relation of self and other?
Surrealism and Otherness
For the apostles of cultural diversity and subjectivism in anthropology such an influence is part 
of the diffusion of the ’modernist project’. The influence of surrealism was such because its apparent 
modernist framework acted as a magnet for Third World intellectuals striving towards the 
modernisation of their societies and it has served to make ’our’ problems ’theirs’, and vice versa. As 
James Clifford has revealingly written of C6saire: "We are all Caribbeans now in our urban 
archipelagos. ’Guinea’ (old Africa, writes C6saire) ’from your cry from your hand from your 
patience/we still have some arbitrary lands’. Perhaps there’s no return for anyone to a native land - 
only field notes for its reinvention."23 Clifford’s identification here is presented as one of sympathy. 
And so it is. But it also serves to mystify the relation in a somewhat insidious way. First of all, it 
elides together Clifford’s own sense of alienation from his society with that of Cesaire. But Cdsaire 
is speaking about a far deeper sense of alienation which has quite different roots. What is the nature 
of the native land that Clifford feels estranged from? What arbitrary lands, embodied for C6saire in 
the myth of Guinea, can be equivalent for Clifford?
Clifford’s comment would appear in any event to be somewhat presumptuous. Cesaire’s 
anguished cry against cultural alienation from his roots is also directed against the European who has 
been responsible for such estrangement. It simply does not belong, as Clifford implies, to the same 
paradigm as the dilemma of European representation. Indeed, if we read this quotation in context 
we will see that it reveals something rather more than Clifford has drawn from it:-
"Guinea whose rains from the curdled height of volcanoes shatter a sacrifice of cows for a 
thousand hungers and thirsts of denatured children 
Guinea from your cry from your hand from your patience 
we still have some arbitrary lands
and when they have me, killed in Ophir perhaps and silenced for good,
23 Jemes Clifford, The Predicament of Culture p 173.
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out of my teeth out of my skin let them make
a fetish a ferocious guardian against the evil eye
as your solstice shakes me strikes me and devours me
at each one of your steps Guinea
silenced in myself with the ancestral depth of medusas"24
If these are re-invented field-notes then anthropology has been following an unaccustomed 
trajectory. One is entitled to ask: field-notes from what? This is a cry of the heart; poetry of the very 
highest calibre. For better or worse, it has nothing to do with anthropological field-notes of any sort. 
Clifford here performs an elision of subject and object on several levels at once (all of which represent 
a subtle form of cultural imperialism): not only does he appropriate the other’s sensibility into the self, 
he also incorporates poetry into anthropology, something that has the effect of controlling and 
incorporating the other’s voice into one’s own.
In a like manner, Clifford calls Cesaire’s negritude ’tactical’ and says that, reading the critique 
of Depestre that places in its specific American context: "To be American is to be hybrid, metis; and 
in Depestre’s vision the true heirs of negritude are writers like Carpentier, Guillen, Amado, Vallejo, 
Cortazar, Marquez. Again negritude is transmuted; it is no longer about roots but about present 
process in a polyphonous reality."25
This is an extraordinary statement. Quite apart from the fact that Carpentier, Guillen and 
Vallejo were all intellectually formed before negritude took form (indeed, Vallejo had been dead for 
a decade), making it somewhat absurd to speak of them as its ’heirs’, apart from Guillen, who was 
a mulatto), all of them are white Latin Americans. Clifford is here making assumptions that seek to 
legitimate the polyphonous reality he advocates in which American identity which would have the 
effect of effecting a solidarity between intellectuals. These assumptions, which are very different from 
what Depestre is saying about American identity, are revealing. Depestre is arguing for a 
consideration of America as a whole: to see the continent as part of the same reality in which the 
United States is not separated out and contrasted against Latin America in a way that privileges the 
United States as being the role model for what the rest of America ought to have, but has not, 
achieved. For Depestre this was essential to undermine the sense of the United States’ imperialist 
’manifest destiny’, whose self-perception is that it has some sort of duty to help the rest of ’backward’ 
America to ’develop’. For Depestre’s argument is that one has to view America as a whole, to see 
how elements of ’development’ and ’under-development’ have interacted, to see that it is part of the 
same reality and that it is untrue to see the United States as a ’success’ against which the rest of the 
continent’s ’failure’ ought to be judged. Clifford, however, is taking this from a contrary viewpoint,
24 Cesaire, ’Ode to Guinea’, translated by Clayton Eshleman and Annette Smith, in The Collected 
Poetry (1983) p 207.
25 Clifford, ibid. p 179
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subsuming US dominance by effectively taking away the other’s voice by assuming it within the same 
reality. The specific reality of Latin America is thus lost: the supposed ’polyphony of voices’ is 
reduced, bizarrely, to one - which is the one that is more authoritative. It makes no sense here to 
speak of American reality as ’hybrid’. Although Clifford is an ’American’ his sense of his 
’Americanness’ is quite different from that of a Haitian. It is difficult to believe that Clifford thinks of 
himself as ’hybrid’, still less as ’metis’! In defining negritude within the context of America as a whole 
and within the Latin American context in specific, Depestre is hardly suggesting that the perspective 
is the same everywhere. Yet Clifford’s comments, read literally, would seem to imply that he himself 
is an ’heir’ of negritude. In some senses one might say this was true, but it is hardly so 
unproblematically, and for Clifford to make such a claim is to exercise his greater authority over the 
black reality of which negritude is one expression. This is exactly comparable with the way in which 
Sartre appropriated the ideology of negritude for existentialism in the fifties. Now it is not 
existentialism, but ’polyphonous reality’ that negritude legitimates. Western arrogance, one might 
believe, knows no bounds.
In looking at the relationship between surrealism and anthropology we have tried to chart out 
a terrain in which it might be possible for separate voices to be heard and to respond to each other 
without denying the other. The question that therefore needs to be addressed here is whether 
surrealism has acted in a way to effect the same sort of cultural imperialism over the other?
On the whole, European surrealists have shown an awareness of their own position within 
their culture and have been suspicious of rapprochement with other cultures suspecting, even if such 
a sentiment is rarely consciously articulated, that such rapprochement can easily lead to a form of 
appropriation of the dominated culture. Breton had expressed just such a fear in speaking to the 
Haitian poets in 1945: "How could I have avoided a certain apprehension at the idea of importing a 
plant like surrealism which, though it aspires to psychical satisfaction of man’s needs in their 
generality, nonetheless emerged in an entirely different climate."26 We have spoken of the mutual 
influence of surrealism and Haiti on each other. It was an influence that involved respect for the 
other’s autonomy. The surrealists never claimed Haiti for their own as Sartre did in respect of 
negritude. A comparison here between Breton’s article on Cesaire and Sartre’s on negritude poetry 
is instructive. Where Breton respected difference, Sartre, like Clifford, only respects difference in 
respected of others. That is, he posits negritude as a challenge to European thought, but he also 
exempts himself from the aspects of European thought to which the challenge is made. What is 
admirable in surrealism in this regard, it seems to me, is that it has fairly consistently recognised its 
own position as part of its own culture. It has never sought to incorporate elements from other 
cultures into itself and has, indeed, always shown great suspicion about doing so. The lessons 
learned from their ’Orientalist’ episode seem never to have been forgotten and very much conditioned 
subsequent surrealist thinking about otherness and made them conscious of the danger of assuming
26 Breton, op cit p 259
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the position of the other. Furthermore, Hegelian anthropology had penetrated too deeply into 
surrealism for the problematic at the heart of human communication not to be recognised. The 
surrealists equally never sought the experience of otherness as has come to be popularised in 
Western fads ranging from the notorious grand hippy trip to Katmandu to the sophisticated 
universalism of the US ’ethno-poetic’ movement which assumes a universal language of poetry, and 
that the divisions between societies can be bridged by locating this privileged realm. Surrealism 
always seems to have recognised that poetry is not transcendent of the cultural circumstances in 
which it is produced. Again, its Hegelian basis is what appears to have caused surrealism to be 
suspicious of attempts at identification with the ’other’ since, according to Hegel, we might recall at 
this point, that other can only be a projection of oneself.
Whilst he was in Haiti, Breton was specifically asked by the Haitian poet, Ren§ Balance, what 
he felt the peoples of colour could gain from an allegiance to surrealism. His reply was very clear:-
"...in considering class and other barriers that must before all else be corrected by other 
means, I think that surrealism aims and is alone at aiming systematically at the abolition of 
these barriers [of the differences between people]. You know that in surrealism the accent 
has always been on displacing the ego, always more or less despotic, by the id, held in 
common by all... Surrealism is allied with peoples of colour, first because it has always taken 
their side against all forms of imperialism and white banditry [...] and secondly because of the 
profound affinities that exist between surrealism and so-called ’primitive’ thought, both of 
which seek the abolition of the conscious and the everyday, leading to the conquest of 
revelatory emotion..."27
We might suspect that in suggesting that ’peoples of colour’ are more responsive to the 
supposed aims of this ’primitive’ thought, Breton is making the same sort of reification we have 
criticised in Sartre. But it will be clear that he is careful not to assume the position of the other, nor 
is he suggesting, whatever ’primitive’ thought might be, that it is an exclusive or even a particular 
preserve of some category of ’primitives’ 28 It is equally clear that whenever he uses the word 
’primitive’, he is tied to a vocabulary with which he is ill-at-ease. His cautious use of the term 
corresponds to the dislike he had for Levy-Bruhl. In referring to ’primitive thought’ it seems clear that 
what he is looking for is not the reification of a particular categorization of thought patterns, but rather 
to establish a quality of value in a similar way to that of the contemporary American Indian writer 
Jamake Highwater with his concept of ’primal thought’, which he sees as characterizing American 
Indian culture, a poetic and affective way of thought rather than a utilitarian one based on cause and
27 op. cit., p 256.
28 for an anthropological account of the use and etymology of the word ’primitive’ that appears 
close to the surrealist understanding see Stanley Diamond’s In Search of the Primitive, pp 123/125.
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effect. This distinction had already been advanced by Jules Monnerot who, writing in Le Surrealisme 
au Service de la Revolution in 1932 had, in a sense, turned L6vy-Bruhl the right way up, insisting that 
the idea of a ’primitive’ mentality was a mystification, but a revealing one since, in being formulated 
it defined its opposite: ’civilised mentality’. This ’civilised mentality’ is a bounded category that limits 
or excludes everything that does not comply with a certain ideological formulation, comprised by the 
bounds of rationality. Non-civilised thought, on the other hand, excludes nothing but embraces the 
totality of all we are and can be. It is not ’primitive’ but rather is thought itself. Civilised mentality on 
the other hand is reducible to its own pre-established limits of acceptability. It is thus an 
impoverishment of thought.29
It is in this sense that we must understand Breton’s assertions. The affinity that surrealism 
feels with peoples of colour is due, as he explained in a speech given in Haiti, to the fact that "they 
had remained closest to the sources, and that in the essential development of surrealism, which has 
consisted in making heard the interior voice within each human being, we have found ourselves linked 
from the beginning with ’primitive’ thought, which remains less alien to you than to us and otherwise 
demonstrates a remarkable strength in Haitian voodoo. In periods of great social and moral crisis, 
I believe that it is indispensable that we enquire into primitive thought, to rediscover the fundamental 
aspirations, the incontestably authentic aspirations, of mankind."30 A key phrase is remains less 
alien to you than to us, making it clear that Breton did not regard the ’black soul’ as being any closer 
to nature (in the way that negritude was to reify itself).
I specifically asked the surrealist writer Vincent Bounoure, who is himself a leading expert on 
American Indian and Polynesian art, if he could illuminate the nature of the surrealists’ attraction for 
the so-called primitive. He gave a clear reply: "The people of white civilisation consider themselves 
to be exterior to nature which, in their eyes, has existence only to be utilised to the best purpose. To 
obviously variable degrees, the peoples of the civilisations called primitive see themselves as natural 
forces in the midst of other forces of natures, as one actor among many in a universal 
psychodrama."31 Surrealism seeks, then, to re-orient humanity into a harmonious relation with the 
world which it sees as having been sacrificed in the process of the development of technological 
society. While surrealism has always perceived itself as being the ’other’ within European culture and 
as a European sensibility, it would certainly not wish to deny to humanity the undoubted material 
gains that Western civilisation has brought to the world. Nora Mitrani puts the issue in these terms: 
"Man of mass civilisation has made a miserable bargain. He has exchanged his independence and 
his freedom of spirit for a higher standard of living. We do not despise this material conquest: even 
here there is much to be done and to gain. But I think that for surrealism this type of bargain does
29 see Monnerot, ’A partir de quelques traits particuliers & la mentality civilisee’, LSASDLR vol V. 
p 35/7
30 Breton, op cit. p 256
31 Vincent Bounoure in a personal letter dated 13 July 1987
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not suit us. Anyway, there is no bargain in the world which could satisfy us: like children we want the 
whole of reality."32
There is in surrealism no thought of a ’return to nature’, no romantic attachment to the past, 
even to the ’primitive’ past. Their commitment always appears to be to the now. The majority of 
surrealists are city dwellers and make no protest against the fact. On the contrary, they love the city. 
Most surrealists not only do not object to the material comforts of a bourgeois existence - they seem 
to demand them as an inalienable right. What they are in revolt against is a world out of harmony 
with itself; a world in which such comforts are seen as having a value in themselves, quite separate 
from all other aspects of life.
In this respect one must take issue with Robin Horton, who has considered surrealism as 
being representative of a modern sort of romantic nostalgia that is drawn to the primitive as a desire 
to return to a ’lost world’ of pre-industrial society. He speaks of our perception of other cultures as 
being born of a "compensatory fantasy in which every frustrated yearning of the West is banished".33 
He speaks of modern man as being alienated from society and trapped in loneliness; as yearning to 
commune with nature; as living in a world in which reason is killing emotion and feeling and science 
killing art; as being frustrated by the lack of symbolism in the structure of Western institutions. For 
each of these aspects of the contemporary ’malaise’ we seek to provide a remedy in our conception 
of a traditional society.
Personally I can find no evidence that the surrealists themselves view the ’contemporary 
malaise’ in these terms at all. They certainly do not see traditional societies as providing any remedy 
for the ills of contemporary life. What Monnerot is arguing in the article cited above is not a variant 
of the L6vy-Bruhl distinctions, but rather - and this appears to be a fundamental surrealist tenet - that 
what we call ’primitive mentality’ is a basic condition of existence common to all people, but which the 
West has often lost consciousness of. That is, that ’primitives’ are perfectly capable of thinking 
scientifically if they need to do so, but the reverse is not always the case. What this reveals is a 
surrealist given - rejecting the evolutionary argument, they see a continuum of thought (made explicit 
by the surrealist slogan ’thought is common to all’) in which it is we who have lost something. 
Thought does not advance; it adapts to fit the exigencies of particular societies. Benjamin Peret made 
the point thus: the fact that we have invented wine does not mean that we stop using water. By virtue 
of the fact that we need to establish a specific category of thought that we label as ’primitive’ without 
fully understanding it, bears witness to the fact that we have lost from our consciousness a whole way 
of viewing the world. It is this that the surrealists seek to recapture. As the Seneglese surrealist 
Cheikh Tidiane Sylla has put it: "In the Western World [...] surrealism is the result of a long
32 Nora Mitrani, in the course of BBC radio programme, ’In Defence of Surrealism’ broadcast in 
1961.
33 Horton, ’L6vy-Bruhl, Durkheim and then Scientific Revolution’, in Horton & Finnegan (eds.) 
Modes of Thought (1973)
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philosophical, political, scientific and poetic struggle to recover what the traditional African has never 
lost."34




SELFHOOD, OBJECTIFICATION AND EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS
The colour of coal is a mystery. Some say it is black - or white.
Joao Guimaraes Rosa
The Background to European selfhood
In considering the relation of Europe to its ’other’ in previous chapters, we have tended to 
take European identity for granted. As we have seen, surrealism sought to set itself against the 
models of European tradition. As such, there seems to be little doubt that it responded to a 
generalised sense of disillusionment with such models within European society itself. But what exactly 
is the European tradition? What is constituted within it? How can the vast number of cultural strains 
apparent within such a wide construct as ’Europe’ or ’European consciousness’ - comprising as it 
does a wide array of cultures from Finland to Greece, Yugoslavia to Portugal - be given form to make 
it methodologically possible to deal with in a coherent way?
To come to grips with such questions, we need to engage with how notions of selfhood and 
identity have been constructed and sustained, especially in the Western context.
164
In the history of ideas, the linkage between the discovery of the ’New World’ of the Americas 
and the coming of the Enlightenment has long been recognised. In his book on the conquest of the 
America, Tzvetan Todorov has perceived the difference in European mentality as being apparent in 
the different personalities of Columbus and Cortes. As Todorov argues, Columbus, still tied to a 
medieval world view in which man and nature were interrelated, would have been unable to defeat 
the Aztecs. It required Cortes, who conceived man as being superior to nature, to outflank the 
mentality of the Aztecs. The conflict between Aztec and Spaniard was a confrontation between two 
extremes: the Aztecs conceived communication only with the world, in which man had no ’rights’, but 
only the responsibility to integrate himself into the world’s harmony.
Cortes intuitively perceived that to defeat the Aztecs it was necessary to engage them on 
other terms than their own. Nor could they be defeated by military means alone. Todorov 
convincingly argues that the conquest of Mexico occurred only because Cortes embodied a different 
sensibility that would allow nothing to stand in the path of its own becoming. Cortes needed to instil 
a sense of superiority over nature, the feeling that man could accomplish anything and triumph 
against any odds. To do so it was necessary to suppress his own inclination to believe in omens and 
signs and relentlessly to pursue the path chosen. Todorov thus saw in the personality of Cortds the 
point at which man definitively separated himself from nature, something that would make possible 
a conception of self that would become more pronounced through the development of Enlightenment 
consciousness. L.L. White has defined this sensibility as the Western ideal of "the self-aware 
individual confronting destiny with his indomitable will and sceptical reason as the only factors on 
which he can rely..."1 Self-awareness was created by, and became the ideal of, all Enlightenment 
thinking. In many ways it became the European myth par excellence, the one upon which all the 
achievements of Western civilisation are based.
In their Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkenheimer have traced back the 
beginnings of this attitude to Homer, especially in the confrontation of Odysseus and the Cyclops, an 
image that is particularly felicitous in terms of our discussion of the relation of self to other, and which 
also connects directly with what Todorov has to say about Cortes. In the confrontation of Odysseus 
and the Cyclops, Odysseus asserts his superiority by means of language, confusing the Cyclops by 
displacing his self from his being. He calls himself ’Nobody’ as a deception. The result is that any 
call the Cyclops makes for retribution remains "magically bound to the name of the one on whom he 
would be avenged, and this name condemns the call to impotence.”3 In so doing, they argue, he had 
transformed language into a sign without reference to what it represented and provided thereby a tool 
of domination that became a particular modus vivendi of the Enlightenment sensibility.
This deception, which Adorno and Horkenheimer characterise as a ’means of exchange’ 
becomes the foundation of the capitalist and bourgeois attitude. By such means direct human
1 L.L. Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud, p 8.
3 Adorno and Horkenheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, p 60.
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interaction is denied: separated from the self, the other has no rights unless he can assert them as 
such. This principle -- seen at its most rapacious in colonial relations - underlies subject and object 
relations in Western discourse, which relies on a peculiarly Western conceptualisation of how dualities 
are to be perceived. The trajectory by which such separation came to take form is complex and goes 
back to far before the Enlightenment. No doubt one could trace it roots back to Zoroastrianism and 
beyond. For our purposes, however, we will take the Aristotelian ’law of contradiction’, which has 
taken form as one of the earliest philosophical formulations that has helped to legitimate the idea.
Aristotle established the ’law of contradiction’ on the principle that a thing could only be what 
it is and not something else (p cannot be non-p). This was done to counter the arguments of the 
sophists who asserted contradictory statements as a matter of principle in order to establish the 
relativity of any concept. Aristotle’s argument has been taken out of this specific context4 to become 
the cornerstone of much of Western thinking to the present day, even though such a proposition has 
enormous phenomenological difficulties (can one extract hydrogen and oxygen from water and still 
have water?)
The very terminology that asserts a law of contradiction implies its own ideological roots. For 
a law is imposed, or at least constructed. A law cannot exist outside the discursive framework that 
establishes it as a law. If we wish to look at the roots of any law, we need to take into account the 
questions of on whom and by whom the law has been imposed and for what reason.
Is the law of contradiction a natural law? Hardly, since we can perceive contradictory factors 
at work throughout nature. As Gregory Schrempp has argued, the law of contradiction is an 
ideological construction, formulated as a scientific principle with little hard evidence to back it up. It 
is a belief, quasi-religious in nature, that has served to sustain and legitimate a certain self-image that 
has been developed by Western consciousness. It is not, in other words, something that has 
emerged from a natural process in the evolution of thought, but has developed out of a range of its 
own contingencies that have served hegemonic purposes in Western discourse. In particular, it has 
served to help legitimate a conception of the self as an autonomous entity, able to separate itself from 
others to achieve an ideal of self-knowledge through its relation to the other. Perhaps the clearest 
formulation of such a position has been the distinction drawn by Sartre between the en-soi and the 
pour-soi, in which the en-soi personality remains unable to rise about the constraints imposed by the 
natural world to assert its integral personality as an independent being that exists in and of itself: it 
is therefore necessary to rise about the constraints of nature by an effort of will, through which one
4 We should perhaps remind ourselves here that our understanding of Greek cultural concepts 
are almost always inflected through Enlightenment ideas, something problematic in so far as there 
was, as we shall argue, a disjunction between the Enlightenment and Greek culture. The 
Enlightenment appropriated Greek culture for its own interests and imposed its own necessities on 
it. Whether the Greeks themselves conceived their concepts in the same terms is something else 
altogether. In this respect Andre Breton’s contention that Greece had colonised Europe perhaps 
requires some adjustment - it would be more accurate to say that the Enlightenment colonised (or, 
more accurately, appropriated) ancient Greece for itself.
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learns to live in terms of the pour-soi. This imposes at the same time a separation between oneself 
and others: the other becomes distinct from, if still similar to, the self. But this similarity provides, not 
a measure of one’s own being, but an object for the self’s contemplation. Self and other thus become 
distinguishable in an absolute way, something that has enormous ramifications for the way in which 
human relationships are perceived. In such a way the objective world comes to exist independently 
of our subjective perception of it.
In establishing the idea of a bounded self, however, one is at the same time alienating oneself 
from one’s own inner being - the self becomes only what it is consciously conceived as being. As 
Adorno wrote: 'The self, its guiding idea and a priori object, has always, under its scrutiny, been 
rendered at the same time non-existent. In appealing to the fact that in an exchange society the 
subject was not one, but in fact a social object, psychology provided society with weapons for 
ensuring this was and remained the case. The dissection of man into his faculties is a projection of 
the division of labour into its pretended subjects, inseparable from the interest in deploying and 
manipulating them to greater advantage."5
The consequence here is that, having become an entity in itself and freed of all contingencies, 
the self has ceased to be the measure of all things. It stands outside not simply nature, but also other 
human beings. It cannot understand anything from within but must externalise everything and make 
of other beings an object of contemplation that has only a random association with its own being. 
This has tended towards the separation of subject from object in an absolute manner, which becomes 
a principle of ’objective science’ and legitimates discursive logic. "The argument is essentially," as 
Schrempp asserts "that one can more objectively contemplate one’s own nature when it is 
experienced in another person of similar character than when it is experienced in one’s own self.”6 
Here we see the sharp contrast with the romantic idea of empathy, founded as it is on the refusal of 
such distantiation and in the assumption that we can know others through ourselves.
As an epistemological principle this can have some methodological justification, but in the way 
that it has been imposed ideologically on Western discourse it involves an intolerable resignation. 
Especially in anthropological discourse it serves to separate knowledge of the other out away from 
knowledge of the self, as though it is possible to make such a separation. Through such a process 
we displace a part of ourselves. By such means a mechanism of repression is established in which 
there is a tendency to dissolve the self into the other and yet assert in so doing that any construction 
taking form from such an encounter is an ’objective’ representation of the ’other’.
In the wider context, this way of thinking about the construction of the self and of self/other 
relations, leads to a collective sense of identity being established upon the same sort of basis. But 
the concretisation of such collective consciousness as a given ’European identity’ is by no means as 
straightforward as might at first sight seem.
5 T.W. Adorno, Minima Moralia, p 64
6 Gregory Schrempp, ’Aristotle’s Second Self’, in Stocking Romantic Motives p 40.
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In the previous chapter we mentioned in passing a distinction drawn by Georges Henein 
between Europe as a geographical place and the Occident as an ideological construct. This 
encapsulates the fundamental issue at stake and we will here try to follow through the implications 
of this distinction in relation to the problems of identity and selfhood raised above.
In considering the Occident in such terms, its actual constitution becomes somewhat elusive - 
as elusive, indeed, as ideas of the ’Orient’, something that is important to note, since the idea of the 
’Occident’ is a construction that is complementary to the idea of the ’Orient’. The ’Occident’ as a 
concept could not have any meaning if it did not establish an other, given form as an object of 
contemplation in terms referred to above, against which to set off its own special characteristics.
If we look at the concept itself and what it comprises we will find that it is as inherently 
contradictory as the idea of the ’Orient’. What exactly does such a concept comprise? If one tries 
to grasp it one finds oneself rather like Alice before the bottle marked ’Drink me’: at times it can be 
so vast as to comprise anything one likes. We can inscribe its presence globally, seeing it 
everywhere, permeating the smallest manifestation in the world. On the other hand, it can be reduced 
down to almost nothing. Today, it generally seems to comprise most of Western Europe, but also the 
United States and Japan, although historically such countries are seen as peripheral extensions of 
it, the latter directly, the former, more problematically, by means of the Meiji Restoration that 
separated its society from the supposedly ’static’ quality characteristic of the Orient. But even within 
this schema, things can fall apart. As we discussed in the previous chapter, in some circumstances 
Germany can even be identified with the Orient; so, too, from a different perspective, can Spain and 
Italy; even, at an extreme, 'Latins’. For the most part, though it always includes English and French 
culture (though, even then, not unproblematically so, since it does not necessarily include minority 
cultures within - Celtic, Basque, Provengal). It can perhaps best be seen as a sort of centrifugal force 
with English and French culture lying at its core.
Samir Amin has identified such an ideology as ’Eurocentrism’, and has sought to provide keys 
towards its definition in a way that seems to correspond very much with Henein’s concept of the 
’Occident’.
As Amin sees, the roots of such an ideology are certainly not to be found either in English 
or French culture as such. They go back far further, and include what are often contradictory 
elements, especially in terms of culture and religion. As he says: "The Holy Family and the Egyptian 
and Syrian Church Fathers had to be made European. Non-Christian Ancient Greece had to be 
assimilated into this lineage, by accentuating an alleged contrast between Greece and the ancient 
Orient and inventing commonalities between these civilized Greeks and the still barbaric Europeans. 
The core of genetic racism therefore remains. But above all, the uniqueness of Christianity had to 
be magnified and adorned with particular and exclusive values that, by simple teleology, account for 
the superiority of the West and its conquest of other people."7 By such a process a rational and
7 Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, p 98.
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secular ideology claiming worldwide scope is established: an ’eternal West’.
As Amin argues, the presuppositions of this ideology are untenable and in particular rest upon 
two pivotal points that are inconsistent with each other: on the one hand the heritage of 
Judeo/Christian and Hellenic culture; on the other the evidence, drawn above all from linguistics, of 
the superiority of the Indo-European language and its derivatives. Both suppositions cannot be true: 
the first involves the incorporation of Oriental ideas into the cultural history of Europe to an extent that 
is wholly inconsistent with the proposition of European supremacy. If the cultural heritage which was 
imported from the Mediterranean and points east was necessary for the development of European 
society, then this would make such a society little more than an appropriation of Oriental concepts 
and without an originality of its own. If the Indo-European language, on the other hand, was 
inherently superior, then it would have its own dynamic and would have had no need of concepts 
derived from Greek and Jewish culture, especially since it had also perceived that same Greek and 
Christian culture as having been formed in opposition to and as a result of its victory over the very 
Persian culture that was the ancient embodiment of what was to become the Indo-European diaspora.
As an ideological construction, Eurocentrism achieved its most comprehensive form in the 
nineteenth century, at the height of English and French colonialism and the expansion of the 
European market system. In the process was created at the same time the ideological construction 
of Orientalism that Edward Said has identified.
Amin’s critique obviously owes a lot to Said, but unlike him he refuses to see Orientalism as 
being commensurate with European writings on the East. It is, rather, a mythical construction that 
emerged out of Europe conceiving of itself as the ’Occident’ and thereby establishing for itself a 
collective identity to be set off against something external to it. As Amin says, it "refers to the 
ideological construction of a mythical ’Orient’, whose characteristics are treated as immutable traits 
defined in simple opposition to the characteristics of the ’Occidental’ world."8 Such supposedly 
’immutable’ traits were, however, always subject to change in accordance with the contingencies of 
particular situations, always serving to provide explanations not so much for the ’superiority’ of the 
West over the East, for that went without saying, but for the fact of such superiority being immutable. 
Thus, for instance, in the nineteenth century Eastern ’backwardness’ was explained as being the 
result of sexual license and an inability to control libidinous instincts; in the twentieth century this idea 
has been reversed: now it is Eastern puritanism amd repression that explain exactly the same 
symptoms.
It is not so much the actual ideas that are insidious here as the form by which they gain a 
hegemonic status through the assumption of immutable qualities. It is the way in which assumptions 
about immutability and inability to change have served to determine how ideological forms of 
domination retain a seamless quality even in respect of events that seemingly undermine the ideology 
at root, as in the incorporation of contemporary Japan into the rubric of the ’West’.
8 ibid.,p 100/101.
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But Eurocentrist ideology was not born from nothing. In taking the form it did in the 
nineteenth century it was maintaining and refining a cultural heritage that had been in place for 
centuries. What was especially introduced was the racist gloss, which in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries added a new and virulent form to an ideological formation that emerged primarily from ideas 
that had their roots in the Renaissance and took manifest form during the Enlightenment.
The phenomenon that Amin describes as ’Eurocentrism’, then, was constructed. As such it 
responded to a set of idea that had been developed with some consistency as the consciousness of 
the ’West’ took form as an entity.
The idea of Europe is based upon two central traditions that have been meshed with one 
another to provide a seemingly homogenous set of ideas laying claim to cultural (the Greco/Roman 
tradition) and religious (the Judeo/Christian tradition) authority.
The Greco/Roman tradition was established in Europe only with the coming of the 
Renaissance. During the medieval period, the intellectual achievements of Greece and Rome were 
largely forgotten in Europe. The preservation of Greek and Roman books was largely left to Arabic 
scholars without whom the extent of Hellenic culture might have been lost to us. It was only with the 
Renaissance that an interest in classical civilisation came to be manifested in European 
consciousness.
The Renaissance perceived itself, and has been seen since by history, as the recovery of 
something that had been lost, but this is not entirely accurate, since the classical heritage never really 
belonged to Europe. The idea that a dark age had descended over Europe through which it 
somehow managed to mislay its Greco-Roman cultural roots was nothing but a Renaissance myth 
established as part of its own ideological legitimation. The medieval era was no more of a ’dark age’ 
than any other. If classical ideas had little importance during the medieval period it is not because 
they were lost, but because they had not been part of Europe in the first place. Furthermore, the 
thrust of medieval society was away from the imperialism that had been imposed from Rome. One 
should hardly be surprised that a society that has been delivered from an imperialist enemy should 
take few pains to preserve that enemy’s cultural tradition. The structure of medieval society belonged, 
for the most part, to an older European order that had nothing to learn from that of Greece or Rome. 
For we should keep in mind that Europe had its own rich culture(s) that had been colonised by Rome, 
and it would be more accurate to say that, in the aftermath of the fall of Rome, European society had 
liberated itself from foreign imposition. It would take many centuries before that society would be able 
to appraise its enemy’s culture dispassionately.
What the Renaissance did, then, was not to recover a ’lost’ tradition, but to invent its own 
tradition by means of the transformation of elements of Hellenic culture to respond to its own cultural 
needs. The Renaissance needed to show the superiority of Hellenic forms to enable it to make a 
conceptual break with medieval thought to which in other respects it was the immediate heir. Its 
judgement on medieval society was thus ideological in nature: it was affirming its own legitimacy by 
its ’recovery’ of the glories of Greece and Rome from the morass of medieval ’vulgarity’. In such a
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way it created the ’dark’ ages as a myth against which to set its own light. In this way it was 
establishing an imperialism in time that would reflect the way in which European imperialism would 
later function in space with respect to the rest of the world.
But the Renaissance did not explicitly deny medieval European culture. Rather it claimed to 
have incorporated it into its own superior vision. This represents what Samir Amin perceived as the 
beginning of the Eurocentrist perception of the world. This was characterised by two essential pre­
requisites: first, the need to break with a tributary past; second, the reconstruction of itself on mythical 
foundations which blur the break with the past and affirm a historical continuity that is, in fact, non­
existent.
The other central element of this tradition was Christianity, which was incorporated into the 
ideology in a similar way.
Christianity was no more part of indigenous European society than were classical ideas, but 
it had been able to integrate itself into medieval culture as a revolutionary movement against Roman 
hegemony. The great attraction of Christianity was its apparent lack of hegemonic political 
aspirations. In its internationalism and in its call to notions of human equality it had an appeal for all 
oppressed societies. But Christianity had hegemonic aspirations of its own: in its very claims to 
universalism there was inscribed a cultural imperialism certainly as virulent as any political 
imperialism.
What distinguishes Christianity as an ideology is its invention of ’God’ as a symbol of absolute 
power, representative of the individual ego with its will-to-power and totalitarian aspirations.
The surrealist writer Joseph Jablonski has taken up this issue in an interesting review article 
on Norman Cohn’s important study, Europe’s Inner Demons.
In his book, Cohn had viewed the great European witchhunts in terms of complex 
psychological and ideological relations between Christianity and the European psyche. As Cohn 
states, his title was chosen to suggest "that the groups which were demonized did not consist of 
inhabitants of distant countries but lived - or, in the case of the witches, were imagined as living - in 
the heart of Europe itself. But it is also meant to convey that for many Europeans these groups came 
to embody part of their innermost selves - their obsessive fears, and also their unacknowledged, 
terrifying desires. The nature of these endopsychic demons is indicated by the specific accusations 
brought against the demonized groups."9 In this respect it represented "unconscious resentment 
against Christianity as too strict a religion, against Christ as too strict a taskmaster.10
Cohn establishes his argument against scholars like Michelet and Margaret Murray, who have 
argued that witchcraft represented an underground movement against Christianity based on the old 
religion that Christianity sought to suppress. Cohn seeks to demolish such arguments.
In his review, Joblonski argues that while Cohn does very effectively destroy the empirical
9 Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons, p 259.
10 ibid., p 262.
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framework of Murray’s evidence, he does so in a way which effectively reformulates and strengthens 
her underlying arguments. While it seems abundantly clear that there was never any organised 
resistance to Christianity and that the existence of witchcraft as the focus of such resistance is thus 
untenable, the virulence of the witchcraft trials shows that something very fundamental to European 
thinking was taking place. This involves a far more damning and far-reaching indictment of Christian 
hegemony, for where Murray had seen an underground movement, which may only have responded 
to the needs of a small minority of the population that resisted Christianity, Cohn sees evidence that 
Christianity was rejected by the European psyche as a whole.
Jablonski extends this argument with his own gloss. He argues that Christianity represented 
a ’universal superego’ that sought to undermine ideologically the heterogeneous strands of European 
culture and thereby appropriate them for its own monolithic and imperialist purposes. Christianity acts 
to reject the duality at the heart of all things and to replace it with a monolithic dualism with totalitarian 
aspirations. Instead of doubt being inscribed at the heart of existence, whereby contrary sentiments 
were seen as complementary, as ’two sides of the same coin’, conviction would be established as the 
principle of life. Doubt would be reserved for anything external to the sensible world. The 
ambivalence of being would be destroyed to be replaced by a ’way of God’ that would admit of no 
uncertainty and would draw an unequivocal distinction between ’true’ and ’false’, ’good’ and ’evil’, ’self’ 
and ’other*. To this end, it established a triad of enemies which were to be expelled from 
consciousness but which still took form as scapegoat symbols. These were the Devil, which 
represented above all the primordial forces of nature and the principles of disorder, revolt and evil; 
the Jew, representing patriarchal order and the male principle; and the Witch, representing matriarchal 
values and the female principle. Against this expelled triad, Christianity sought to institute itself in 
universal form in a way that would reject nature, the animal, and sexuality and would exalt the human 
in a severely emasculated ’totality’: "being neither male nor female, totally divorced from nature, 
paralyzed by fear of its own instincts, a slave to its own guilt. The church longs to lord it over such 
creatures as a Universal Superego promising a poisonous ’love’ in exchange for submission.”11
Such was the momentum gathered by this process that it became less an instrument by which 
men dominated others than the very form of domination itself. It divided people against each other 
and, simultaneously, against themselves. As such it was not opposed by a minority, or even a 
majority, of the population of Europe. Rather it was subconsciously rejected by European 
consciousness as a whole, to the extent that those most zealous in the propagation of its spirit were 
the very people who were subconsciously the most hostile to it. This can be seen by a consideration 
of the nature of the demonic hierarchy, which is plainly nothing but the church itself in inverted form. 
That the extent of the internal repression involved was so great, argues Jablonski, can be seen from 
the behaviour of the witch accusers themselves, who seem in general to have been overcome with 
a sense of remorse in which they came to accept the innocence of the very people they had so
11 Joseph Jablonski, ’The Devil’s Own’, p 11.
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zealously persecuted. Jablonski likens such a psychological state to post-orgasmic lassitude.
We might add here, too, that the pre-Christian religions of Europe had hardly any hegemonic 
aspirations and certainly no urge towards universality that would have made possible the sort of 
underground resistance suggested by Margaret Murray. But what Christianity needed, in accord with 
its dualistic formulae, was an enemy precisely with such a universalist aim. It needed something to 
embody the ’evil’ that would bring its own embodiment of the ’good’ into relief. It therefore needed 
to invent witchcraft in the same way that the Renaissance needed to create the myth of the ’dark 
ages’: to legitimate itself.
Where Christianity differs from all previous religions (even from the Judaism - which remains 
the religion of ’the chosen people’ - from which it emerged) is in this urge towards universality and 
equality. But, as Tzvetan Todorov has argued, such concepts are inherently contradictory: Christianity 
can assert its universality only by denying the legitimacy of non-Christian modes of thought, its 
assertion of equality only by accepting its own superiority. As he says: "the Christian incarnation is 
not one which can be added to the rest, it is one in an exclusive and intolerant fashion, and leaves 
no room for other gods. [...] Christianity’s egalitarianism is part of its universality: since God belongs 
to all, all belong to God."12
The two strands upon which the European tradition are based (this ’Hellenic/Christian 
alliance’) can be seen to meet in the Greek myth of Prometheus which, as Samir Amin argues, is the 
Renaissance myth par excellence.
The constituents of the myth of Prometheus in terms of Enlightenment ideology is double- 
edged: Prometheus restores the power of the control of fire to man (a power of which he had been 
deprived only because of the duplicity of Prometheus himself), but with it also comes the will to power 
that inserts hegemonic desires into human relations. It was the latter rather than the former 
consequence that was to bring down the wrath of the gods on the head of Prometheus, for the 
rebellion of Prometheus is a false revolt - a revolt of the spirit against itself. Since the gods are only 
a projection of human needs, it represents not so much a revolt against authority, but against man 
himself. It represents the beginning of mastery over nature in the rejection of sacrifice as the point 
of mediation between humanity and the natural world: man keeps the fruits of the earth for himself 
rather than for the general good.
The conceit displayed by Prometheus is that which we have encountered in seeking to 
elucidate the characteristics of the European ’self’ that perceives itself solely in terms of its own self- 
awareness and determination to triumph against no matter what odds. In self-awareness and self- 
consciousness arise the respect for similar qualities in others, but they also lead to separation: it 
becomes necessary, by the very process of self-awareness, to deny one’s own relation to others. We 
learn to respect other’s ’rights’ rather than to respect other people for what they are in themselves. 
A belief in equal rights as an abstraction standing above the concrete relations of living can in this
12 Todorov, op. cit., p 106
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way also lead to intolerance and even to the legitimation of the violation of those very same supposed 
’rights’ of other people when they stand in the way of one’s own self-realisation. This leads in its turn 
to feelings of guilt and repentance. And in this respect the ’light’ which Prometheus brought was the 
same as that to which the Enlightenment laid claim.
As we have seen, the Enlightenment legitimated itself as a triumph over darkness and in so 
doing it created the myth of the medieval ’night’. As such it brought everything into the light, and 
especially the human personality. We were given a ’self’ as something that belonged to us, rather 
than as our essential being. This reinforces the argument made earlier about the separation by 
Odysseus of his identity into ’self’ and ’non-self’. As Adorno recognised, the connexions between the 
notion of selfhood and the development of private property are hardly coincidental. We come to ’own’ 
a self in the same way that we might ’own’ a house. The self becomes an object of possession like 
any other and in the process gives rise to the possibility of ’owning’ others: we thus have the right not 
only to control nature, but also to control other people’s labour. Such an idea has served to transform 
what had been in medieval times the cardinal sin of usury into the thoroughly respectable notion of 
’profit’.
It was Max Weber who first made the connexion of the capitalist attitude with Christian 
ideology in asserting the link between the ’protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism’. Although often 
regarded as one of Weber’s more superficial contentions, we can see that Protestantism, as 
Christianity taken to its logical, secular conclusion, leads into the mentality of capitalist expansion. 
It would be facile to see the one as the cause of the other as the two ideologies are so inseparably 
interlinked that they must be treated as two aspects of the same phenomonon. As such, the 
movement away from religious forms becomes acute within Christianity, something that has led 
Georges Bataille to argue that in essence Christianity is not a religion but a political movement. 
Todorov perceived the same thing and spoke of this thrust within Christianity as being a process in 
which "egalitarianising religion leads to transcendence of religion’’.13
Adorno and Horkheimer said that ’’Animism had spiritualized objects; industrialism objectified 
spirits",14 and what we see occurring with the development of Western society is the progressive 
estrangement of man from his natural surroundings and even from the sensibility of his own self. This 
established the basis of the Western subject and object relation in specific terms. As Roger Bastide, 
for example, has argued the difference between African and Western forms of thinking is that whereas 
the former conceived of human relations in terms of the interrelationship between subject and object, 
in the West they were conceived in terms of the mastery of the subject over the object.15
This leads us to a reappraisal of the distinction between supposedly ’civilised’ and ’primitive’
13 Todorov, op. cit., p 107.
14 Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, p 41.
15 Roger Bastide, ’Religions africains et structures de civilisation’, (1968) Presence Africaine, 66.
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patterns of thought, the subject of so much controversy since the time of L6vy-Bruhl.
The idea of the ’Primitive’ as a myth
In Levy-Bruhl a distinction is made between civilised and primitive on the basis of cognitive 
ability. It is a qualitative distinction drawn by means of an implicit acceptance of the superiority of the 
logical thought patterns of Western, supposedly ’civilised’ thinkers. Such a crude dichotomy is hardly 
acceptable today, but nevertheless the broad outlines of L6vy-Bruhl’s distinctions remain in place, 
even though the debate has taken on multifarious aspects that go far beyond the manifest content 
of his own work.
Symptomatic in this respect may be an article by Robin Horton, in which he tries to bring 
L6vy-Bruhl’s distinction into question by contrasting it with that of Durkheim, arguing that L6vy-Bruhl 
established what he calls an ’inversion’ model in which primitive thought is simply a contrary 
established to set off the characteristics of our own thought. Durkheim on the other hand saw a 
continuity between the two: primitive thought was essentially no different from modern logical thinking 
- it just wasn’t as efficient. It was the introduction of a critical spirit of enquiry that enabled modern 
thought to go beyond the limited thought pattern of what he calls ’traditional’ societies. This is a no- 
nonsense empiricist’s argument - science replaces religion because science does what religion tries 
to do with a greater competence.
I am by no means convinced, however, even taking Horton’s contentions as read, that 
Durkheim’s position is substantially different from that of L6vy-Bruhl: it still assumes a qualitative 
distinction between ’primitive’ and ’civilised’ thought and, like most other critiques of L6vy-Bruhl, simply 
takes issue with the process by which the transformation of the one into the other was accomplished.
But Horton’s article is significant in other ways. He accepts the distinction as a process of 
evolution, and he identifies a single factor - the birth of a critical spirit - as being responsible for the 
transformation. In so doing he assumes the process to be unilineal and irreversible. But also he 
refuses to countenance the possibility of any evolution other than the one specified. Yet if evolution 
has any meaning, it must be a continual and universal process. If, at some point in the past, ’our’ 
culture was identical to ’theirs’ (i.e. primitive), and has since diverged, still ’their’ culture must have 
also evolved in a different way, of which we know nothing. Unless we accept a purely uni-directional 
thrust to evolution in which there is only one direction in which it can go, which is the way we have 
already gone - others must therefore ’catch up’. We become thereby the yardstick by which all others 
are judged, the assumption of which is the beginning of racist and imperialist myths. It is this point 
that Samir Amin particularly emphasised in his discussion of Eurocentrism - insisting that the 
universalism to which Europe lays claim is not in fact universal, but the opposite, since it subsumes 
everything under the mantle of its own point of view. In so doing its ’universalism’ is nothing more 
than the imposition of European norms onto the rest of the world.
What we need to accept is that the concept of the ’primitive’ is, as Jules Monnerot long ago
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insisted, a myth of the civilised. As Stanley Diamond has said: "The search for the primitive is [...] 
as old as civilization. It is the search for the utopia of the past, projected into the future, with 
civilization being the middle term."16 In focusing on ideas around the primitive, then, we should be 
aware that it is generally less the idea of the primitive itself that is at issue than Western 
understandings of it. What it provides us with above all is a conceptual tool that enables us to focus 
more clearly on ideas about the differences between societies and ways of thinking. In so doing it 
establishes an identifiable object against which to set off our own self-image as ’civilised’ people. 
What we are not doing is talking about a definable group of people who can be called ’primitives’.
The myth of the primitive arises from a conception of ourselves as a collective entity. It 
testifies to a need to give ourselves a collective identity commensurate with our general ideas about 
the self as a bounded individual, something which requires an ’other' against which to reflect and 
judge itself.
Central to L6vi-Bruhl’s conceptualization of primitive thought is the notion that it was 
comparable to the Western mystical tradition which was thus viewed as a survival of such thinking. 
However, as the idea of the bounded self gained ground in Western thought it gave a new meaning 
to mystical consciousness in which the self dissolves in union with God. For L6vy-Bruhl, tied to the 
notion of the bounded self as distinctive of ’civilised’ man, ’participation’ was an early form of 
mysticism. But in contemporary Europe the mystical tradition functioned as a reaction of the spirit 
against the newly rationalised self. It was in mysticism that the idea of the subconscious first took 
form as an explanation and sanction for the ecstatic.17 Functionally, therefore, mysticism was not 
a precursor of rationalism but followed on from it.
The Re-evaluation of the Self in Surrealism
If mystical consciousness sought to escape the consequences of the idea of a bounded self, 
we see a different perspective on notions of the self emerging towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, exemplified by Rimbaud’s statement tha t"/ is another". This key moment in the modernist 
questioning of the concept of selfhood has been interpreted in several ways, but today the 
predominant interpretation is the one that, following Foucault’s announcement of the ’death of man', 
is seen to imply an identity crisis in which the ideological construction of the Enlightenment ’self is 
being deconstructed, but with no idea of what is being put in its place. The ’/ ’ becomes problematic 
as a term of definition: how do we delineate its boundary so that it takes into account all the 
multifarious elements contained within it?
There is, however, little trace of an identity crisis in Rimbaud’s own words: "/ is another. If 
the brass wakes up the trumpet, it is not at all its fault. This much is evident to me: I am present as
16 Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, p 208.
17 see, for a discussion of this question, William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 
p 486/490.
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my thought is being born: I watch it, listen to it: I pluck at the bow strings and the symphony stirs in 
the depths or bounds onto the stage with a leap."
In surrealism far from implying an identity crisis, Rimbaud’s perception was taken as a 
liberation. Rimbaud also said," It is false to say: I think. One should say: I am thought.” This idea, 
as we discussed earlier, is at the heart of surrealist ideas of automatic writing and served as a prelude 
to ideas leading to the discovery of the unconscious: whatever constituted the self was more than the 
sum total of its consciously elaborated manifest actions. Here Freud’s ’discovery’ of the unconscious 
served as verification. But such notions do not subjectify being. On the contrary, they serve to 
objectify its hidden aspects.
In his exploration of identity at the beginning of Nadja, Breton defines the self as being 
commensurate not with its own essence, but with what it ’haunts’. Both in Nadja and in Breton’s other 
narratives (and this is also a common theme in surrealism narrative generally) the subject is displaced 
vis-ii-vis the objective world he describes. Instead of a given subject (i.e. Breton) responding to the 
objective world separable from him, what we are shown is an objectively experienced world in which 
subject and object interpenetrate and are perceived as part of the same process: the world infects 
Breton’s personality as he himself acts upon that world. Recalling our discussion of the imagination 
in surrealism, we see here how the imagination takes form as an ontological category: the 
imagination, again, becomes real.
In a like manner Paul Nouge has stated that he thinks of himself "not as a person but as an 
action which takes place through me and for which I am partially responsible." Bona de Mandiargues, 
too, likening herself to Lichtenberg’s ’bladeless knife without a handle’, says: "When I speak of myself, 
it is not a question of me. I would like constantly to throw myself outside of the self into others... I 
would like to go towards the whiteness, to become like a pinch of salt, a polyhedron in which all things 
converge and vanish; to be both reflexion and assimilation of images. I would like to be a diamond 
and to become myself a play of reflexions."18 One could multiply such quotations throughout 
surrealist writings for the question of identity can be seen, I think, as the central theme generally in 
surrealist narrative. But such slippage of the self is not seen by surrealists as being problematic. 
They appear to have no difficulty in conceptualising themselves in terms of manifold forms of being: 
this does not involve an identity crisis. Pierre Mabille has said: "Our being is the sum of all the activity 
of the environment, which is transformed into us and retained in our bodies. We are the reservoir of 
all the energy that has not been immediately spent."19 Elsewhere he has noted, "Man is for himself 
a conscious frontier placed between two worlds: that of the interior, the indivisible self that is the real 
and directly experienced life, and that of the exterior, which is the unlimited universe, infinitely
18 Bona de Mandiargues, Bonaventure, p 59/60.
19 Pierre Mabille, Egregores ou la vie des civilisations, p 221.
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multiplied and created."20 Identity, then, is never fixed: it emerges from the interplay between 
different domains in specific contexts. For surrealism essence and experience are one. The self is 
not a separated being, but rather a concentrated form of energy that takes particular forms in 
particular circumstances. Those circumstances are determined by the life that is directly experienced. 
They are neither imposed on the subject from outside, nor are they established as a result of the 
subject’s own will.
According to the American Indian writer Jamake Highwater the Western idea of the personal 
self is a ’fearsome dogma’ in that it both absolute and permanently on display. "Indians," he asserts, 
"find it incredible that a person must retain one identity, one name, one persona for his or her entire 
existence, no matter what immense changes may take place in that person’s life."21
We know from the linguistic analyses of Whorf that the structure of language can often reveal 
a very different perception of man’s relation to the world than that found in European languages. In 
the Hopi language, for instance, reality is examined not in terms of objects, but in terms of events. 
Unlike English, which tends to exclude from the notion of the self the element of change, in Hopi the 
subject is defined in terms of a constant process of becoming. This "implies that existents do not 
’become later and later’ all in the same way; but some do so by growing like plants, some by diffusing 
and vanishing, some by a procession of metamorphoses, some by enduring in one shape till affected 
by violent forces."22 This more flexible approach to the question of identity and its evolution arises 
most specifically in relation to North American Indian conceptions of selfhood and the personality.
According to Jamake Highwater, the fact that the American Indian does not conceive of the 
’self’ as having a bounded personality does not at all mean that there is no individual awareness. But 
the conception of the person is not interiorised: it is projected outwards into the community and it is 
the tribe that has a sense of ’selfhood’ distinguished from all other tribes. The idea is that "people 
enrich or enervate the power that gives them life, and then they pass out of existence... What 
remains is the tribe; the community; the orenda."23
In discussing notions of the self, Dorothy Lee has written of the Wintu that they "...conceive 
of the self not as strictly delimited or defined, but as a concentration, at most which gradually fades 
and gives place to the other. Most of what is other for us, is for the Wintu completely, or partially, or
20 Mabille, Le Merveilleux, p 10.
21 Jamake Highwater, The Primal Mind, p 168.
22 B.J. Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality, p 147.
23 Highwater, ibid, p 170.
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upon occasion, identified with the self."24 She goes on to compare this conception of the self with 
what she assumes to be ’ours’ : "The Wintu conception of the self differs from our own in that it 
contains the total person and the activity of all its aspects, and in that it fades out gradually and 
without distinct demarcation. It is not clearly opposed to the other, neither is it clearly identical with 
or incorporated with the other, and is of equal status to the other; where we see a one way 
relationship from self to other, an assertion of the self upon the other, the Wintu see a coordinate 
togetherness, with, at most, a stressed point of view."25 It is completely otherwise in our society in 
which experience is valid only when "the self is logically and cognitatively in control".26
Lee’s comparisons here are valuable, but they raise the question of who precisely this ’we’ 
is? She is drawing the reader into a sort of complicity in which his own categories will be 
questioned. But to whom is she addressing her remarks? To a small, specialised, academic 
audience? To the American public at large? To Europeanised intellectuals? For it would seem plain 
that anyone of a surrealist persuasion would certainly object to being considered within such a 
collective designation. Indeed, if we consider surrealism in this context, then we will see that there 
is a remarkable congruence between their view of the world and that of the Wintu. We could quite 
easily replace the word ’Wintu’ in the above quotations with ’surrealist’ without doing any great 
violence to the surrealist point of view.
The fact that the surrealist viewpoint is so close to that of an American Indian tribe brings into 
focus how problematic a notion the European ’civilised’ mind is. In the previous chapter we touched 
upon the question of surrealism as the other ’within’ European culture and this is something that could 
be developed to discuss surrealism in relation to elements of European culture with which they 
themselves have perceived an affinity, which would include the whole Manichean and gnostic 
tradition, the hermetic tradition, Celtic society and myths, and elements of popular culture, 
millenarianism and conceptions of revelation and madness, subjects that the surrealists have often 
treated with a systematisation and sophistication. But what seems significant in this respect is that 
a group of intellectuals with a highly privileged position in Western society and with access to the 
whole scope of Western education and deductive knowledge should feel the necessity to explore and 
recover ’primitive’ concepts of being, or elements within Western culture which deductive logic would 
like to believe it had made anachronistic. For a rationalist, like Robin Horton, this is simply a 
’romantic nostalgia’ for what we have surpassed, rather, one supposes, like a nostalgia for childhood: 
one has to accept that one is now grown up. But is this all that is involved?
In his work on what he calls the 'Primal Mind’ - seen particularly from the American Indian 
perspective - Jamake Highwater seeks to legitimate primitive concepts by reference to Western artists
24 Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture, p 134.
25 ibid, p 136.
26 ibid,, p 138.
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and argues that elements of the ’primitive’27 remain pervasive throughout Western culture, although 
generally marginalised as the preserve of artists and outsiders.
Highwater’s analysis is essentially a re-evaluation of Levy-Bruhl’s dichotomies, but from a 
perspective that seeks to valorise what Levy-Bruhl had dismissed from the purview of the ’modern’ 
sensibility. This is in many ways an admirable enterprise, but it leaves open the ideological bias of 
the ’West’, which would be quite happy to leave the ’poetic’ values associated with the ’primitive’ or 
’primal’ to the excluded category of artists, madmen and visionaries as surrogates from the reality 
principle by which ’civilised’ people have to live. In this respect, those artists who have fostered their 
outsider status and made a direct connexion between it and ’primitive’ values have served to 
strengthen rather than undermine Enlightenment ideology by giving legitimacy to the duality between 
’civilised’ and ’primitive’ modes of thought.
In Robin Horton’s article considering L^vy-Bruhl and Durkheim, we saw that the assumption 
being made was for the unilinear relentless march of progress on the Western model. Although 
Horton was arguing for the idea that all people think alike, he was still asserting the superiority of 
Western knowledge as a system of thought.
As we have already argued, following Monnerot, that the ’primitive’ is a myth of the ’civilised’, 
we can see that Horton’s argument does no more than utilise the myth of the ’primitive’ in another 
Western way. To question his argument is to question the construction of this myth as it applies to 
the object in anthropological discourse.
We might mention here that for, say, Amazonian Indian peoples (to take an example at 
random), a microscopic knowledge of the rhythms of the forest is essential. They ’read’ the forest in 
exactly the same way that we read a book, being able to draw out subtle meanings from the shape 
of a branch, the rustling of the wind at certain times, etc, etc. This is a very real, a very concrete form 
of knowledge the import and subtlety of which are inconceivable for most Westerners. Yet it is so not 
because we have transcended such knowledge and replaced it with something more efficient, but 
rather because it is of no use to us in the sort of life we live in contemporary society. In just the same 
way, our deductive logic may be of little use to Amazonian Indians. It is not that one thought leads 
on to another more efficient one, but, to repeat what we said earlier, that thought adapts itself to 
particular circumstances. We might recall here Benjamin Peret’s point about the fact that wine does 
not replace water.
In discussing the Hopi language, Whorf notes that in comparison with European languages, 
it is inadequate to express a formal systematisation of language. But at the same time it is far richer 
and more precise in expressing the relation of consciousness to sensation. Where we would tend 
in English to say of an object that: ’it is red’, the Hopi says what something that would be equivalent 
in English to ’I hear that it is red'. "Does the Hopi language," he asks, "show here a higher plane of
27 Highwater argues for the use of the word ’primal’ against the derogative associations implied 
by the word ’primitive’. However, in so far as we have sought to show that the ’primitive’ can be 
nothing but a myth of the ’civilised’, then such a euphemism would serve as a mystification.
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thinking, a more rational analysis of situations, than our vaunted English? Of course it does. In this 
field and in various others, English compared to Hopi is like a bludgeon compared to a rapier."28 
As Whorf insists, we will get nowhere by reducing all cultures to a common denominator defined by 
our own perspective.
As we have tried to show throughout this thesis, reality is not determined by directly observed 
logical categories. Reality is absolute. As Dorothy Lee has said: "If reality were not absolute then 
true communication would of course be impossible."29 But we can only perceive it under 
contradictory and ambivalent forms. Inevitably, reality shifts in relation to our gaze. There can, 
therefore, be no one way by which to categorise or discuss it in its absolute sense. Yet equally reality 
cannot be relative - there must be an absolute point at which the disjunctions we see around us no 
longer appear in contradictory forms. The desire to attain such lucidity, which was implicit in 
romanticism and became explicit in surrealism, cannot be dismissed out of hand as being anti- 
scientific.
28 B.J. Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality, p 85.
29 Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture, p 89.
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CONCLUSION:
This thesis has utilised a wide canvas to consider the question of objectivity in anthropological 
perspective. In contrast to fieldwork-based anthropology, this has involved a concentration on general 
questions at the expense of the particular. We have not chosen this course. We have assembled 
the material and it has spoken to us. We have listened to it and tried to do justice to what it has told 
us without forcing an argument from the material. This endeavour is in accord with the romantic and 
surrealist demand that the subject should not impose itself on the nature of the object.
The thesis began as an examination of the relationship between literature and anthropology 
with a particualr focus on surrealism in the light of James Clifford’s work. As it crystalised, it came 
to survey a wide array of themes current in anthropological theory. It became clear that there were 
a range of issues connected with the romantic traditon that had not been satisfactorily treated in
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anthropological history. These issues have entailed a re-consideration of the ideological foundations 
of Western culture and the way in which romanticism has been eclipsed not only in anthropology but 
in the sciences generally. Pierre Bourdieu has referred to his intellectual apprenticeship as being a 
’fieldwork in philosophy’. In a similar spirit we might say that this thesis has emerged from a sort of 
'fieldwork in anthropology’.
Anthropology took form in the nineteenth century against the background of unquestioned 
positivist assumptions of the nature of scientific enquiry that issued from Enlightenment ideology. 
According to Adorno and Horkenheimer, Enlightenment ideology can be characterised by its insertion 
of ’deception as a means of exchange’ into the frame of human discourse. By such means was 
colonialism made possible: "the contract was fulfilled and yet the other party is deceived”.1
The Enlightenment should be given its due: "the condition of self-conscious man is efficient 
in promoting thought and action, particularly in new explorations of all kinds and it produced among 
other things a rigorous development of the rational intellect."2 But the Enlightenment served to 
decentre man in the world as it decentred the world in the cosmos. It treated self-awareness as 
primary rather than secondary and denied the integrity of the other while at the same time it separated 
the mind from the body and divided the self from itself. By such means it caused the divided self to 
deny self-knowledge as a valid means of knowledge of the other as it reduced the other to an object 
of pure contemplation.
Anthropology, as the study of humankind, embodies within itself the contradictions of the 
Enlightenment view, but inherent in anthropology is an auto-critique of Enlightenment ideology - to 
study ’man’ is to lay bare the problematic of the self in relation both to itself and to others. Although 
anthropology has sought to deny such problematic by the adoption of positivist methodology it has 
done so only by reducing its field of study and turning away from its own rationale - to found a 
’science of humanity’.
1 Adorno and Horkenheimer, The Dialectic o f Enlightenment, p 61. A striking 
example of this in concrete terms is the means by which American Indians were 
induced to sign away their ’rights’ to their land; the contract was binding even though 
they did not know what they signed.
2 L.L. Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud, p 35.
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The allegory by which knowledge is separated out from its object into parcels is the means by 
which the Enlightenment deception is achieved: we speak of one thing but mean something else. 
This position did not go unchallenged.
Romanticism sought to confront this allegory and reassert immediacy by means of the symbol 
which would re-establish thought in its unity.
Surrealism, through an exploration of the unconscious factor of the human personality, sought 
to extend the romantic critique and give form to a sensibility that would not be tied to Enlightenment 
concepts.
Positivism met the romantic and surrealist challenge by ignoring its philosophical position and 
distorting its methodological concepts. In anthropological terms it denied the immediacy of knowledge 
and made the other into an object separable from the subject. The romantic principle that knowledge 
must begin with oneself was dismissed from consideration as being subjectivism and irrationalism. 
Empathy as a methodological tool faded from view.
The aim of this thesis has been to re-appraise romanticist and surrealist concerns within the 
contemporary anthropological context, not in order to argue that they provide a ’better’ means of 
anthropological enquiry but to reveal the way in which positivist hegemony in the sciences has served 
to distort and suppress the issues raised by such considerations.
Positivism no longer holds sway in the social sciences. Its ascendency has passed to 
hermeneutic and structuralist approaches that inscribe a subjectivism at the heart of human discourse 
that essentially is the inverse of positivist objectivism. This has led, in anthropology, to the 
development of a ’reflexive’ approach to the collection of data in which self-knowledge through the 
other and conversely knowledge of the other by means of the self (the basis of the romantic position) 
is denied as emphatically as it is in positivism. We have tried to argue that by such means the 
integrity of the other is still denied: the deception remains.
We have analysed post-modernist attempts to engage with the question of representation. 
Post-modernist representations are unsatisfactory on a number of counts, but primarily in the way 
that, consciously or not, they serve to valorise subjectivism. We have sought to show that value 
cannot be ascribed to the object isolated from its relation with the subject. To seek to do so by 
transforming the object into a ’subject’ in its own right with whom we engage in dialogue is as 
spurious as to found a science based purely on supposedly ’objective’ considerations.
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The central difficulty lies in the nature of the ’other’. We live in a world in which people who 
would once have been treated as ’others’, and exoticised as such, have access to our own 
communication system and can answer ’us’ back on our own terms. The other’s own voice can 
therefore no longer be ignored, as it almost always was in colonial times. This is undoubtedly 
something that raises questions in anthropology which are very difficult to answer in terms of the 
rationalist/positivist subject and object dichotomy. But at the same time it is not possible, we have 
sought to show, to dissolve the object from methodological consideration. A great danger lies in the 
way in which the object is denied by being incorporated into the subject in such a way that its voice 
thereby becomes neutralised. Diversity of views and differing world views are undermined in the very 
process of giving value to them: the effect is to impose universal values at the level of the lowest 
common-denominator., something that can only serve to maintain the status quo and ultimately retain 
an us and them divide.
In the romantic tradition, the subject and object relation is accepted, but on terms that are 
very different from those encountered in the central Enlightenment tradition. Little attention has been 
paid to this phenomenon, especially to the surrealist contribution to such a debate, which has mostly 
been ignored altogether. We would therefore contend that a re-appraisal of romantic and surrealist 
concerns is of value to recall to anthropology its forgotten heritage.
There can be no exclusive means of seeking knowledge. As the surrealists would be the first 
to acknowledge, empiricist and rationalist based research remains as valid as ever: disinterested 
research into the nature of phenomena can uncover factors in human culture that must remain hidden 
if all knowledge is inflected through the self. The aim, then, is not to discredit rationalism, but to 
confront its claim to a monopoly of knowledge.
In accordance with the precepts of rationalism, anthropology has established a methodology 
based on fieldwork that gives undue emphasis to the particular at the expense of the general. This 
thesis, both in scope and method, assumes that this approach does not exhaust the possibilities of 
anthropological knowledge.
It should be recognised that the romantic approach has a place in anthropological research, 
and that its criteria for judgement are as objective, even if on different grounds, as those for rational 
and empirical modes of scientific investigation. Romantic approaches are in no sense irrational or 
subjective.
It is not sufficient to know the other as an object of contemplation. We should also 
acknowledge that it is possible to know otherness through oneself. As the Guyanese writer Wilson 
Harris wrote: "I felt the face before me begin to fade and part company from me and from themselves
186
as if our need for one another was now fulfilled, and our distance from each other was the distance 
of a sacrament, the sacrament and embrace we knew in one muse and one undying soul. Each of 
us now held in his arms what he had been for ever seeking and what he had always possessed."3 
Within such a quest, as we have sought to show, there lies a long suppressed possibility of another 
anthropological knowledge.





SURREALIST DECLARATIONS ON COLONIALISM
TO THE SOLDIERS AND SAILORS
Comrades,
In spite of the promises given to us in 1919, war has again broken out, this time in Morocco, as 
horrible as the one that ravaged the world for more than four years.
This war has no other aim than to save national honour. You are being sent to Morocco to allow 
the bankers to get their hands on the riches of the Republic of the Riff so they can grease the palms 
of the capitalists.
YOU ARE FIGHTING THE WAR OF THE BANKERS
Comrades, soldiers and sailors, we have confidence in you: we know you will do your duty toward 
the Riffians who are struggling for their independence. You will not be the flunkeys of the banks. 
Remember that the Russian Bolsheviks, the glorious sailors of the Black Sea, the soldiers of Odessa, 
the Spanish soldiers of the Riff, have been able to stop the war by fraternisation ...
Understand your duty:
FRATERNISE WITH THE RIFFIANS 
STOP THE MOROCCAN WAR
Down with the War in Morocco!
Immediate peace with the Riff!
Long live the military evacuation of Morocco!
Long live fraternisation with the Riffians!
Maxime Alexandre, Louis Aragon, Antonin Artaud, Georges Bessi6re, Joe Bousquet, Pierre 
Brasseur, Andr6 Breton, Robert Desnos, Paul Eluard, Max Ernst, Theodore Fraenkel, Michel 
Leiris, Georges Limbour, Georges Malkine, Andr§ Masson, Douchan Matisch, Max Morise, 
Georges Neveux, Marcel Noll, Benjamin Peret, Raymond Queneau, Philippe Soupault, Dede 
Sunbeam, Roland Tual, Jacques Viot, Pierre de Massot, Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes 
18 October 1925
(This was a PCF declaration which the surrealists signed along with the Clarte and Philosophes 
groups. Only the surrealist signatories are given here.)
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DON’T VISIT THE COLONIAL EXHIBITION
On the evening of 1 May 1931 .which is to say the day before the Colonial Exhibition was 
inaugurated, the Indo-Chinese student Tao was picked up by the police. To justify this action 
Chiappe* used lies and an anonymous letter. We now learn that, sufficient time having passed to 
avoid protest, this arrest, which was taken as a preventive measure, was merely a prelude to his 
deportation to lndo-China(1). Tao’s crime? To be a member of the Communist Party (which is after 
all not illegal in France) and to have been among the protesters outside the Elysee against the 
execution of forty Annamites.
In vain has world opinion been mobilised against the fate of Sacco and Vanzetti. And Tao, 
delivered up to military justice and the justice of mandarins, has no guarantee that his life will be 
spared. This fine curtain-raiser was an appropriate prelude to the Vincennes exhibition in 1931.
The idea of colonial piracy (the word is illuminating but hardly strong enough) dates from the 
nineteenth century, and is one we have made our own. With our surplus money we send ships, 
shovels and pickaxes to Africa and Asia, which we are pleased to present as gifts to the natives, even 
though they are provided precisely to allow the natives to work for a living and help to create such 
wealth. We pretend that it is perfectly reasonable that the reserves of gold that lie in the vaults of the 
Banque de France should be created by the work of millions of new slaves. But the fact is that it is 
forced - or free - labour that is at the heart of this monstrous exchange. The fact is that men whose 
customs, insofar as it is possible to learn what they are from rarely disinterested accounts, appear 
(not that this is saying much) to be less perverted than ours , are being drawn away from the true 
goals of the human species, away from knowledge, love and human happiness. Not content with this, 
our own self-perception is enough to give us the credentials to organise a Colonial Exhibition, 
something which, if we are not very much mistaken, responds to a very French idea, or more 
accurately a French calculation, around which all the enthusiasts gather like vultures. Yet we are 
distinguished from these native peoples only by the fact that we are white (as colourless people we 
call them coloured) and purely due to the power of European metallurgy, and distinguished most 
especially from them for having worked our skins off in 1914 for a miserable collective funerary 
monument. All the Lyauteys*, the Daumesnils* and the Doumiers* who today lord it in this France of 
the Moulin-Rouge would fit in better in the nearby carnival of skeletons. A few days ago it was even 
possible to see an undefaced poster in Paris in which Jacques Doriot was presented as being 
responsible for the massacres in Indo-China. An undefaced poster.
The dogma of the integrity of national territory, invoked to give moral justification to these 
massacres, is not based on sufficient play of words to enable us to forget that hardly a day goes by 
without people being killed in the colonies. The presence on the inaugural platform at the Colonial 
Exhibition of the President of the Republic, the Emperor of Annam, the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris 
with several governors with their thugs, opposite both the pavilion of the missionaries and those of 
Citro6n and Renault, clearly reveals the complicity of the whole of the bourgeoisie in the birth of the 
new and particularly repugnant idea of "Greater France". It is to try to indoctrinate the idea of this 
fraudulent concept that the pavilions at Vincennes have been built. It is a question of giving to the 
citizens of the metropolis the consciousness of being proprietors and to this end it is necessary not 
to waver at the echo of faraway gunfire. It is all about annexing a perspective of minarets and 
pagodas (as had been suggested before the war in a song about the bamboo-huts) to the pleasant 
French landscape.
In this context we have not forgotten the charming recruitment poster for the colonial army, 
which gives us the image of a life of ease, with big-breasted negresses a-plenty, as the petty officer 
in his elegant khaki is carried around in his rickshaw by the natives. A life, to be sure, of adventure 
and advancement.
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In other respects, the advertising spares us nothing as we see a native king coming in person 
to beat the drum at the door of these papier-mach6 palaces.The fair is international and in this way 
colonial fact (a European fact, as the opening address made clear) becomes acquired fact.
With due regard to the scandalous Socialist Party and the jesuitical League of the Rights of 
Man, one would be hard-pressed to make a distinction between good and bad types of coloniser. The 
pioneers of national defence in a capitalist regime, with the unspeakable Bancour at their head, can 
justly be proud of the Vincennes Luna-Park. But for all those who refuse once and for all to be 
among the defenders of the bourgeois parties it is necessary to oppose such rejoicing and exploitation 
in the appropriate way in accord with the attitude of Lenin, who was the first person this century to 
recognise colonial peoples as allies of the world proletariat.
In response to this discourse and to the death sentences, we must respond by demanding 
the immediate evacuation of the colonies and the bringing to trial of the generals and officials 
responsible for the massacres in Annam, Lebanon, Morocco and Central Africa.
Andr6 Breton, Paul Eluard, Benjamin P6ret, Georges Sadoul, Pierre Unik, 
Andre Thirion, Rene Crevel, Aragon, Rene Char, Maxime Alexandre, Yves 
Tanguy, Georges Malkine.
May 1931
1. We have felt it necessary to refuse to accept the signatures of foreign comrades for this manifesto.
* Chiappe was Parisian Chief of Police, a hated figure later to be caricatured in Buftuel’s Diary of 
a Chambermaid (1963); Marshall Lyauty was a colonial general; Daumesnil a radical deputy and 
Minister of the Colonies; Doumier was President of the Republic; Paul-Bancour was a member of 
the French delegation at the League of Nations.
FIRST CONSIDERATION OF THE COLONIAL EXHIBITION
It is we, the poets, who nail the guilty to the eternal scaffold. Future generations will 
insult and scorn those we condemn.
Emile Zola
On the night of 27 and 28 June the pavilion of the Netherland Antilles was completely 
destroyed by fire. "So what?" might be the response of any spectator who understands the nature 
of the imperialist demonstration at Vincennes. People will perhaps be surprised that, since we are 
hardly noted as enthusiasts for the conservation of art objects, we have not abandoned ourselves to 
this initial response. Yet just as the opponents of nationalism have the duty to defend the nationalism 
of oppressed peoples, so the opponents of that art which is the fruit of the capitalist economy also 
have the duty dialectically to place the arts of the oppressed peoples in opposition to it. The pavilion 
which the journalists call, without the least embarrassment, the 'Dutch' pavilion unquestionably 
contained the most valuable manifestations of the intellectual life of Malaysia and Melanesia. As we 
know well, it was a question of the rarest and oldest artistic artifacts known in those areas, objects 
which had been violently torn from those who made them and which a European government can, 
as paradoxical as it may seem, not be afraid to present as an advert for its own method of 
colonisation(l). Even the scandalous inversion of meaning by which such an act of piracy seems to 
be completed was insufficient, for these objects could still serve the appetite of the anthropologist, the 
sociologist and the artist. Only by adopting a completely superficial point of view could one see the
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fire on 28 June as a simple accident. What has been lost, in spite of the use that capitalism would 
like to make of it, was destined to haunt the latter, thanks to the quality of the evidence it constituted. 
From such evidence only materialist science could benefit, as Marx and Engels have shown in the 
use they made of the research done by Morgan on the Iroquois and the Hawaiians to help them in 
their own study of the origin of the family. The revelation of the arts of the so-called ’primitive’peoples 
has been such that the recent discoveries both in the realm of art and sociology would be 
incomprehensible if that did not take this determining factor into consideration. Equally, in its struggle 
against religion, materialism alone is in a position effectively to utilise the connexions that must be 
made between the images of the whole world. This is something the missionaries, whose pavilions 
did not burn down, understand very well, since they are in the habit of mutilating fetishes while they 
drag the natives into their schools to be taught to reproduce the features of their Christ according to 
the formulas of the lowest forms of European art (2) (this comparison would be all the better 
established in the anti-religious museums in Russia). All these are excellent reasons for us to consider 
the destruction of the treasures of Java, Bali, Borneo, Sumatra, New Guinea etc as a sort of act of 
negligence on the part of capitalism, which it had so elegantly gathered together under a imitation 
straw roof. In this way colonial work, which begins with massacres, and is continued by conversions, 
forced labour and disease, reaches completion (in which connexion, while the French newspapers 
have given the lie to the fact that the natives who came to the Colonial Exhibition brought sleeping- 
sickness and leprosy to Paris, we are not aware that any precautions have been taken to protect the 
workers at the Colonial Exhibition from the dangers of European plagues, from alcoholism to 
prostitution by way of tuberculosis).
If anyone thinks it excessive to indict capitalism for the fire of 28 June, we would point out that 
contrary to what happens when a train is derailed and the driver, whether he lives or dies, is the first 
person on whom blame is placed, the night-watchman of the destroyed pavilion has been absolved 
from any responsibility. They were, presumably, unable to find any communists among his relatives! 
Even so, Figaro, among other newspapers, has drawn a direct relation between communist agitation 
in Malaysia and the spark that started the fire(3). For ourselves we restrict ourselves to noting that 
capitalism must take full responsibility for what happens at Vincennes, since it is capitalism that has 
coined it there, rather than blaming more specifically, for example, the missionaries. However such 
a charge would not be without justification if one thinks about the vile habits of the priests and their 
iconoclastic falsification of texts.
As for those who believe they perceive a contradiction between our applause for the 
proletariat’s acts of purification in burning down convents in Spain and this terrible loss which 
philosophically lights up the smile in the corner of Marshall Lyautey’s face, we shall not content 
ourselves with repeating what was said at the beginning of this text. We would point out that if the 
fetishes of the Sunda Islands have an undeniable scientific value for us and have, for this reason, lost 
their sacred qualities, the same cannot be said for the fetishes of Catholic inspiration (paintings by 
Valdes Leal, sculptures by Berruguete and collecting-boxes of the house of Bouasse-Lebel) which 
have not the slightest interest, either from a scientific or artistic point of view. Equally Catholicism has 
laws, courts, prisons, schools and money with which to protect itself and its representations of Christ, 
which have only a minimal interest compared to tikis and totems.
Without taking into account the nostalgia that it imparts to the bourgeoisie’s kids - did you 
know how big France is? - the exhibition has now established its first consideration. This 
consideration displays a deficit that will not put up the price of the Angkor temple which has been sold 
to a film company for the purpose (as it happens!) of being burned down.
Here a simple question is raised: despite opinions to the contrary, the Dutch Indies pavilion 
was not built to be burned down. Nevertheless it burst into flames like a match. The Angkor temple 
was actually built to be burned down. Can this not lead us to suspect that it might have been 
constructed from especially inflammable materials which might cause it to go the same way before 
its appointed date? In such circumstances, and despite the assurances given by the Prefect of Police 
to the municipal council that the exhibition is the best guarded place in the world against fire, does 
not this French colonial work run the risk of being staged not only at the expense of science but also
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at the expense ot the lives of the crowds who come to it together with a good part of the Parisian 
population?
3 July 1931
Yves Tanguy, Georges Sadoul, Aragon, Andr6 Breton, Andr6 
Thirion, Maxime Alexandre, Paul Eluard, Pierre Unik, Rene Char, 
Benjamin P6ret, Ren6 Crevel, Georges MalkineO
(*)and twelve signatures of foreign comrades.
1. "I have to address my regret and sympathy to Your Excellency about the fire at the principal 
pavilion of the Dutch East Indies, which we had inaugurated together and which was a magnificent 
testimony to the colonial work of your country." (telegram from M. Paul Reynaud to the minister for 
the colonies of the Netherlands)
2. See L’Annee Missionaire (1931)
3. Article by Eug&ne Marsan
LEGITIMATE DEFENCE
This is only a preliminary warning. We consider ourselves to be totally committed. We are 
sure that there are other young people like us who could add their signatures to ours and who - to 
the extent that it is compatible with remaining alive - refuse to adjust to all those who attempt, 
consciously or not, by their smiles, work, exactitude, propriety, speeches, writings, actions and their 
very persons, to pretend that everything can continue as it is. We rise up against all those who are 
not suffocated by this capitalist, Christian, bourgeois world, to which, involuntarily, our protesting 
bodies belong.
In every country the Communist Party (Third International) is in the process of playing the 
decisive card of the Spirit - in the Hegelian sense of the word. Its defeat, impossible as we think it 
to be, would be for us the definitive ‘Je ne peux plus’. We believe unreservedly in its triumph 
because we accept the dialectical materialism of Marx, freed of all misleading interpretation and 
victoriously put to the test by Lenin. We are ready, on this plane, to submit to the discipline that such 
convictions demand.
On the concrete plane of modes of human expression, we equally and unreservedly accept 
surrealism to which, in 1932, we relate our becoming. We refer our readers to the two manifestos 
of Andr6 Breton, Ren§ Crevel, Salvador Dali, Paul Eluard, Benjamin P6ret and Tristan Tzara. It must 
be said that it is one of the disgraces of our time that these works are not better known everywhere 
that French is read. And in the works of Sade, Hegel, Lautr6amont, Rimbaud - to mention only a few 
- we seek everything surrealism has taught us to find. As for Freud, we are ready to utilize the 
immense machine that he has set in motion to dissolve the bourgeois family. We are moving with 
sincerity at a furious pace. We want to see clearly into our dreams and we listen to their voices. And 
our dreams permit us to see clearly into the life that has been imposed on us for so long.
Among the filthy bourgeois conventions, we despise above all the humanitarian hypocrisy, 
this stinking emanation of Christian decay. We loathe pity. We don’t give a damn about sentiment. 
We intend to shed light on human psychic concretions - a light related to that which illuminates 
Salvador Dali’s splendid convulsive plastic works, where it seems sometimes, suddenly that love-birds 
could be ink-bottles or shoes or little bits of bread, taking wing from assassinated conventions.
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If this little journal, a temporary instrument, breaks down, we shall find other instruments. We 
accept with indifference the conditions of time and space which, by defining us in 1932 as people of 
the French West Indies, have thus settled our boundaries without at all limiting our field of action. 
This first collection of texts is particularly devoted to the West Indian question as it appears to us. 
(The following issues, without abandoning this matter, will take up many others.) And if, by its 
content, this collection is addressed primarily to young French West Indians, it is because we think 
it is a good idea that our first effort finds its way to people whose capacity for revolt we are far from 
underestimating. And if it is aimed especially at young blacks, this is because we believe that they 
especially have had to suffer from capitalism (outside Africa, witness Scottsboro) and that they seem 
to offer, in that they have a materially determined ethnic personality, a generally higher potential for 
revolt and joy. For want of a black proletariat, to whom international capitalism has not given the 
means to understand us, we speak to the children of the black bourgeoisie; we speak to those who 
are not already killed established fucked-up academic successful decorated decayed endowed 
decorative prudish decided opportunist; we speak to those who can still accept life with some 
appearance of truthfulness.
Having decided to be as objective as possible, we know nothing of each other’s personal 
lives. We want to go a long way, and if we expect much from psychoanalytical investigation, we do 
not underestimate (from those acquainted with psychoanalytic theory) pure and simple psychological 
confessions which, provided that the obstacles of social conventions are removed, can tell us a great 
deal. We do not admit that one can be ashamed of what he suffers. The Useful - social convention - 
constitutes the backbone of the bourgeois ‘reality’ that we want to break. In the realm of intellectual 
investigation, we pit against this ‘reality’ the sincerity that allows man to disclose in his love, for 
example, the ambivalence which permits the elimination of the contradiction decreed by logic. 
According to logic, once an object with an affective value appears, we must respond to it either with 
the feeling called love or with the feeling called hate. Contradiction is a function of the Useful. It does 
not exist in love. It does not exist in the dream. And it is only by horribly gritting our teeth that we 
are able to endure the abominable system of constraints and restrictions, the extermination of love 
and the limitation of the dream, generally known by the name of Western civilisation.
Emerging from the French black bourgeoisie, which is one of the saddest things on earth, we 
declare - and we shall not go back on this declaration - that we are opposed to all the corpses: 
administrative, governmental, parliamentary, industrial, commercial and all the others. We intend, as 
traitors to this class, to take the path of treason as far as it will go. We spit on everything they love 
and venerate, especially those things that give them sustenance and joy.
And all those who adopt the same attitude, no matter where they come from, will be welcome 
among us.*
Etienne Lero, Th6lus Lero, Ren6 M6nil, Jules-Marcel 
Monnerot, Michel Pilotin, Maurice-Sabas Quitman, Auguste 
Tesee, Pierre Yoyotte.
(1932)
*lf our critique is purely negative here, if we do not propose any positive efforts in place of 
that which we mercilessly condemn, we excuse ourselves on the grounds that it was 
necessary to begin - a necessity which did not enable us to await the full development of our 
ideas. In our next issue, we hope to develop our ideology of revolt.
(translated by Paula Wissing)
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MURDEROUS HUMANITARIANISM
For centuries, the soldiers, priests and civil agents of imperialism, in a welter of looting, 
outrage and wholesale murder, have with impunity grown fat off the coloured races. Now it is the turn 
of the demagogues, with their counterfeit liberalism.
But the proletariat of today, whether metropolitan or colonial, is not longer fooled by fine 
words as to the real end in view, which is still, as it always has been, exploitation by the greatest 
number for the benefit of a few slavers. Now these slavers, knowing their days are numbered and 
reading the doom of their system in the world crisis, fall back on the gospel of mercy, whereas in 
reality they rely more than ever on their traditional methods of slaughter to enforce their tyranny.
No great penetration is required to read between the lines of the news, whether in print or on 
the screen: punitive expeditions, blacks lynched in America, the white scourge devastating town and 
country in our parliamentary kingdoms and bourgeois republics.
War, that reliable colonial epidemic, receives fresh impulse in the name of ‘pacification’. 
France may well be proud of having launched this Godsent euphemism at the precise moment when, 
in the throes of pacifism, she sent forth her tried and trusty thugs with instructions to plunder ail those 
distant and defenceless peoples from whom the intercapitalist butchery had not distracted her 
attentions for a space.
The most scandalous of these wars, that against the Riffians in 1925, stimulated a number 
of intellectuals, investors in militarism, to assert their complicity with the hangmen of jingo and capital.
Responding to the appeal of the Communist Party, we protested against the war in Morocco 
and made our declaration in ‘Revolution First and Always’.
In a France hideously inflated with having dismembered Europe, made mincemeat of Africa, 
polluted Oceania and ravaged whole tracts of Asia, we surrealists pronounced ourselves in favour of 
changing the imperialist war, in its chronic and colonialist form, into a civil war. Thus we placed our 
energies in the service of the revolution - of the proletariat and its struggles - and defined our attitude 
towards the colonial problem, and hence toward the colour question.
Gone were the days when the representatives of this snivelling capitalism might screen 
themselves in those abstractions which, in both secular and religious mode, were invariably inspired 
by the Christian ignominy and which strove on the most grossly interested grounds to masochise 
whatever people had not yet been contaminated by the sordid moral and religious codes in which men 
feign to find authority for the exploitation of their fellows.
When whole peoples have been decimated by fire and sword it became necessary to round 
up the survivors and domesticate them in such a cult of labour as could only proceed for the notions 
of original sin and atonement. The clergy and professional philanthropists have always collaborated 
with the army in this bloody exploitation. The colonial machinery that extracts the last penny from 
natural advantages hammers away with the joyful regularity of a poleaxe. The white man preaches, 
doses, vaccinates, assassinates and (from himself) receives absolution. With his psalms, his 
speeches, his guarantees of liberty, equality and fraternity, he seeks to drown out the sound of his 
machine guns.
It is no good objecting that these periods of rapine are only a necessary phase and pave the 
way, in the words of the time-honoured formula, lo r an era of prosperity founded on a close and 
intelligent collaboration between the natives and the metropolis’. It is no good trying to palliate 
collective outrage and butchery by jury in the new colonies by inviting us to consider the old, and the 
peace and prosperity they have so long enjoyed. It is no good blustering about the Antilles and the 
‘happy evolution’ that has enabled them to be assimilated, or very nearly, by France.
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In the Antilles, as in the Americas, the fun began with the total extermination of the natives, 
in spite of their having extended a most cordial reception to the Christopher Columbian invaders. 
Were they now - in the hour of triumph and having come so far - to set out empty-handed for home? 
Never! So they sailed on to Africa and stole men. These were in due course promoted by our 
humanists to the ranks of slavery, but were more or less exempted from the sadism of their masters 
by virtue of the fact that they represented a capital which had to be safeguarded like any other capital. 
Their descendants, long since reduced to destitution (in the French Antilles they live on vegetables 
and salt cod and are dependent in the matter of clothing on whatever old guano sacks they are lucky 
enough to steal), constitute a black proletariat whose conditions of life are even more wretched than 
those of its European equivalent and which is exploited by a coloured bourgeoisie quite as ferocious 
as any other. This bourgeoisie, covered by the machine-guns of culture, ’elects’ such perfectly 
adequate representatives as ’Hard Labour’ Diagne and ’Twister’ Delmont.
The intellectuals of this new bourgeoisie, though they may not all be specialists in 
parliamentary abuse, are no better than the experts when they proclaim their devotion to the Spirit. 
The value of this idealism is precisely given the manoeuvres of its doctrinaires who, in their paradise 
of comfortable iniquity, have organised a system of poltroonery proof against all the necessities of life 
and the urgent consequences of dream. These gentlemen, votaries of corpses and theosophies, go 
to ground in the past, vanish down the warrens of Himalayan monasteries. Even for those whom a 
last few shreds of shame and intelligence dissuade from invoking those current religions whose God 
is frankly a God of cash, there is the call of some ’mystic Orient’ or another. Our gallant sailors, 
policemen and agents of imperialist thought, in league with opium and literature, have swamped us 
with their irretentions of nostalgia; the function of all these idyllic alarums among the dead and gone 
being to distract our thoughts from the present, the abominations of the present.
A holy-saint-faced international of hypocrites deprecates the material progress foisted on 
blacks; protests, courteously, against the importation not only of alcohol, syphillis and field artillery but 
also of railways and printing. This comes well after the former rejoicings of its evangelical spirit at the 
idea of the 'spiritual values’ current in capitalist societies, and notably respect for human life and 
property, which devolve naturally from enforced familiarity with fermented drinks, firearms and 
disease. It is scarcely necessary to add that the colonist demands this respect for property without 
reciprocity.
Those blacks who have been merely compelled to distort in terms of fashionable jazz the 
natural expression of their joy at finding themselves partakers of a universe from which Western 
peoples have wilfully withdrawn may consider themselves lucky to have suffered nothing worse than 
degradation. The eighteenth century derived nothing from China except a repertoire of frivolities to 
pave the alcove. In the same way the whole object of our romantic exoticism and travel lust is of use 
only in entertaining that class of blase client sly enough to see an interest in deflecting to his own 
advantage the torrent of those energies which soon - much sooner than he thinks - will close over his 
head.
Andre Breton, Roger Caillois, Ren6 Char, Rene Crevel, Paul 
Eluard, J.-M. Monnerot, Benjamin Peret, Yves Tanguy, Andre 
Thirion, Pierre Unik, Pierre Yoyotte.
[probably drafted in 1932, the declaration was published in 1934 in Nancy Cunard’s Negro:an 
anthology. The translation is by Samuel Beckett.]
FREEDOM IS A VIETNAMESE WORD
Is there a war in Vietnam? One can hardly doubt it. The press in ’free’ France, more than 
ever subject to censorship, remains silent. They tamely note down military victories and to comfort 
the families speak of those soldiers who have only been ’lost’ (the bankers show their hand in this 
type of reporting). Not a word is heard about the fierce repression perpetrated there in the name of
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democracy. Everything is done to hide from the French people a scandal that alarms the world.
There is a war in Indochina, an imperialist war undertaken in the name of a people who have 
themselves only just been liberated from five years of oppression against another people unanimous 
in their desire for freedom.
This aggression has a grave significance:
It shows first of all that nothing has changed: as it did in 1919 capitalism, having abused the 
most noble slogans of freedom in the name of patriotism, seeks to establish total control to continue 
its traditional imperialist policies and to re-establish the power of its financiers, army and clergy.
It has equally shown that the officials of the working-class, contemptuous of the anti-imperialist 
tradition that has long been one of the clearest dynamics of the workers' movement and in flagrant 
disregard of the oft-proclaimed right of national self-determination, have been accomplices - not 
without a certain ambivalence of behaviour - of this oppression. Whether due to corruption or by blind 
submission to a strategy imposed from on high, they have capitulated to demands whose effect is to 
conceal or to invert the true nature of the struggle.
Thus we appeal to all those who retain some lucidity and some sense of honesty and remind 
them that it is not possible to defend freedom here whilst imposing servitude elsewhere. It is not 
possible to wage such an odious war in the name of the French people without bringing in its wake 
a dire set of consequences.
The carnage has been deftly organised by an admiral-monk to maintain the cruel capitalist 
tyranny of bureaucrats and priests. And let us have no illusions about what is involved: there can be 
no question of preventing Vietnam from falling into the hands of a rival imperialism. For since when 
has French imperialism shown any independence? Since when has it done anything, in the past 
quarter of a century, than give up and sell out? What protection does it flatter itself it is giving to any 
of its slaves?
We surrealists, who have always seen as our objective the liberation of mankind, cannot 
remain silent in the face of such a stupid and revolting crime. Surrealism can only be against a 
regime which can view this bloody spectacle with pleasure: a regime which, as soon as it is born, can 
collapse into the mire of compromise and extortion which can be nothing but the calculated prelude 
to the establishment of a new totalitarianism.
On the occasion of this new crime, surrealism declares that it has renounced none of its 
demands and least of all the desire for a radical transformation of society. But it knows how illusory 
are appeals to conscience, intelligence and even the interests of people; how easy are the lies and 
the errors and inevitable divisions. It is for this reason that surrealism has chosen a wider and deeper 
domain; one which is in proportion to true human fraternity.
It is for this reason that it makes a vehement protest against imperialist aggression and 
extends its fraternal welcome to all those who embody, in the present moment, the becoming of 
freedom.
Adolphe Acker, Yves Bonnefoy, Joe Bousquet, Francis Bouvet, Andre 
Breton, Jean Brun, J.-B. Brunius, Eliane Catoni, Jean Ferry, Guy Gullequin, 
Jacques Halpern, Arthur Harfaux, Maurice Henry, Marcel Jean, Pierre 
Mabille, Jehan Mayoux, Francis Meunier, Maurice Nadeau, Henri Parisot, 




DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO INSUBORDINATION 
IN THE ALGERIAN WAR
A very important Movement is developing in France and it necessary that French and 
international opinion be better informed about it. At the moment that the Algerian War has taken a 
new turning point we must remain clear about what is involved and not forget the depth of the crisis 
that has opened up during the past six years.
Today more and more French people are pursued, condemned and imprisoned for having 
refused to participate in this war or for having helped the Algerian combatants. Misrepresented by 
their adversaries, but also defended under false pretences by those whose duty it is to defend them, 
their reasons remain generally misunderstood. It is not enough to state that such resistance to public 
power is respectable. A protest of honour, justice and truth such as this has a significance that is 
important to grasp irrespective of whatever happens in the course of events.
For the Algerians the struggle, whether followed by military or diplomatic means, involves no 
equivocation. It is plainly a war of national independence. But what is it for the French? It is not a 
foreign war. French territory has never been threatened. More than this: it is a war directed against 
a people that the State is determined to call French, even though they are struggling precisely for the 
means by which no longer to be so considered. It is not even sufficient to define it as a war of 
conquest, an imperialist war, accompanied by an accentuation of racism, although it is both. The 
equivocation remains.
In fact, by a decision that constitutes a fundamental abuse, the State has today mobilised 
entire classes of citizens for the sole end of carrying out what it admits is a police operation against 
an oppressed population, a population in revolt only by want of elementary dignity, since it wishes 
only to be recognised at last as an independent community.
Neither a war of conquest, nor a war of ’national defence’, the Algerian War has little by little 
become an action that serves only the interests of the army itself and the caste it has thrown up, 
which refuses to give an inch faced with an upheaval of which even the civil power, if we take account 
of the general collapse of colonial empires, seems to recognise the validity.
Today it is primarily the will of the army that sustains this criminal and absurd combat, and 
this army, through the political role that several of its highest representatives have required it to play, 
sometimes acts openly and violently beyond all legality. As such it betrays the role that the whole 
country has entrusted to it and runs the risk of perverting the nation itself, by forcing its citizens, under 
orders, to be accomplices of a factious and degrading action. Do we have to recall that, fifteen years 
after the destruction of the Hitlerian order, French militarism, by following the demands of such a war, 
is party to the restoration of torture and to reinstating it as an institution in Europe?
It is in such conditions that so many French people have come to bring into question 
traditional values and obligations. What can good citizenship mean when, in such circumstances, it 
becomes shameful submission? Does not the refusal to serve become a sacred duty, when ’treason’ 
means a courageous respect for the truth? And when, by the will of those who use it as a means of 
racist or ideological domination, does not the army place itself in rebellion against democratic 
institutions and so give to the revolt against the army a new meaning?
The question of conscience has been there from the beginning of the war. As the war has 
continued, it is natural that such conscience should become concretized through more and more 
common acts of insubordination and desertion, as well as providing help and refuge for the Algerian 
combatants. A free movement that has developed at the margins of the official parties, without their 
help and, in the last analysis, in spite of their disavowal. Once more, with no need of militants and 
pre-established slogans, a resistance has been born through a spontaneous taking of conscience, 
seeking and inventing forms of action and means of struggle in accord with a new situation of which
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the political groups and the press have knowingly, whether by inertia or by doctrinal timidity, whether 
by moral or nationalist prejudices, refused to recognise in its true meaning and its true demands.
The undersigned, believing that each person must make a stand and that it is henceforth 
impossible to consider such diverse facts as part of an individual adventure, and believing that they 
themselves, according to their position and means, are under a duty to intervene, not to give advice 
to those people who have personally made their decision in the face of such grave problems, but to 
demand that those who judge them must not be allowed the equivocation of words and values, 
accordingly declare
- We respect the refusal to take arms against the Algerian people and consider it wholly 
justifiable.
- We respect those French people who regard it as their duty to give aid and refuge to the 
Algerians who have been oppressed in the name of the French people and consider their actions 
justified.
- The cause of the Algerian people, which contributes in a decisive fashion to the destruction 
of the colonial system, is the cause of all free people.
Jean-Louis Bedouin, Robert Benayoun, Raymond Borde, Vincent Bounoure, 
Andre Breton, Guy Cabanal, Simone Collinet, Adrien Dax, Yves Elleouet, 
Jean Ferry, Dr. Theodore Fraenkel, Georges Goldfayn, Edouard Jaguer, 
Alain Joubert, Robert Legarde, Jacqueline Lamba, Gerard Legrand, Michel 
Leiris, Georges Limbour, Andr6 Masson, Pierre de Massot, Jehan Mayoux, 
Jose Pierre, Andr6 Pieyre de Mandiargues, Jean Schuster, Jean-Claude 
Silbermann, Claude Tarnaud, Tristan Tzara.
1 September 1960
[This notorious declaration, more commonly known as the ’Declaration of the 121’ after the 
initial number of signatories, was drawn up by the Surrealist Group and was eventually signed 
by 247 French intellectuals. Only the names of those who have participated in surrealist 




SURREALISM; n. Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which it is proposed to express -verbally, 
in writing or by any other means - the actual functioning of thought. The dictation of thought, in the 
absence of all control exercised by reason, and outside all aesthetic or moral considerations.* 
ENCYCLOPEDIA: philos. Surrealism is based on the belief in the superior reality of certain forms of 
previously neglected associations, in the omnipotence of dream, in all the disinterested play of 
thought. It tends toward the ruin once and for all of all psychic mechanisms and to substitute itself for 
them in solving the principal problems of life.
ANDRE BRETON 1924
* Breton was later to qualify this definition, regretting that it takes account only of "surrealism’s idealist 
disposition" and adding, "I deceived myself (....) in advocating use of automatic thought not only 
removed from all control exercised by reason but also disengaged from ’all aesthetic or moral 
considerations’. It should at least have said conscious aesthetic or moral considerations.
ANDRE BRETON 1924/34
For us surrealism IS life and there is no diversification to be introduced between what in surrealism 
is pure speculation of the mind and what is given as a reinstallation of life into the surrealist 
perspective. We need, as a first principle, to accustom ourselves to this confusion and to aim all of 
our strength at the establishment of such confusion.
ANTONIN ARTAUD 1925
Surrealism is not a new means of expression (...) it means total liberation of the mind and all that 
resembles it Surrealism is not a poetic form. It is a cry of the mind turning back on itself, and it is 
determined to break apart from its fetters, even if it must be by material means!
FRENCH SURREALIST GROUP 1925
Surrealism is for me nothing but the insidious extension of the invisible, the unconscious within reach.
ANTONIN ARTAUD 1926
The vice called surrealism is the disordered and impassioned use of the image as a drug, or rather 
the uncontrolled provocation of the image for itself and for what it brings in the domain of 
representation by way of imperturbable metamorphosis: for each image, every time, forces you to 
reconsider the whole Universe.
LOUIS ARAGON 1927
Everything I love, everything I think and feel, leads me to a particular philosophy of immanence in 
accord with which surreality is comprised in reality itself and is neither superior not external to it. 
Thereby the contained is also the content.
ANDRE BRETON 1928
Surrealism is at best a notion that slips away like the horizon before the walker, for like the walker 
it is a relation between the spirit and that which it will never attain.
LOUIS ARAGON 1928
Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a certain point of the mind at which life and 
death, real and imaginary, past and future, communicable and incommunicable, high and low, cease 
to be perceived contradictorily. It would thus be vain to seek in surrealist activity any other aim than 
the hope of determining this point.
ANDRE BRETON 1929
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The idea of surrealism tends simply towards the total recuperation of our psychic strength by a means 
that is simply the vertiginous descent into ourselves, the systematic illumination of hidden places and 
the progressive darkening of other places, perpetual promenading in the middle of forbidden zones.
ANDRE BRETON 1929
A certain ambiguity contained in the word surrealism is capable [...] of leading one to suppose that 
it designates I know not what transcendental attitude, when on the contrary it expresses [...] a desire 
to deepen the foundations of the real, to bring about an ever clearer and at the same time more 
passionate consciousness of the world perceived by the senses.
ANDRE BRETON 1934
Surrealism, which is the constructive evolution of Dadaism, seeks to integrate human poetry into true 
life, which is to say that it it hereby implicitly submits itself to the dialectical movement of becoming 
human. Its limits can only be those of mankind in relation to the earth and vice versa.
MARCEL LECOMTE/E.L.T. MESENS 1934
Surrealism is the collective experience of individualism.
ANDRE MASSON 1938
Surrealism is the internal terror of man, his forests, his temples, his dawns, his splendours. 
Surrealism consists of a representation of the formless, of that which has not yet taken form. It is the 
expression of the unconscious, of that which has not yet been discerned and is at the base of all 
mental civilisation.
ALBERTO SAVINIO 1942
Surrealism involves seeking the means to effectively explore the personal and collective unconscious; 
the determination to reject the enormously antiquated vision of beauty presented by the Cartesian 
bourgeoisie based on a Greco-Latin-Louis XIV pseudo-classicism. The determination to draw closer 
to the arts of the so-called primitives, naives and savages. The will to introduce into such exploration 
a dialectical critical approach with all the tools forged by materialism, biological science, 
psychoanalysis etc. [...] The most important thing is to introduce knowledge into a domain denied by 
academic science and exploited by charlatans, which is to say the relation of man and the cosmos.
PIERRE MABILLE 1943
Surrealism can exist only in continual opposition towards the entire world and towards itself, it is a 
negation of the negation directed towards the most inexpressible delirium without, it hardly needs 
saying, losing one or another aspect of its revolutionary power.
GHERASIM LUCA 1944
Surrealism - which is catching fire - in the sense of being an autonomous doctrine or a specific 
method, does not exist. But it is a historic fact that this fire still illuminates the intellectual landscape 
as far as the horizon.
PAUL NOUGE 1947
Surrealism is not a school, but a state of mind. Nobody belong to this movement, but everybody is 
part of it. Is surrealism disappearing? No, because it is neither here nor there: it is elsewhere It is 
a phantom, a brilliant obsession.
MAURICE BLANCHOT 1947
SURREALISM IS THAT WHICH WILL BE.
FRENCH SURREALIST GROUP 1947
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To be nothing. To be everything. To open the individual.
To navigate. To awaken. To conceal.
FRENCH SURREALIST GROUP (Slanislas Rodanski) 1948
Neither a school nor a sect, so much more than an attitude, surrealism is, in the most aggressive and 
total sense of the term, an adventure. An adventure of mankind and of the real thrown together in the 
same movement.
FRENCH SURREALIST GROUP 1951
Surrealism is a tornado on the edge of an atmospheric depression where the norms of humanist 
individualism founder.
JACQUES LACAN 1958
Surrealism is the desperate attempt of poetry to incarnate itself in history.
OCTAVIO PAZ 1959
Surrealism is the direct knowledge of reality; reality is absolute and unrelated to the various ways of 
interpreting it; [...] Surrealism is the knowledge of absolute thought.
RENE MAGRITTE 1965
Surrealism represents a desperate effort and passionate quest for continuity, a continuity of the 
subject with its own internal spirit and [...] also a will towards continuity between the subject and the 
external world.
PHILIPPE AUDOIN 1966
Surrealism is not poetry but a poetics and even more, and more decisively, a vision of the world. 
External revelation, inspiration breaks the subjectivist labyrinth: it is something that assaults us as 
soon as consciousness dozes, something that irrupts through a door that only opens when the doors 
of wakefulness close. Internal revelation, it causes our belief in the unity and identity of that same 
consciousness to waver: there is no self and within each of us diverse voices are in conflict. (...) the 
true originality of surrealism consists not only in having made of inspiration an idea but, more 
radically, an idea of the world.
OCTAVIO PAZ 1966
Surrealism is always what will be. it will be the contrary of what it has been if its maintains its living 
heritage.
VINCENT BOUNOURE 1967
Surrealism is a preface to a future sensibility.
ALAIN JOUFFROY 1971
Surrealism is in search of an authentic language, the language of negation, as the great refusal to 





Genealogy or issue which they had, Artes which they studied, Actes which they did. This part of 
History is named Anthropology.
R. HARVEY 1593
Anthropologie, or the history of human nature, is, in the vulgar (yet just) impression, distinguished in 
two volumes: the first entitled Psychologie, the nature of the rational soule discoursed: the other 
anatomie, or the fabrick or structure of the body of man revealed in dissection...
ANON 1655
Anthropology includes the consideration both of the human body and soul, with the laws of their 
union, and the effects thereof, as sensation, motion,etc.
ANON (18th Century)
A discourse upon human nature. Among Divines, that manner of expression by which the inspired 
writers attribute human parts and passions to God.
BRITISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 1822
Anthropology is the branch of natural history which treats man and the races of man.
TOPINARD 1876
Social Anthropology [...] is limited to the crude beginings, the rudimentary development of human 
society. [...] Its province may be divided into two departments, one of which embraces the customs 
and beliefs of savages, while the other includes such relics of these customs and beliefs as have 
survived in the thought and institutions of more cultured people.
J.G. FRAZER 1908
It may be [...] described as the ’science of man’, which compasses two main divisions - the one which 
deals with natural man [...]; the other which is concerned with man in relation to his fellows.
A.C. HADDON 1910
In its power to make us understand the roots from which our civilisation has sprung [anthropology] 
impresses us with the relative value of all forms of culture, and thus serves as a check to an 
exaggerated valuation of the standpoint of our period, which we are only too liable to consider the 
ultimate goal of human evolution, thus depriving ourselves of the benefits to be gained from the 
teachings of other cultures and hindering an objective criticism of our own work.
FRANZ BOAS 1911
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Anthropology is the whole history of man as fired and pervaded by the idea of evolution. Man in 
evolution - that is the subject in its full reach. Anthropology studies man as he occurs at all times. 
It studies him as he occurs in all known parts of the world. It studies his body and soul together - as 
a bodily organism, subject to conditions operating in time and space, which bodily organism is in 
intimate relation with a soul-life also subject to those same conditions.
R.R. MARRETT 1912
Social anthropology is the study that seeks to formulate the general laws that underlie the phenomena 
of culture. Ethnology is the history of peoples, including the history.
A.R.RADCLIFFE-BROWN 1923
Anthropology is the science of man and of his culture at various levels of development, it includes 
the study of the human frame, of racial distinctions, of civilisation, of social structure, and of man’s 
mental reaction to his environment. We confine our attention to the study of culture, and, since the 
study of living peoples uses methods and controls sources of information entirely different from those 
at the disposal of archaeology and pre-history, we restrict our scope to the study of modern living 
representatives of primitive mankind.
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI 1926
Anthropology deals with man as a social being. The races, languages and cultures found in different 
localities and following one another in the course of time are the material and contain the problems 
of methodological study [...] Its subject matter includes all the phenomena of the social life of man 
without limitation of time and space.
FRANZ BOAS 1930
Anthropology is the study of human beings as creatures of society. It fastens its attention upon those 
physical characteristics and industrial techniques, those conventions and values, which distinguish one 
community from all others belonging to a different tradition.
RUTH BENEDICT 1934
Ethnology is the science of peoples and their cultures and life histories as groups, irrespective of their 
degree of advancement.
A.R. KROEBER 1948
The Social Anthropologist studies society directly, living among them for months or years, whereas 
sociological research is usually from documents and largely statistical. The social anthropologist 
studies societies as wholes - he studies their ecologies, their economies.their legal and political 
institutions.their family and kinship organisations, their religion, their technologies, their arts etc as 
parts of general social systems.
E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD 1951
In social anthropology [...] we attempt to extend our knowledge of man and society to ’primitive’ 
communities, ’simpler peoples’ or ’preliterate societies’.
S.F.NADEL 1953
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Social anthropology may be defined as the investigation of the nature of human society by the 
systematic comparison of societies of diverse types, with particular attention to the simpler forms of 
society of primitive, savage or non-literate people.
A.R. BRADCLIFFE-BROWN 1958
Anthropology means ’talking about man’ as psychology means’ talking about mind’.
LUCY MAIR 1965
Social anthropologists study people’s customs, social institutions and values, and the ways in which 
these are interrelated. They carry out their investigations mainly in the context of living communities 
[...] and their central not their only interest is in systems of social relations.
JOHN BEATTIE 1964
Cultural anthropology is a circumscribed enterprise in exploring the extremities and possibilities of our 
own thought and culture.
BOB SCHOLTE 1970
Anthropology is a view of the human condition and a means towards gaining some removal from and 
perspective on our own lives [...] it attempts to explain the ways in which various societies are 
organised and to analyze their civilisations.
ROBERT F. MURPHY 1979
If there is an overall aim today that is both intellectually and morally commendable in the mission that 
is anthropology - the ’study of man’ - it is not only that the study of other societies reveals the way 
in which they are influenced by ours but also that such investigations provide us with some critical 
leverage with which to assess and understand the sacrosanct and unconscious assumptions that are 
built into and emerge from our social forms.
MICHAEL TAUSSIG 1979
The question What is Anthropology deserves at least three different answers. The first has to do with 
curiosity about foreign people. This is a characteristic anthropologists share with others, both past and 
present. The second response concerns the development of anthropology as a profession with distinct 
standards for membership and practice. And the third response concerns anthropology as an 
academic discipline that offers a general perspective on the human condition.
JEANNE GUILLERMAN 1981
Today the label ’anthropology’ covers two quite different disciplines which were in no way predestined 
for a monogamous union: interpretive ethnography, a lively and somewhat troubled discipline, and 
anthropology properly speaking, which consists of little more than a vague scientific project nursed 
in a compost of philosophical reminiscence.
DAN SPERBER 1981
However else anthropology could be defined, to do anthropology meant to study a specific community 
through long-term participant observation.
LAD I SLAV HOLY 1984
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Y oung. F re u d . B ergson .
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D id e ro t . D u rck hc i in .
l lo lb a c h . L cvy-B riih l .
K a n t . Schiller . L6nine. Sorcl .
Sade. M irabcau . Syn ge . C laudel.
Laclos. A p o ll in a ire . M istral.
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M atu r in . M a lak o v sk y . B arbu ssc .
I l a b b c . S c h o p en h au e r . C hirico . M auriac .
A. B e r t r a n d . V igny. S av in  io. T o u le t .
N erv a l . L a m a r t in e . N eu berg . M alraux .
Borel. B alzac . K ip ling .
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M arx . M aurras .
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M eriin te . B e n d a .
F ro m c n t in . Valois .
B au d e la i re . L eco n te  d e  Lisle. V au le l .
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Back cover of a 
catalogue o f books 
issued by Jose C orti, 
Paris, 1931.
The Nights of Young are surrealist from beginning to end. Unfortunately it is a priest who is speaking, 
a bad priest no doubt, but a priest all the same.
Swift is surrealist in malice.
Sade is surrealist in sadism.
Chateaubriand is surrealist in politics.
Hugo is surrealist when he isn’t stupid.
Desbordes-Valmore is surrealist in love.
Bertrand is surrealist in the past.
Rabbe is surrealist in death.
Poe is surrealist in adventure.
Baudelaire is surrealist in morality.
Rimbaud is surrealist in the practice of life and elsewhere.
Mallarmg is surrealist in confidences.
Jarry is surrealist in absinthe.
Nouveau is surrealist in the kiss.
Saint-Pol-Roux is surrealist in the symbol.
Fargue is surrealist in atmosphere.
Vach6 is surrealist in me.
Reverdy is surrealist at home.
Saint-John- Perse is surrealist at a distance.
Roussel is surrealist as a storyteller.
Andr6 Breton: Manifesto of Surrealism 1924)
Heraclitus is surrealist in dialectic.
Albertus Magnus is surrealist in the automaton.
Lulle is surrealist in definition.
Flamel is surrealist in the night of gold.
Uccello is surrealist in the free for all fight.
Radcliffe is surrealist in the landscape.
Carrier is surrealist in drowning.
Monk Lewis is surrealist in the beauty of evil.
Maturin in surrealist in despair.
Arnim is an out and out surrealist and chiefly in time and space.
Nerval is surealist in allegory.
Borel is surealist in liberty.
Forneret is surrealist in the maxim.
Hervey Saint-Denis is surrealist in the directed dream.
Cross is surrealist in the mirror of the ear.
Carroll is surrealist in nonsense.
Gustave Moreau is surrealist in fascination.
Huysmans is surrealist in pessimism.
Allais is surrealist in mystification.
Helen Smith is surrealist in the tongue.
Picasso is surrealsit in cubism.
Cravan is surrealist in the challenge.
Chirico is surrealist in the effigy.
Duchamp is surrealist in the game.
Mac Sennet is surrealist in movement.
The Postman Cheval is surrealist in architecture.
(Andr6 Breton ’Surrealism yesterday, today, tomorrow’ in This Quarter, Sept 1932)
Seurat is surrealist in the motif.
(Andr6 Breton: Qu'est-ce que c ’est le surrealisme? (1934)
WILL YOU OPEN THE DOOR
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If the following people were to call at your door would you open it? The Surrealist Group in Paris 




















Balzac 9 7 Lenin 15
Barbey d'Aurevilly 10 6 Mallarme 10
Baudelaire 17 0 Marx 11
Bettina 6 7 Moreau 15
Brisset 12 2 Nerval 16
Cesanne 2 15 Nietzsche 9
Chateaubriand 7 10 Nouveau 15
Juliette Drouet 13 2 Novalis 16
Fourier 15 2 Poe 7
Freud 16 1 De Quincey 16
Fulcanelli 12 1 Robespierre 13
Gauguin 14 2 H. Rousseau 15
Goethe 8 8 J. J. Rousseau 15
Goya 15 2 Seurat 11
Caroline de Guederode 11 0 Stendhal 8
Hegel 14 3 Van Gogh 13









Pancho Villa Lamiel Sade
Freud Alice Lautrdamont
Novalis Portuguese Nun Baudelaire
Paracelsus Helene Smith Hegel
2. The Zodiac
1. ARIES The Fashionable Tiger (story by Jean Ferry)
2. TAURUS- Falmer’s Head of Hair (from Lautr6amont)
3. GEMINI- The Gile Monster (from Arizona)
4. CANCER- Jeanne Sabrenas (from Jarry)
5. LEO - Ldonie d ’Ashby (from Rimbaud)
6. VIRGO - The Secreatry Bird (a lizard eater)
7. LIBRA - The Gravity Manager (from Duchamp)
8. SCORPIO - The Candylura (Star-faced mole spoken of by medieval authors
9. SAGITARIUS - The Wolf Table (painting by Brauner)
10. CAPRICORN - Raymond Roussel
11. AQUARIUS - The Great Invisibles
12. PISCES- The Window of Magna sed Apta (from Peter Ibbetson)
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3. The Tarot
1. THE JUGGLER - Melmoth the Wanderer
2. THEPAPESS - Life and death of the Postman Chevai
3. THE EMPRESS - Reveries of the Solitary Walker (Rousseau)
4. THE EMPERER - The Golden Bough
5. THE POPE - Les Fleurs du mal
6. THE LOVER - Hdlderlin: Poems of Madness
7. THE CHARIOT - Justine (Sade)
8. JUSTICE- Sermons (Eckhart)
9. THE HERMIT - Christian Rozencrantz’s Nuptials
10. THE WHEEL OF FURTUNE - The Trial (Kafka)
11. STRENGTH - The Harness and the Saddle Horse Through the Ages (Lefebvre ■ 
Noettes
12 THE HANGED MAN The Science of God (Brisset)
13. DEATH - The Rotting Enchanteur (Apollinaire)
14. TEMPERANCE - Memorabilia (Swedenberg)
15. THE DEVIL - Ubu Roi
16. TOWER OF DESTRUCTION - Faust Part 2
17. THE STAR- Theory of the Four Movements (Fourier)
18. THE MOON- And the Moon Shone and the Dew Fell (Forneret)
19. THE SUN - Dreams and How to Control Them (Hervey de Saint-Denis)
20. JUDGEMENT - John: Apocalypse
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